THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE

TRANSLATED WITH NOTES

BY

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PREFACE

THIS is a shortened form of the translation of the *Politics* originally published in 1946. The text of the translation is unabridged (except that a few passages, which are mainly of antiquarian interest, have been omitted); and the notes of the original edition are also, with only a few exceptions, retained. The original introduction (except for one of its sections, here printed as a prefatory note), and also the appendixes, have been omitted; but on the other hand two new items have been added—a chronological table of the main events of Greek history which are mentioned in or bear on the text of the *Politics*, and a glossary, with an English key, of the main historical and philosophical terms used or implied in the course of Aristotle's argument.

A list is appended of the few passages of the text of the translation which are omitted in this shorter edition.

E. B.

August, 1947.

PASSAGES OF THE TEXT OF THE *POLITICS* NOT TRANSLATED, BUT BRIEFLY SUMMARIZED

1. Book II, c. x, §§ 1–6, 16 (the Cretan constitution).
2. Book II, c. xi, §§ 1–14 (the Carthaginian constitution).
3. Book II, c. xii, §§ 7–14 (early Greek legislators).
4. Book IV, c. xv, §§ 14–22 (methods of the appointment of magistrates).
5. Book IV, c. xvi, §§ 2–7 (enumeration of types of law-courts).
6. Book V, c. iv, §§ 4–7 (instances of public troubles caused by private disputes).
7. Book V, c. x, §§ 16–18, part of § 19, and § 20 (instances of revolutions in tyrannies due to the tyrant's personal misconduct).
8. Book V, c. xii, §§ 1–6 (the duration of tyrannies).
9. Book VI, c. viii, §§ 6–13 (list of the six indispensable offices in a polis).
10. Book VIII, c. x, §§ 2–5 (note on the historical origin of the system of common tables).

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CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

(*mainly of events or persons mentioned in or connected with the* Politics)

776. Traditional date of the first Olympiad, from which the Greeks reckoned their dates.

700. Completion of the union of Athens and the surrounding country in one city-state or polis.

625 (*circa*). Periander tyrant at Corinth, and Thrasybulus at Miletus.

600? The institution of the Spartan system (the 'good order' or *eunomia*) connected with the name of 'Lycurgus'.

594. Legislation of Solon at Athens.

585 onwards. Thales the philosopher, of Miletus.

561–527. Peisistratus tyrant (with interruptions) at Athens.

509. Cleisthenes reforms the constitution of Athens.

490–479. The Persian Wars.

478. The Confederacy of Delos: beginnings of Athenian 'Empire'.

460 onwards. Pericles the leader of the democratic party at Athens.

460? Hippodamus, the town-planner and political theorist, lays out the Peiraeus.

451. Introduction of payment for attendance at the *dikastēria*.

431–404. The Peloponnesian War.

429. Death of Pericles, followed by the 'demagogues' at Athens.

428? Birth of Plato.

411. Revolution of the Four Hundred at Athens: attempt to institute a form of 'polity'.

410. Restoration of democracy at Athens.

404. Final defeat of Athens: rule of the Thirty Tyrants, followed in 403 by the restoration of democracy at Athens.

404–371. The Spartan 'Empire'.

399. Execution of Socrates on the ground of irreligion.

392. Isocrates opens his school of oratory near the Lyceum, in which he taught for 50 years.

388? Plato's *Republic*: the Platonic Academy in Athens: Plato's first visit to Syracuse, to the court of Dionysius I, tyrant from 405 to 367.

384. Birth of Aristotle, at Stagira (to the east of Salonica).

377. Foundation of the Second Athenian Confederacy.

371. Battle of Leuctra: Sparta defeated by Thebes: period of Theban ascendancy.

367–347. Aristotle at the Platonic Academy.

367–366. Plato's second visit to Syracuse, to the court of Dionysius II, who had just succeeded his father, to train him as a 'philosopher-king'.

361. Plato's last visit to Syracuse. His dialogue the *Politicus*, or 'Statesman', may belong to this period.

359–336. Reign of Philip of Macedon.

357. Expedition of Dion to Sicily.

347. Plato's *Laws*: the death of Plato: Aristotle leaves Athens.

347–344. Aristotle at Assus (in the NW. of Asia Minor), with a group of Platonists, in connexion with the ex-slave Hermias, tyrant of Atarneus, whose niece he marries.

344–342. Aristotle at Mytilene, in the island of Lesbos, engaged in the study of biology.

342–336. Aristotle at Pella, in Macedonia, as the tutor of Alexander.

338. Battle of Chaeronea: victory of Philip: Macedonian control of Greece henceforth.

336. Assassination of Philip: accession of Alexander: his appointment at the Congress of Corinth as 'leader' of the Greeks against the Persians.

336–322. Aristotle at Athens as the head of the Lyceum and founder of the Peripatetic or Aristotelian School. During this period the Macedonian Antipater is regent in Greece on Alexander's behalf, and he and Aristotle are in connexion. To this period the *Politics* probably belongs, though Aristotle may have given instruction in the subject at Assus (347–344) and at Pella (342–336).

336–328. The Athenian statesman Lycurgus, an old pupil (like Aristotle) of Plato, a leader at Athens.

334–323. Alexander in Asia till his death in 323.

329–325. The treatise on the *Constitution of Athens* written by Aristotle during this period.

328. Alexander executes Callisthenes, the nephew and pupil of Aristotle, in Asia. Revulsion of feeling in the Lyceum against Alexander.

323. Death of Alexander: troubles in Athens: Aristotle takes refuge in Chalcis, a city in Euboea, his mother's birth-place.

322. Death of Aristotle. His will contains directions for the emancipation of slaves. Death in the same year of the Athenian orator Demosthenes.

321. Antipater's constitutional settlement at Athens: he institutes a 'polity' of the type suggested by Aristotle in the *Politics* (see also under the year 411).

317–307. Demetrius of Phalerum, an old student of the Lyceum and a friend of Aristotle, in power at Athens. He translates into law many of the ideas of the Aristotelian school.

307. Demetrius expelled: a law passed, in reaction, forbidding philosophers to teach in Athens without licence.

306. The law quashed. The philosophical schools continue their teaching at Athens without restriction.

NOTE ON THE VOCABULARY OF THE *POLITICS*

MANY words in every language have associations, echoes, and overtones, which no translation can convey. This is a fact which makes the translation of poetry especially difficult, if not impossible; for the poet uses overtones and evokes echoes, by the very nature of poetic diction, in an especial degree. But it is also a fact which makes the translation of a work on political theory difficult, and especially difficult when it is a translation from the Greek. There are overtones, echoes, and associations in the political vocabulary of the ancient Greeks which we can hardly recapture. Their political terms were charged with the significance of their own political environment and their own political experience; and neither the environment nor the experience is ours. They are terms belonging to a vanished Mediterranean world of 'urbanity', which is not our world; and only those who lived in that vanished world could hear and understand the fullness of their music. It is easy to translate the Greek word *polis* by our word 'state'; but the essence vanishes in the translation. The sunshine, the common life, and the civic ardour of some 'little town'[1] on a land-locked bay of the Mediterranean has passed into something larger, more sombre, and far more distant. The word 'state' comes to us from the Latin *status*, in its sense of standing or position: it meant, when we adopted it in the sixteenth century, the standing or position of the person (or persons) in authority, so that Louis XIV was etymologically justified in saying *L'État, c'est moi!*; and though it has widened in the course of time to designate also the whole political community, it is still used to-day in its old sense (as when we speak of 'state interference'), and its overtones are still the overtones of authority. How different are the suggestions of the word *polis*—the city: *our* city;

[1] Little town, by river or sea shore,
Or mountain-built with peaceful citadel.
(Keats: *Ode on a Grecian Urn.*)

the violet-crowned city of the Virgin Goddess, with its citizens

> Ever delicately walking
> Through the most pellucid air.[1]

This difference between *polis* and 'state' may serve to remind us of a general feature in our English vocabulary of politics. It is true that we use the word 'politics' (and even the word 'politician'—though that has a very different significance from the *politikos* of Plato and Aristotle); but the bulk of our English vocabulary of politics is drawn from the Latin. We speak not only of the 'state', but also of 'constitution', 'government', 'administration', 'sovereignty', 'statute', 'justice'—and every word is derived from the Latin. The bulk of our political vocabulary is a Latin vocabulary.[2] It is a useful, and indeed a majestic vocabulary: Latin has not only sonority, but it has also the gift of solemnity; and it adds precision to both. But the precision of Latin cannot do proper justice to the flexibility and the nuances of the Greek. This is a point which has been admirably emphasized by Sir John Myres, in the concluding pages of his work on *The Political Ideas of the Greeks*. 'With the necessary translation of Greek philosophical nomenclatures into Latin', he writes, 'grave disaster happened.' Perhaps there was hardly disaster,[3] but there certainly was confusion; and the history of the term 'Law of Nature'—a Latin term used to express an idea which comes from the Greek, but fated to alter the original idea it was used to express—is a testimony to the confusion.[4]

In the light of these observations it may be useful to elucidate briefly the ideas implicit in some of the cardinal terms of Aristotle's political vocabulary. Five sets of terms deserve a particular examination. The first set of terms,

[1] Euripides, *Medea*, the chorus beginning in line 824.

[2] This, of course, is not peculiar. A little more than half of our ordinary vocabulary consists of Latin words.

[3] It is only just to say that the Latin translations of Aristotle's philosophical terminology (substance and attribute, quality and quantity, and many others) have given to French and English thinkers a clarity denied to German philosophers, who have used native Teutonic forms.

[4] Myres, op. cit., pp. 237–40. The writer would add that he is indebted to Sir John Myres in several passages of this Prefatory Note.

which may be briefly expressed under the rubric of 'the state', includes the term *polis*, with its derivatives, and a number of cognate terms. The second set, which comes under the rubric of 'government', includes the term *archē* and some allied terms. A third set, of peculiar importance, which comes under the head of 'law and justice', includes the two terms *nomos* and *dikē* and their derivatives. A fourth may be added, which is less political than philosophic—the term *physis* or nature, with its peculiar Greek associations and its special connotation in Aristotle's system of thought. Finally there is a set of terms—terms descriptive of social life and moral conduct—which is so closely connected with the terms of Aristotle's political vocabulary that it equally demands some notice and examination.

§ 1. *The vocabulary of the conception of state.* The word *polis*, as has already been implied at the beginning of this prefatory note, means a civic republic, or, more particularly and especially, the city which is its heart. But this is a general statement; and it instantly needs qualification. We must therefore add, speaking more precisely, that the Greeks had a special word for the city as a place of residence—the word *asty*—and that the word *polis* originally meant the citadel (or acropolis, as it was called at Athens) at the foot of which lay the *asty*. But if this was its original sense, the word *polis* came in time to mean the whole organized political community, including both the residents in the *asty* (with, of course, any magistrates or others resident in the citadel) and the country-dwellers around the *asty* who frequented it for business and politics. This transference and extension of the sense of the word *polis* is easy to understand. The citadel, to which alone the appellation of *polis* was originally given, was the natural centre of gravity and the focus of authority; and it was an easy matter to use the term which originally denoted the centre in order to denote the whole circle and its content.

A further refinement may be added. It has been noted by scholars that the word *polis* was specially applied in Athenian documents to denote the circle of the organized community when it was acting externally (in the way of treaties or

otherwise), and was thus engaged in relations with other organized communities. In other words, it was used as a term of the language of diplomacy; and it signified a 'power' engaged in relation with other 'powers'. Another term was employed, in the usage of Athenian documents, to designate the organized community when it was acting internally, and was thus engaged in the conduct of its own domestic affairs. This was the term *demos*, the ancestor of the word 'democracy'. Here again we have to record a growth and a transference of the original sense of the term. The word *demos* was originally used to denote the country-side and the country-dwellers (the people of the *agros*, as distinct from the people of the *asty*); and we accordingly find the units of the country-side called, in general Athenian usage, by the name of *demoi*, and their inhabitants by the name of *demotai*. But by the fifth century a new use had supervened. The term *demos*, used in the singular as a general collective noun, had come to signify more particularly the whole Athenian community when assembled for its domestic affairs in an 'assembly of the summoned' or 'meeting of those called out for attendance'—which is the literal meaning of the word *ecclesia*. We may connect the rise of this new use of the term *demos* with the reforms of Cleisthenes (509 B.C.), who organized the Athenian community in a new system of tribes based on the demes of the country-side. 'The result', it has been said, 'was literally "demokratia", government by the country-side population of Attica';[1] but *demos* was an engulfing term, and it included, of course, the people of the *asty* as well as the people of the country-side.[2]

[1] Myres, op. cit., p. 214; cf. also pp. 38–40.

[2] It may be added here that Aristotle uses a number of other words which are cognate with *demos*—a term which has been translated, according to the nature of the context, either by the word 'people' or the word 'populace'. One of these other words is *plēthos* (with its two companions *hoi polloi* and *hoi pleiones*—the many and the more), which has been generally translated as 'the masses', but might be rendered more truly, if also more pedantically, as 'the *plenum*' or 'the plurality'. ('The masses' has an overtone of depreciation, which the Greek word, with its suggestion of 'fullness', does not carry.) Another word is *ochlos* (the crowd or mob), which Aristotle applies to the crowd in the market-square, or to the mob of oarsmen in the Athenian triremes, but sometimes uses more simply to designate mere multitude.

From this refinement (which, it will be noticed, relates specifically to Athens—but Attic speech and Athenian terminology set the general tone for all Greece) we may now return to the word *polis*. It had a large number of derivatives. There is the derivative *politēs*, or, as we translate it by a Latin word, 'citizen'. There is the derivative *politikos*, which is better translated (though, even so, it is translated imperfectly) by the Latin word 'statesman' than by the word 'politician'. There is the derivative *politikē*, which signifies the theory (or rather the art) of the common life of the *polis* and the betterment of that life, and which is thus something different from 'political theory' or 'the theory of the state'. There is the derivative *politeia*, which we translate by the Latin terms 'constitution' or 'form of government', but which again is something different from either; for it means, as Aristotle explains, a way of life, or a system of social ethics, as well as a way of assigning political offices. Finally, there is the derivative *politeuma*, which is used by Aristotle to signify the concrete or personal side of the *politeia*, or, in other words, to mean the body of persons enjoying full civic rights under the *politeia*.[1]

This abundant wealth of derivatives from the one word *polis* creates two difficulties for the translator. The first is that he is bound to use different words (citizen, statesman, political theory, constitution, civic body) for a set of words which are all verbally interconnected and all chime verbally together in the original Greek. He therefore loses inevitably the consonance and concordance, drawn from the common associations and overtones of the common life of the *polis*, which the words originally carried. The second, and added, difficulty is that most of the words which he is compelled to use in translating the derivatives of *polis* are words derived from the Latin. They are good words, but they are words of a more rigid and static quality. They are more legal and (if

[1] In the translation the term *politeuma* is generally rendered as 'the civic body'. In one passage (III, VI, § 1) Aristotle identifies the *politeuma* with the *politeia*, enunciating the principle that 'the civic body is the constitution itself' (cf. III, VII, § 2).

that word may be used) less social. A 'constitution', in our sense of the word, is not a way of life. The *politeia* was; and it was thus something more—if also, in legal precision, something less—than a constitution.

§ 2. *The vocabulary of the conception of government.* Turning from the notion of the state to that of government, we may now proceed to examine the significance and the associations of some of the current Greek terms connected with the latter notion. We have already seen that the term *polis* supplied two derivatives—the *politikos* or statesman, and the *politeuma* or civic governing body—which are both connected with the notion of government. But there are also two other terms—the term *archē* and the term *kyrios*—which deserve investigation. The term *archē* is the general term for rule or government, as the term *archōn* is the general term for a ruler, governor, or magistrate. The word originally signifies 'beginning' or 'initiative'; and we may imagine that the reason why it was extended, by an easy transference, to mean authority or rule was that the Greeks regarded those in authority as beginning, or starting, or initiating a course of political action.[1] If the essence of authority is thus initiative, the question will naturally arise whether the initiative needs confirmation, or some process of validation, before it can proceed on the way to achievement and consummation—in other words, to the *telos* or end which follows the *archē* or beginning. It is perhaps no licence of conjecture to answer this natural question by turning to the term *kyrios*. It is a term familiar in the Christian liturgy in the sense of 'Lord'; but the essential sense of the Greek root from which it comes

[1] The point is fully developed by Myres, op. cit., pp. 80–97. It may be noted that Attic usage described those who were in authority not only by the name of 'those in the *archē*' (or at the beginning of action), but also by that of 'those in the *telos*' (or at the end and achievement of action). The magistrate begins, or initiates; but he must also end, or achieve, the initiative which he has started. Aristotle, however, does not appear to follow this usage. He needs the term *telos* for his philosophical doctrine of final causes; and he uses it in that sense throughout the *Politics*. The one passage in which there is an approach to a political use of the term *telos* is in Book VI, c. VIII, § 17, where he speaks of an office possessing the double power 'of introducing [i.e. initiating] matters and bringing them to completion' (*telos*).

is confirmation, ratification, and the general process of giving validity. The word *kyrios* often occurs in the *Politics*, sometimes as a neuter noun and in the form of *to kyrion*, and sometimes as an adjective. It is most readily translated (but, as we shall see, imperfectly translated) by the word 'sovereign'. What, then, is the 'sovereign', or *to kyrion*, which gives validity to the initiative of magistrates—or, it may be, of persons other than magistrates who, in the phrase of Aristotle, 'introduce matters'?[1] The answer of Aristotle is simple. Again and again he speaks of the deliberative body as being *to kyrion*. It is therefore the deliberative body which is the validity-giving organ, or sovereign, in any constitution. That organ will vary, of course, in size and in breadth of composition from one constitution to another. In democratic Athens it would include the thousands of citizens who attended the *ecclesia*. In an oligarchy it might be restricted to a council, or even to an inner council. But whatever may be its size or the breadth of its composition, the deliberative is *to kyrion*, and it exercises what we call sovereignty.[2]

The system of government implied in the genius of the Greek language and the terminology of Aristotle is thus a system in which the 'initiative' of civic magistrates is combined with 'validation' by the civic organ of deliberation. These are the terms in which we must think of the government of the Greek *polis*. They are also the terms in which we may think of the government of the Roman *civitas* in the early days of the Republic. But the Roman Republic passed into an empire; and the Latin terminology acquired an imperial tincture. Government became a matter of *principatus*—of 'the first place' or 'pre-eminence' rather than of 'initiative': it came to be surrounded by the idea of *maiestas*—of a 'superiority' of grandeur resident in the *princeps*. This *maiestas* passed, or was changed, during the later Middle Ages, but more especially during the sixteenth century, into

[1] In Athenian use by the end of the fifth century, demagogues who were not magistrates exercised initiative in the assembly: see Book IV, c. IV, § 25 and note.

[2] But only an *immediate* sovereignty, subject to the *ultimate* sovereignty of law (see Index, under Sovereignty).

the cognate word 'sovereignty', which was derived, through the popular Latin *superanus*, from the Latin preposition *super*. We thus enter upon the days of a high and transcendent 'sovereignty', naturally allied with an idea of the 'state' (which also came on the scene, as we have already had reason to notice at the beginning of this note, during the course of the sixteenth century) by virtue of which a 'state' was regarded as the 'standing' or position of the person (or persons) in the enjoyment of superior authority. All of this issues, and is expressed, in the Benthamite and Austinian notion of the sovereignty of a determinate person or body of persons in receipt of habitual obedience from the bulk of a given society; and much of this is still implied in our use of the word 'sovereignty' to-day. But little, if anything, of this is germane to the ancient world of the *polis*, with its initiating magistrates and its validating deliberative body. If, therefore, we use the word 'sovereign' in translating any of Aristotle's Greek, we are importing something in the act, and we are bound to give warning of the importation.

§ 3. *The vocabulary of the conceptions of law and justice.* We may now proceed to the terms connected with the notions of law and justice. Early in the course of the *Politics*, at the end of the second chapter of the first book, Aristotle, in a striking passage, introduces the Greek terms for these notions. 'Man, when perfected, is the best of the animals; but if he be isolated from "Nomos" and "Dikē" he is the worst of all.' He adds—and these words are also striking—' "Dikē" belongs to the *polis*; for "Dikē", which is the determination of what is just (*to dikaion*), is an ordering of the political association.'

The greater of these two words is the word *dikē*. What does it signify, and what are its associations? Literally it means a showing or 'indication', and it is perhaps derived from the same root as the word *digitus* or finger. On this basis it comes to mean a showing or indication—in the form of a pronouncement—about the 'right' or 'straight' thing to do, or about the proper 'correction' of something which has been done askew or amiss; and it may thus be said to connect itself with the Latin *rectum* and with modern derivatives of

that word (through the compound *directum*) such as the French *droit* and the Italian *diritto*, as well as with our own word 'right'. But we shall not understand the full implication of the word *dikē* unless we trace it in its derivatives (for it too, like the word *polis*, was fruitful in derivatives), and particularly in the two derivatives *dikaiosynē* and *dikastērion*.

Dikaiosynē is the quality of going straight or doing right. But it means something more than, or at any rate something different from, the Latin *iustitia* and our English 'justice'. These are specifically legal words—except when they are used with religious connotations derived from the Vulgate and the Latin Fathers or from our English Bible. The Greek term *dikaiosynē* is not specifically legal. If *dikē*, as Aristotle says, 'is an ordering of the political association', we have to remember that the association of the *polis* was a system of social ethics. *Dikaiosynē* is the quality of a man belonging to such a system; and it is therefore ethical as well as legal. It has the overtones and suggestions of our own word 'righteousness'. Whenever we meet the word 'justice' in a translation from the Greek—particularly from the Greek of Plato's *Republic*, but also from the Greek of Aristotle's *Politics*—we have to remember that what we are meeting is something more than our 'justice'. We are meeting a moral virtue as well as a legal quality; and though the legal quality may be often in the foreground, and may seem to occupy the whole stage, the moral virtue is always in the background. The strict sense of law as law was not a mark of the *polis*. From some points of view this may be counted a defect; but at any rate it was a fact. *Dikaiosynē* was one of the virtues: indeed it could be counted as the compendium and consummation of the virtues, in which the whole of goodness stood compact.

Dikastērion is an institutional word: it denotes a court in which *dikē* is administered and the right and straight course is shown or indicated. But such a court is hardly a law court in our sense of the word; nor were its members (the *dikastai*), properly speaking, judges. The Athenian dikasteries were popular courts of hundreds of members which expressed the people's sense of *dikē* and the demands of *dikaiosynē*. They

are thus the organ, in the judicial sphere, which corresponds to the deliberative in the other spheres of the State: they are in that sphere (we may almost say) *to kyrion*. They are the final force beyond the 'initiative' of any magistrate or college of magistrates which may administer justice: they are in some sense sovereign: at any rate they are the validation and confirmation of *to dikaion*. From any strict legal point of view this system is of course defective: it remits what ought to be strict and impartial justice to the emotional pleadings of litigants and the fluid popular sense of justice. But it would be an error to adopt a strict legal point of view. The Athenian dikasteries were not administering a strict legal system of justice. They were seeking to express, as samples and representatives of the civic community, an idea of what was 'right', or 'straight', or (we may even say) 'fair'. They were seeking, in other words, to express a public opinion of what was generally *equitable*. They were, if we like to say so, transcending legal justice, and running into the subjective; but the historian of jurisprudence may none the less pass a verdict on their action which is not unfavourable.

We may now turn to the word *nomos*, and to the relation between *nomos* and *dikē*. *Nomos* comes from a root *nem* which grew into many trunks—not only law, but also pasture: not only law and pasture, but also currency (*nomisma*), and also nemesis or (as it is defined in the dictionary) 'the righteous assignment of anger at anything unjust or unfitting'. The fundamental notion of the root is assigning or apportioning; and the suggestion which it conveys is that of assigning a place or position and fixing its bounds. That is how the notion of law can go with the notion of pasture (*in loco pascuae me collocavit*—He stationed me by his assignment in a place of pasture): that is why it is congenial with the notion of nemesis (in the Greek sense of the word); and that is why it is connected with the notion of currency as a thing assigned and apportioned.[1] The *nomos* of a political association is thus the assignment or apportionment of places and their bounds; and

[1] On the connexion between *nomos* and *nomisma* see Book I, c. IX, § 8 and note.

the *nomoi*, in the plural, are the several rules of this assignment. *Nomos* is thus close to *dikē*, which, as we saw, is a showing or indication of the right and straight thing to do; and conversely *dikē* (defined by Aristotle as 'an ordering of the political association') is close to the *nomos* which assigns and apportions places and bounds. The relation of *nomos* to *dikē* is therefore one of close congruity; but it is at the same time a relation of difference. *Dikē* is a showing of what is right in actual and particular cases: *nomos* is a general formulation or assignment of positions. *Dikē* moves and bends to the case, 'like the flexible rule of lead used in the Lesbian style of building': *nomos* has the rigidity of a general rule. *Dikē* speaks by the *dikastērion*: *nomos* speaks either by some ancient written formulation or by some old and unwritten customary rule of the same general scope and validity.

It will be seen that *nomos* is not legislation in our sense of the word; and it may be noted here that a legislature, sitting in constant session and regularly making laws, was in no way an institution of the Greek *polis*.[1] *Nomos* is an old formulation rather than a contemporary legislative act; and it is a formulation which transcends strict law and may enter the domain of social ethics. (That is why Aristotle can connect education with the spirit of the laws, and why he can speak of the laws as intended 'to make the citizens good and just'.) In both of these ways *nomos* is different from *lex*, which specifically means an enactment or contemporary legislative act, and which is specifically legal in its intention and scope. There is a passage in one of the speeches of Demosthenes, addressed to an Athenian *dikastērion*, which has been more than once quoted by scholars,[2] but may be quoted here once more for the light which it throws on the current Greek conception of *nomos*, as an Athenian orator and statesman presented it to his fellow citizens:

> Be the *polis* in which they have their abode great, or be it small, men's lives are all controlled by nature (*physis*) and by *nomos*.

[1] See the note on the nature of Greek law in Book III, c. xi, § 19.
[2] See Vinogradoff, *Historical Jurisprudence*, vol. ii, c. ii, § 1, and Sir John Myres, *The Political Ideas of the Greeks*, pp. 189–94.

Nature is something unordered, something uneven, something peculiar to each man; *nomoi* are something common, something ordered, something identical for all men. Nature, if it be evil, often wishes for evil things; and you will therefore find men of that type doing wrong. *Nomoi* wish for the just, the good, and the beneficial: this is what they seek; and this is what, when once it was found, was shown[1] to men as a common injunction, equal for all and alike for all. This is *nomos*, to which it is proper that all men should render obedience. There are many reasons why they should do so; but the chief of them are—first, that law is an invention and gift of the gods [and has thus a religious origin]; next, that it represents the opinion of sensible men [and is thus based on the best of public opinion]; next, that it is a correction of wrongdoings, whether voluntary or involuntary [and it thus sets matters 'right' or 'straight']; and, finally, that it is the general covenant of a *polis*, in accordance with which it is proper that all the members of the *polis* should live.

The last of the reasons which Demosthenes gives for obedience to *nomos* is the only one of the four which introduces the specific notion of volition (though that notion has already been implied in the use of the term 'injunction'); and we may notice that it introduces volition, or 'enactment', in the particular form of a covenant or agreement, made between the members of a *polis*. That is a homage to liberty; but it is a homage which Aristotle, in the third book of the *Politics*,[2] is unwilling to pay. Regarding the *polis* as something more than an alliance, he equally regards its *nomos* as something more than a covenant (he uses the same word as Demosthenes) or 'a guarantor of men's rights against one another'. Law is to him something higher: it is 'a rule of life such as will make the members of a polis good and just'. It is the sister of *dikaiosynē*; and *dikaiosynē* is a righteousness which transcends any terms of contract.

§ 4. *Philosophical terms.* The vocabulary of the *Politics* not only raises questions of political nomenclature. It also raises questions of philosophical terminology. Aristotle assumes

[1] Two things may be noted in this verb—first, that it is in the past tense (which suggests the antiquity of law), and secondly that it is the same verb of 'showing' which is the root of *dikē*.

[2] III, c. IX, § 8.

that students and readers will be familiar with the general 'terms of art' which belong to his philosophy. He assumes, for instance, that they will understand the sense in which he uses the word *physis* and its derivatives; he assumes that they will know what he means by saying that 'the *polis* is by *physis*', or that 'man is by *physis* an animal intended for life in the *polis*'. It would almost need a volume, or at any rate a whole essay, to explain the origin and significance of his general conception of *physis*. Here it can only be noticed that an English translator is bound to render *physis* and *physikos* by the Latin words 'nature' and 'natural', and that he is equally bound to alter the exact significance of the Greek by using those Latin terms. The Latin *natura*, connected with a verb which indicates the idea of birth, suggests the primitive: the Greek *physis*, connected with a verb which indicates the idea of growing (and which may be used, in the transitive sense, of 'growing' a family, or teeth, or an understanding), suggests the whole process that leads from the first inception of 'growing', through all the stages of 'growth', to the completion of the 'grown' thing. That is all implied in the saying that 'the *polis* is by *physis*'. It is hardly implied in the rendering that 'the state exists by nature', which rather carries the mind towards the notion of primitive origin. To get a true conception of Aristotle's doctrine of the natural state—and of his doctrine of natural justice and natural law as expressed in the *Ethics* and the *Rhetoric*—it is necessary always to remember that the word 'natural' is here raised to a power which is higher than it possesses in our ordinary speech. We have, as it were, to unhook the word from the Latin *natura*, and to hitch it to the Greek *physis*, in order to become aware of its associations and echoes, and to see that it includes the process of 'growth' and the condition of being 'grown' as well as the beginnings of 'growing'.

§ 5. *Social and moral terms.* There are many other 'terms of art' in Aristotle's philosophical vocabulary which the translator has sought, wherever it seemed to him necessary, to explain in his notes to the text.[1] But there are also some

[1] The reader, for instance, will find explanatory notes on the term

terms which are not Aristotelian 'terms of art', but common terms of ordinary usage in the general vocabulary of the Greeks, about which some final words may be said. They are terms of everyday life, common to all civilized peoples; but they are terms which were used by the Greeks, and are regularly used in the *Politics*, with something of a peculiar flavour. There are two main sets of such terms. The first set may be called social. It includes the various terms which were used to denote social grading and the difference between social classes. Greek life, like the life of most peoples and states, was based on a distinction of social strata. Apart from the depressed class of household slaves (*douloi*) and that of the serfs or dependants tied to the soil (who went by various names in different Greek states, but may be generally designated as *perioikoi*), there were two main strata. The upper is called by various names in the course of the *Politics*: numerically, it is 'the few' (*oligoi*): economically, it is 'the wealthy' (*plousioi*) or 'the possessing' class: in point of culture and prestige, it is 'the better' or 'the best' (*beltiones* or *aristoi*), or again it is 'the notables' (*gnōrimoi*), or it is 'the reasonable and fair' (*epieikeis*) who make up the better sort, or it is 'the men who are reasonable and fair and able to enjoy leisure'. The other class has also a variety of names. Numerically, as we have already noticed, it is called the 'people' or 'populace' (*demos*),[1] or the 'masses' (*plēthos*), or sometimes the 'mob' (*ochlos*). Economically, it is 'the poor' (*penētes*), or, if we look at its subdivisions, it is 'the manual labourers' (*chernētes*), 'the workers for hire' (*thētes*), and 'the artisans' (*technītai*). In point of culture and manners, it is 'the mechanics' or 'the vulgar' (*banausoi*),[2] who fill their lives

By mere mechanic operation;

'association' (or *koinōnia*) in Book I, c. 1, § 1: on the terms 'whole' and 'compound' (*holon* and *syntheton*), as applied to the state, in Book III, c. 1, at the end: on the term 'leisure' (*scholē*), and cognate terms, in Book VII, c. xv, at the end.

[1] In a broader sense, as was noted above, *demos* denotes *all* the members of the state assembled in the *ecclesia* for the conduct of domestic affairs.

[2] The word *banausos* is said to be derived from the Greek word for a furnace, and to denote originally the man who works by the forge or in

who must say to themselves

> My nature is subdued
> To what it works in, like the dyer's hand;

who are by their nature 'the unleisured' (*ascholoi*), spending their days in a cycle of 'toil' and 'relaxation' (*ponos* and *anapausis*), and having no 'opportunity of leisure'.

The connotations and associations of this set of social terms, as it appears in the *Politics*, were by no means entirely true to the actual facts of Athenian life, where the workman —the mason, or the tanner—had his honour, could play his part in the general system of the State, and could enjoy its treasures of culture on the Acropolis or in the theatre. It would rather appear that the whole set of terms belonged to the vocabulary of the higher society in which Aristotle and his students would more particularly move, and that they reflect the prejudices of that society.[1] Something the same may be said of the second main set of terms, which may be called by the name of moral. The general moral terminology of the *Politics* assumes a system of ethics which is based on the rational principle of a trained and discerning mind. Virtue is defined in the *Ethics* as 'a state of character, concerned with choice, which consists in a mean . . . determined by a rational principle' (or *logos*) 'such as the man of practical wisdom (the *phronimos*) would use'. It is also noted in the *Ethics*, and equally in the *Politics*,[2] that virtue needs an 'equipment' (or *chorēgia*) of necessary instruments; it needs, for instance, the means for the practice of liberality. *Aretē*—the Greek word which we translate by 'virtue', or 'goodness', or 'excellence' —has thus for Aristotle a double association: it is associated

the smithy. It may therefore be apposite to refer to Ecclesiasticus, xxxviii. 24–34, and especially to verse 28, which denies wisdom to 'the smith sitting by the anvil', whose flesh 'the vapour of the fire will waste'. The whole passage, written under Greek influence (perhaps between 200 and 180 B.C.), gives a striking account of general Greek ideas of social structure. See the note on Book VII, c. IX, § 4.

[1] Aristotle himself, when he escapes from the current vocabulary of a circle, and pauses to examine impartially the capacity of the many, defends that capacity alike in the sphere of politics and in that of aesthetics; see Book III, c. XI, note at the end of the chapter.

[2] See Book VII, c. XIII, § 3 and § 7.

with intellect, and it may also be said to be associated with social position. The word in itself, apart from its Aristotelian associations, has a shade of meaning in general Greek usage which makes it at once something more and something less than our word 'virtue'. It is something more, because it can mean excellence in any field: there is an *aretē* of the good citizen as well as an *aretē* of the good man, and the two may be different;[1] there is an *aretē* of the soldier, or martial virtue, as well as an *aretē* of the civilian, or civic virtue. Again, the word *aretē* is something less than our 'virtue': it has, in itself, no necessary moral implication; and we must add the adjective ethical, and speak of *ēthikē aretē*, to make sure that that implication is present. We may thus say that *aretē* has suggestions of *virtù* (in the Italian sense of a taste for fine art) as well as suggestions of virtue; and we may even say that those who possess the gift of *aretē* are *virtuosi* as well as 'virtuous'. We may be guilty of an extravagance in so saying; and we have to remember that our own word 'virtue' can be applied to the qualities of precious stones and plants as well as to man's moral nature. But the extravagance will be justified, at any rate in some measure, if it helps the reader to remember that the *aretē* of which Aristotle so often speaks is a word of many associations—intellectual, social, and general—which differentiate it from our 'virtue'.

This theory or speculation (as it might be called by Aristotle) on the vocabulary of the *Politics* may end with one last observation. It has been noted, more than once, that the Latin element in our English speech is not always a good conductor of the sense with which Greek words are charged. But there are times when Latin may stand us in good and happy stead. The Greek word *eudaimonia* may furnish us with an instance. It is generally translated by our word 'happiness'. But happiness carries with it the material association of pleasure; and *eudaimonia* is a word of different and higher associations. Literally it means the condition of being under a good genius; and it is defined in the *Politics*[2]

[1] This question engages Aristotle in Book III, cc. IV–V.
[2] Book VII, c. XIII, § 5.

as a state of activity (and not of enjoyment), which consists in the energy and practice of goodness. It is thus a conquest rather than a happening or good hap; and it may be better expressed by the Latin word 'felicity' than by any other word. 'Bliss' and 'blessedness' might perhaps serve; but they raise philological difficulties,[1] and they import the religious associations of Christianity. 'Felicity' has the felicity of matching most nearly the shade of meaning in the original Greek.

NOTE. The general argument of the preceding pages is carried into detail, and expressed in an alphabetical form, in the glossary of philosophical and historical terms which comes at the end, immediately after the Index. The reader is accordingly referred to that glossary, and to the key with which it is furnished.

[1] 'Bliss' and 'blessedness', as the *Oxford English Dictionary* notes, are separate words, from separate roots, which crossed and blended in the process of time. (The one meant blitheness: the other meant being marked with blood and so consecrated.) The crossing and blending of senses grew greater still when, after the conversion of England to Christianity, 'blessedness' began to be coloured by the Latin word 'benediction'.

BOOK I

THE THEORY OF THE HOUSEHOLD

A
THE POLITICAL ASSOCIATION AND ITS RELATION TO OTHER ASSOCIATIONS (cc. I–II)

CHAPTER I

All associations have ends: the political association has the highest; but the principle of association expresses itself in different forms, and through different modes of government.

1252 a § 1. Observation shows us, first, that every polis [or state] is a species of association, and, secondly, that all associations are instituted for the purpose of attaining some good—for all men do all their acts with a view to achieving something which is, in their view, a good. We may therefore hold [on the basis of what we actually observe] that all associations aim at some good; and we may also hold that the particular association which is the most sovereign of all, and includes all the rest, will pursue this aim most, and will thus be directed to the most sovereign of all goods. This most sovereign and inclusive association is the polis, as it is called, or the political association.

§ 2. It is a mistake to believe[1] that the 'statesman' [the *politikos*, who handles the affairs of a political association] is the same as the monarch of a kingdom, or the manager of a household, or the master of a number of slaves.[2] Those who hold this view consider that each of these persons differs from the others not with a difference of kind, but [merely with a difference of degree, and] according to the number, or the

[1] This belief is, in Aristotle's view, that of Plato. The immediate reference is to the *Politicus* of Plato, 258 E–259 D.

[2] The political association, as appears later in Book III (see e.g. c. VI, § 9), is an association of 'equal and like' members; and the *politikos* who handles its affairs will therefore be only *primus inter pares*. That is why he differs essentially from the ruler of a kingdom, or of a household, or of a body of slaves.

paucity, of the persons with whom he deals. On this view a man who is concerned with few persons is a master: one who is concerned with more is the manager of a household: one who is concerned with still more is a 'statesman', or a monarch. This view abolishes any real difference between a large household and a small polis; and it also reduces the difference between the 'statesman' and the monarch to the one fact that the latter has an uncontrolled and sole authority, while the former exercises his authority in conformity with the rules imposed by the art of statesmanship and as one who rules and is ruled in turn. But this is a view which cannot be accepted as correct. [There is an *essential* difference between these persons, and between the associations with which they are concerned.]

§ 3. Our point will be made clear if we proceed to consider the matter according to our normal method of analysis. Just as, in all other fields, a compound[1] should be analysed until we reach its simple and uncompounded elements (or, in other words, the smallest atoms of the whole which it constitutes), so we must also consider analytically the elements of which a polis is composed. We shall then gain a better insight into the difference from one another of the persons and associations just mentioned; and we shall also be in a position to discover whether it is possible to attain a systematic view of the general issues involved.[2]

Note on the nature of associations

Two passages from the *Ethics* may be cited in illustration and explanation of the first section of this chapter. They both come from the part of the *Ethics* (Books VIII–IX) which deals with the nature of friendship, or what may be called 'social sympathy'.

(*a*) '*Every* form of friendship involves association. But kinship and comradeship may be distinguished as peculiar forms [because they depend peculiarly on natural feeling and innate sympathy]. The form of friendship which unites fellow citizens—or fellow

[1] On the sense which Aristotle attached to the technical term 'compound' see below, Book III, c. 1, § 2, and note.

[2] These general issues, as they emerge later, turn on the nature of authority over slaves, the nature of marital and parental authority, and the nature of household management in general.

tribesmen, or fellow voyagers—is more in the nature of pure association, since it seems to rest on a sort of compact' (*Ethics*, VIII, c. XII, § 1). Association, it will be noticed, is here connected with compact and 'construction': see below, c. II, § 15, and note.

(*b*) 'All associations are in the nature of parts of the political association. Men journey together with a view to some particular advantage, and by way of providing some particular thing needed for the purposes of life; and similarly the political association seems to have come together originally, and to continue in existence, for the sake of the *general* advantage which it brings' (ibid., c. IX, § 4).

CHAPTER II

To distinguish the different forms of association we must use an analytic or genetic method, tracing successively the association of the household, that of the village, and that of the polis. The polis, or political association, is the crown: it completes and fulfils the nature of man: it is thus natural *to him, and he is himself 'naturally a polis-animal'; it is also* prior *to him, in the sense that it is the presupposition of his true and full life.*

§ 1. If, accordingly, we begin at the beginning, and consider things in the process of their growth, we shall best be able, in this as in other fields, to attain scientific conclusions by the method we employ.[1] § 2. First of all, there must necessarily be a union or pairing of those who cannot exist without one another. Male and female must unite for the reproduction of the species—not from deliberate intention, but from the natural impulse, which exists in animals generally as it also exists in plants, to leave behind them something of the same nature as themselves. Next, there must necessarily be a union of the naturally ruling element with the element which is naturally ruled, for the preservation of both. The element which is able, by virtue of its intelligence, to exercise forethought is naturally a ruling and master element; the element which is able, by virtue of its bodily power, to do what the other element plans is a ruled element, which is

[1] The analytic method of the previous chapter is, in effect, identical with the genetic method here suggested (the method of 'considering things in the process of their growth'), since the genetic method begins with the simple elements, and thus implies the use of analysis.

naturally in a state of slavery; and master and slave have accordingly [as they thus complete one another] a common interest. . . . **1252 b** § 3. The female and the slave [we may pause to note] are naturally distinguished from one another. Nature makes nothing in a spirit of stint,[1] as smiths do when they make the Delphic knife to serve a number of purposes: she makes each separate thing for a separate end; and she does so because each instrument has the finest finish when it serves a single purpose and not a variety of purposes. § 4. Among the barbarians, however [contrary to the order of nature], the female and the slave occupy the same position—the reason being that no naturally ruling element exists among them, and conjugal union thus comes to be a union of a female who is a slave with a male who is also a slave.[2] This is why our poets have said,

> Meet it is that barbarous peoples should be governed by the Greeks

—the assumption being that barbarian and slave are by nature one and the same. . . .

§ 5. The first result of these two elementary associations [of male and female, and of master and slave] is the household or family. Hesiod spoke truly in the verse,

> First house, and wife, and ox to draw the plough,

for oxen serve the poor in lieu of household slaves. The first form of association naturally instituted for the satisfaction of daily recurrent needs is thus the family; and the members of the family are accordingly termed by Charondas 'associates of the breadchest', as they are also termed by Epimenides the

[1] i.e. the spirit which makes the female serve the purpose of a slave as well as that of a mate.

[2] The argument is that among the barbarians the female is slave (as well as mate) for the simple reason that all alike are slaves, men as well as women, and the emergence of a true *consortium* of marriage, distinct from the nexus of slavery, is thus impossible. The cause of this uniform condition of slavery is the absence of a free class, capable of holding office and practising the art of 'ruling and being ruled in turn'—the sort of class which was the essence of the Greek political association and the cause of its freedom. On the other hand, a people, such as the Greeks, which possesses such a class may naturally aspire (Aristotle incidentally reflects) to rule the general slave world of the barbarian peoples.

Cretan 'associates of the manger'. The next form of association—which is also the *first* to be formed from more households than one, and for the satisfaction of something more than daily recurrent needs—is the village. § 6. The most natural form of the village appears to be that of a colony or offshoot from a family; and some have thus called the members of the village by the name of 'sucklings of the same milk', or, again, of 'sons and the sons of sons'[1]. . . . This, it may be noted, is the reason why each Greek polis was originally ruled—as the peoples of the barbarian world still are—by kings. They were formed of persons who were already monarchically governed [i.e. they were formed from households and villages, and] households are always monarchically governed by the eldest of the kin, just as villages, when they are offshoots from the household, are similarly governed in virtue of the kinship between their members. § 7. This primitive kinship is what Homer describes, [in speaking of the Cyclopes]:

Each of them ruleth
Over his children and wives,

a passage which shows that they lived in scattered groups, as indeed men generally did in ancient times. The fact that men generally were governed by kings in ancient times, and that some still continue to be governed in that way, is the reason that leads us all to assert that the gods are also governed by a king. We make the lives of the gods in the likeness of our own—as we also make their shapes. . . .

§ 8. When we come to the final and perfect association, formed from a number of villages, we have already reached the polis—an association which may be said to have reached the height of full self-sufficiency; or rather [to speak more exactly] we may say that while it *grows* for the sake of mere

[1] The latter phrase comes from Plato's *Laws*. The general argument of Aristotle at this point is clearly stated by Newman in his note: 'He has proved that the household is necessary and natural, and if he can prove that the village is an outgrowth of the household, and the polis of the village, then the polis will be shown to be natural.' 'The analytic-genetic method which he is using thus ends by providing a proof of the 'natural' character of the polis.

life [and is so far, and at that stage, still short of full self-sufficiency], it *exists* [when once it is fully grown] for the sake of a good life [and is therefore fully self-sufficient].[1]

Because it is the completion of associations existing by nature, every polis exists by nature, having itself the same quality as the earlier associations from which it grew. It is the end or consummation to which those associations move, and the 'nature' of things consists in their end or consummation; for what each thing is when its growth is completed we call the nature of that thing, whether it be a man or a horse or a family.[2] **1253 a** § 9. Again [and this is a second reason for regarding the state as natural] the end, or final cause, is the best. Now self-sufficiency [which it is the object of the state to bring about] is the end, and so the best; [and on this it follows that the state brings about the best, and is therefore natural, since nature always aims at bringing about the best].[3]

From these considerations it is evident that the polis belongs to the class of things that exist by nature, and that man is by nature an animal intended to live in a polis.[4] He who is without a polis, by reason of his own nature and not of some accident, is either a poor sort of being, or a being higher than man: he is like the man of whom Homer wrote in denunciation:

'Clanless and lawless and hearthless is he.'

§ 10. The man who is s . . by nature [i.e. unable to join in the society of a polis] at once plunges into a passion for war;

[1] See the note at the end of the chapter.

[2] 'The state is natural because it develops from natural associations. But it would be wrong to think it is only natural because *they* are natural and because it grows from *them*. It is natural *in itself*, as the completion, end, or consummation of man and man's development—the essentially natural condition of anything being its final, or complete, or perfect condition. If we could imagine a state coming into existence directly and immediately, without the preceding stages of the household and the village, it would still be natural, in virtue of completing and perfecting man and his development.

[3] 'The explanatory passage in brackets is borrowed from Newman's note.

[4] 'It would be a strange thing to make the happy man a solitary: no one would choose to have all the good things of the world in solitude: man is a being meant for political association, and whose nature it is to live with others' (*Ethics*, IX, c. IX, § 3).

he is in the position of a solitary advanced piece in a game of draughts.

The reason why man is a being meant for political association, in a higher degree than bees or other gregarious animals can ever associate, is evident. Nature, according to our theory, makes nothing in vain; and man alone of the animals is furnished with the faculty of language. § 11. The mere making of sounds serves to indicate pleasure and pain, and is thus a faculty that belongs to animals in general: their nature enables them to attain the point at which they have perceptions of pleasure and pain, and can signify those perceptions to one another. But language serves to declare what is advantageous and what is the reverse, and it therefore serves to declare what is just and what is unjust. § 12. It is the peculiarity of man, in comparison with the rest of the animal world, that he alone possesses a perception of good and evil, of the just and the unjust, and of other similar qualities; and it is association in [a common perception of] these things which makes a family and a polis.

We may now proceed to add that [though the individual and the family are prior in the order of time] the polis is prior in the order of nature to the family and the individual. § 13. The reason for this is that the whole is necessarily prior [in nature] to the part.[1] If the whole body be destroyed, there will not be a foot or a hand, except in that ambiguous sense in which one uses the same word to indicate a different thing, as when one speaks of a 'hand' made of stone; for a hand, when destroyed [by the destruction of the whole body], will be no better than a stone 'hand'. All things derive their essential character from their function and their capacity; and it follows that if they are no longer fit to discharge their function, we ought not to say that they are still the same things, but only that, by an ambiguity, they still have the same names.

§ 14. We thus see that the polis exists by nature and that it

[1] The whole is prior to the part in the sense that the part presupposes it; the idea of the whole must first be there before the part can be understood, and the whole itself must first be there before the part can have or exercise a function.

is prior to the individual.[1] [The proof of both propositions is the fact that the polis is a whole, and that individuals are simply its parts.] Not being self-sufficient when they are isolated, all individuals are so many parts all equally depending on the whole [which alone can bring about self-sufficiency]. The man who is isolated—who is unable to share in the benefits of political association, or has no need to share because he is already self-sufficient—is no part of the polis, and must therefore be either a beast or a god. § 15. [Man is thus intended by nature to be a part of a political whole, and] there is therefore an immanent impulse in all men towards an association of this order. But the man who first *constructed* such an association was none the less the greatest of benefactors.[2] Man, when perfected, is the best of animals; but if he be isolated from law and justice he is the worst of all. § 16. Injustice is all the graver when it is armed injustice; and man is furnished from birth with arms [such as, for instance, language] which are intended to serve the purposes of moral prudence and virtue, but which may be used in preference for opposite ends. That is why, if he be without virtue, he is a most unholy and savage being, and worse than all others in the indulgence of lust and gluttony. Justice [which is his salvation] belongs to the polis; for justice, which is the determination of what is just, is an ordering of the political association.

Note on the development of the polis *in Aristotle's view and in Greek history*

The elementary associations of husband and wife, and of master and slave, have first been attributed to the natural necessities of

[1] These two points are interconnected. The polis exists by nature in the sense that it is the whole to which man naturally moves in order to develop his innate capacity, and in which he is thus included as a part. Because it is the whole, of which the individual is necessarily a part, it is prior to the individuals who are its parts, as wholes generally are prior to their parts.

[2] Aristotle here concedes, and indeed argues, that in saying that the state is natural he does not mean that it 'grows' naturally, without human volition and action. There is art as well as nature, and art co-operates with nature: the volition and action of human agents 'construct' the state in co-operation with a natural immanent impulse.

reproduction and self-preservation; and the family generally, as the first form of developed association, has then been attributed to the satisfaction of daily recurrent needs. The village, as the second form, has next been attributed to the satisfaction of 'something more than daily recurrent needs'—e.g. (one may guess) the satisfaction of such higher and more spiritual needs, above the daily round of material necessities, as the village tribunal for justice, or the village festival in honour of the gods. The polis, as the third and final form, is now attributed to the satisfaction of still higher and still more spiritual needs. Its origin, indeed, may be ascribed to the bare necessities of life (such as the necessity of defence from external enemies by means of greater numbers and from a more central and commanding position). But its essence is essentially and fundamentally due to moral or spiritual causes—causes already operative in the village, but now operative upon a far larger scale; causes, as Aristotle proceeds to explain, such as the establishment of a complete and common system of justice; causes which may be generally comprehended under the head of 'the attainment of a good quality of life'. (The general gist of this argument recurs in Book III, c. VI, §§ 3–4.) The polis thus fulfils the whole nature of man, and especially the higher part of his nature; and that is why it has 'reached the height of full self-sufficiency', containing as it does in itself (and not needing to draw from any other association outside or above itself) all the resources necessary for full and complete human development. Thus fulfilling the whole nature of man, the polis is particularly and specially 'natural', in that sense of the word which means the final and perfect condition of ultimate development—not the *terminus a quo*, but the *terminus ad quem*.

The actual and historical development of the Greek polis is described by Professor Adcock in the *Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. iii, c. xxvi. The causes of the development, as they are there sketched, may be classified under three heads. (1) The geographical and economic: a place with a good water-supply, a good harbour, and other conveniences for population and trade, naturally expanded upon this basis into a polis (Aristotle assumes these conditions for his ideal *polis* in Book VII, c. VI and c. XI, §§ 1–5). (2) The military: a place with a stronghold, which could serve as a citadel or acropolis, naturally offered facilities which encouraged the growth of a polis (Aristotle again assumes these military conditions in Book VII, c. XI, §§ 5–12). (3) The socio-political: a place which could offer a common system of impersonal and impartial justice naturally attracted a large population and grew to the dimension of a polis (Aristotle particularly notes this condition in § 12 of this chapter).

It may be added that the term 'self-sufficiency' (in Greek *autarkeia*, or as we now say 'autarky') is defined in the *Ethics*, Book I, c. VII, § 7, as 'that which by and of itself makes life desirable and lacking in

nothing'. This may be understood to mean the possession of such material resources, and such moral incentives and impulses, as make a full human development possible, without any dependence on external help, material or moral.

II

THE ASSOCIATION OF THE HOUSEHOLD AND ITS DIFFERENT FACTORS (cc. III–XIII)

CHAPTER III

1. The constituent elements of the household. *The three relations of master and slave, husband and wife, and parent and child. The fourth element of 'acquisition'.*

1253 b § 1. Having ascertained, from the previous analysis, what are the elements of which the polis is constituted, we must first consider the management of the household; for every state is [primarily] composed of households. The parts of household management will correspond to the parts of which the household itself is constituted. A complete household consists of slaves and freemen. But every subject of inquiry should first be examined in its simplest elements; and the primary and simplest elements of the household are the connexion of master and slave, that of the husband and wife, and that of parents and children. We must accordingly consider each of these connexions, examining the nature of each and the qualities it ought to possess. § 2. The factors to be examined are therefore three—first, the association of master and slave; next, what may be called the marital association (for there is no word in our language which exactly describes the union of husband and wife); and lastly, what may be called the parental association, which again has no single word in our language peculiar to itself. § 3. But besides the three factors which thus present themselves for examination there is also a fourth, which some regard as identical with the whole of household management, and others as its principal part. This is the element called 'the art of acquisition' (*chrematistic*); and we shall have to consider its nature.

We may first speak of master and slave, partly [for reasons

of utility] in order to gather lessons bearing on the necessities of practical life, and partly [for reasons of theory] in order to discover whether we can attain any view, superior to those now generally held, which is likely to promote a scientific knowledge of the subject. § 4. There are some who hold that the exercise of authority over slaves is a form of science. They believe (as we said in the beginning) that the management of a household, the control of slaves, the authority of the statesman, and the rule of the monarch, are all the same. There are others, however, who regard the control of slaves by a master as contrary to nature. In their view the distinction of master and slave is due to law or convention; there is no natural difference between them: the relation of master and slave is based on force, and being so based has no warrant in justice.

Chapter IV

2. Slavery. (*The instruments of the household form its stock of property: they are animate and inanimate: the slave is an animate instrument, intended* (*like all the instruments of the household*) *for action, and not for production.*)

§ 1. We may make the assumption that property is part of the household, and that the art of acquiring property is a part of household-management; and we may do so because it is impossible to live well, or indeed to live at all, unless the necessary conditions are present. We may further assume that, just as each art which has a definite sphere must necessarily be furnished with the appropriate instruments if its function is to be discharged, so the same holds good in the sphere of household management. § 2. ~~Finally~~, we may also assume that instruments are partly inanimate and partly animate: the pilot, for instance, has an inanimate instrument in the rudder, and an animate instrument (for all subordinates, in every art, are of the nature of instruments) in the look-out man. On the basis of these assumptions we may conclude that each article of property is an instrument for the purpose of life; that property in general is the sum of such instru-

ments; that the slave is an animate article of property; and that subordinates, or servants, in general may be described as instruments which are prior to other instruments [i.e. animate instruments which must first be present before other, and inanimate, instruments can be used].[1] §3. There is only one condition on which we can imagine managers not needing subordinates, and masters not needing slaves.) This condition would be that each [inanimate] instrument could do its own work, at the word of command or by intelligent anticipation, like the statues of Daedalus or the tripods made by Hephaestus, of which Homer relates that

> Of their own motion they entered the conclave of Gods on Olympus,

as if a shuttle should weave of itself, and a plectrum should do its own harp-playing. 1254 a §4. [Here, however, we must draw another distinction.] The instruments of which we have just been speaking [e.g. the shuttle] are instruments of *production*; but articles of household property [such as the slave or other chattels] are instruments of *action*.[2] From the shuttle there issues something which is different, and exists apart, from the immediate act of its use; but from [articles of household property, e.g.] garments or beds, there only comes the one fact of their use. We may add that, since production and action are different in kind, and both of them need their own proper instruments, those instruments must also show a corresponding difference. §5. Life is action and not production; and therefore the slave [being an instrument for the purpose of life] is a servant in the sphere of action.[3]

There is a further consideration [which is necessary to explain fully the nature of the slave]. An 'article of property'

[1] Thus the look-out man is necessary to the pilot as an animate instrument, before he can properly use the inanimate instrument, the rudder.

[2] This distinction between production (or *poiēsis*) and action (or *praxis*) is based on the idea that 'production' aims at a result beyond the immediate doing, which remains when the doing is over, but 'action', such as the rendering of a service, is complete in itself, and aims at no result beyond the immediate doing.

[3] See the note at the end of the chapter.

is a term that is used in the same sense in which the term 'part' is also used. Now a part is not only a part of something other than itself: it also belongs entirely to that other thing [and has no life or being other than that of so belonging]. It is the same with an article of property as it is with a part. Accordingly, while the master is merely the master of the slave, and does not belong to him, [having a life and being of his own beyond that of a master], the slave is not only the slave of his master; he also belongs entirely to him, [and has no life or being other than that of so belonging].

§ 6. From these considerations we can see clearly what is the nature of the slave and what is his capacity. We attain these definitions—first, that 'anybody who by his nature is not his own man, but another's, is by his nature a slave'; secondly, that 'anybody who, being a man, is an article of property, is another's man'; and thirdly, that 'an article of property is an instrument intended for the purpose of action and separable from its possessor'.)

Note on slaves and other 'instruments' of life

The argument of § 4 and the first sentence of § 5, is subtle; and, as stated by Aristotle, it is so logically stated that the simple meaning is almost hidden. We may explain it as follows. At the end of § 3 Aristotle had seemed to imply that slaves would not be necessary if, for example, shuttles could do their own work of producing a web by themselves. He reflects, in § 4, that this is not really the case. The slave is not, after all, concerned with producing things; and he would still be necessary even if machines could produce things by themselves without any attendants. (Aristotle is thus not thinking of factory-slavery or plantation-slavery, but of the household slave.) The slave is concerned with the life of the household and its action, rather than with production: he does not help in the making of things, but in living and all its activities. This is the simple argument of § 4 and the first sentence of § 5; but the simplicity gets complicated by the fact that Aristotle (always ready for refinements) introduces the idea that inanimate household goods or articles, such as clothes and beds, also differ from inanimate articles which are used in production. This is true enough, and it teaches us that not only the slave, but also the things which he tends, belong to the area of living and the activities of living rather than to those of production. But we are tempted to lose sight of the slave himself when we are diverted to the consideration of other household goods.

Chapter V

There is a principle of rule and subordination in nature at large: it appears especially in the realm of animate creation. By virtue of that principle, the soul rules the body; and by virtue of it the master, who possesses the rational faculty of the soul, rules the slave, who possesses only bodily powers and the faculty of understanding the directions given by another's reason. But nature, though she intends, does not always succeed in achieving a clear distinction between men born to be masters and men born to be slaves.

§ 1. We have next to consider whether there are, or are not, persons who are by nature such as are here defined; whether, in other words, there are persons for whom slavery is the better and just condition, or whether the reverse is the case and all slavery is contrary to nature. The issue is not difficult, whether we study it philosophically in the light of reason, or consider it empirically on the basis of the actual facts.[1]

§ 2. Ruling and being ruled [which is the relation of master and slave] not only belongs to the category of things necessary, but also to that of things expedient; and there are species in which a distinction is already marked, immediately at birth, between those of its members who are intended for being ruled and those who are intended to rule. . . . There are also many kinds both of ruling and ruled elements. This being the case, the rule which is exercised over the better sort of ruled elements is a better sort of rule—as, for example, rule exercised over a man is better than rule over an animal. § 3. The reason is that a function is a higher and better function when the elements which go to its discharge are higher and better elements; and where one element rules and another is ruled, we may speak of those elements as going together to discharge a function. . . . In *all* cases where there is a compound, constituted of more than one part but forming one common entity—whether the parts be continuous [as in the body of a man] or discrete [as in the relation of master and

[1] The two different methods, as Newman remarks, are not actually distinguished in the subsequent argument; but on the whole Aristotle follows the first.

slave]—a ruling element and a ruled can always be traced.[1] § 4. This characteristic [i.e. the presence of ruled and ruling elements] is present in animate beings by virtue of the whole constitution of nature, inanimate as well as animate; for even in things which are inanimate there is a sort of ruling principle, such as is to be found, for example, in a musical harmony. But such considerations [of the inanimate part of nature] perhaps belong to a more popular method of inquiry; and we may content ourselves here with saying that animate beings are the first [in the ascending scale of nature] to be composed of soul and body, with the former naturally ruling and the latter naturally ruled. § 5. Dealing with such animate beings, we must fix our attention, in order to discover what nature intends, not on those which are in a corrupt, but on those which are in a natural condition. It follows that we must consider the man who is in the best state both of body and soul, and in whom the rule of soul over body is accordingly evident; for in those who are [permanently] bad, or who [for the time being] are in a bad condition, the reverse would often appear to be true **1254 b**—the body ruling the soul as the result of their evil and unnatural condition.

§ 6. Whatever may be said of inanimate things, it is certainly possible, as we have said, to observe in animate beings —and to observe there first [with any certainty]—the presence of a ruling authority, both of the sort exercised by a master over slaves and of the sort exercised by a statesman over fellow citizens. The soul rules the body with the sort of authority of a master: mind rules the appetite with the sort of authority of a statesman or a monarch. In this sphere [i.e. in the sphere of man's inner life] it is clearly natural and beneficial to the body that it should be ruled by the soul, and again it is natural and beneficial to the affective part of the

[1] The fact that a ruling element and a ruled can be traced in *all* cases of compounds goes to prove that, as Aristotle has said previously, there are many kinds both of ruling and ruled elements. Compounds, as they range through the whole scale of nature, from inanimate objects to animate beings and ultimately to man, differ greatly from one another. The ruling and ruled elements which they contain must therefore differ greatly. On Aristotle's conception of 'compounds' see below, Book III, c. 1, § 2, and note.

soul that it should be ruled by the mind and the rational part; whereas the equality of the two elements, or their reverse relation, is always detrimental. § 7. What holds good in man's inner life also holds good outside it; and the same principle is true of the relation of man to animals as is true of the relation of his soul to his body. Tame animals have a better nature than wild, and it is better for all such animals that they should be ruled by man because they then get the benefit of preservation. Again, the relation of male to female is naturally that of the superior to the inferior—of the ruling to the ruled. This general principle must similarly hold good of all human beings generally [and therefore of the relation of masters and slaves].

§ 8. We may thus conclude that all men who differ from others as much as the body differs from the soul, or an animal from a man (and this is the case with all whose function is bodily service, and who produce their best when they supply such service)—all such are by nature slaves, and it is better for them, on the very same principle as in the other cases just mentioned, to be ruled by a master. § 9. A man is thus by nature a slave if he is capable of becoming (and this is the reason why he also actually becomes) the property of another, and if he participates in reason to the extent of apprehending it in another, though destitute of it himself. Herein he differs from animals, which do not apprehend reason, but simply obey their instincts. But the use which is made of the slave diverges but little from the use made of tame animals; both he and they supply their owner with bodily help in meeting his daily requirements.

§ 10. [We have hitherto been speaking of mental differences.] But it is nature's intention also to erect a physical difference between the body of the freeman and that of the slave, giving the latter strength for the menial duties of life, but making the former upright in carriage and (though useless for physical labour) useful for the various purposes of civic life—a life which tends, as it develops, to be divided into military service and the occupations of peace. The contrary of nature's intention, however, often happens: there are some

slaves who have the bodies of freemen—as there are others who have a freeman's soul. But if nature's intention were realized—if men differed from one another in bodily form as much as the statues of the gods [differ from the human figure] —it is obvious that we should all agree that the inferior class ought to be the slaves of the superior. § 11. And if this principle is true when the difference is one of the body, it may be affirmed with still greater justice when the difference is one of the soul; though it is not as easy to see the beauty of the soul as it is to see that of the body.

1255 a It is thus clear that, just as some are by nature free, so others are by nature slaves, and for these latter the condition of slavery is both beneficial and just.✓

Chapter VI

Legal or conventional slavery: the divergence of views about its justice, and the reason for this divergence. In spite of the divergence, there is a general consensus—though it is not clearly formulated—that superiority in goodness justifies the owning and controlling of slaves. Granted such superiority in the master, slavery is a beneficial and just system.

§ 1. But it is easy to see that those who hold an opposite view are also in a way correct. 'Slavery' and 'slave' are terms which are used in two different senses. [There is, as we have seen, a kind of slavery which exists by nature; but] there is also a kind of slave, and of slavery, which exists [only] by law or (to speak more exactly) convention. (The law in virtue of which those vanquished in war are held to belong to the victor is in effect a sort of convention.) § 2. That slavery can be justified by such a convention is a principle against which a number of jurists bring what may be called an 'indictment of illegality'.[1] [They think that the principle violates the nature of law; and] they regard it as a detestable notion

[1] The 'indictment of illegality' might be brought against any one who proposed a measure in the assembly which could be held to contravene the established law (*nomos*). By analogy, the convention in favour of the victor enslaving the vanquished might be held to be in the nature of a measure which contravened *nomos*.

that anyone who is subjugated by superior power should become the slave and subject of the person who has the power to subjugate him, and who is his superior [merely] in power. Some, however, support, if some oppose, [the principle]; and even men of judgement differ. § 3. The cause of this divergence of view, and the reason why the opposing contentions overlap one another, is to be found in the following consideration.[1] There is a sense in which goodness, when it is furnished with an equipment [of material resources],[2] has the greatest power to subjugate; and [conversely] a victor is always pre-eminent in respect of *some* sort of good. This connexion of power with goodness or some sort of good leads to the idea that 'power goes with goodness'; and [as this idea is shared by both sides in the dispute about slavery] the dispute between the two sides thus comes to turn exclusively on the point of justice. § 4. On this point, one side holds that justice is a relation of mutual goodwill [and is therefore incompatible with slavery imposed by convention]; the other side holds that the rule of a superior is in itself, and by itself, justice [and is therefore a justification of such slavery. But the ambiguity of the idea which is common ground for both sides obscures the whole issue.] If the divergent views are pitted separately against one another [i.e. deprived of their common ground], neither view has any cogency, or even plausibility, against the view that the superior *in goodness* ought to rule over, and be the master of, his inferiors.[3]

[1] Newman analyses clearly the argument at this point. There is a divergence of views, arising from the fact that two contentions overlap in the area of a common principle, accepted by the holders of either contention, but interpreted differently by either. The common principle is that 'power goes with goodness'. One side interprets this to mean that power of itself implies goodness, and therefore confers a right (based on the goodness which it implies) to enslave any captive. The other side interprets it to mean that power must be accompanied by goodness—i.e. must have goodness added to it (and thereby the goodwill which goodness conciliates)—before there can be a rightful relation of master and slave which is attended, as such a relation should be, by goodwill.

[2] On Aristotle's conception of equipment, or *choregia*, and of the relation in which it stands to goodness or excellence, see below, Book VII, c. 1, § 13, note.

[3] Stated 'separately', one view is that the convention in favour of the victor enslaving the vanquished is always unjust, and the other is that the

§ 5. [The same general result—that superior goodness is really the ground of owning and controlling slaves—may be attained in another way.] There are some who, clinging, as they think, to a sort of justice (for law is a sort of justice), assume that slavery in war is always and everywhere just [because it is warranted by law]. Simultaneously, however, they contradict that assumption; for in the first place it is possible that the original cause of a war may not be just [in which case, in spite of the warrant of law, slavery so caused will not be just], and in the second place no one would ever say that a person who does not deserve to be in a condition of slavery is really a slave. If such a view were accepted, the result would be that men reputed to be of the highest rank would be turned into slaves or the children of slaves, if it happened to them or their parents to be captured and sold into slavery.[1] § 6. This is the reason why Greeks [though ready to defend the enslavement of prisoners of war] do not like to call such persons slaves, but prefer to confine the term to barbarians. But by this use of terms [they contradict their own view, and] they are, in reality, only seeking to express that same idea of the natural slave which we began by mentioning. They are driven, in effect, to admit that there are some [i.e. the barbarians] who are everywhere and inherently slaves, and others [i.e. the Greeks] who are everywhere and inherently free. § 7. The same line of thought is followed in regard to nobility, as well as slavery. Greeks regard themselves as noble not only in their own country, but absolutely and in all places; but they regard barbarians as noble only in their own country—thus assuming that there is one sort of nobility and freedom which is absolute, and

convention is always just. So stated, neither view can be maintained against a third or intermediate view which Aristotle suggests. This is the view that superiority in goodness alone justifies its possessor in being a master of slaves. On this view it follows that a victor may justly enslave the vanquished *if he possesses such superiority*—but only on that condition. The convention will accordingly sometimes be just, and sometimes unjust; it cannot be always either the one or the other.

[1] A law promoted by the Athenian statesman Lycurgus, about 330 B.C., prohibited Athenians from purchasing as slaves any free men taken in war. Aristotle may have had this law in his mind.

another which is only relative. We are reminded of what Helen says in the play of Theodectes:

> 'Scion of Gods, by both descents alike,
> Who would presume to call me serving-maid?'

§ 8. When they use such terms as these, men are using the one criterion of the presence, or absence, of goodness for the purpose of distinguishing between slave and freeman, or, again, between noble and low-born. **1255 b** They are claiming that just as man is born of man, and animal of animal, so a good man is born of good men. It is often the case, however, that nature wishes but fails to achieve this result.

§ 9. It is thus clear that there is some reason for the divergence of view which has been discussed, and that not all those who are actually slaves, or actually freemen, are natural slaves or natural freemen. It is also clear that there are cases where such a distinction [of the natural slave and the natural freeman] exists, and that here it is beneficial and just that the former should actually be a slave and the latter a master—the one being ruled, and the other exercising the kind of rule for which he is naturally intended and therefore acting as master. § 10. But a wrong exercise of his rule by a master is a thing which is disadvantageous for both master and slave. The part and the whole, like the body and the soul, have an identical interest; and the slave is a part of the master, in the sense of being a living but separate part of his body. There is thus a community of interest, and a relation of friendship, between master and slave, when both of them naturally merit the position in which they stand.[1] But the reverse is true [and there is a conflict of interest and enmity],

[1] The idea that friendship is possible between master and slave also occurs in the *Ethics*, VIII, c. xi, §§ 6–7: 'With the slave as a slave one cannot be friends: with the slave as man, one can; for there seems to be a relation of justice as between any person whatever and any other person, whoever he be, who can share in a system of law or be a party to an agreement; and therefore there can also be a relation of friendship with a slave in so far as he is a man.' We cannot but note that if the slave can be regarded as sharing in a system of law, he becomes a *subject* of rights, and ceases to be a mere *object* or 'inanimate instrument'.

when matters are otherwise and slavery rests merely on legal sanction and superior *power*.

Chapter VII

The training of slaves, and the art of using them properly. How they may be justly acquired.

§ 1. The argument makes it clear that the authority of the master and that of the statesman are different from one another, and that it is *not* the case that all kinds of authority are, as some thinkers hold, identical.[1] The authority of the statesman is exercised over men who are naturally free; that of the master over men who are [naturally] slaves; and again the authority generally exercised over a household by its head is that of a monarch (for all households are monarchically governed), while the authority of the statesman is an authority over freemen and equals. § 2. Now [the definition of the master being that given at the end of the previous chapter—i.e. that he is a man naturally endowed with a gift for controlling natural slaves] masters are not so termed in virtue of any science which they have acquired, but in virtue of their own endowment; and the same is true of slaves and freemen generally. But there *may be* a science [of ruling] which belongs to masters, and another [of serving] which belongs to slaves; and the latter would be of the nature of the science taught by the man of Syracuse, who instructed servants for pay in the discharge of their ordinary duties. § 3. Instruction in such subjects might be extended further: it might include, for example, the art of cookery and other similar forms of skilled domestic service. The reason why this might be done is that some duties [i.e. the skilled] are of a higher standing,

[1] Here Aristotle returns to a view which he had already challenged in the beginning of the *Politics*, c. 1, § 2. The theme running through the early chapters of the *Politics* (though it sometimes seems to be lost in the ramifications of the argument) is the theme of the peculiar character of the Greek polis, and therefore of the peculiar character of the political authority (an authority of freemen over freemen) which is exercised in the polis.

even if others [i.e. the ordinary and menial] are needed more: as the proverb says:

'Slave may go before slave, and master may go before master.'

§ 4. All such forms of science are necessarily of a servile character. But there is also a form of science belonging to the master, which consists in the *use* of slaves: a master is such in virtue not of owning, but of using slaves. This science belonging to the master is something which has no great or majestic character: the master must simply know how to command what the slave must know how to do. § 5. This is why those who are in a position to escape from being troubled by it delegate the management of slaves to a steward, and spend on politics or philosophy the time they are thus able to save. The art of *acquiring* slaves for ownership differs both from the art of being a master and from that of being a slave—that is to say, when it is justly practised; for in that case it is, in a way, part of the art of war, or of the art of hunting.[1]

This may serve to suffice for the distinction, and the definition, of master and slave.

Chapter VIII

3. Property and the art of acquisition ('chrematistic'). *The art of household management is distinct from that of acquisition. It has to provide a stock of requisites for the household; and the different methods by which this is done produce different ways of life—the hunting, the pastoral, the agricultural, and so forth. Nature intends and provides the requisites for household use; and the acquisition of such requisites is a natural mode of acquisition. Property in them is limited to the amount required by household needs; and it is the nature of all true wealth to be so limited.*

1256 a § 1. We may now study generally all forms of

[1] Aristotle thus implies the justice of the slave-trade when the slaves handled are barbarians either captured in war or seized in the course of slave-raids.

property and the art of acquiring it,[1] following our normal method [the analytical and genetic method, which proceeds from the parts to the whole and from the first beginnings to the developed result]; for we have already seen that the slave is an article of property, [and this leads us to consider the whole institution of which he is part]. The first problem which may be raised is whether the art of acquiring property is identical with that of household management, or is a part of it, or is ancillary to it; and whether, if it be ancillary, it is so in the sense in which the art of making shuttles is ancillary to the art of weaving, or in the sense in which the art of casting bronze is ancillary to the art of sculpture. . . . Either of these ancillary arts serves its master-art in a different way; the one provides it with an instrument, and the other with material. § 2. (By 'material' we mean the substance from which a product is made: wool, for instance, serves the weaver as the substance from which he produces cloth; and bronze serves the sculptor in the same way.) . . . That the art of household management is not identical with the art of acquiring property is obvious. It is the function of the latter simply to *provide* [either instruments or materials, as the case may be], but it is the function of the former to *use* what has been provided; for what art can there be, other than that of household management, which will deal with the use of the resources of the household? But the question whether the art of acquisition [if not identical with that of household management] is a part of it, or a separate art altogether, is one which admits a divergence of views. [Indeed it is a question which raises a number of issues.] § 3. If a man who is engaged in acquisition has to consider from what different sources he can get goods and property, and if property and wealth include many different parts [drawn from many different sources], we shall first have to consider [these parts before we can consider acquisition as a whole; we shall have to ask] whether farming is a part of the art of acquisition, or a separate art: indeed we shall have to ask that question generally, in regard to *all* modes of occupation and gain which are

[1] See the note at the end of the chapter.

concerned with the provision of subsistence. § 4. This leads to a further observation. There are a number of different modes of subsistence; and the result is a number of different ways of life, both in the animal world and the human. It is impossible to live without means of subsistence; and in the animal world we may notice that differences in the means of subsistence have produced consequent differences in ways of life. § 5. Some animals live in herds, and others are scattered in isolation, according as they find it convenient for the purpose of getting subsistence—some of them being carnivorous, some herbivorous, and some, again, omnivorous.[1] Nature has thus distinguished their ways of life, with a view to their greater comfort and their better attainment of what they need: indeed, as the same sort of food is not naturally agreeable to all the members of a class, and as different sorts suit different species, we also find different ways of life even inside the class of carnivorous animals—and equally in that of the herbivorous—distinguishing species from species. § 6. What is true of animals is also true of men. Their ways of life also differ considerably. The most indolent are the pastoral nomads. They acquire a subsistence from domestic animals, at their leisure, and without any trouble; and as it is necessary for their flocks to move for the sake of pasturage, they also are forced to follow in their tracks and to cultivate what may be called a living and moving farm. § 7. There are others who live by hunting; and of these, again, there are different kinds, according to their different modes of hunting. Some live by being freebooters:[2] some, who live near lakes and marshes and rivers, or by a sea which is suitable for the purpose, gain a livelihood by fishing; others live by hunting birds or wild animals. Most men, however, derive their livelihood from the soil, and from cultivated plants.

[1] The implication appears to be that carnivorous animals are solitary and herbivorous live together.

[2] It is curious to find freebooting or piracy regarded as on the same footing with a pastoral or farming life, and as a mode of acquisition dependent on the freebooter's own labour. But piracy was a tolerated pursuit in the eastern Mediterranean (on something like the same footing as trade) down to Aristotle's time, and indeed later. Pompey had to deal with the pirates of the Levant as late as 67 B.C.

§ 8. The different ways of life (at any rate if we take into account only those who follow an occupation dependent on their own labours, and do not provide themselves with subsistence [at the expense of others] by exchange and petty trade) may be roughly classified as five **1256 b**—the pastoral, the farming, the freebooting, the fishing, and the life of the chase. But there are some who live comfortably by means of a combination of different methods, and who eke out the shortcomings of one way of life, when it tends to fall short of being sufficient in itself, by adding some other way. For example, some combine the pastoral way of life with the freebooting: others combine farming with the life of the chase; and similar combinations may similarly be made of other ways of life, as needs and tastes impel men to shape their lives.

§ 9. Property of this order [that is to say, for the purpose of subsistence] is evidently given by nature to all living beings, from the instant of their first birth to the days when their growth is finished. § 10. There are animals which, when their offspring is born, bring forth along with it food enough to support it until it can provide for itself: this is the case with insects which reproduce themselves by grubs, and with animals which do so by eggs. Animals which are viviparous have food for their offspring in themselves, for a certain time, of the nature of what is called milk.

§ 11. [If it is evident that there is thus a natural provision for food at birth, and during growth,] it is equally evident that we must believe that similar provision is also made for adults. Plants exist to give subsistence to animals, and animals to give it to men. Animals, when they are domesticated, serve for use as well as for food; wild animals, too, in most cases if not in all, serve to furnish man not only with food, but also with other comforts, such as the provision of clothing and similar aids to life. § 12. Accordingly, as nature makes nothing purposeless or in vain, all animals must have been made by nature for the sake of men. It also follows that the art of war is in some sense [that is to say, so far as it is directed to gaining the means of subsistence from animals] a natural mode of acquisition. Hunting is a part of that art; and hunting

ought to be practised—not only against wild animals, but also against human beings who are intended by nature to be ruled by others and refuse to obey that intention—because war of this order is naturally just.

§ 13. It follows that one form of acquisition [i.e. what may be called the 'hunting' form] is naturally a part of the art of household management. It is a form of acquisition which the manager of a household must either find ready to hand, or himself provide and arrange, because it ensures a supply of objects, necessary for life and useful to the association of the polis or the household, which are capable of being stored.[1]

§ 14. These are the objects which may be regarded as constituting true wealth. [True wealth has a limit of size, determined by the purpose of the association it serves]; and the amount of household property which suffices for a good life is not unlimited, nor of the nature described by Solon in the verse,

'There is no bound to wealth stands fixed for men.'

§ 15. There *is* a bound fixed [for the property needed by the art of household management], as is also the case in the means required by the other arts. All the instruments needed by all the arts are limited, both in number and size, by the requirements of the art they serve; and wealth may be defined as a number of instruments used in a household or state [and needed for their respective 'arts'].

It is thus clear that there is a natural art of acquisition which has to be practised by managers of households and statesmen; and the reason for its existence is also clear [the reason being that it is natural for man to acquire what is naturally provided for his use].

Note on the different senses of 'chrematistic'

The art of acquisition, or 'chrematistic', is treated by Aristotle, in the next four chapters (cc. VIII–XI), not only in connexion with

[1] We may note that though he is speaking of the household only, in the beginning of the sentence, Aristotle also includes the polis at the end. 'Economy', as we have noticed, though it literally means only household management, is treated by him in its political as well as its domestic aspect; see the note at the end of this chapter.

the household, but also in connexion with the polis. Under this head he may be said to attempt to state the elements of 'economics', and to deal both with 'domestic' and with 'political' economy. In his technical use of the term 'chrematistic', we may note, as Newman does, that he varies. (1) Sometimes the term is used to indicate the art of acquisition generally, and as if it covered all forms—sound or unsound—of the acquisition of property. (2) Generally—and this is its most common use—it is used to indicate only those forms of acquisition which are perverted or unsound, in the sense that they are directed merely to selfish monetary gain. (3) Sometimes—but more rarely—it is used to indicate only the sound or natural forms of acquisition, which are necessary for the life of the household or state.

Chapter IX

The 'art of acquisition', as a way of acquiring property distinct from the natural way of the household. It originates in exchange, when exchange is conducted through the medium of currency and for profit. The view thus arises that the art of acquisition is specially concerned with accumulating a fund of currency. But there is a contrary view that currency is a mere convention, and not the true object of the art of acquisition. This contrary view has its truth. There is a natural form of the art of acquisition, which is not distinct from, but a part of, the art of household management. This natural form of acquisition aims at the accumulation not of currency, but of true wealth—and therefore not at the infinite, but at the finite.

§ 1. But there is a second form of the general art of getting property, which is particularly called, and which it is just to call, 'the art of acquisition'. It is the characteristics of **1257 a** this second form which lead to the opinion that there is no limit to wealth and property. There are many who hold this second form of the art of getting property to be identical with the other form previously mentioned, because it has affinities with it. In fact it is not identical, and yet it is not far removed. The other form previously mentioned is natural: this second form is not natural, but is rather the product of a certain sort of experience and skill.

§ 2. We may start our discussion of this form from the

following point of view. All articles of property have two possible uses. Both of these uses belong to the article as such, but they do not belong to it in the same manner, or to the same extent. The one use is proper and peculiar to the article concerned; the other is not. We may take a shoe as an example. It can be used both for wearing and for exchange. Both of these uses are uses of the shoe as such. § 3. Even the man who exchanges a shoe, in return for money or food, with a person who needs the article, is using the shoe as a shoe; but since the shoe has not been made for the purpose of being exchanged, the use which he is making of it is not its proper and peculiar use. The same is true of all other articles of property. § 4. Exchange is possible in regard to them all: it arises from the natural facts of the case, and is due to some men having more, and others less, than suffices for their needs. We can thus see that retail trade [which buys from others to sell at a profit] is not naturally a part of the art of acquisition. If that were the case, it would only be necessary to practise exchange to the extent that sufficed for the needs of both parties [and not to the extent of the making of profit by one of the parties at the expense of the other].

§ 5. In the first form of association, which is the household, it is obvious that there is no purpose to be served by the art of exchange. Such a purpose only emerged when the scope of association had already been extended [until it issued in the village]. The members of the household had shared all things in common: the members of the village, separated from one another [in a number of different households], had at their disposal a number of different things, which they had to exchange with one another, as need arose, by way of barter—much as many uncivilized tribes still do to this day. § 6. On this basis things which are useful are exchanged themselves, and directly, for similar useful things, but the transaction does not go any farther [that is to say, no money is involved]; wine, for instance, is given or taken, in return for wheat, and other similar commodities are similarly bartered for one another. When used in this way, the art of exchange is not contrary to nature, nor in any way a form of the art of acquisi-

tion [in the second sense of that term defined at the beginning of this chapter]. Exchange simply served [in its first beginnings] to satisfy the natural requirements of sufficiency. § 7. None the less it was from exchange, as thus practised, that the art of acquisition [in its second sense] developed, in the sort of way we might reasonably expect. [Distant transactions were the cause.] The supply of men's needs came to depend on more foreign sources, as men began to import for themselves what they lacked, and to export what they had in superabundance; and in this way the use of a money currency was inevitably instituted. § 8. The reason for this institution of a currency was that all the naturally necessary commodities were not easily portable; and men therefore agreed, for the purpose of their exchanges, to give and receive some commodity [i.e. some form of more or less precious metal] which itself belonged to the category of useful things and possessed the advantage of being easily handled for the purpose of getting the necessities of life. Such commodities were iron, silver, and other similar metals. At first their value was simply determined by their size and weight; but finally a stamp was imposed on the metal which, serving as a definite indication of the quantity, would save men the trouble of determining the value on each occasion.[1]

1257 b § 9. When, in this way, a currency had once been instituted, there next arose, from the necessary process of exchange [i.e. exchange between commodities, with money serving merely as a measure], the other form of the art of acquisition, which consists in retail trade [conducted for profit].[2] At first, we may allow, it was perhaps practised in

[1] The account of money or currency here given may be compared with that in the *Ethics*, Book V, c. v: 'All goods must be measured by some *one* thing. Now this unit is really demand, which brings and holds all goods together . . . but money has become, by virtue of convention, a sort of representative of demand. That is why it has the name it bears ("numismatic"): it exists by law or convention (*nomos*), and not by nature; and we have the power of changing or cancelling its value' (§§ 10–11). . . . 'Money suffers the same vicissitudes as goods: its value is not always constant; but it is steadier than the values of goods. That is why all goods must be priced in money; for then there will always be the possibility of exchange and with it of association between man and man' (§ 14).

[2] See the note at the end of this chapter.

a simple way [that is to say, money was still regarded as a measure, and not treated as a source of profit]: but in process of time, and as the result of experience, it was practised with a more studied technique, which sought to discover the sources from which, and the methods by which, the greatest profit could be made. § 10. The result has been the emergence of the view that the art of acquisition is specially concerned with currency, and that its function consists in an ability to discover the sources from which a fund of *money* can be derived. In support of this view it is urged that the art is one which produces wealth and money; indeed those who hold the view often assume that wealth is simply a fund of currency, on the ground that the art of acquisition (in the form of retail trade for profit) is concerned with currency. § 11. In opposition to this view there is another which is sometimes held. On this view currency is regarded as a sham, and entirely a convention. Naturally and inherently (the supporters of the view argue) a currency is a nonentity; for if those who use a currency give it up in favour of another, that currency is worthless, and useless for any of the necessary purposes of life. A man rich in currency (they proceed to urge) will often be at a loss to procure the necessities of subsistence; and surely it is absurd that a thing should be counted as wealth which a man may possess in abundance, and yet none the less die of starvation—like Midas in the fable, when everything set before him was turned at once into gold through the granting of his own avaricious prayer.

§ 12. Basing themselves on these arguments, those who hold this latter view try to find a different conception of wealth [from that which identifies it with a fund of currency] and a different conception of the art of acquisition [from that which makes it specially concerned with currency]. They are right in making the attempt. The [natural] art of acquisition, and natural wealth, *are* different. The [natural] form of the art of acquisition is connected with the management of the household [which in turn is connected with the *general* acquisition of *all* the resources needed for its life]; but the other form is a matter only of retail trade, and it is concerned only with

getting a fund of money, and that only by the method of conducting the exchange of commodities. This latter form may be held to turn on the power of currency; for currency is the starting-point, as it is also the goal, of exchange. § 13. It is a further point of difference that the wealth produced by this latter form of the art of acquisition is unlimited.[1] [In this respect the art of acquisition, in its retail form, is analogous to other professional arts.] The art of medicine recognizes no limit in respect of the production of health, and the arts generally admit no limit in respect of the production of their ends (each seeking to produce its end to the greatest possible extent)—though medicine, and the arts generally, recognize and practise a limit to the means they use to attain their ends, since the end itself constitutes a limit. The same is true of the retail form of the art of acquisition. There is no limit to the end it seeks; and the end it seeks is wealth of the sort we have mentioned [i.e. wealth in the form of currency] and the mere acquisition of money. § 14. But the acquisition of wealth by the art of household management (as contrasted with the art of acquisition in its retail form) *has* a limit; and the object of that art is not an unlimited amount of wealth. It would thus appear, if we look at the matter in this light,[2] that all wealth must have a limit. In actual experience, however, we see the opposite happening; and all who are engaged in acquisition increase their fund of currency without any limit or pause.

§ 15. The cause of this contradiction lies in the close connexion between the two different modes of acquisition [that of the householder, and that of the retail trader]. They overlap because they are both handling the same objects and acting in the same field of acquisition; but they move along different lines—the object of the one being simply accumula-

[1] Wealth produced by the natural form of acquisition, which is part of the art of household management, is limited in amount, because it has only to serve the actual needs of the household. Wealth produced by the other and unnatural form of acquisition is not limited by any object which it serves.

[2] i.e., in the light of the fact that true wealth is the sum of what is needed for the subsistence and the general needs of the household, and is limited by those needs. (Newman's notes.)

tion, and that of the other something quite different. This overlap of the two modes explains[1] why some men believe that mere accumulation is the object of household management; and in the strength of that belief they stick to the idea that they must keep their wealth in currency untouched, or increase it indefinitely. § 16. But the fundamental cause of this state of mind is men's anxiety about livelihood, rather than about well-being; **1258 a** and since their desire for that is unlimited, their desire for the things that produce it is equally unlimited. Even those who do aim at well-being seek the means of obtaining physical enjoyments; and, as what they seek appears to depend on the activity of acquisition, they are thus led to occupy themselves wholly in the making of money. This is the real reason why the other and lower form of the art of acquisition has come into vogue. § 17. Because enjoyment depends on [the possession of] a superfluity, men address themselves to the art which produces the superfluity necessary to enjoyment; and if they cannot get what they want by the use of that art—i.e. the art of acquisition—they attempt to do so by other means, using each and every capacity[2] in a way not consonant with its nature. The proper function of courage, for example, is not to produce money but to give confidence. The same is true of military and medical ability: neither has the function of producing money: the one has the function of producing victory, and the other that of producing health. § 18. But those of whom we are speaking turn all such capacities into forms of the art of acquisition, as though to make money were the one aim and everything else must contribute to that aim.

We have thus discussed the unnecessary form of the art of acquisition: we have described its nature, and we have explained why men need [or think that they need] its services.

[1] But, as Newman notes, Aristotle argues a little later (in the next section, § 16) that the explanation is not so much this overlap of two modes as a deeper cause—that is to say, a misconception of the purpose of life and of the nature of well-being.

[2] 'Capacity', as the next sentence makes clear, includes both moral qualities, such as courage, and professional abilities such as those of the soldier or doctor.

We have also discussed the necessary form: we have shown that it is different from the other, and is naturally a branch of the art of household management, concerned with the provision of [a due amount] of subsistence, and *not*, therefore, unlimited in its scope, as the other form is, but subject to definite bounds.

Note on 'chrematistic' in the sense of money-making

'Chrematistic', or the art or acquisition, is a term used by Aristotle in various senses: see the note at the end of c. VIII. Here 'the other form', which he proceeds to discuss, is money-making proper, where *monetary* gain is the object. It is distinguished from the form (where no actual money-making is involved, but a gain is none the less made) in which the object is simply the exchange of commodities. This latter form is sound or natural 'chrematistic': 'the other form' is perverted or unsound. It should be noted that, in the Greek, 'chrematistic' means not the making of money, but the acquisition of things (*chrēmata*). At the same time it should also be noted that *chrēmata* is a term which, though it primarily means things, tends to imply the notion of money ('an ambiguous word, often meaning money and always suggestive of it', Newman, ii, p. 187).

CHAPTER X

Household management is concerned with the use, and not (except in the way of general supervision) with the acquisition, of property; generally the householder should be able to count on nature supplying the means he needs. Acquisition for acquisition's sake shows its worst side in usury, which makes barren metal breed.

§ 1. The argument of the last chapter provides a clear solution to the problem which we originally raised:[1] 'Does the art of acquisition belong to the province of the manager of the household and the statesman [and is it thus a part of, or otherwise connected with, their art]? Or is it outside that

[1] See § 1 of chapter VIII, where the question was raised whether the art of 'chrematistic' was identical with, or a part of, or ancillary to, the art of household management. Aristotle here introduces the art of the statesman, as well as that of household management, in connexion with 'chrematistic'; but, as has already been noticed, his treatment of 'economy' tends to be political as well as domestic.

province, and should property be regarded as something on which they can simply count [and with the acquisition of which they need not concern themselves]?' It may be urged, in favour of the second alternative, that just as the art of the statesman does not produce human stock, but counts on its being supplied by nature and proceeds to use her supply, so nature must also provide the physical means of subsistence—the land, or sea, or whatever it be. Then, and upon that basis, it is the province of the householder to manage properly the means which are ready to his hand. § 2. It is not the business of the art of weaving to produce wool, but to use it, and to distinguish the sorts of wool which are good and suitable from those which are poor and unsuitable. [The same principle applies to the art of household management.] If this were not the case, and if the art of acquisition were held to be a part of the art of household management, the question might be raised why the art of medicine should not equally be held to be a part; and it might be argued that the members of a household must needs have health, in the same way as they must needs have life or any of the other necessaries. § 3. The reasonable view of the issue thus raised is that there is a sense [that of general supervision] in which the manager of a household or a ruler is bound to see to the health of the members of his household or state; but there is another sense [that of actual treatment] in which they have no obligation, and doctors alone are concerned. Similarly, in the matter of property, there is a sense in which it is the business of the manager of a household to see to its acquisition; but in another sense that is not his business, and acquisition belongs to an ancillary art.

On a general view, as we have already noticed, a supply of property should be ready to hand [as a provision of nature]. It is the business of nature to furnish subsistence for each being brought into the world; and this is shown by the fact that the offspring of animals always gets nourishment from the residuum of the matter that gives it its birth.[1] § 4. The natural form, therefore, of the art of acquisition is always,

[1] This is a point already made in c. VIII, § 10.

and in all cases, acquisition from fruits and animals. That art, as we have said, has two forms: one which is connected with retail trade, and another which is connected with the management of the household. Of these two forms, the latter is necessary and laudable; the former is a method of exchange which is justly censured, because **1258 b** the gain in which it results is not naturally made [from plants and animals], but is made at the expense of other men. The trade of the petty usurer [the extreme example of that form of the art of acquisition which is connected with retail trade] is hated most, and with most reason: it makes a profit from currency itself, instead of making it from the process [i.e. of exchange] which currency was meant to serve. § 5. Currency came into existence merely as a means of exchange; usury tries to make it increase [as though it were an end in itself]. This is the reason why usury is called by the word we commonly use [the word *tokos*, which in Greek also means 'breed' or 'offspring'[1]]; for as the offspring resembles its parent, so the interest bred by money is like the principal which breeds it, and [as a son is styled by his father's name, so] it may be called 'currency the son of currency'. Hence we can understand why, of all modes of acquisition, usury is the most unnatural.[2]

[1] Shakespeare thus speaks of interest as a 'breed for barren metal', when he makes Antonio ask Shylock

When did friendship take
A breed for barren metal of his friend?

[2] Aristotle's condemnation of 'chrematistic', and his attitude to the lending of money at interest, may be connected with the economic development of Athens during the fourth century. Deposit banks, which made loans to merchants from their funds, were coming into existence; and the Athenian banks were making Athens the principal money-market of Greece. The creation of new capital particularly fostered shipping, and made Athens 'a mart of the world' (see Book VII, c. VI, § 4). On this general development see the *Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. VI, pp. 72–4.

Chapter XI[1]

A practical consideration of the art of acquisition. The divisions of that art which may be made on practical grounds. Instances of the successful practice of the art, especially by the creation of monopolies.

§ 1. We have now discussed sufficiently that part of our subject [i.e. the art of acquisition] which is related to pure knowledge: it remains to consider the part which is related to actual use. All subjects of this nature may be treated liberally in theory, but have to be handled in practice as circumstances demand. The parts of the art of acquisition which are of actual use are the following. The first is an experience of farm-stock. We have to know which are the most profitable breeds, and on what soil, and with what treatment, they will give us the greatest profit: we have to know, for example, the right way of stocking horses, or cattle, or sheep, or any other kind of farm-stock. § 2. (Only experience can tell us how different breeds compare with one another in point of profit, or what breeds are most paying on what sorts of soil: for some breeds thrive on one sort of soil, and some on another sort.) Other useful parts of the art of acquisition are experience in cultivation, not only of cornland but also of land planted with vines and olives; experience in bee-keeping; and experience in the rearing of such fish and fowl as may help to provide subsistence. § 3. These are the parts and the original elements of the art of acquisition in its soundest and properest form [which consists in production]. We now come to exchange [as a second part or form of the art of acquisition]. This includes, first and foremost, commerce (which is divided into the three operations of the provision of a ship, the carriage

[1] This chapter, as Newman notes, differs in some respects from those preceding it, and its argument cannot be altogether squared with that of the previous chapters. It differs, for example, from the three previous chapters (cc. VIII X) in the account given of 'chrematistic'. Some of it may possibly be an addition, which has not altogether been reduced to harmony with its context. The whole chapter—alike in its practical trend and in its collection of instances—is more akin to the *Oeconomica* (which is *not* an Aristotelian treatise) than it is to the *Politics*.

of freight, and offering for sale—operations which differ from one another in the sense that some have a greater margin of safety, and others a greater margin of profit); it includes, in the second place, investment at interest; and it also includes, in the third place, service for hire. § 4. This last part of exchange [service for hire] is partly a matter of skilled craftsmen in the mechanical arts, and partly of unskilled workers who can render only the service of bodily labour. A third form of the art of acquisition[1] is a form intermediate between the first and second; for it possesses elements both of the first, or natural, form, and of the form which consists in exchange. It is concerned with things extracted from the earth [metals] or with products of the earth which bear no fruit but are still of use [trees used for timber]; and we may thus cite, as examples, the industries of lumbering and mining. § 5. Mining, in its turn, has many forms, because there are many species of metals extracted from the earth.

A general account has now been given of the various forms of acquisition: to consider them minutely, and in detail, might be useful for practical purposes; but to dwell long upon them would be in poor taste. § 6. Suffice it to say that the occupations which require most skill are those in which there is least room for chance: the meanest are those in which most damage is done to physique: the most servile are those in which most use is made of physical strength: the least noble are those in which there is least need for the exercise of goodness.

§ 7. There are books on these subjects by several writers: **1259 a** Charetides of Paros and Apollodorus of Lemnos have written on the cultivation of cornland and land planted with vines and olives: others have written on other themes; anyone who is interested should study these subjects with the aid of these writings. A collection ought also to be made of the scattered stories about the ways in which different people have succeeded in making a fortune. § 8. They are all useful to those who value the art of acquisition. There is, for example, the story which is told of Thales of Miletus. It is

[1] See the note at the end of the chapter.

a story about a scheme for making money, which is fathered on Thales owing to his reputation for wisdom; but it involves a principle of general application. § 9. He was reproached for his poverty, which was supposed to show the uselessness of philosophy; but observing from his knowledge of meteorology (so the story goes) that there was likely to be a heavy crop of olives [next summer], and having a small sum at his command, he paid down earnest-money, early in the year, for the hire of all the olive-presses in Miletus and Chios; and he managed, in the absence of any higher offer, to secure them at a low rate. When the season came, and there was a sudden and simultaneous demand for a number of presses, he let out the stock he had collected at any rate he chose to fix; and making a considerable fortune he succeeded in proving that it is easy for philosophers to become rich if they so desire, though it is not the business which they are really about. § 10. The story is told as showing that Thales proved his own wisdom; but, as we have said, the plan he adopted—which was, in effect, the creation of a monopoly—involves a principle which can be generally applied in the art of acquisition. Some states, therefore, as well as individuals, adopt this resource when in need of money: they establish, for instance, a monopoly in provisions. § 11. [But state monopolies may clash with private.] In Sicily a man with whom a sum of money had been deposited bought up all the iron from the ironworks; and afterwards, when retailers came from their shops to get a supply, he was the only seller from whom they could buy. He did not raise the price to any great extent; but he gained, none the less, a profit of a hundred talents on an outlay of fifty. § 12. This speculation came to the notice of Dionysius, the ruler of Syracuse, and he ordered the man to leave the city, though he allowed him to take his gains: the reason was his discovery of a way of making profit which was injurious to the interests of Dionysius himself. Yet his idea was simply the same as that of Thales; and what both of them did was merely to establish a private monopoly. § 13. But a knowledge of these methods is useful to statesmen as well [as private persons]: states—like households, but to an even

greater extent—are often in want of financial resources and in need of more ways of gaining them. This is the reason why some of those who adopt a political career confine their political activity to matters of finance.

Note on the account in c. XI *of the senses of 'chrematistic'*

It has been already noticed, in the first note to this chapter, that Aristotle gives in it a somewhat different account of 'chrematistic' and its divisions. The classification of the different divisions of 'chrematistic' which appears in the previous chapters (VIII–X) has already been explained in the note at the end of c. VIII. In the present chapter the classification of the different divisions is: (1) 'the soundest and properest form', which consists in dealing with farm-stock, arable cultivation, bee-keeping, and the like; (2) 'the form which consists in exchange'—a form here made to include even usury, which in c. X, § 4 was distinguished from exchange; (3) a third form 'intermediate between the first and the second', which consists, somewhat curiously, in lumbering and mining—industries which certainly have some elements of the first form of the art of acquisition, but in which it is difficult to see any elements of the second or 'exchange' form (unless one assumes that these industries produce for exchange, and not for immediate use).

CHAPTER XII

4. Marriage, Parenthood, and the general management of the household. *The nature of marital authority, which is like that exercised by a statesman over his fellow citizens. The nature of parental authority, which is like that of a king over his subjects.*

§ 1. We said, in a previous passage,[1] that there were three parts of the art of household management—the first, of which we have already spoken, being the art of controlling slaves: the second, the art of exercising paternal authority; and the third, that of exercising marital authority. [The last two remain to be discussed, and to be discussed separately; for] while the head of the household rules over both wife and children, and rules over both as free members of the house-

[1] This previous passage comes in c. III, § 1. Aristotle here reverts (after a long passage on property and profit-making, which includes the four chapters VIII–XI) to the consideration of the three integral elements of the household which he had begun to discuss in the chapters on slavery, IV–VII.

hold, he exercises a different sort of rule in either case. **1259 b** His rule over his wife is like that of a statesman over fellow citizens; his rule over his children is like that of a monarch over subjects. The male is naturally fitter to command than the female, except where there is some departure from nature; and age and maturity are similarly fitter to command than youth and immaturity. § 2. In most cases where rule of the statesman's sort is exercised there is an interchange of ruling and being ruled [which does not occur in regard to husband and wife]: the members of a political association aim by their very nature at being equal and differing in nothing. Even so, and in spite of this aim, it is none the less true that when one body of citizens is ruling, and the other is being ruled, the former desires to establish a difference —in outward forms, in modes of address, and in titles of respect—which may remind us of the saying of Amasis about his foot-pan.[1] The relation of the male to the female is permanently that in which the statesman [temporarily] stands to his fellow citizens. § 3. Paternal rule over children, on the other hand, is like that of a king over his subjects. The male parent is in a position of authority both in virtue of the affection to which he is entitled and by right of his seniority; and his position is thus in the nature of royal authority. Homer, therefore, was right and proper in using the invocation

Father of Gods and of men

to address Zeus, who is king of them all. A king ought to be naturally superior to his subjects, and yet of the same stock as they are; and this is the case with the relation of age to youth, and of parent to child.

[1] Amasis, who from being a subject had become a ruler, had a golden foot-pan made from the image of a god, which the Egyptians proceeded to reverence greatly. He seized on the analogy, in an address to his subjects. He had fared himself, he told them, like this foot-pan; as it had been merely a utensil, and then had become an object of reverence, so he had been merely a subject, and now had become a king, entitled to honour and respect (Herodotus II. 172).

Chapter XIII

The art of household management is a moral art, aiming at the moral goodness of the members of the household; and this is true in regard to slaves as well as to other members. The goodness of the head of the household has a quality of its own: the different classes of members have also different qualities of goodness. This is part of a general law that goodness is relative to function, and that it is the function of some to guide, and of others to be guided —and guided, too, in different ways. The master's duty of guiding the slaves of the household. The subjects of marriage and parenthood (only briefly mentioned in the previous chapter) are to be reserved for future treatment, in connexion with the polis and the proper mode of its government (Book VII, cc. XVI–XVII).

§ 1. It is clear from the previous argument that the business of household management is concerned more with human beings than it is with inanimate property;[1] that it is concerned more with the good condition of human beings than with a good condition of property (which is what we call wealth); and, finally, that it is concerned more with the goodness of the free members of the household than with that of slaves.

§ 2. Here a preliminary question may be raised in regard to the slave. Has he any 'goodness' beyond that of discharging his function as an instrument and performing his menial service—any goodness of a higher value, such as belongs to temperance, fortitude, justice, and the rest of such moral qualities?[2] Or has he no 'goodness' outside the area of the

[1] Aristotle has, it is true, dealt largely with inanimate property, under the head of the art of acquisition, in the four chapters VIII–XI. But the main conclusions still remain: (1) that the art of acquisition is not a part of household management (or what the Greeks termed 'economy') in the same sense as the personal exercise of authority over the persons of the slave, the wife, and the child; (2) that the essential parts of the household, which are the material of the householder's art of management, are the three personal relations of master and slave, husband and wife, and parent and child; and (3) that the essence of the art of household management is to make these three relations as good as possible, and is thus, in the last resort, moral, and not 'economic', in the modern sense of that word.

[2] Aristotle enumerates three of the four cardinal Greek virtues, but instead of enumerating the fourth (Wisdom) he contents himself with an 'etcetera'. It would be difficult to predicate wisdom of the slave, since he

bodily services he renders? § 3. Either alternative presents difficulties. If slaves have a 'goodness' of the higher sort, in what respect will they differ from freemen? If they have not, it is a surprising thing: they are human beings, with a share in reason [and we should naturally expect them to have the higher goodness of reasoning beings]. But the question thus raised in regard to the slave may be asked almost equally in regard to the wife and the child. Can *they* have 'goodness' [of the higher sort]? Must a wife be 'good', in the sense of temperate, and brave, and just? Should a child be called licentious or temperate? Is the answer Yes, or must it be No?

§ 4. [Before we can give any answer, we must carry the argument further:] we must raise the question [not in particular cases, but] in a general form. Is the goodness of those who naturally rule the same as the goodness of those who are naturally ruled, or does it differ? If we say that both of them ought to share in the nobility of goodness,[1] why should one of them permanently rule, and the other be permanently ruled? The difference between them cannot be simply a difference of degree [which would admit of their both sharing in that nobility, though to a different extent]: the difference between ruler and ruled is one of kind, and degree has nothing to do with the matter. § 5. If, on the other hand, we say that one of them ought, and the other ought not, to share, we commit ourselves to a strange view. How can the ruler rule properly, or the subject be properly ruled, unless they are both temperate and just? Anyone who is licentious or cowardly will utterly fail to do his duty. **1260 a** The conclusion which clearly emerges is that both classes [the ruled as well as the ruler] must share in goodness, but that there must be different kinds of goodness [one for the ruler and one for the ruled]—just as there are also different kinds of goodness among different classes of the ruled.

§ 6. The view here suggested [that the ruler and the ruled

'participates in reason to the extent of apprehending it in another, though destitute of it himself' (c. v, § 9).

[1] The Greek word—*Kalokagathia*—means literally the quality of one who is both handsome and good, and was originally applied to the character of the 'complete gentleman'.

have separate kinds of goodness] takes us straight to the nature of the soul. The soul has naturally two elements, a ruling and a ruled; and each has its different goodness, one belonging to the rational and ruling element, and the other to the irrational and ruled. What is true of the soul is evidently also true of the other cases [i.e. those of the household and the state]; and we may thus conclude that it is a general law that there should be naturally ruling elements and elements naturally ruled.[1] § 7. [Just because there is a general law, operative in many spheres, there are different modes of its operation, according to the sphere in which it operates.] The rule of the freeman over the slave is one kind of rule; that of the male over the female another; that of the grown man over the child another still. It is true that all these persons [freeman and slave, male and female, the grown man and the child] possess in common the different parts of the soul;[2] but they possess them in different ways.[3] The slave is entirely without the faculty of deliberation; the female indeed possesses it, but in a form which remains inconclusive; and if children also possess it, it is only in an immature form. § 8. What is true [of their possessing the different parts of the soul] must similarly be held to be true of their possessing moral goodness: they must all share in it, but not in the same way—each sharing only to the extent required for the discharge of his or her function. The ruler, accordingly, must possess moral

[1] Aristotle here appears to argue in a circle—first from the relations of persons to the relation of the elements in the soul, and then back from the relation of the elements in the soul to the relations of persons. But the centre of the circle is the general principle of rule and subordination; cf. c. v of this book, §§ 1–7.

[2] A full account of the different 'parts' of the soul is given later in the *Politics* (Book VII, c. xiv). The 'parts' with which Aristotle is here concerned are simply the rational and ruling element, and the irrational and ruled element, which are mentioned in the previous section.

[3] A difficulty here arises in Aristotle's argument. If the slave has in him *both* of the different parts of the soul, the rational as well as the irrational, why should he be treated as if he had only the irrational part? The answer which Aristotle gives (cf. c. v, § 9) is that the rational element in the slave, while inadequate for his own deliberation about alternative courses of action, enables him to understand the rational character of his master's commands to follow a given course of action. But in spite of the answer, some discrepancy remains.

goodness in its full and perfect form [i.e. the form based on rational deliberation], because his function, regarded absolutely and in its full nature, demands a master-artificer, and reason is such a master-artificer;[1] but all other persons need only possess moral goodness to the extent required of them [by their particular position]. § 9. It is thus clear that while moral goodness is a quality of all the persons mentioned, the fact still remains that temperance—and similarly fortitude and justice—are not, as Socrates held,[2] the same in a woman as they are in a man. Fortitude in the one, for example, is shown in connexion with ruling; in the other, it is shown in connexion with serving; and the same is true of the other forms of goodness.

§ 10. This conclusion also emerges clearly when we examine the subject more in detail, and in its different divisions [i.e. if we consider the nature of goodness separately in women, children, and slaves]. To speak in general terms, and to maintain that goodness consists in 'a good condition of the soul', or in 'right action', or in anything of the kind, is to be guilty of self-deception. Far better than such general definitions is the method of simple enumeration of the different forms of goodness, as followed by Gorgias. § 11. We must therefore hold that what the poet Sophocles said of woman

A modest silence is a woman's crown

[a saying which implies that there is a special form of goodness for women] contains a general truth—but a truth which does not apply to men. [Children, again, have their own special form of goodness]; a child is immature, and his goodness is therefore obviously not a matter of his relation to his present self, but of his relation to the end [which he will attain

[1] The argument may be elucidated from an analogy cited by Newman in his note. The function of healing is regarded 'absolutely and in its full nature' when it is ascribed to the physician who directs and superintends healing as a master-artificer; it is regarded 'only in a qualified way' when it is ascribed to a subordinate who executes his directions. When we consider the ruler's function in the light of this analogy we see that it requires (1) the full power of reason, which includes the deliberative faculty, and (2) the full form of moral goodness which that supplies.

[2] The reference is to the argument of Plato's dialogue, the *Meno*, 72–3.

when mature] and to the guiding authority [of the parent, which prepares him for that end]. § 12. Similarly, too, the goodness of the slave is a matter of his relation to his master.

We laid it down, in treating of slaves, that they were useful for the necessary purposes of life.[1] It is clear, on that basis, that they need but little goodness; only so much, in fact, as will prevent them from falling short of their duties through intemperance or cowardice. If this be true [i.e. if the slave should have goodness to this extent], the question may be raised whether artisans too ought not to have goodness, seeing that they often fall short of their duties through intemperance. § 13. But does not the case of the artisan differ greatly from that of the slave? The slave is a partner in his master's life: the artisan is less closely attached to a master. The extent of the goodness incumbent on him is proportionate to the extent of the servitude to which he is subject; [and this is less than that of the slave,] since the mechanical type of artisan is subject only to what may be called a limited servitude.[2] Again [and this is another difference] **1260 b** the slave belongs to the class of those who are naturally what they are; but no shoemaker, or any other artisan, belongs to that class.[3] § 14. It is therefore clear [whatever may be said of artisans and their employers] that the master of a household must produce in the slave the sort of goodness we have been discussing,[4] and he must do so [as master and moral guardian, and] not as a manager giving instructions about particular duties.[5] This is the reason why we may disagree with those

[1] Cf. c. v, § 9, 'they supply their owner with bodily help in meeting his daily requirements'.

[2] That is to say, he is under a servitude for the one purpose of his particular task, and not (like the genuine slave) for all purposes.

[3] They are not born in their occupation, but voluntarily enter it. They are not therefore intended by their birth and character for a particular form of goodness (as slaves are): they are on their own account, except when they are acting in the field of their 'limited servitude', and they must achieve their own goodness accordingly.

[4] Goodness, that is to say, over and above technical goodness in the discharge of physical duties; or, in other words, goodness of the moral order.

[5] Management, as we have seen, can be delegated: cf. the beginning of c. VII, and especially § 5. But the master cannot delegate his inherent duty of the moral guidance of slaves.

who are in favour of withholding reason [i.e. rational instruction and admonition] from slaves, and who argue that only command should be employed. Admonition ought to be applied to slaves even more than it is to children.

§ 15. This may serve as a sufficient discussion of these topics. There remain for discussion a number of questions —the relation of husband and wife, and that of parent and child; the nature of the goodness proper to each partner in these relations; the character of the mutual association of the partners, with its qualities and defects and the methods of attaining those qualities and escaping those defects. All these are questions which must be treated later in the discourses which deal with forms of government. [The reason for postponing them is this.] Every household is a part of a polis. The society of husband and wife, and that of parents and children, are parts of the household. The goodness of every part must be considered with reference to the goodness of the whole. We must therefore consider the government [of the whole polis] before we proceed to deal with the training of children and women—at any rate if we hold that the goodness of children and women makes any difference to the goodness of the polis. § 16. And it *must* make a difference. Women are a half of the free population: children grow up to be partners in the government of the state.

As we have already discussed some aspects of the household [i.e. slavery and the art of acquisition], and as we are to discuss the rest [i.e. marriage and parenthood] at a later stage, we may dismiss our present inquiry as finished and make a new start. Let us first examine the theories of those who have expressed opinions about an ideal form of government.[1]

[1] This paragraph seeks to make a transition between the incomplete Book I, which treats of 'economics', and the remaining books, which deal with 'politics' in its various forms. The paragraph as it stands may be the work of a later editor. In any case, there is not an easy transition from Book I to Book II.

As regards the promise here made, that marriage and parenthood will be discussed later, it can only be said that some remarks are made on these themes in the last two books of the *Politics*, in which Aristotle sketches his own picture of an ideal form of government. But the remarks are only made incidentally, and the themes are not treated as independent themes.

BOOK II

REVIEW OF IDEAL STATES

A
IDEAL STATES IN THEORY (cc. I–VIII)

CHAPTER I

1. Plato's Republic. *Political association is a sharing: how much should be shared? Plato's scheme of communism.*

1260 b 27 § 1. Our purpose is to consider what form of political association is the ideal for those who can count upon the material conditions of their life being, as nearly as possible, just what they would themselves wish.[1] We must begin by investigating ideal forms of government other than our own [i.e. other than that depicted in books vii–viii]; and we must investigate not only forms which are actually practised by states that are accounted to be well governed, but also forms of a different order which have been designed by theorists and are held in good repute. The gain of such a discussion will be twofold. In the first place, we shall discover what is right, and what is useful, in our field of inquiry. In the second place, when we proceed to seek for something different from the forms of government we have investigated, we shall not be thought to belong to the class of thinkers who desire at all costs to show their own ingenuity, but rather to have adopted our method in consequence of the defects we have found in existing forms.

§ 2. Our beginning must start from the point which is the natural starting-point of such a discussion [i.e. from the question, 'What are the things in which the members of a

[1] We may have (1) a form of association which is the best possible under actual conditions, and which is therefore the best relatively to those conditions, or (2) a form of association which is the best possible under ideal conditions, and which is therefore the best absolutely. Aristotle discusses the first form in Books IV–VI, and especially in the latter half of Book IV. He discusses the second form in Books VII–VIII. Here, in the first half of Book II, he only discusses the views of others about the second form.

political association are associated, and what is the extent of their association?'] One of three alternatives must be adopted. All the citizens must have all things in common; or they must have nothing in common; or they must have some things in common, and others not. The second alternative —that they should have nothing in common—is clearly impossible: the constitution of a polis involves in itself some sort of association, and its members must initially be associated in a common place of residence. **1261 a** To be fellow citizens is to be sharers in one state, and to have one state is also to have one place of residence. [There must therefore always be sharing in a common neighbourhood.] § 3. But we have still to choose between the first and the third alternative. Is it better that a state which is to be well conducted should share in all the things in which it is possible for it to share, or that it should share in some things and not in others? It is certainly possible [to adopt the first alternative, i.e.] that the citizens should share children and wives and property with one another. This is the plan proposed in the *Republic* of Plato, where Socrates argues for the necessity of community of wives and children and community of property. We are thus faced by the question whether it is better to remain in our present condition [of separate families and private property] or to follow the rule of life laid down in the *Republic*.

Chapter II

Community of wives and children. *Criticisms of the* end *or* object—*unity—which Plato proposes to attain by it:* (a) *carried to its logical extreme, that object would produce a one-man state;* (b) *it neglects the social differentiation necessary in a state* (*a differentiation which, even in a state of 'equals and likes', produces the distinction of governors and governed*); (c) *it thus makes self-sufficiency impossible, because self-sufficiency involves different elements making different contributions.*

§ 1. The establishment of a system of community of wives involves, among many others, two major difficulties. The

object for which Socrates states that it ought to be instituted is evidently not established by the arguments which he uses. Considered as a *means* to the end which he states as necessary for the polis, his scheme as set out is impracticable; and yet he gives no account of the lines on which it ought to be interpreted.[1] § 2. The object which Socrates assumes as his premiss is contained in the principle that 'the greatest possible unity of the whole polis is the supreme good'. Yet it is obvious that a polis which goes on and on, and becomes more and more of a unit, will eventually cease to be a polis at all. A polis by its nature is some sort of aggregation: [i.e. it has the quality of including a large number of members]. If it becomes more of a unit, it will first become a household instead of a polis, and then an individual instead of a household; for we should all call the household more of a unit than the polis, and the individual more of a unit than the household. It follows that, even if we could, we ought not to achieve this object: it would be the destruction of the polis.

§ 3. There is a further objection. Not only is the polis composed of a *number* of men: it is also composed of different *kinds* of men, for similars cannot bring it into existence. There is a difference between a polis and a military alliance. A military alliance, formed by its very nature for the sake of the mutual help which its members can render to one another, possesses utility purely in virtue of its quantity; and a great alliance, even if there is no difference of kind among its members, is like a weight which depresses the scales more heavily in the balance. [A polis is essentially different: it necessarily requires a difference of capacities among its members, which enables them to serve as complements to one another, and to attain a higher and better life by the

[1] Two fundamental criticisms are here raised—first, that the end of the Platonic scheme (unity) is not proved by Plato to be the right end for a political association; secondly, that the means proposed for the attainment of that end are not capable of realizing it, nor indeed, as Aristotle's argument goes on to suggest, practicable in themselves. The first line of criticism is developed in §§ 2–8 of this chapter: the second is developed in c. III.

mutual exchange of their different services.][1] In this respect a polis will also differ from a tribe: [a tribe, like a military alliance, may be the stronger merely by virtue of being larger], provided, however, that it does not allow its members to be scattered in separate villages, but unites them in a confederacy like that of Arcadia. [Unlike a mere aggregate, such as a tribe or alliance,] a real unity, such as a polis, must be made up of elements which differ in kind.

§ 4. A consequence follows [from this conception that the polis is composed of different elements, mutually exchanging different services in virtue of different capacities]. It is that the well-being of every polis depends on each of its elements rendering to the others an amount equivalent to what it receives from them. This is a principle already laid down in the *Ethics*.[2] It is a principle which has to be observed even among free and equal citizens [in spite of the fact that, as such, they appear to be identical in kind].[3] They cannot all rule simultaneously; they must therefore each have office for a year—or by some other order of succession and for some other period. § 5. In this way it comes about that all are rulers [in turn], just as [all would be shoe-makers and carpenters in turn] if shoe-makers and carpenters changed their occupations and the same men were not always shoe-makers and carpenters. § 6. It would be better indeed if the principle followed in the arts and crafts [that 'the cobbler should stick to his last'] were also applied to the affairs of the political association; and from this point of view it is better for the

[1] This passage is inserted in order to make explicit what is implied in Aristotle's argument—the idea that the polis, being an *association*, must be composed, like all associations, of different elements which can exchange services, and can thus attain, in virtue of their different capacities, a higher standard of life.

[2] *Ethics* V, c. v, § 6.

[3] The argument of this passage is excellently stated in Newman's note. 'This is true even of free and equal citizens, among whom one would least expect any difference in kind to exist, for though here there is no intrinsic difference, yet the impossibility of all ruling at the same time leads to an "imitation" of, or approximation to, such difference, and breaks them into rulers and ruled, two classes different in kind, even though they interchange their positions from time to time. Hence here too "the rendering to others of an amount equivalent to what has been received" is in place.'

same men always to be rulers wherever possible. But where this ideal is impossible, **1261 b** through the natural equality of all the citizens—and also, it may be argued too, because justice requires the participation of all in office (whether office be a good thing or a bad)—there is yet an imitation of it, or an approximation to it, if equals retire from office in turn and are all, apart from their period of office, in the same position. § 7. This means that some rule, and others are ruled, in turn, as if they had become, for the time being, different sorts of persons. We may add that even those who are rulers for the time being differ from one another, some holding one kind of office and some another [which again proves that difference of kinds is essential to the constitution of a polis].

These considerations are sufficient to show, first, that it is not the nature of the polis to be a unit in the sense in which some thinkers say that it is, and secondly, that what is said to be the supreme good of a polis is really its ruin. But surely the 'good' of each thing is what preserves it in being. § 8. There is still another[1] consideration which may be used to prove that the policy of attempting an extreme unification of the polis is not a good policy. A household is an institution which attains a greater degree of self-sufficiency than an individual can; and a polis, in turn, is an institution which attains self-sufficiency to a greater degree than a household. But it only attains that goal, and becomes fully a polis, when the association which forms it is large enough [and diversified enough] to be self-sufficing.[2] On the assumption, therefore, that the higher degree of self-sufficiency is the more desirable thing, the lesser degree of unity is more desirable than the greater.

[1] The first consideration is that urged in § 2—that when unity is made the end, the end defeats itself. The second is that urged in §§ 3–7—that unity contravenes the essential differentiation of the different elements of the polis. (Aristotle inverts the order of these two considerations in his résumé at the end of § 7.) The third, urged here, is that self-sufficiency is a more desirable end than unity.

[2] See Book I, c. 11, § 8, and the note at the end of that chapter.

Chapter III

Community of wives and children (continued). Criticisms of such community considered as a means *for producing the end of unity:* (a) *as all collectively, and not each individually, are parents, there will be no real feeling, but rather a general apathy;* (b) *kinship will be fractional kinship (when 1,000 are father to the same child, each father is only 1/1,000 father);* (c) *nature will 'recur', and spoil the scheme.*

§ 1. [We now turn from criticism of the end to criticism of the means.] Even if it were the supreme good of a political association that it should have the greatest possible unity, this unity does not appear to follow from [i.e. to be achieved by] the formula of 'All men saying "Mine" and "Not mine" at the same time [and of the same object'],[1] which, in the view of Socrates, is the index of the perfect unity of a polis. § 2. The word 'all' has a double sense: [it may mean 'each separately', or 'all collectively']. If it be understood in the first sense, the object which Socrates desires to realize may perhaps be realized in a greater degree [than if it be understood in the second]: each and all separately will then say 'My wife' (or 'My son') of one and the same person; and each and all separately will speak in the same way of property, and of every other concern. But it is not in the sense of 'each separately' that all who have children and wives in common will actually speak of them. They will all call them 'Mine'; but they will do so collectively, and not individually. § 3. The same is true of property also: all will call it 'Mine'; but they will do so in the sense of 'all collectively', and not in the sense of 'each separately'. It is therefore clear that there is a certain fallacy in the use of the term 'all'. It is a term which,

[1] The formula is that used in Plato's *Republic*, 462 c. We may note, in regard to the whole of this chapter (and also the next), that the means criticized in it by Aristotle is only one sort of means—community of wives and children, or the abolition of the family. The criticism of the other sort of means (community of property) is postponed to c. v. Some of the considerations adduced apply, indeed, equally to both sorts of means (e g. the consideration in §§ 2–3, and again that in § 4); but on the whole Aristotle follows two distinct lines of criticism for the two different means.

like the similar terms 'both' and 'odd' and 'even',[1] is liable by its ambiguity [to produce quarrels in actual life, and] equally to breed captious arguments in reasoning. We may therefore conclude that the formula of 'all men saying "Mine" of the same object' is in one sense [the sense of 'each separately'] something fine but impracticable, and in another sense [that of 'all collectively'] in no wise conducive to harmony.[2]

§ 4. Not only does it not conduce to harmony: the formula also involves an actual loss. What is common to the greatest number gets the least amount of care. Men pay most attention to what is their own: they care less for what is common; or, at any rate, they care for it only to the extent to which each is individually concerned. Even where there is no other cause for inattention, men are more prone to neglect their duty when they think that another is attending to it: this is exactly what happens in domestic service, where many attendants are sometimes of less assistance than a few. § 5. The scheme of Plato means that each citizen will have a thousand sons: they will not be the sons of each citizen individually: any and every son will be equally the son of any and every father; and the result will be that every son will be equally neglected by every father.

1262 a There is still a further objection [which arises from what has just been said about each citizen having a thousand sons]. Each citizen, when he says 'Mine' of any child who is prosperous or the reverse, is speaking fractionally. He does not mean that the child is wholly 'Mine', but only that he is 'Mine' to the extent of a fraction determined by the total number of citizens. When he says 'He is mine' or 'He is so-and-so's', the term 'Mine' or 'So-and-so's' is used with

[1] 'Both' may mean 'both together' or 'either separately': the quality of being 'even' may exist in a whole (when all the parts collectively are 'even' with something else) without existing in the parts, of which 'each separately' may be odd; and the same is true of the quality of being 'odd'.

[2] Why should the formula, in the second or collective interpretation of 'all', be in no wise conducive to harmony? The answer comes later, when Aristotle argues that discord rather than harmony (or at any rate a 'watery friendship') is produced by community of wives and children (*infra*, § 7).

reference to the whole body concerned—the whole thousand, or whatever may be the total number of citizens.[1] Even so he cannot be sure [i.e. he cannot even be sure that he is as much as the thousandth part of a father]; for there is no evidence who had a child born to him, or whether, if one was born, it managed to survive.[2] § 6. Which is the better system—that each of two thousand, or ten thousand, persons should say 'Mine' of a child in this fractional sense, or that each should say 'Mine' in the [total] sense in which the word is now used in ordinary states? § 7. As things are, A calls by the name of '*My* son' the same person whom B calls by the name of '*My* brother': C calls him '*My* cousin': D, E, and so forth call him '*My* relative', because he is somehow connected with them, either closely or distantly and whether by blood or by marriage; while besides these different modes of address X and Y may use still another, and call him '*My* clansman' or '*My* tribesman'.[3] It is better to be own cousin to a man than to be his son after the Platonic fashion. § 8. Even on Plato's system it is impossible to avoid the chance that some of the citizens may guess who are their brothers, or children, or fathers, or mothers. The resemblances between children and parents must inevitably lead to their drawing conclusions about one another's identity. § 9. That this

[1] We may illustrate Aristotle's argument from a phrase of Edmond About—'the Frenchman looks with pride at his face in the glass as he shaves in the morning, remembering that he is the forty-millionth part of a tyrant, and forgetting that he is the whole of a slave'. This might be inverted to run—'the Platonic citizen looks at himself with pride in the mirror, thinking that he is the father of a thousand sons, but forgetting that he is only the thousandth part of a father'.

[2] In the scheme of the *Republic* (459–60), the working of the system of temporary marriages is 'a secret which only the rulers know'. The offspring of these marriages is taken by the proper officers; if good, it is reared: if bad, it is 'put away'.

[3] The argument implied by Aristotle is that the ordinary system of the family and of family relationship (1) enables A, B, and the rest to feel to a man, in their different ways and from different angles, 'that keen sense of something *idion* [i.e. of personal interest] which . . . the change proposed by Plato would take away or seriously diminish' (Newman's note), and (2) enriches the man himself, who is placed in these different and individual relations to A, B, and the rest, by giving him, as it were, a number of facets, which would be absent on the Platonic plan, and the absence of which would leave him one plain, dull, and unrelieved surface.

actually happens in real life is stated as a fact by some of the writers on descriptive geography. They tell us that some of the inhabitants of upper Libya have their wives in common; but the children born of such unions can still be distinguished by their resemblance to their fathers. Indeed there are some women, and some females in the animal world (mares, for instance, and cows), that show a strong natural tendency to produce offspring resembling the male parent: the Pharsalian mare which was called the Just Return is a good example.[1]

CHAPTER IV

Community of wives and children (continued). Problems arise when parents do not know their children, or children their parents. At best such a community produces a watery sort of fraternity. Plato's addition to it of a scheme of transposition of ranks raises further difficulties.

§ 1. There are also other difficulties in a system of community of wives and children, which its advocates will not find it easy to meet by any precautions. We may take as examples cases of assault, unintentional (and, we may also add, intentional) homicide, fighting, and slander. All these offences, when they are committed against father or mother or a near relative, differ from offences against persons who are not so related, in being breaches of natural piety. Such offences must happen more frequently when men are ignorant of their relatives than when they know who they are; and when they do happen, the customary penance can be made if men know their relatives, but none can be made if they are ignorant of them. § 2. It is also surprising that Plato, after having made all the young men of his state the common sons of the older citizens, should content himself with debarring older men who are 'lovers' of the young from carnal intercourse with them, and should not debar them from behaving as 'lovers' or practising other familiarities. Such familiarities, if practised between son and father, or brother and brother

[1] So called because she returned, in her offspring, exactly what had been given by its sire.

[as might easily happen if relationship were unknown], are the very height of indecency, all the more as the mere cherishing of this form of love, without giving it actual expression, is in itself indecent. § 3. It is surprising, too, that Plato should debar male lovers from carnal intercourse on the one ground of the excessive violence of the pleasure, and that he should think it a matter of indifference that the 'lovers' may be father and son, or again that they may be brothers.[1]

§ 4. Community of wives and children would seem to be more calculated to serve Plato's object if it were practised among the governed class of the farmers rather than among the governing guardians. **1262 b** The spirit of fraternity is likely to exist to a less degree where wives and children are common; and the governed class ought to have little of that spirit if it is to obey and not to attempt revolution. § 5. Generally, a system such as Plato suggests must produce results directly opposed to those which a system of properly constituted laws should produce, and equally opposed to the very object for which, in his view, this community of wives and children ought to be instituted. § 6. Fraternity is generally held to be the chief good of states, because it is the best safeguard against the danger of civil dissensions. Plato himself particularly commends the ideal of the unity of the state; and that unity is commonly held, and expressly stated by Plato, to be the result of fraternity. We may cite the argument of the *Symposium*, where, in the discourse on love, Aristophanes is made, as we all know, to speak of two lovers desiring in the excess of their 'fraternity' to grow together into a unity, and to be one instead of two. § 7. Now in the case of two lovers, the result of an excessive desire for unity must be either the disappearance of both of them into a new being, or the disappearance of one of them into the other. But in the case of the political association the result of an excessive desire for unity would be different: it would be

[1] The two objections to the Platonic system in this paragraph depend on contemporary Greek notions and practices - the notion of what constitutes 'holiness' or natural piety among kinsfolk, and the practice of homosexuality between older and younger men.

merely a watery sort of fraternity [and therefore less unity, instead of more]: a father would be very little disposed to say 'Mine' of a son, and a son would be as little disposed to say 'Mine' of a father.[1] § 8. Just as a little sweet wine, mixed with a great deal of water, produces a tasteless mixture, so family feeling is diluted and tasteless when family names have so little meaning as they have in a constitution of the Platonic order, and when there is so little reason for a father treating his sons as sons, or a son treating his father as a father, or brothers one another as brothers. § 9. There are two things which particularly move men to care for an object and to feel affection for that object. One of them is that the object should belong to yourself: the other is that you should like it. Neither of these motives can exist among men who live under a constitution such as the Platonic.

There is still a further difficulty. It concerns that part of Plato's scheme which may be called the transposition of ranks, under which children born to parents in the inferior rank of farmers and craftsmen are to be transferred [if they prove to be superior in endowment] to the superior rank of the guardians, and vice versa children born to parents in the superior rank are to be transferred [if they prove inferior] to the inferior. How such transposition is actually to be effected is a matter of great perplexity; and in any case those who transfer such children, and assign them their new place, will be bound to know who are the children so placed and with whom they are being placed.[2] § 10. In addition, those problems of assault, unnatural affection, and homicide, which have already been mentioned [as generally raised by the whole of Plato's scheme], will be raised even more by this part of his scheme. Transposition of ranks will mean that those transferred from the rank of guardian to an inferior rank will cease for the future to address the guardians as

[1] Because, in either case, he is only the thousandth part, and he is removed by that whole distance from full fatherhood or full sonship.

[2] The difficulty arising from such knowledge (which may leak out and spread) will be, as Weldon suggests, that 'a child cannot be absolutely separated from the class to which he belongs [by birth]'. He will still trail the cloud of his previous origin in his new position.

brothers, or children, or fathers, or mothers, as the case may be [though they will still be actually related to them in those ways]; and it will have the same effect for those who have been transferred to a superior rank. Such persons will thus lose entirely any deterrent which kinship provides against the commission of these offences.[1]

This may serve as a determination of the issues raised by the idea of community of wives and children.

Chapter V

Community of property. *Three possible systems of property. The difficulties of a system under which ownership and use are both common: the merits of a system under which ownership is private and use is common—it gives more pleasure, and it encourages goodness more. Communism cannot remedy evils which really spring from the defects of human nature: it is also based on a false conception of unity, and neglects the true unity which comes from education; finally, it is contradicted by experience. Plato's particular scheme of community of property leaves the position of the farming class obscure. The system of government which he connects with his scheme is too absolute, and is likely to cause discontent: it also deprives the ruling class of any happiness.*

§ 1. The next subject for consideration is property. What is the proper system of property for citizens who are to live under an ideal constitution? Is it a system of communism, or one of private property? § 2. This is an issue which may be considered in itself, and apart from any proposals for community of wives and children. **1263 a** Even if wives and children are in severalty [and the family system is preserved], as is now universally the case, questions relating to property still remain for discussion. Should use and owner-

[1] In § 1 of this chapter Aristotle had argued that offences against kinsfolk, which involved a breach of natural piety, were more likely to occur under Plato's system of diluted kinship than they were under the ordinary system of kinship. The argument of this section adds a further refinement. Transferred children, it is argued, have lost even the safeguard of diluted kinship, by losing connexion with the members of the class in which they were actually born.

ship both be common? [Or should one be common and the other private?] We may note three possible alternatives. First, we may have a system under which plots of land are owned in severalty, but the crops (as actually happens among some uncivilized tribes) are brought into a common stock for the purpose of consumption. Secondly, and conversely, the land may be held in common ownership, and may also be cultivated in common, but the crops may be divided among individuals for their private use: some of the uncivilized peoples are also said to practise this second method of sharing. Thirdly, the plots and the crops [i.e. ownership and use] may both be common.

§ 3. When the cultivators of the soil are a different body from the citizens who own it [as will be the case if they are serfs or slaves], the position will be different and easier to handle; but when the citizens who own the soil are also its cultivators, the problems of property will cause a good deal of trouble. If they do not share equally in work and recompense, those who do more work and get less recompense will be bound to raise complaints against those who get a large recompense and do little work.[1] § 4. Indeed it is generally true that it is a difficult business for men to live together and to be partners in any form of human activity, but it is specially difficult to do so when property is involved. Fellow travellers who are merely partners in a journey furnish an illustration: they generally quarrel about ordinary matters and take offence on petty occasions. So, again, the servants with whom we are most prone to take offence are those who are particularly employed in ordinary everyday services.

§ 5. Difficulties such as these, and many others, are involved in a system of community of property. The present system [of private property] would be far preferable, if it were adorned[2] by customs [in the social sphere] and by the enact-

[1] See the note at the end of the chapter.

[2] The Greek word is the same as that which comes in the proverb 'Sparta has fallen to your lot: adorn it' (*Spartam nactus es: hanc adorna*). The 'adorning' of common property which Aristotle has in mind consists in its common use—partly under the influence of social habit, and partly under that of legal rule.

ment of proper laws [in the political]. It would possess the advantages of both systems, and would combine the merits of a system of community of property with those of the system of private property. [It would be the ideal]; for property *ought* to be generally and in the main private, but common in one respect [i.e. in use].[1] § 6. When everyone has his own separate sphere of interest, there will not be the same ground for quarrels; and the amount of interest will increase, because each man will feel that he is applying himself to what is his own. And on such a scheme, too, moral goodness [and not, as in Plato's scheme, legal compulsion] will ensure that the property of each is made to serve the use of all, in the spirit of the proverb which says 'Friends' goods are goods in common'. Even now there are some states in which the outlines of such a scheme are so far apparent, as to suggest that it is not impossible; in well-ordered states, more particularly, there are some elements of it already existing, and others which might be added. § 7. In these states each citizen has his own property; but when it comes to the use of this property, each makes a part of it available to his friends, and each devotes still another part to the common enjoyment of all fellow citizens. In Sparta, for example, men use one another's slaves, and one another's horses and dogs, as if they were their own; and they take provisions on a journey, if they happen to be in need, from the farms in the countryside belonging to other citizens. § 8. It is clear from what has been said that the better system is that under which property is privately owned but is put to common use; and the function proper to the legislator is to make men so disposed that they will treat property in this way.

There is a further consideration which must be taken into account. This is the consideration of pleasure. Here too [as well as in the matter of goodness] to think of a thing as your own makes an inexpressible difference. [The satisfaction of a natural feeling brings pleasure]; and it may well be that

[1] Aristotle thus arrives at his formula, which may be stated in a sort of jingle (cf. § 8 below)—*idia ktēsis, koine chrēsis*, or 'property several; use of it communal'.

regard 1263 b for oneself [and, by extension, for what is one's own] is a feeling implanted by nature, and not a mere random impulse. § 9. Self-love is rightly censured, but what is really censured is not so much love of oneself as love of oneself in excess[1]—just as we also blame the lover of money [not so much for loving money as for loving it in excess]; the simple feeling of love for any of these things [self, or property, or money] is more or less universal. We may add that a very great pleasure is to be found in doing a kindness and giving some help to friends, or guests, or comrades; and such kindness and help become possible only when property is privately owned. § 10. But not only are these pleasures [that arising from the satisfaction of a natural feeling of self-love, and that arising from the satisfaction of our impulse to help others] impossible under a system of excessive unification of the state. The activities of two forms of goodness are also obviously destroyed. The first of these is temperance in the matter of sexual relations (it is an act of moral value to refrain from loving the wife of another in the strength of temperance): the second is liberality in the use of property.[2] In a state which is excessively unified no man can show himself liberal, or indeed do a liberal act; for the function of liberality consists in the proper use which is made of property.

§ 11. Legislation such as Plato proposes may appear to wear an attractive face and to argue benevolence. The hearer receives it gladly, thinking that everybody will feel towards everybody else some marvellous sense of fraternity—all the more as the evils now existing under ordinary forms of government (lawsuits about contracts, convictions for perjury, and obsequious flatteries of the rich) are denounced as due to the absence of a system of common property. § 12. None

1 Self-love, my liege, is not so vile a thing
As self-neglecting.
The regard which a man has for himself is, on a higher plane, a moral necessity: it is the basis of a sense of moral responsibility.

2 In referring to the first of these activities, Aristotle introduces again, in a chapter which is otherwise concerned with community of property, the idea of community of wives and children. It may also be noticed that in this section (§ 10) he leaves the consideration of pleasure, begun in § 8, and returns to the consideration of goodness.

of these evils, however, is due to the absence of communism. They all arise from the wickedness of human nature. Indeed it is a fact of observation that those who own common property, and share in its management, are far more often at variance with one another than those who have property in severalty—though [we tend to be misled by the fact that] those who are at variance in consequence of sharing in property look to us few in number when we compare them with the mass of those who own their property privately.

§ 13. Another consideration must also be pressed. Justice demands that we should take into account not only the evils from which men will be liberated when once they have turned their property into a common stock, but also the benefits of which they will be deprived. The life which they are to live appears to be utterly impossible.[1] The cause of the fallacy into which Plato falls must be held to be the wrong character of the premiss [about the nature of unity] on which he bases his argument. § 14. It is true that unity is to some extent necessary, alike in a household and a polis; but total unity is not.[2] There is a point at which a polis, by advancing in unity, will cease to be a polis: there is another point, short of that, at which it may still remain a polis, but will none the less come near to losing its essence, and will thus be a worse polis. It is as if you were to turn harmony into mere unison, or to reduce a theme to a single beat. § 15. The truth is that the polis, as has already been said,[3] is an aggregate of many members; and education is therefore *the* means of making it a community and giving it unity. [This is the sense in which unity is necessary, and the extent to which it is necessary.] It is therefore surprising that one who intends to introduce a system of education, and who believes that his ideal polis will achieve goodness by means of this system, should none

[1] On Aristotle's argument, a system of common property injures life by (1) diminishing the area of goodness, §§ 6 and 10, (2) starving men of natural and proper pleasures, §§ 8–9, and (3) increasing instead of diminishing discord, § 12.

[2] The argument here returns to the point which was made (in regard to community of wives) in c. 11, § 2.

[3] c. 11, § 2.

the less think that he is setting it on the right track by such methods as he actually proposes, rather than by the method of social customs, of mental culture, and of legislation [intended to promote a proper spirit in the use of property].[1] An example of such legislation may be found in Sparta and Crete, where the law has made the institution of property serve a common use by the system of common meals.

1264 a § 16. There is another matter which must not be ignored—the teaching of actual experience. We are bound to pay some regard to the long past and the passage of the years, in which these things [advocated by Plato as new discoveries] would not have gone unnoticed if they had been really good. Almost everything has been discovered already; though some of the things discovered have not been co-ordinated, and some, though known, are not put into practice.

§ 17. It would shed a great deal of light on the value of Plato's ideas, if we could watch the actual construction of a constitution such as he proposes. The foundation of any state will always involve the division and distribution of its members into classes—partly in the form of associations for common meals, and partly in that of clans and tribes. [Plato's system of classes being therefore a matter of common form,] it follows that the only peculiar feature of the legislation proposed by Plato is the rule that the guardians are not to farm the land; and even that is a rule which the Spartans already attempt to follow.[2]

§ 18. [But it is not only the position of the guardians which may be challenged]; the scheme of the whole constitution is

[1] The precise meaning of 'legislation' is to be gathered from § 8 of this chapter, where Aristotle argues that the proper function of the legislator is to create a disposition or mental habit of putting private property to common use. The statement that a conjunction of social customs, mental culture, and legislation is the proper method of making a community and giving it unity is a repetition and amplification of the point made in § 5 of the chapter, where Aristotle argues that the present system of private property would be preferable, 'if adorned by customs and by the enactment of proper laws'.

[2] The Spartan 'peers' (who are analogous to Plato's guardians) owned the land, but left the farming to 'helots'. This, however, is not the Platonic system. Plato's guardians do not own the land; and his farmers, who are owners as well as farmers, are not helots.

open to criticism.[1] Plato has not explained, nor indeed is it easy to explain, the position of the different members under that scheme. The mass of the citizens who are not guardians —in other words, the farmers—will be, in effect, nearly the whole of the citizen body. But their position is left undefined. We are not told whether these farmers, as well as the guardians, are to have property in common, or to own it individually; nor do we learn whether their wives and children are to be common to them all, or to belong to each separately.[2] § 19. [We may take three possible alternatives, and examine each in turn.] The first alternative is that all things [wives and children as well as property] should belong to them all in common. In that case, what will be the difference between them and the guardians? What advantage will they gain by accepting the government of the guardians? What is to make them actually accept it?—unless it be some shift of policy such as is used in Crete, where the serfs are allowed to enjoy the same general privileges as their masters, and are excluded only from athletic exercises and the possession of arms. § 20. The second alternative is that the institutions of property and of marriage should be the same for the farmers as they actually are in most states to-day [and that there should thus be a system of separate families and private property]. In that case, we may inquire, what will be the scheme on which the whole community is based? There will inevitably be two states in one, and those two states will be opposed to one another—the guardians being made into something of the nature of an army of occupation, and the farmers, artisans, and others being given the position of ordinary civilians.[3] § 21. Again, [upon the assumption that

[1] Aristotle has just mentioned, at the end of § 17, the guardians and the guardians only. But he passes on naturally here to the other class of the farmers, and to the general problem of the relations of farmers and guardians.

[2] Aristotle here forgets, or at any rate neglects, the actual argument of the *Republic*. Plato makes it clear that the farmers own private property, and live in private or separate families. We may also notice that here again, as in § 10 (and in §§ 19–20 below), Aristotle introduces the subject of community of wives in a chapter otherwise concerned with community of property.

[3] We should have expected that the opposition of the 'two states in one'

the farmers have a system of separate families and private property], legal complaints, and actions at law, and all the other evils which Plato describes as existing in actual states, will equally exist among them. It is true, indeed, that he says that the farmers, in virtue of their education, will not need a number of regulations (such as rules of city police, market by-laws, and other similar regulations); but it is also true that he provides education only for the guardians. § 22. It is a further difficulty in Plato's scheme that he attaches a condition to the farmers' control of their holdings—the condition that they shall pay a quota of their produce to the guardians. This is likely to make them far more difficult to handle, and much more filled with high ideas of their own importance, than the helots of Sparta, or the serfs of Thessaly, or the farm-slaves of other states. § 23. In any case Plato's scheme, as it stands, fails to indicate whether the farmers should live under a system of communism equally with the guardians, or should live under a different system. It also fails to throw any light on other questions connected with this—such as the position of the farmers in the political system, the nature of their education, and the character of the laws they are to observe. We thus find it difficult to discover —and yet this is a matter of the highest importance—how the farming class is to be constituted if the common life of the guardians is to be preserved. **1264 b** § 24. The third and last alternative is that the farmers should have a system of community of wives, combined with a system of private property. In that case, who will see to the house while the men are seeing to the business of the fields? . . . And, for that matter, who will see to the house on the first alternative, when property is common as well as wives? . . . It is strange, too, that Plato should draw an analogy from the animal world in order to prove that women should follow the same pursuits as men. Animals, unlike women, have no domestic duties.

would have consisted in the fact that one proceeded on the system of community of wives and property, and the other on the opposite system. Actually, the opposition is here described as consisting in the fact that the guardians are like a garrison placed in a dependent city, and the farmers are like the citizens of such a city.

§ 25. There is also an element of danger in the method of government which Plato proposes to institute.[1] He makes one body of persons the permanent rulers of his state [thus rejecting the principle of 'ruling and being ruled in turn']. This is a system which must breed discontent and dissension even among the elements which have no particular standing, and all the more, therefore, among the high-spirited and martial elements.[2] § 26. The reason which makes it necessary for him to make one body of persons permanent rulers is obvious. [They alone have the natural endowment for ruling]: 'the divine gold which is mixed in the soul' cannot reside at one time in one body of men and at another time in another; it must reside permanently in one body. This is why he says that 'the god who fashioned you mixed gold in the composition' of some, silver in that of others, and brass and iron in that of the rest, who were to be craftsmen and farmers.[3] § 27. It is a further objection [to Plato's general scheme for his ruling class] that he deprives his guardians even of happiness,[4] maintaining that it is the happiness of the whole state which should be the object of legislation. It is impossible for the whole of a state to be happy unless most of its parts, or all, or at any rate some, are happy. The quality of being happy is not of the same order as the quality of being even. The quality of being even may exist in a whole without existing in either of its parts: the quality of being happy cannot. § 28. A further point may be raised. If the guardians are not

[1] In this section, and in the remaining sections of the chapter, Aristotle passes from a criticism of the Platonic scheme of communism of property to a criticism of the Platonic system of government. The two things are, of course, connected; but the passage, as it stands, is of the nature of an appendix to the rest of the argument of the chapter.

[2] The 'elements of no particular standing' may indicate the class of farmers. The 'high-spirited and martial elements' naturally suggests the class of auxiliaries, who serve as soldiers in the Platonic state, and whose particular quality is that of high spirit.

[3] Aristotle here criticizes, by implication, the doctrine of a particular endowment of classes, and suggests, as more applicable to the conditions of the Greek city and its practice of 'ruling and being ruled', the doctrine of a general endowment of all citizens, by virtue of which they are able to turn from other occupations to the occupation of ruling, and vice versa.

[4] They lose the natural pleasures, arising from private property, which Aristotle has discussed in §§ 8–10 of this chapter.

happy, what are the other elements of the state which are? There is certainly no happiness for the craftsmen, or for the mass of the common people.

We may thus conclude that the Republic which Plato has described raises all the difficulties we have mentioned, and others which are no less serious.[1]

Note on common property and its cultivation in the scheme of the Republic

Aristotle is here assuming, though he does not make the assumption explicit, that there is a system of common ownership of land. On that assumption two alternatives are possible in regard to the cultivation of the land so owned. (1) The cultivation may be done by a class separate from and subordinate to the citizens who own the land; or (2) it may be done by the citizens themselves who own the land. The second alternative, in Aristotle's view, leads to the troubles mentioned in the text: the first would produce a different and easier position, 'for as the citizens would not work themselves, individual citizens would not be in a position to compare their own hard work and small recompense with the easy work and large recompense of others, and thus one more source of disagreement among the citizens would be removed' (Newman's note).

We may note, as Newman does, that neither alternative is proposed in the *Republic*, because the assumption on which both are based—that of common ownership of the land—is *not* an assumption made in the *Republic*. On Plato's scheme the land is owned in severalty by the farming class, and the one element of communism is that the class of the guardians make a common 'use' of that part of the produce raised from the land which is paid to them by the members of the farming class in return for their discharge of political and military duties. There is thus no common ownership in the Platonic system; there is only common consumption, and that only among the class of the guardians. The members of the farming class own, cultivate, and consume in severalty—subject only to two conditions, first that they pay a quota of their produce to the guardians, for *their* common use, and secondly that the amount of land which each may own is restricted. There is thus a sense in which it may be said that Aristotle's own formula of 'property several, use of it communal' is observed in the *Republic*.

[1] Aristotle's criticisms of the *Republic*, in the first five chapters of Book II, are very justly described in Newman's note on this sentence. 'The object . . . is, we see from this sentence, in the main to point out difficulties enough . . . to show that there is still room for another attempt to depict a "best constitution" (cf. c. 1, § 1). The same may be said to be true of the somewhat grumbling criticism of the *Laws* which follows.'

Chapter VI

2. Plato's Laws. *The scheme of the* Laws *is not greatly different from that of the* Republic. *It postulates too large a territory, but fails to pay proper attention to the problem of foreign relations. It does not sufficiently define the amount of property required, or the object for which it is required; nor does it make proper provision for a balance between property and population. The system of government is a sort of 'polity', but it is not properly balanced: the method of electing the magistrates and councillors is too oligarchical.*

§ 1. The same, or nearly the same, is true of Plato's later work, the *Laws* [i.e. it raises difficulties which show that there is room for another attempt to depict an ideal constitution]; and this makes it advisable for us to examine briefly the constitution there described. A further reason for doing so is that [the argument of the *Laws* is fuller, while] in the *Republic* Plato has only attempted to solve a very small number of issues—mainly the proper method for ensuring community of wives and children and community of property, and the proper way of distributing power under the constitutional system. § 2. He contents himself in the *Republic* with dividing the population into two parts: one consists of the farmers, the other of the military class; and from this last there is recruited, to form still another part, the deliberative and sovereign class of the perfect guardians.[1] § 3. But so far as the first part—the farmers and artisans—are concerned, the scheme of the *Republic* leaves it unsettled whether or no they are to have some share in office, and whether or no they, too, are to bear arms and join in military service. It is stated, indeed, that the women [i.e. those in the military class of the ordinary guardians] should join in military service and enjoy the same education as the male guardians; but otherwise Plato has filled up the dialogue with digressions extraneous

[1] Later, in Book IV, c. xiv, § 16, Aristotle ascribes sovereignty (*to kyrion*) to the deliberative element in the state. This is the reason why, in this passage, he combines the terms 'deliberative' and 'sovereign' in his description of the 'perfect guardians' who form the government.

to the main theme, and with a discussion of the proper nature of the education of his guardians.

1265 a § 4. The great bulk of the *Laws* is concerned with legislation. Plato says little about the constitution; and in what he does say [he is inconsistent, for] though he speaks of desiring to institute a form of government which will be more in the reach of existing states, he gradually brings the form he proposes round again to the other type [i.e. that described in the *Republic*]. § 5. In all matters other than community of wives and of property, he provides identical institutions for both of his states. Education is the same in both: the members of both are to live a life free from menial duties: there is the same arrangement for common meals in both. The only differences are that in the *Laws* women as well as men are to be included in the arrangements for common meals, and the number of citizens who bear arms—which in the *Republic* is only 1,000—is to be fixed at a total of 5,000.

§ 6. All the writings of Plato are original: they show ingenuity, novelty of view, and a spirit of inquiry. But perfection in everything is perhaps a difficult thing. Take, for example, the number of citizens which has just been mentioned. We cannot overlook the fact that such a number will require a territory of the size of Babylon or some such space which is similarly unlimited in extent. It will need all that to support 5,000 persons in idleness, especially when we reflect that they will be augmented by a crowd of women and attendants many times as great as themselves. § 7. We may admit that it is right to make assumptions freely; but it cannot be right to make any assumption which is plainly impossible.[1]

It is stated in the *Laws* that there are two factors to which the legislator should pay regard in enacting laws: the territory of the state, and the inhabitants of that territory. But there is also a third factor. If a polis is to live a political life

[1] Aristotle is thinking in terms of a Greek polis, with a limited territory surrounded by arms of the sea or ranges of hills. Athens was exceptional in having a territory of 1,000 square miles: Corinth had 350: the general average was perhaps about 70 (*Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. iii, p. 698).

[involving ntercourse with other states], and not a life of isolation, it is a good thing that its legislator should also pay regard to neighbouring countries. For example, a state should not only employ such instruments of war as are serviceable in its own territory: it should also employ the instruments which are serviceable for use abroad. § 8. Even if such a life [i.e. a life of activity rather than contemplation, and of military activity at that] is not accepted as an ideal, either for the individual's own way of life or for the state's common way, the fact remains, none the less, that men should be formidable to their enemies when they are in retreat, as well as when they are invading.[1]

The amount of property [as well as the amount of military preparation] should also be considered; and we have to ask whether it is not better to determine it in a different—that is to say, a more definite—way than that of Plato.[2] He states in the *Laws* that the amount should be 'sufficient for a life of temperance'. § 9. [This is vague]: it is much the same as saying, 'sufficient for a good life'; indeed [if you aim at generality] that expression has the advantage of being more general; and besides [if you stop at Plato's definition] there is the further difficulty that 'a life of temperance' may also be a life of misery. A better definition than Plato's [because fuller and more inclusive] would be, 'sufficient for a life of temperance *and liberality*'. These two objects—which should always be combined, for if they are parted liberality will be

[1] The importance of what may be called 'foreign policy', and of military preparedness as the necessary basis of foreign policy, is more than once emphasized by Aristotle: see c. VII of this book, § 14 and note.

[2] In discussing the amount of military equipment required, Aristotle has argued that the objects for which it is intended should first be clearly and fully defined. They must be made, for example, to include the object of resistance to foreign invasion, as well as that of domestic defence. Similarly, he now argues, a clear and full definition of the objects for which it is intended is necessary in order to determine the amount of property required. We must not stop short at the single object of a life of temperance: we must include the further object of a life of liberality, which by its nature involves relations to others—just as we have also included, in dealing with the amount of military equipment required, the further object of resistance to aggression, which equally involves relations to others.

accompanied by luxury, and temperance by penury—represent the only qualities to be desired in the use of wealth. A man cannot use his wealth either in a meek or in a manly spirit [i.e. in a spirit which involves the quality of fortitude]; but he can use it both in a temperate and in a liberal spirit. The two qualities of temperance and liberality must therefore be the qualities involved in the use of wealth.

§ 10. [Another point arises in connexion with Plato's view of the amount of property required by his citizens.] It is strange that he should distribute landed property in [a fixed number of] equal lots, without making any corresponding arrangements to secure a [fixed] number of citizens.[1] He imposes no restriction on the number of children who may be brought into the world: he believes that, however many children may be born [in some families], the absence of children [in others] will mean that the rate of reproduction will just suffice to maintain the level of the population; and he bases his belief on the fact that this is what actually appears to happen in existing states. **1265 b** § 11. But a stationary population will need to be maintained with far more accuracy in the state of the *Laws* than it is in existing states. In existing states, properties can be freely divided to cover the whole population, however large it may be, and nobody need be destitute: in Plato's state, the properties are indivisible, and any surplus population which may arise, whether it be large or small, will have no property at all. § 12. One would have thought that it was even more necessary to limit population, and to prevent reproduction from exceeding a certain level, than to limit property [by instituting a fixed number of equal lots]. If population is limited, the rate of reproduction should be fixed to allow for the incidence of infant mortality and for the amount of infertility among married couples. § 13. If no restriction is imposed on the rate of reproduction (and this is the case in most of our existing states), poverty is the inevitable result; and poverty produces, in its turn, civic dissension and wrongdoing. Pheidon of Corinth, one of the earliest

[1] Here Aristotle is unjust to Plato, who does seek to face the problem (*Laws*, 740).

legislators, held that the number of family plots and the number of citizens should be kept equal to one another, even if the citizens had all started originally with plots of unequal size; but what we find in the *Laws* is the opposite of Pheidon's policy.[1]

§ 14. We must leave to a later occasion any discussion of the improvements which might be suggested in this part of Plato's scheme.[2] Here we must notice another omission of which Plato is also guilty. He has not explained how the rulers are to differ from the ruled. He simply uses a simile: the relation of ruler and ruled, he suggests, should be like that of warp and woof, which are made out of different wools. § 15. It is a further omission that while he allows a man's whole property to be increased fivefold, he does not explain why his plot of land should not also be allowed to increase up to some given point. The distribution of the farm-houses is another subject which needs further consideration: it hardly seems to conduce to efficiency of household management. Plato assigns to each of his citizens two separate houses, situated in different parts [of his plot]. It is difficult to live in two houses [without loss of efficiency].[3] § 16. [But there is more to be said about the form of government proposed in the *Laws*.] The whole system tends to be one neither of democracy nor of oligarchy, but rather an intermediate form, of the sort which is usually called 'polity':[4]

[1] Pheidon was willing to leave the plots themselves unequal, but insisted on preserving equality between the total number of the plots and the total number of the citizens. Plato, in the *Laws*, insists on having the plots equal, but takes no measures (so Aristotle argues) to secure equality between the number of the plots and the number of the citizens.

[2] The promise is partly redeemed in Aristotle's own sketch of an ideal state, Book VII, c. x, § 11, and c. xvi, § 15.

[3] Plato's object, as Newman says in his note, seems to have been that of providing a separate house and quarters for a married son. The curious thing is that Aristotle himself, in his sketch of an ideal state, gives each of his citizens two separate plots and (by implication) two separate houses, one near the city and one on the frontier (Book VII, c. x, § 11).

[4] The 'polity', as described by Aristotle himself later, in Book IV, cc. viii–ix and xi–xiii, is a constitution which may be described as a mixture of, or a 'mean' between, democracy and oligarchy. It rests on the middle class, and the franchise is therefore vested in those who can afford to bear arms (cf. Book III, c. vii, § 4). In Book IV Aristotle

the citizens, for example, are drawn only from those who bear arms. If Plato's view in constructing this constitution is that it represents the form which is most readily attainable by most states, he may very well be right; but if he regards it as the form which comes next in merit to his first, or ideal, form of constitution [i.e. that in the *Republic*], he is mistaken: one might commend more highly the constitution of Sparta, or some other form of a more aristocratic character [than that depicted in the *Laws*]. § 17. There are, indeed, some thinkers who hold that the ideal constitution itself should be a mixture of all constitutions; and they commend, for this reason, the constitution of Sparta. These thinkers are all agreed that the Spartan constitution is composed of all the three elements—monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy—but [they differ in their interpretation of these elements]. According to some of them, monarchy is represented by the two kings: oligarchy by the Council of Elders; and democracy by the Ephors, who are drawn from the ranks of the people. Others, however, regard the Ephoralty as representing tyranny; and these consider that the element of democracy appears in the Spartan system of common meals, and in the general habit of daily life at Sparta. **1266 a** § 18. [Whatever may be thought of this line of opinion, and of these different interpretations of the Spartan constitution], the argument of the *Laws* is to the effect that the best constitution should be composed of democracy and tyranny [only][1]—forms which one would classify as either not constitutions at all or the worst of all constitutions. One comes nearer the truth in seeking to combine

describes the 'polity' as the best possible constitution for average states; and he treats the Spartan constitution as an example of this mixed form (c. IX, §§ 7–9). Here, as will be seen, he seems to take a different line, distinguishing the Spartan constitution from the 'polity', and including even Plato's scheme of a 'polity' in his general 'grumbling' criticism of the *Laws*.

[1] This statement seems doubly unjust to Plato. In the first place, he is not dealing in the *Laws* with the ideal constitution, but (as Aristotle himself has just implied) with the form which comes nearest to the ideal. In the second place, the forms which he proposes to mix are not tyranny and the sort of democracy which is 'either not a constitution at all or the worst of constitutions', but a constitutional form of monarchy and a tempered form of democracy.

more forms [than two]; for a constitution is better when it is composed of more numerous elements.[1] It is a further objection to Plato that the constitution depicted in the *Laws* has really no element of monarchy, but only the elements of oligarchy and democracy, with a particular inclination towards oligarchy.[2] § 19. This appears clearly in the method proposed for appointing magistrates. There is, indeed, one feature which combines democracy with oligarchy. This is the use of the lot for the purpose of finally choosing magistrates from a panel of persons who have been previously elected. But there are two other features which are definitely oligarchical. In the first place, the richer citizens are compelled to attend the assembly, to vote in elections of magistrates, and to discharge other forms of political duty, while the other citizens are allowed to abstain. Secondly, an attempt is made to secure a greater number of magistrates from the wealthier class, and to fill the highest offices from the ranks of those whose assessments are highest. § 20. The method of electing councillors is also oligarchical.[3] All the citizens, it is true, are compelled to take part in the election. But this general compulsion extends only to the preliminary election of a number of candidates from the first assessment class, and of an equal number from the second: when it comes to the preliminary election of candidates from the third and fourth classes, the system of general compulsion stops; indeed in the preliminary election from the fourth class only the members of the first and second classes are

[1] This seems to be inconsistent with Aristotle's view, in Book IV, that a 'polity' composed of the two elements of democracy and oligarchy is the best possible form for average states. On the other hand, he also urges in Book IV (c. VIII, § 9) that it is better to combine more elements than are combined in the 'polity'.

[2] The previous objection (urged in §§ 16 and 17, and in the first half of § 18) is that the constitution depicted in the *Laws*, even if it were a combination of monarchy and democracy, would not be the next best to the ideal constitution—being only a 'polity' which mixes two elements, and being thus inferior to the more 'aristocratical' form, such as the Spartan, which combines three elements. The objection now urged is that Plato is not true to his own conception of the 'next best' constitution, and does not actually mix monarchy and democracy.

[3] See the note at the end of the chapter.

compelled to vote.[1] § 21. [All this relates to the process of pre-election.] Then, from the whole list of pre-elected persons, there must next be elected, says Plato, an equal number of persons for each assessment class. The result will be that the electors who have the largest assessments and belong to the higher orders will form the majority, because many of the common people, not being compelled to do so, will not vote.[2]

§ 22. These considerations, and others which will be mentioned when the time comes for us to examine the nature of the best constitution, are sufficient to prove that it should not be formed by combining democracy and monarchy.[3] We may add that there is also a danger in the method of electing the magistrates by the double process of pre-election and a final election. If a knot of people, even of moderate size, decide to act in combination [at both stages], they will always decide the way in which the elections will go. . . . These are the considerations which are raised by the constitution described in the *Laws*.

Note on the method of electing councillors in the Laws

We must note, in order that Aristotle's brief references may become clear, that Plato's scheme for the appointment of the 360 members of the council involves three successive stages. (1) The first stage is concerned with *pre-election*. At this stage preliminary elections are made—on four successive days—of representatives of each of the four assessment grades or classes. No definite number is suggested by Plato for the number thus elected to represent each class in this stage of pre-election; but he does suggest the 'class' method of voting described by Aristotle in § 20. (2) The second

[1] Plato's scheme (*Laws* 756) is that (1) the members of all the four classes must join in the pre-election of representatives of the first two classes, (2) only those of the first three classes need join in the pre-election of representatives of the third class, and (3) only those of the first two classes need join in the pre-election of representatives of the fourth class.

[2] This statement is strictly true only of the first, or preliminary, stage of pre-election. It is not strictly true of the second stage of final election, in which *all* are compelled to vote. But it must be admitted that if the wealthy have an advantage in the first stage, they will have some consequent advantage in the second.

[3] It has already been remarked, in the note to § 18 above, that Plato is not dealing in the *Laws* with the *best* constitution, but only with the *next best*.

stage is concerned with the definite *election* of representatives. The whole list of all the representatives pre-elected in the first stage is now published; and all the citizens, of all the four assessment classes, must now join *together* in electing an equal number of representatives (180) for each assessment class. (3) Even now the process is not finished. The second period may be that of the definite election; but election itself is not final. The *lot* has still to be used. The third and last stage in Plato's scheme is accordingly the stage in which the lot is used to cut down by half the number of representatives of each assessment class (i.e. from 180 to 90). We thus get at last the 90 representatives of each of the four classes who constitute the final Council of 360. It will be noticed that Aristotle is not quite accurate in suggesting that an *equal* number of candidates is pre-elected for each class in the first stage.

Chapter VII

3. Phaleas of Chalcedon. *His proposal for the equalization of property in land. It would involve regulation of the population: it would also involve determination of the exact standard on which equality was to be achieved. Generally, equality matters more in the moral, or educational, sphere than in the material: disorder and crime are due to moral defects as well as to economic causes. The amount and distribution of property in a state are affected by considerations of foreign as well as domestic policy; but the essential criticism of Phaleas is that he lays too much emphasis on material factors.*

§ 1. There are also a number of other schemes for new constitutions, some of them proposed by amateurs, and others by men who were versed in philosophy or statesmanship. They all come nearer to the existing constitutions, under which men are now actually living, than does either of the schemes proposed by Plato. No other thinker has proposed such novelties as community of wives and children or common meals for women: on the contrary, thinkers have rather started from the immediate necessities of life. § 2. Thus there are some who hold that the proper regulation of property is more important than any other object, because this is the issue on which civil discords always arise. Phaleas of Chalcedon was the first to suggest regulation of property

for the purpose of preventing discord; and he proposed accordingly that all the citizens should have equal amounts of property [i.e. in land]. **1266 b** § 3. He thought that in new colonies this could be achieved, without any difficulty, at the moment of their foundation. States which were already established would present a greater problem; but even here equality could be introduced—and that in the shortest possible time—if the rich gave dowries [in land] but did not receive them, and the poor, conversely, received but did not give them. § 4. Plato, when he was writing the *Laws*, was of the opinion that the amount of property should be left unrestricted up to a given point; beyond that point, he was in favour of restriction, proposing, as has already been said,[1] that no citizen should be allowed to accumulate to an extent which would make his property more than five times as large as the smallest property owned by any other citizen.

§ 5. Those who propose such legislation ought not to forget, as they continually do, that regulation of the amount of property ought to be accompanied by regulation of the number of children in the family. If the number of children exceeds what the amount of the property will support, the abrogation of the law [establishing a system of equal properties] must necessarily follow; and, apart from that consequence, it is a sorry thing that a large number of persons should be reduced from comfort to penury. It is difficult for men who have suffered that fate not to be revolutionaries. § 6. We must admit, indeed, that [there are arguments in favour of equality of property, and that] there were some, in times past, who clearly recognized that such equality had an influence on the character of a political association. We may cite the example of Solon's legislation at Athens; and in other states, too, there are laws to be found which prevent men from acquiring land to any extent they desire. Similarly there are laws to be found which prevent the *sale* of property: among

[1] See c. VI, § 15. But it appears from that section that Plato was thinking of the accumulation of the *total* property of each citizen, while Phaleas was concerned with *landed* property only. Phaleas, we may note, was a contemporary of Plato.

the Locrians, for instance, there is a law to the effect that men cannot sell their property unless they can prove that an evident misfortune has befallen them. § 7. There are also laws to be found which provide that the original lots [of landed property] must be maintained intact: it was the neglect of such a law at Leucas, to mention one instance, which made the constitution excessively democratic; men came into office, as a result, who no longer possessed the necessary legal qualification.[1] But [in spite of the arguments in favour of equality of property derived from these facts] it is possible that equality of property may exist, and yet [be a defective system, because] the amount possessed by each individual may be either unduly large, which leads to luxury, or unduly small, which results in penury. It is therefore clear that it is not enough merely to establish the general principle of equality of property: it is [also] necessary to aim at [a definite system of equality based on] a fixed and moderate amount. § 8. But even if one were to fix the same moderate amount for each, there would still be no real gain. It is more necessary to equalize men's desires than their properties; and that is a result which cannot be achieved unless men are adequately trained by the influence of laws.[2] Phaleas, however, might possibly retort that this is just the view which he himself propounds; for it is his opinion that equality should be doubly pursued in states, and should mean equality of education as well as of property. § 9. But in that case we ought to be told what is to be the character of the education [which all are equally to receive]. There would be no real gain if it were merely one and the same for all; for it is possible for education to be one and the same for all, and yet to be of a

[1] In consequence of the failure to maintain the original lots intact, men who had only part of a lot had to be admitted to office, in spite of legal requirements which (we may gather) demanded the possession of a whole lot as the necessary qualification.

[2] This argument is like the argument previously advanced against the Platonic system of common property; cf. c. v, §§ 5, 15. Aristotle prefers to trust neither to a system of common *ownership* nor to a system of equal *ownership* (both, in his view, material in their nature), but to a system of moral training which affects the moral disposition and secures the right *use* of property.

character which will produce a disposition to covet wealth, or to covet office, or to covet both. § 10. This raises a further point. [It is necessary to deal with office, or political power, as well as with property]: civil discord arises not only from inequality of property, but also from inequality of the offices which men hold. But here we must note a difference. The distribution of property works in the opposite way from the distribution of office. The masses become revolutionary when the distribution of property is *unequal*. Men of education become revolutionary when the distribution of office is *equal*.[1] **1267 a** This is the point of the verse in Homer:

> Office and honour are one and the same for the good and the bad man.

§ 11. [There is also a further point which has to be taken into account. We have to consider not only the causes of civil discord, but also the causes of ordinary crime.] There are some crimes which are due to lack of necessities; and here, Phaleas thinks, equality of property will be a remedy, and will serve to prevent men from stealing simply through cold or hunger. But want is not the only cause of crimes. Men also commit them simply for the pleasure it gives them, and just to get rid of an unsatisfied desire. Vexed by a desire which goes beyond the simple necessities of life, they will turn criminals to cure their vexation. § 12. [There is still a third factor to be considered.] Men may not only commit crime to cure a desire they already feel: they may start some desire [and then commit crime to satisfy that desire] just in order to enjoy the sort of pleasure which is unaccompanied by pain.

What is the remedy for these three kinds of crime?[2] For

[1] Aristotle's own principle, stated later in Book III (c. IX, §§ 1–6), is that office should be awarded in proportion to desert, and therefore on a principle of 'proportionate equality', which gives men office in equal proportion to the different contributions which they make to the well-being of the state. Now 'men of education' contribute something additional, which (on the principle of 'proportionate equality') should receive an additional recognition in the distribution of office.

[2] 'The three are', as Newman explains in his note, '(1) wrongdoing for the sake of absolute necessaries; (2) wrongdoing for the sake of superfluities with a view to curing painful desire and obtaining pleasure;

the first kind, we may answer, some modicum of property and some sort of work: for the second, a temperate disposition; as for the third kind, we can only say that if there are men who want to get unmixed pleasure purely by their own independent effort, they will find no satisfaction except in the aid of philosophy; for all pleasures other than that of philosophy need the assistance of others. § 13. [Other remedies are therefore necessary besides the remedy of Phaleas, which touches only the kind of crime committed from want of necessities.] The greatest crimes are committed not for the sake of necessities, but for the sake of superfluities. Men do not become tyrants in order to avoid exposure to cold. This is the reason why[, the crime of the tyrant being great,] the honours paid to the man who assassinates a tyrant—and not a mere thief—are also great.[1] We thus see that the general scheme of the constitution proposed by Phaleas avails only against the lesser crimes.

§ 14. There is a further criticism to be made of Phaleas. He seeks to arrange most of the details of his scheme with a view to the proper working of the constitution internally. But [external affairs have also to be considered; and] arrangements should also be made to meet the problem of defence against all neighbouring and foreign states.[2] It is therefore

(3) wrongdoing for the sake of superfluities with a view to obtaining painless pleasure'.

The distinction between (2) and (3) is subtle. Under (2) the criminal seeks to cure a painful desire, from which he *already* suffers, by attaining release from pain and enjoying the pleasure of such release. Here there is a mixture of pleasure and pain. Under (3) the criminal seeks to enjoy a pleasure altogether unmixed with pain by *immediately* indulging in desire and proceeding to gratify it at once without any interval of suffering.

[1] The question whether tyrannicide was justifiable was much debated in the Middle Ages and in the sixteenth century. Aristotle does not discuss the general question of tyrannicide: he simply remarks—perhaps remembering the honours paid in Athens to Harmodius and Aristogeiton, who assassinated the tyrant Hipparchus—that tyrannicides are actually honoured.

[2] The problem of external relations—of foreign policy and defence—is one which is always present to Aristotle. He has already raised it (c. VI, §§ 7–8) in criticizing Plato's *Laws*; and when he comes to construct his own ideal constitution he pays special attention to the problem (Book VII, c. VI, and especially c. XI). There is also a reference to the problem of defence in Book IV, c. IV, §§ 10–11.

necessary that the constitution should be constructed with a view to military strength; and of this Phaleas has nothing to say. § 15. What applies to the constitution also applies to property. It should be adequate not only as a basis for the political activities of the citizens internally, but also as a resource for meeting external dangers. This latter consideration suggests the proper amount. On the one hand, it should not be so large that neighbouring and more powerful states will covet it, while its owners are unable to repel an attack: on the other hand, it should not be so small that those who own it are unable to sustain the burden of a war even with states otherwise equal and similar to their own. § 16. Phaleas has given us no indication; but we must not forget that *some* amount of property is an advantage, and we may perhaps suggest, as the best criterion of that amount, that stronger states shall find no advantage in going to war with a state because its wealth is excessive, but will go to war with it only in circumstances in which they would do so even if its wealth were less than it is. § 17. There is an historical incident which illustrates our argument. When the Persian Autophradates was planning to besiege the town of Atarneus, Eubulus, the ruler of the town, asked him to consider the length of time which it would take to capture it, and to calculate the expense which a siege of that duration would mean.[1] He was willing, he said, to surrender the town immediately for less than that amount. This had the effect of causing Autophradates, after a little reflection, to abandon the siege of the town.

§ 18. [Returning to the theme of the *internal* effects of the distribution of property] we must admit that a system which gives equal properties to all the citizens has a certain advantage, in that it helps to prevent mutual discord; but the advantage, on the whole, is inconsiderable. Men of education would be aggrieved by the system, feeling that they deserved

[1] Eubulus was at one time ruler of two towns, Atarneus and Assus, in the north-west of Asia Minor, somewhere about 350 B.C. Aristotle would naturally be interested in his fortunes, because he stayed in Assus, for some years after 347, as the guest of Hermias (the successor of Eubulus) whose niece he married.

something more than mere equality; indeed, as a matter of actual observation, they often rise in revolt and cause civic discord for this very reason. § 19. [Indeed there would be a general revolt against pure equality]: **1267 b** the naughtiness of men is a cup that can never be filled: there was once a time when two obols were a sufficient allowance,[1] but now that this has become the tradition men are always wanting something more, and are never contented until they get to infinity. It is the nature of desire to be infinite; and the mass of men live for the satisfaction of desire. § 20. The source from which a remedy for such evils may be expected is not the equalization of property, but rather a method of training which makes the better sort of natures unwilling, and the poorer sort unable, to indulge in covetousness.[2] The latter object will be attained if men of a poorer nature are put in an inferior position without being subjected to injustice.

§ 21. [It is a final argument against the scheme of Phaleas that] even in regard to his proposal for equality of property he has expressed himself imperfectly. He would equalize property only in land; but wealth may also consist in slaves, cattle, and money, and in addition there will be a considerable stock of what are called movables. The proper course is either to deal with all these forms of wealth by an equal distribution or the fixing of a moderate maximum, or to leave all alike unregulated. § 22. It is also evident, from the legislation proposed by Phaleas, that he proposes to institute only a small body of citizens: the artisans are all to be public slaves, and are not to furnish any addition to the citizen body. § 23. It may be the case that one class of artisans—those who are employed on public property—should be made public slaves. If so, it ought to be done on the lines which are followed at Epidamnus, or on the scheme which Diophantus once sought to introduce at Athens.

The observations which we have made on the constitution

[1] The daily allowance made in the fifth century to each Athenian citizen, during festivals, to pay for seats in the theatre.

[2] Aristotle repeats his constant theme (see the note on § 8, above) that a system of moral training, which affects the moral disposition and secures the right attitude to property, is the method to be followed.

proposed by Phaleas will enable the student to judge whether his suggestions are good or bad.

Chapter VIII

4. Hippodamus of Miletus: *a planner of towns, who also sought to plan states on new lines. His advocacy of 'triads'—three social classes; three divisions of the territory; three sorts of laws. Criticism of his three classes and three divisions of territory. Criticism of his legal novelties, and especially of his proposal to reward the inventors of reforms. Tradition has its claims; and the value of a law-abiding habit may be greater than that of legal reforms.*

§ 1. Hippodamus the son of Euryphon, a citizen of Miletus, was the first man without practical experience of politics who attempted to handle the theme of the best form of constitution. He was a man who invented the planning of towns in separate quarters, and laid out the Peiraeus with regular roads.[1] In his general life, too, [apart from these innovations] he was led into some eccentricity by a desire to attract attention; and this made a number of people feel that he lived in too studied and artificial a manner. He wore his hair long and expensively adorned: he had flowing robes, expensively decorated, made from a cheap but warm material, which he wore in summer time as well as in winter; and he aspired to be learned about nature generally [as well as about town-planning]. § 2. The state which he planned to construct was one of 10,000 citizens, divided into three classes: the first of artisans, the second of farmers, and the third a defence force equipped with arms. § 3. The territory was to be similarly divided into three parts. One was intended for religious purposes; the second for public use; and the third was to be private property. The first part was to meet the expenses of the regular worship of the civic deities; the second part—

[1] Miletus, his native city, had been laid out on a fine scale, and on geometrical lines, soon after 480 B.C. He perhaps learned his methods in Miletus and carried them to Athens, where he may have written a work on town planning to which Aristotle is here referring (*Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. v, p. 463).

that devoted to public use—was to support the defence force; and the third was to be the private property of the farming class. § 4. Hippodamus also believed that there should be only three classes of laws, corresponding to the three main issues—wanton assault, damage, and homicide—on which he held that all lawsuits arise. He proposed, too, that there should be a single supreme court, to which all cases that appeared to have been improperly decided should be referred; and this court, on his plan, was to be constituted of elders selected for the purpose. **1268 a** § 5. He also held that judgements should not be given in the courts by the method of dropping a pebble into the voting urn: each judge should deposit a tablet. If he gave an absolute verdict of condemnation against the defendant, he would write that verdict on the tablet: if he gave an absolute verdict of acquittal, he would leave the tablet blank; if he wished to record a qualified verdict—partly of condemnation, and partly of acquittal—he would specify the nature of his verdict. Hippodamus objected to the ordinary method of voting as a bad sort of arrangement: it compelled a judge [in a border-line case] to violate his judicial oath by giving a verdict of absolute acquittal or condemnation. § 6. He also proposed a law for conferring honours on any who should make an invention of benefit to the state; and he further suggested, as a novelty not hitherto included in the legislation of any state, that the children of those who had been killed in action should be supported at the public expense. . . . Actually, such a law is already in existence at Athens, and also in other states. . . . § 7. Finally, the magistrates, on his scheme, were all to be elected by the people: the people was to be constituted of the three classes already mentioned; and the magistrates whom they elected were to devote themselves to three subjects—public matters, matters relating to aliens, and matter relating to orphans.

These are the main and most notable features in the political arrangements proposed by Hippodamus. The first criticism which we may raise concerns the division of the citizen-body. § 8. The artisans, the farmers, and the military class all share in the constitution, in the sense of possessing

the *active* franchise; but the farmers share without possessing arms, and the artisans share without possessing either land or arms, which makes them both, in effect, the slaves of the class in possession of arms. § 9. It is thus impossible that these two classes should share in all the offices of the state; for the members of the class which possesses arms must necessarily be appointed generals and police magistrates, and must thus hold, in the main, the highest offices. But if the members of these two classes do not share in the constitution [i.e. in the sense of being eligible for office and thus possessing the *passive* franchise], how can they be friendly disposed to the constitution? It may be rejoined that the class which possesses arms ought to be superior to both of the other classes. We may answer that rejoinder by the argument, that it will be difficult for this class to be superior unless it is also numerous. § 10. But, in that case, is there any need for the other two classes to share in the constitution [in the sense of exercising the *active* franchise], or to control the appointment of magistrates? We may also raise the larger question whether the farmers are really of any service to the state. We may admit that artisans are necessary (they are necessary in every state), and that they can earn a subsistence from their crafts in the state proposed by Hippodamus as they do in all other states. But the case of the farmers is different. If they had provided the means of existence for the military class, they might reasonably have been counted as an integral part of the state [for by contributing to the support of an essential class they would have made an essential contribution to the state]; but on the scheme of Hippodamus they own their land as private property, and they will farm it for their private benefit. § 11. A further difficulty arises with regard to the third part of the territory which is to be common property, and from which the members of the defence force are to draw their subsistence. If the members of the defence force farm this common land themselves, there will be no distinction, such as Hippodamus wishes to establish, between the military and the farming class. If, on the other hand, those who farm this common land are to be distinct both from the class of

farmers on private estates and from the military class, we shall have a fourth class in the state; and this class will have no share in anything whatsoever and will be extraneous to the constitution. § 12. There is, indeed, another and third alternative—that the same persons who farm their own private estates should also farm the common land. In that case, however, it will be difficult for each cultivator to produce enough to maintain two households [his own, and that of a member of the military class]; and the question may also be fairly asked, **1268 b** ['Why begin by dividing public from private land?] Why not start at once with a system by which the farmers—using all the land, and each cultivating his share as a single plot—will at one and the same time get subsistence for themselves and provide it for the military class?' There is a sad confusion in the ideas of Hippodamus on all these matters.

§ 13. We may also disagree with the law he proposes in regard to the method of giving judicial decisions. He prescribes that a judge should[, if he thinks fit,] give a qualified verdict, even though the plaint on which he gives his decision is stated in absolute terms. This is, in effect, to prescribe that the judge should become an arbitrator. A qualified verdict is possible in a court of arbitration, even when there are several arbitrators (for they can confer with one another in order to determine their verdict); but in a court of law such a verdict is impossible, since, far from permitting any conference, the majority of legal codes contain specific measures for securing that the judges shall *not* communicate.[1] § 14. The perplexity to which decisions will thus be reduced [if the method of the qualified verdict is introduced into courts of law] can easily be seen. Let us suppose that any given judge is of the opinion that damages should be given—but not to the amount for which the plaintiff sues. A plaintiff,

[1] Aristotle is assuming the existence of popular courts of law, each containing a large number of judges or 'dicasts'—it may be several hundreds. He is also assuming that each of these judges votes separately, and is debarred from communicating with other judges. In these circumstances there cannot be any conference, such as is necessary to a qualified verdict; and there cannot, therefore, be a qualified verdict.

for example, may sue for 20 minae but a judge will give a verdict for 10 (or a plaintiff may sue for a still larger sum and a judge will give a verdict for something still less); but [as there are a number of judges] another will give a verdict for 5, and still another a verdict for 4. In this way, it is obvious, the various judges who give a qualified verdict will each award a different proportion of the amount claimed. But [this is not all: we have also to consider the judges who give a plain and unqualified verdict; and of these] some will award the whole sum claimed, while the rest will award nothing at all. § 15. What is the method of estimating [the total effect of] the different decisions thus given? . . . Turning to another point [also made by Hippodamus—that the giving of a plain verdict compels a judge to violate his oath], we must notice that a plain verdict of pure acquittal or pure condemnation never compels a judge to violate his oath, provided that the plaint itself has been duly laid in a plain and unqualified form. If, for instance, the plaint laid against the defendant is for 20 minae, the judge who gives a verdict for his acquittal does not decide that the defendant owes nothing; he only decides that he does not owe 20 minae. We only arrive at a judge who really violates his oath when we find one who gives a verdict *against* the defendant although he does not believe that he owes the 20 minae claimed by the plaintiff.

§ 16. In regard to the further question raised by Hippodamus—whether some honour ought not to be conferred on those who suggest an improvement which is of benefit to the state—we may argue that legislation in such a sense cannot be safely enacted, and has only a specious sound. It might encourage false accusations [of revolutionary plans] against the reformers, and perhaps lead, in this way, to political disturbances. But the proposal also involves another problem, and suggests a further argument. There are some thinkers who raise a doubt whether states lose or gain by changing their traditional laws when some other and better law is possible. § 17. If, on this issue, we take the line that change is *not* a gain, it is difficult to agree readily with the proposal made by Hippodamus; for changes which are really subversive

of the laws, or of the constitution, may be proposed on the plea that they tend to the common good. However, as the issue has now been mentioned, it will be as well to define our views about it a little further. § 18. It is, as we have said, an issue which is in debate; and a case may be made for the view that change is the better policy. Certainly in other branches of knowledge change has proved beneficial. We may cite in evidence the changes from traditional practice which have been made in medicine, in physical training, and generally in all the arts and forms of human skill; and since politics has to be counted as an art or form of skill, it can be argued logically that the same must also be true of politics. § 19. It can also be argued that the actual facts [of history] provide an indication [of the benefits of change]. The usages of old times were exceedingly simple and uncivilized: Greeks went about armed, and bought their brides from each other. § 20. Indeed the relics of ancient custom which are still in existence, here and there, are utterly absurd: 1269 a there is, for instance, a law at Cyme, relating to homicide, that if an accuser can produce a definite number of witnesses from his own kinsmen, the person accused shall be liable to the charge of murder.[1] § 21. All men, as a rule, seek to follow, not the line of tradition, but some idea of the good; and the earliest-known human beings, whether they were 'earth-born' or the survivors of some cataclysm, were in all probability similar to ordinary or even foolish people to-day. (Indeed that is actually the tale that is told of the 'earth-born' men.) It would therefore be an absurdity to remain constant to their notions. But besides these considerations [which relate to *unwritten* custom], it may also be urged that to leave *written* laws unchanged is not a good policy. § 22. The

[1] The law at Cyme is not so 'utterly absurd': it has its analogies, as Newman notes, in the old Germanic custom of compurgation. Aristotle, and the Greeks generally, had naturally less of the historic sense, and of the spirit of historical understanding and sympathy, than we may properly be expected to possess after centuries of historical scholarship. On the other hand, Aristotle has a deep respect for the general wisdom of the ages (cf. c. v, § 16); and though he may criticize ancient usages (*nomima*), as he does here, he also made a collection of the *nomima* of uncivilized peoples, in addition to his collection of the 'polities' of Greek states.

reason is that in matters of political organization, as in the arts generally, it is impossible for every rule to be written down precisely: rules must be expressed in general terms, but actions are concerned with particulars. [The first form of a law will thus be inexact; and it will need to be changed in the light of further experience of men's actions in detail.]

But while these arguments go to show that in *some* cases, and at *some* times, law ought to be changed, there is another point of view from which it would appear that change is a matter which needs great caution. § 23. When we reflect that the improvement likely to be effected may be small, and that it is a bad thing to accustom men to abrogate laws light-heartedly, it becomes clear that there are some defects, both in legislation and in government, which had better be left untouched. The benefit of change will be less than the loss which is likely to result if men fall into the habit of disobeying the government. § 24. We must also notice that the analogy drawn from the arts is false. To change the practice of an art is not the same as to change the operation of a law. It is from habit, and only from habit, that law derives the validity which secures obedience. But habit can be created only by the passage of time; and a readiness to change from existing to new and different laws will accordingly tend to weaken the general power of law. § 25. Further questions may also be raised. Even if we admit that it is allowable to make a change, does this hold true, or not, of all laws and in all constitutions? And again, should change be attempted by any person whatsoever, or only by certain persons? It makes a great difference which of these different alternatives is adopted. . . . We may therefore dismiss this question for the present. It belongs to a different occasion.

B

ACTUAL STATES WHICH APPROACH THE IDEAL (cc. IX–XII)

Chapter IX

1. The Spartan Constitution. *The problem of finding a leisured class for the purposes of government: serfdom as a solution: the*

Spartan Helots. The undue influence of women at Sparta: the bad distribution of property, and its bad effects on the army. The defects of the Ephorate, the Council of Elders, and the dual kingship: defects of the Spartan system of common meals. The bad results of Spartan militarism, and the bad state of public finances at Sparta.

§ 1. When we consider the constitutions of Sparta and Crete—or indeed, for that matter, of any other state—two questions emerge.[1] The first is whether any of their provisions is good or bad when it is judged by the standard of an *ideal* system: the second is whether any provision runs contrary to the principles and character of their constitutions *as actually established*. § 2. It is generally agreed that leisure, or in other words freedom from the necessity of labour, should be present in any well-ordered state; but it is difficult to see by what mode of organization this leisure is to be secured. The serfdom of the Penestae in Thessaly is one sort of mode, but the serfs there have often revolted against their masters; and the helots have similarly revolted against the Spartans, for whose misfortunes they are always on the watch, just as if they lay in an ambush. § 3. Nothing similar, it is true, has hitherto happened in Crete. Perhaps **1269 b** the reason is that the neighbouring cities of the island, although engaged in mutual hostilities, never enter into any alliance with revolting serfs: it is not to the interests of any, as each has serfs of its own. But all the neighbours of Sparta—Argos, Messenia, and Arcadia—have been her enemies; and this is the cause of the frequent revolts of the helots. [The example of Thessaly proves the same point]: the early revolts of their serfs against the Thessalians were due to the fact that they

[1] In the preceding eight chapters Aristotle has considered, according to the plan laid down in c. 1, § 1, 'forms of government designed by theorists and held in good repute'. He now turns to 'forms actually practised by states that are accounted to be well-governed'. In either case his method is critical: he seeks to discover the defects which are to be avoided, in order to avoid those defects in constructing his own ideal state. His account of the Spartan constitution—like his account of Plato's proposals and his accounts of the schemes of Phaleas and Hippodamus—is therefore critical. It does not necessarily represent his considered view of the general value of the Spartan constitution.

were still engaged in hostilities with the peoples on their borders—the Achaeans, the Perrhaebians, and the Magnesians. . . . § 4. Even if there were no added trouble, the handling of serfs is, in itself, an irksome business. It is not easy to determine on what footing one should associate with them: if they are driven with a loose rein, they become insolent, and proceed to claim equality with their masters: if they have a hard life, they fall into conspiracy and rancour. The moral is plain. States which suffer in this way from having a system of serfdom have not discovered the best mode of organization [for the purpose of securing leisure].

§ 5. Another criticism of the Spartan constitution turns on the indulgence permitted to women. This hinders Sparta from attaining either the purpose of its own constitution or the happiness of its citizen body. Just as husband and wife are alike essential parts of the family, so a state should also be considered as almost equally composed of men and women members. In all constitutions, therefore, where the position of women is poorly regulated, one-half of the citizen body must be considered as left untouched by the laws. § 6. This is what has actually happened at Sparta. The legislator who made the Spartan code intended to make the whole citizen body hardy; but if he fulfilled that intention, as he obviously did, in regard to the men, he has wholly neglected to achieve it in regard to the women, who indulge in all sorts of licence and live a luxurious life. § 7. The inevitable result, in such a constitution, is the worship of wealth, especially if—as happens with most military and martial stocks—the citizens are dominated by their wives. (But the Celts are an exception to this general rule: so, too, are such peoples as openly approve of homosexual attachments.) § 8. There was wisdom in the earliest author of myths when he paired Ares and Aphrodite: the facts show that all martial races are prone to passionate attachments either to men or to women. It was attachments of the latter sort which were common in Sparta; and the result was that, in the days of her hegemony, affairs largely fell into the hands of women. § 9. But what is the difference between governors

being governed by women and women being actually governors? The results are the same. [We may take one example of those results.] Even in the matter of courage, which is useless in all life's ordinary affairs and only of use, if it has a use, in time of war, the women of Sparta have had a most mischievous influence. § 10. They showed this during the Theban invasions; unlike the women of other states, they were of no use whatever, and caused more confusion than the enemy. We may admit that the licence enjoyed by women seems to have come about originally at Sparta in a way which it is easy to understand. **1270 a** § 11. The men were absent on expeditions for long periods: there was war with the Argives, and with the Messenians and Arcadians. Living a military life (which develops a number of good qualities) they were provided with some preparation [for a system of state-training], and on the return of peace and leisure they were thus ready to place themselves at the disposal of the legislator. [It was different with the women, who had been living their own life at home.] Lycurgus indeed attempted, according to tradition, to bring the women too within the range of his laws; but they opposed him, and he had to abandon the attempt. § 12. But while we can thus explain what actually happened, and so account for the origin of this defect in the Spartan system, we have to remember that we are not concerned with what can, or cannot, be excused [historically], but with what is actually right or wrong.

§ 13. The defects in the position of women at Sparta, as we have already suggested, seem not only calculated to produce some lack of harmony in the constitution, if we take that by itself, but also likely to foster the growth of avarice. It is natural, therefore, to pass from the observations just made to some criticism of the unequal distribution of property at Sparta. § 14. While some of the Spartans have come to possess an excessively large amount of property, others have been reduced to the merest fraction; and in this way the land has mostly passed into the hands of a very few persons. This matter has been badly handled by the legislation of Sparta. The legislator, very rightly, made it improper to buy or sell

any land belonging to a Spartan citizen; but he also allowed any person who so desired to give or bequeath his property—though the same results must necessarily follow in the one case as in the other. § 15. Actually, about two-fifths of the whole country belongs to [a few owners, and those few] women; this is due to the number of heiresses and the practice of giving dowries. It would have been better to have had no dowries at all, or to have fixed them at a small, or at any rate a moderate, amount. As it is, a citizen may give the daughter who inherits his property to any man whom he likes (rich or poor); and if he dies intestate before he has done so, the man who is left in the position of guardian gives her in marriage at *his* discretion. § 16. The result has been that while the territory would have supported 1,500 horse and 30,000 foot, the number had dwindled [by the time of the Theban invasions of 369–362 B.C.] to less than 1,000. History itself has clearly shown the defects of the Spartan methods of dealing with property. Sparta was unable to weather a single defeat in the field; and she was ruined by want of men. § 17. It is stated that, under the early kings, the Spartans were in the habit of giving citizenship to strangers, and that, as a result, they suffered from no want of men, in spite of the long wars they were fighting: indeed they are said to have numbered, at one time, as many as 10,000 citizens. Whether this statement is true or false, Sparta would have done better to keep her ranks filled by maintaining an equal distribution of property. § 18. Such a reform is, however, impeded by the very law which the Spartans have adopted for the encouragement of the birth-rate. Anxious for **1270 b** the Spartans to be as numerous as possible, and seeking accordingly to induce his fellow citizens to have as many children as possible, the legislator has enacted a law that the father of three sons should be exempt from military service, and the father of four entirely free from all taxes. § 19. Yet it is obvious that, if families are large, and the land is divided accordingly [among a number of children], a large number of the citizens must necessarily be reduced to poverty.

This leads to a further criticism, which turns on the defects

of the institution called the Ephorate.[1] The Ephors at Sparta have a sovereign authority in matters of the highest importance; but they are all drawn from the people at large, and it often happens that very poor men, whose lack of means renders them open to bribery, attain this office. § 20. This weakness has often been shown in the past; and there is a recent instance in the affair at Andros, when some of the Ephors, by taking bribes, did their best to involve the whole state in ruin. It is a further defect of this institution that it is so important, and so much in the nature of a dictatorship, that even the kings have been compelled to court the favour of the Ephors. The result has been that—apart from their venality—the whole constitution has suffered, in common with the monarchy, from their overgrown power; and from being an aristocracy it has tended to turn into a democracy. § 21. But it must be admitted that the Ephorate is a force which holds the constitution together. The right of sharing in the most important office of the state makes the people at large contented; and this result, whether it be due to the influence of legislation or to the working of chance, has a beneficial effect on the affairs of Sparta. § 22. If a constitution is to survive, all the elements of the state must join in willing its existence and its continuance.[2] [Such a will exists in each of the elements at Sparta]: it exists in the two kings, who are content with the honour paid to their persons: it exists among the upper classes, who are content with their access to the Senate (for a seat in the Senate is given as a reward for excellence); and it also exists in the people at large, who are made contented by the Ephorate and by all being eligible alike for that office. § 23. But [though the Ephorate has this advantage, it still suffers from defects]. It is right and proper that all should be eligible for the office, but not that the election should be conducted on the present method,

[1] The five Spartan Ephors, or 'overseers', had a general superintendence of the Spartan constitution. A number of modern thinkers, from Calvin and Althusius to Fichte, have sought to advocate an imitation of the Spartan Ephorate, in the form of some ultimate supreme council. or supreme court, finally controlling the action of the state.

[2] See the note at the end of the chapter.

which is far too childish.[1] Again, the Ephors are just ordinary men, but they have power to decide important cases; and it would be better, therefore, that they should not decide at discretion [as they now do], but on the basis of written rules set down in legal form. § 24. Finally, their mode of life is not in agreement with the aim of the state. It permits too much indulgence. This contradicts the discipline imposed on the other citizens, which inclines so much to the opposite extreme of severity that men cannot endure its rigour, and escape from it into the secret enjoyment of sensual pleasures.

The institution of the Council of Elders has also its defects. § 25. If the members of the council were men of probity, and adequately trained in manly virtues, it might be argued that the institution was of benefit to the state. . . . Even so, it would be dubious whether councillors should be life-judges in important cases, [as they now are]: the mind, as well as the body, is subject to old age. . . . But when, as a matter of fact, **1271 a** the training of the councillors is such that even the legislator distrusts their character, the council cannot be regarded as a safe institution. § 26. It is evident from experience that those who have held the office of councillor have often been influenced by bribery and favouratism in dealing with public affairs. This is a reason why they should not, as they now are, be free from any scrutiny of their conduct. It is true that the Ephors would appear to have the right to scrutinize the conduct of every magistrate; but this is too sweeping a prerogative for them to possess, nor is it the way in which, in our view, the councillors should be subjected to scrutiny. § 27. The method of electing councillors is also defective. The final election is made in a childish way [by a peculiar form of acclamation]; and there is an impropriety in requiring that, to be eligible, a man should openly seek election. The man who deserves the office should have it whether he wants it or no. § 28. In requiring candidates to

[1] We do not know what this 'childish' method was—whether it was real election of any sort (by acclamation or otherwise), or election mixed with some element of chance (such as the use of the lot or the taking of auspices), or pure reliance on chance.

seek election, the legislator is plainly acting in the spirit which he seeks to infuse into the whole of the constitution. He has imposed the requirement because he wants to make his citizens generally ambitious of honours and office; for no one would seek election as councillor unless he had such an ambition. Yet ambition and avarice are exactly the motives which lead men to commit nearly all intentional crimes.

§ 29. The general theme of kingship, and the question whether it is good or bad for states to have kings, may be left to another occasion. But if there are to be kings, they had better not come to the throne on the principle now followed in Sparta, and each new king should be appointed for his personal conduct and character.[1] § 30. On the present system it is clear that even the legislator himself must be of the opinion that he cannot make the kings behave well and honourably. At any rate he shows a distrust of their being sufficiently good for his purpose; and this distrust has appeared in the practice of joining opponents with the kings on embassies, and in the general opinion that divisions between them served as a political safeguard.

The legal arrangements made, at the time of its introduction, for regulating the system of common meals (or, as the Spartans call them, *phiditia*), may also be criticized. § 31. The cost of such gatherings ought to be defrayed from public funds, as it is in Crete; but the rule at Sparta is for each man to bring his own contribution, in spite of the fact that some of the citizens are extremely poor and unable to bear the expense. The natural result is the very opposite of the legislator's intention. § 32. The system of common meals was meant to be democratic, but the rule which is followed at Sparta makes it almost the reverse. Citizens who are extremely poor find it difficult to share in the common meals;

[1] The monarchy at Sparta (which was a dual monarchy, with two kings ruling simultaneously) was an hereditary office confined to the family of the Heraclidae, and descending by right of seniority. According to Plutarch, Lysander had suggested (early in the fourth century B.C.) that the office of king should be turned into something in the nature of a presidency, and should be open to merit irrespective of descent. Aristotle, as Newman notes, appears to agree with this suggestion.

and yet it is the traditional rule of the Spartan constitution that those who cannot contribute their quota are debarred from sharing in constitutional rights.

§ 33. Other writers have also censured, not without justice, the law relating to the office of admiral. It is a cause of civil discord. The office of admiral is a sort of second kingship, set up as a counterpoise to the kings, who hold the position of generalissimos for life.

§ 34. There is another respect in which the purpose and intention of Spartan legislation may be censured; **1271 b** and the censure has already been passed by Plato in his *Laws*. The whole system of legislation is directed to fostering only one part or element of goodness—goodness in war—because that sort of goodness is useful for gaining power. The inevitable result has followed. The Spartans remained secure as long as they were at war; but they collapsed as soon as they acquired an empire. They did not know how to use the leisure which peace brought; and they had never accustomed themselves to any discipline other and better than that of war.

§ 35. There is another defect at Sparta which is equally grave. The Spartans hold that the 'goods' for which men strive [happiness, honour, and the like] are to be attained by being good, and not by being bad. They are right in thinking that goodness is the way to the 'goods' of life; but they are wrong in believing that these 'goods' are greater than goodness.

§ 36. Another defect at Sparta is the state of the public finances. The treasury is empty, while the state is compelled to wage major wars; and the taxes are not properly paid. Most of the land is in the hands of citizens, and [as the taxes fall on land] none of them looks at all closely at another man's payments. § 37. The effect of the Spartan system is here the reverse of beneficial: it has reduced the state to penury while encouraging private avarice. This may serve as an account of the Spartan constitution, and these are the defects which are particularly open to censure.

Note on Aristotle's conception of will or consent as the basis of the state

This important Aristotelian idea—that 'will is the basis of the state'—is implied in the whole conception of 'association'; and it is

constantly repeated by Aristotle. It appears in Book IV, c. IX, § 10 (where the mixed constitution is said to be dependent on the will of every part); in IV, c. XII, § 1 (where it is stated, as a principle common to all constitutions, that the part which wills the continuance of the constitution should be stronger than the part which does not); and in V, c. IX, § 5 (where the same principle is laid down in the same words). It will be noted that Aristotle sometimes assumes the consent of *all* the parts (e.g. in the present context, where he is primarily thinking of Sparta, and again in the passage in which he is speaking of the mixed constitution), and sometimes only assumes the consent of the *major* part. Perhaps we may say that he assumes the consent of the major part for all constitutions, and only assumes that of all the parts for constitutions of the mixed type.

CHAPTER X

2. The Cretan type of constitution. *Crete possibly the model of Sparta: similarities between the two. The Cretan system of common meals is superior to the Spartan; but the Cretan* Cosmoi, *who correspond to the Spartan Ephors, are inferior to them. Cretan 'feudalism': confederations of nobles: feuds and factions: Crete hitherto saved from their evil effects by its geographical isolation.*

[The first 6 sections are concerned with the possible historical connexion, and with the analogies, between the Cretan constitution and the Spartan. In the following sections, 7–15, Aristotle proceeds to appraise the peculiar merits and defects of the Cretan constitution.]

1272 a 12 § 7. . . . The arrangements for common meals in Crete are better than they are at Sparta. At Sparta each citizen contributes individually the quota allotted to him, and if he fails to do so he is legally debarred, as has already been noted, from a share in constitutional rights. § 8. In Crete the common meals are placed on a more public footing. The whole of the agricultural produce and live stock raised on the public land, and all the rents paid in kind by the Perioeci, form a common fund, of which one moiety is devoted to the cult of the gods and the discharge of public services, and the other to the provision of common meals. This makes it possible for all alike—men, women, and children—to be fed

at the public cost.[1] § 9. The legislation of Crete contains a number of ingenious devices intended to encourage an abstemious form of diet in the interest of the state; it also includes a provision for the segregation of women, to prevent them from having too many children, and it sanctions homosexual connexions. (Whether that is right or wrong is a question which may be left for a later occasion.)

What we have said will show that the arrangements for common meals in Crete are superior to those at Sparta. On the other hand, the *Cosmoi* are an institution which is inferior even to the Ephoralty. § 10. They share the defect of the Ephors—that of being casually appointed [through the absence of any proper qualification]—without presenting the constitutional advantage which the Ephors present. In the Spartan system, under which every citizen is eligible for the Ephoralty, the people at large can share in the enjoyment of this highest of offices, and the popular will is therefore enlisted in support of the constitution. In Crete, however, the *Cosmoi* are drawn from a limited number of families, and not from the people at large; while the members of the council of elders are drawn, in their turn, from the limited circle of those who have served as *Cosmoi*. § 11. This Cretan council of elders may be criticized on the same grounds as the Spartan. Their immunity from the rendering of any account, and their life-tenure, are both prerogatives beyond their desert; and their power of acting at their own discretion—and not on the basis of written rules—is a positive danger. § 12. As for the institution of the *Cosmoi*, we must add that it is no proof of its being properly organized that the people should remain contented in spite of their exclusion from it. The *Cosmoi*, unlike the Ephors, have no opportunity of using their powers for their own profit: they live on an island, remote from the danger of corruption.

1272 b § 13. The remedy which the Cretans provide for the defects of this institution is curious, and belongs to an arbitrary oligarchy rather than a constitutional state. Again

[1] Aristotle follows the Cretan plan in his own ideal state (Book VII, c. x, § 11).

and again a confederation[1] is formed—either by some of their own colleagues, or by a group of private persons—which proceeds to eject the *Cosmoi* from office; and they are also allowed to resign their office before their term has expired. Surely it is better that all such matters should be regulated by law, and not settled by the mere will of men, which is a dangerous standard for action. § 14. Still worse, however, is the practice of declaring an abeyance of office of the *Cosmoi*, to which powerful nobles often resort when they are unwilling to submit to justice. This proves that the Cretan system, if it has some of the elements of a constitution, is not really a constitution at all, but an arbitrary form of oligarchy.[2] It is a habit [of the Cretan nobles] to break up the people and their own followers into many factions; to set up, on that basis, as many monarchies; and then to quarrel and fight. § 15. In effect, and as long as it lasts, such a state of things simply means the disappearance of the state and the dissolution of political society. A state which is brought to this pass is in danger: those who wish to attack it will now have also the power. But Crete itself, as has already been noted, is saved from this danger by its geographical position; and distance has here the same effect which is achieved elsewhere by laws for the expulsion of aliens. [§ 16 is omitted.]

Chapter XI

3. The Carthaginian constitution. *Similarities of Carthage and Sparta, with the balance, in some respects, in favour of Carthage. The constitution of Carthage is generally based on*

[1] This practice of a right of confederation may remind us of the 'Confederations' formed by Polish nobles against the government under the old Polish constitution. The practice of declaring an abevance of the office of *Cosmoi*, which is mentioned below, may also remind us, as Newman notes, of the *liberum veto* of unreformed Poland.

[2] The word used by Aristotle is *dynasteia*, which designates an oligarchical government, in the hands of a clique of powerful nobles (*dynatoi*), acting by arbitrary discretion—and not by constitutional rules—in the style and spirit of a 'tyrant'. A *dynasteia* is thus a plural form of tyranny; and the use of the word naturally leads Aristotle in the next sentence, to speak of monarchy (in its 'tyrannical' form) as characteristic of Crete.

the principle of aristocracy; but it deviates from that principle, partly towards democracy and partly towards oligarchy. Its main defect is that it attaches too much importance to wealth, and is thus, in effect, a moneyed oligarchy. Another defect is the habit of pluralism. Carthage has sought to correct her defects by a policy of encouraging the emigration of the poor; but while this policy has been fortunate in its results, it is not an adequate remedy.

[Aristotle's account of the Carthaginian constitution is mainly of antiquarian interest. It seems curious that he should give an account of a non-Hellenic constitution as one of the three 'actually practised by states that are accounted to be well governed', and the more curious when we reflect that Carthage was challenging the Greek hold on Sicily at the time at which he wrote. But Carthage, along with Sparta and Crete, had a constitution of the mixed type, called the 'polity', to which he inclined as 'the best possible under actual conditions' (see note 1 to c. 1 of this book); and it is probably for this reason that he gives an account of Carthage. It is on the same ground that he refers again to the Carthaginian constitution in Book IV, c. VII, § 4, where it is mentioned as paying regard to wealth, merit, and numbers, and thus mixing oligarchy, aristocracy, and democracy.

His general verdict on the constitution in this chapter is that 'while it is generally based on the principle of aristocracy or "polity",[1] it sometimes deviates from it in the direction of democracy, and sometimes in that of oligarchy' (§ 5). After stating the deviations in either direction, he comes to the conclusion that the general tendency, with one qualification, is in the direction of oligarchy.]

. . . § 15. **1273 b 18** The Carthaginians have a constitution which [though based on the principle of aristocracy or 'polity'] is in practice oligarchical; but they avoid the dangers of oligarchy by encouraging the diffusion of wealth. From time to time a section of the populace is planted out among the dependent cities—a policy which remedies the defects of the constitution

See the note at the end of the chapter.

and serves to give it stability. But this may be said to be the effect of chance; and legislation, not chance, is the true means for preventing the risk of civil discord. § 16. In the present position of affairs the law provides no way of ensuring internal peace if chance should begin to turn adverse and the masses revolt against their rulers. . . .

Note on Aristotle's use of the words polity *and* aristocracy

'Polity' is a word which has two senses in the *Politics*—the general sense of a constitution, and the particular sense of a mixed constitution. The word is here used in the latter sense. The reader may be puzzled by the fact that Aristotle here uses the words aristocracy and 'polity' as if they were equivalent—the more as he generally speaks of aristocracy as one of the elements (but only *one* of the elements) included in a mixed constitution. But he sometimes uses the term aristocracy to denote a mixed constitution—apparently on the ground that the principle of recognition of merit (which is the essential element of aristocracy) is also essential in a good 'polity'. There may, however, be 'polities' which do not recognize the claims of merit, but only those of wealth and numbers (thus mixing only the features of oligarchy and democracy); and such 'polities', containing no aristocratic element, cannot be called aristocracies. Carthage *did* recognize the claims of merit in the elections to various offices, and her constitution *could* accordingly be called an aristocracy.

Chapter XII

4. Postscript on other legislators. *Solon and the constitution of Athens. The earliest legislators. Various notes* (*e.g. on the severity of Draco's laws, and on the legislation of Pittacus about the offences of drunken persons*).

§ 1. Those who have left any record of their views on questions of government may be divided into two classes. Some have been men who took no part in political affairs of any kind or description, but lived for the whole of their lives in a private capacity; we have already mentioned practically everything worthy of note which has come from men of this class. Others, again, have been men who actively served as lawgivers—some in their own and others in foreign states—and who were thus personally concerned in government. [We may subdivide this second class]: some of its members

were only concerned with codes of laws: others were authors of constitutions as well as codes. Lycurgus and Solon are both in the latter category: they not only framed codes of law, but also made constitutions. § 2. The constitution of Sparta has already been described. Solon is held, by one school of thought, to have been a good lawgiver, who may be credited with a triple achievement. He swept away an oligarchy which was far too absolute; he emancipated the people from serfdom; and he instituted that 'ancestral democracy' under which the constitution was so admirably tempered[1]—with the Council of the Areopagus standing for oligarchy, the method of electing the executive magistrates for aristocracy, and the system of popular law-courts for democracy. § 3. In actual fact, **1274 a** however, it would appear that two of these elements—the council and the method of electing the executive magistrates—existed before his time and were simply continued by him. But he certainly introduced the principle of democracy by making membership of the law-courts open to every citizen; and that is the reason why he is blamed by some of his critics, who argue that he really destroyed the other elements by making these popular law-courts, with their members appointed by lot,[2] supreme in every case. § 4. Later, as these courts grew in strength, the successors of Solon, seeking to flatter the people in the way that men flatter a tyrant,[3] transformed the constitution into its present form of extreme democracy. Ephialtes and Pericles curtailed the Council of the Areopagus; Pericles introduced the system of paying the members of the law-courts; and thus each demagogue, in his turn, increased the power of the people until

[1] The more conservative classes at Athens, after the Peloponnesian War and the shock which it brought to advanced democracy, advocated a programme of reversion to the 'ancestral constitution' of earlier days. It is perhaps the view of these classes which Aristotle is here describing.

[2] The appointment of members by lot, which threw the office of judge open to all indiscriminately, accentuated the popular character of the 'dicasteries'.

[3] Aristotle, in later passages of the *Politics*, compares 'extreme' or 'final' democracy with tyranny. It is, he argues, a collective version of tyranny: the people, in such a form of democracy, impose the arbitrary fiat of mass-will in the same way that the tyrant imposes the arbitrary fiat of his single will. (Book IV, c. IV, § 26, and Book V, c. V, § 10.

the constitution assumed its present form. § 5. This development, however, appears to be due to accident rather than to any deliberate design on the part of Solon. The people, who had been the cause of the acquisition of a maritime empire during the course of the Persian wars, acquired a conceit of themselves; and in spite of the opposition of the better citizens they found worthless demagogues to support their cause. Solon himself would seem to have given the people only the necessary minimum of power.[1] He gave them simply the rights of electing the magistrates and calling them to account;[2] and if the people do not enjoy these elementary rights, they must be a people of slaves, and thus enemies to the government. § 6. [Even in giving these rights, he instituted a check]: only the notable and the well-to-do were made eligible for any office; and the magistrates were exclusively drawn from the Pentecosiomedimni [the class with an income, from landed property, of 500 measures of produce], the Zeugitae [the class with an income of 200], and the Hippeis [the class with an income of 300]—while the lowest class, that of the Thetes [with an income of less than 200], was ineligible for any office. . . .

[The rest of the chapter gives a brief account of the early legislators of Greece, and adds a number of notes on details of their legislation.]

[1] In his own phrase, 'I gave the people so much authority as was sufficient for it; and I did not permit either side to carry the day unfairly.'

[2] These are the rights assigned to the masses by Aristotle himself in Book III, c. xi.

BOOK III

THE THEORY OF CITIZENSHIP AND CONSTITUTIONS

A
CITIZENSHIP (cc. I–V)

CHAPTER I

To understand constitutions (or polities), we must inquire into the nature of the state (polis); *and to understand that—since the state is a body of citizens* (politai)*—we must examine the nature of citizenship. Citizenship is not determined by residence, or by rights at private law, but by constitutional rights under the system of public law: 'a citizen is one who* permanently *shares in the administration of justice and the holding of office.' This definition is more especially true in a democracy: to make it generally applicable, we must modify it to run, 'a citizen is one who shares* for any period of time *in judicial and deliberative office'.*

1274 b 32 § 1. When we are dealing with the subject of polity [i.e. constitutions or forms of government], and seeking to discover the essence and the attributes of each form, our first investigation may well be directed to the polis itself; and we may begin by asking, 'What is the nature of the polis?' [There are three reasons for so doing.] In the first place, the nature of the 'polis', or state, is at present a disputed question; and while some affirm, 'It was the *state* that did such and such an act', others reply, 'It was not the state, but the *government* —the governing oligarchy or tyrant.' In the second place, all the activity of the statesman and the lawgiver is obviously concerned with the state; [and we must therefore understand the state in order to understand that activity]. Finally, a polity or constitution is a scheme established [in order to regulate the distribution of political power] among the inhabitants of a polis; [and we must first understand the polis in order to understand that scheme].

§ 2. [But as we have gone back beyond the polity to the

polis, so we have to go back beyond the polis to the politēs or citizen.] A polis or state belongs to the order of 'compounds', in the same way as all other things which form a single 'whole', but a 'whole' composed, none the less, of a number of different parts.[1] This being the case, it clearly follows that we must inquire into **1275 a** the nature of the citizen [i.e. the part] before inquiring into the nature of the state [i.e. the whole composed of such parts]. In other words, a state is a compound made up of citizens; and this compels us to consider who should properly be called a citizen and what a citizen really is. The nature of citizenship, like that of the state, is a question which is often disputed: there is no general agreement on a single definition: the man who is a citizen in a democracy is often not one in an oligarchy. § 3. We may leave out of consideration those who enjoy the name and title of citizen in some other than the strict sense —for example, naturalized citizens. A citizen proper is not one by virtue of residence in a given place: resident aliens and slaves share a common place of residence [with citizens, but they are not citizens]. § 4. Nor can the name of citizen be given to those who share in civic rights only to the extent of being entitled to sue and be sued in the courts. This is a right which belongs also to aliens who share its enjoyment by virtue of a treaty; though it is to be noted that there are many places where resident aliens do not enjoy even this limited right to the full—being obliged to choose a legal protector [to sue and be sued on their behalf], so that they only share to a limited extent in the common enjoyment of the right. § 5. [We may thus dismiss those who have only the right to sue and be sued from our consideration,] just as we may also dismiss children who are still too young to be entered on the roll of citizens, or men who are old enough to have been excused from civic duties. There is a sense in which the young and the old may both be called citizens, but it is not altogether an unqualified sense: we must add the reservation that the young are undeveloped, and the old superannuated, citizens, or we must use some other qualifica-

[1] See the note at the end of the chapter.

tion; the exact term we apply does not matter, for the meaning is clear.

What we have to define is the citizen in the strict and unqualified sense, who has no defect that has to be made good before he can bear the name—no defect such as youth or age, or such as those attaching to disfranchised or exiled citizens (about whom similar questions have also to be raised and answered). § 6. The citizen in this strict sense is best defined by the one criterion, 'a man who shares in the administration of justice and in the holding of office'. Offices may be divided into two kinds. Some are discontinuous in point of time: in other words, they are of the sort that either cannot be held at all for more than a single term or can only be held for a second term after some definite interval. Others, however, have no limit of time—for example, the office of judge in the popular courts, or the office of a member of the popular assembly. § 7. It may possibly be contended that judges in the courts and members of the assembly are not holders of 'office', and do not share in 'office' by virtue of their position. But it would be ridiculous to exclude from the category of holders of office those who actually hold the most sovereign position in the state; and we may dismiss the contention as trivial, since the argument turns on a word [or rather the absence of one]. The point is that we have no one word to denote the factor common to the judge and the member of the assembly, or to describe the position held by both. Let us, in the interest of a clear analysis, call it 'indeterminate office' [i.e. office held for an indeterminate period]. § 8. On that basis we may lay it down that citizens are those who share in the holding of office as so defined.

Such is the general nature of the definition of citizen which will most satisfactorily cover the position of all who bear the name. [But it still leaves us confronted by difficulties.] Citizenship belongs to a particular class of things where (1) there are different bases on which the thing may depend, (2) these bases are of different kinds and different qualities—one of them standing first, another second, and so on down the series. Things belonging to this particular

class, when considered purely as so belonging, have no common denominator whatever—or, if they have one, they have it only to a meagre extent.[1] § 9. [The different bases of citizenship are different constitutions]; constitutions obviously differ from one another in kind, and some of them are obviously inferior **1275 b** and some superior in quality; for constitutions which are defective and perverted (we shall explain later in what sense we are using the term 'perverted') are necessarily inferior to those which are free from defects. It follows that [as constitutions differ, so] the citizen under each different kind of constitution must also necessarily be different. § 10. We may thus conclude that the citizen of our definition [one holding the indeterminate office of judge in a court and member of an assembly] is particularly and especially the citizen of a democracy. Citizens living under other kinds of constitution *may* possibly, but do not necessarily, correspond to the definition. There are some states, for example, in which there is no popular element: such states have no regular meetings of the assembly, but only meetings specially summoned;[2] and [so far as membership of the courts is concerned] they remit the decision of cases to special bodies. In Sparta, for example, the Ephors take cases of contracts (not as a body, but each sitting separately); the Council of Elders take cases of homicide; and some other

[1] Applying these general considerations to citizenship, we may say (1) that the 'basis' of citizenship is the constitution; (2) that constitutions are of different 'kinds', with the different kinds of constitutions having different 'qualities'; and (3) that citizenship has therefore differences of quality, so that a common denominator or definition can hardly exist. Considered purely as members of the class of citizens, the citizen under an extreme oligarchy and the citizen under an extreme democracy have little or nothing in common; though if we consider them not as citizens, but as human beings, we may find that they have a common, if meagre, denominator in *that* capacity.

[2] These 'specially summoned' meetings may also have been attended only by persons specially summoned; but Aristotle appears to refer here to the *time* of the meeting, and not to the *persons* attending the meeting. Democracies had regular meetings: states of a different type had only irregular meetings. The point of time here taken is in general agreement with Aristotle's emphasis on the argument of time in his definition of citizenship as the holding of deliberative and judicial office for *an indeterminate period.*

authority may take other cases. § 11. Much the same is also true of Carthage, where a number of bodies of magistrates have each the right to decide all cases.

But our definition of citizenship [may still be maintained, in spite of these difficulties, since it] can be amended. We have to note that in constitutions other than the democratic, members of the assembly and the courts do not hold that office for an indeterminate period. They hold it for a limited term; and it is to persons with such a tenure (whether they be many or few) that the citizen's function of deliberating and judging (whether on all issues or only a few) is assigned in these constitutions. § 12. The nature of citizenship in general emerges clearly from these considerations; and our final definitions will accordingly be: (1) 'he who enjoys the right of sharing in deliberative or judicial office [for any period, fixed or unfixed] attains thereby the status of a citizen of his state', and (2) 'a state, in its simplest terms, is a body of such persons adequate in number for achieving a self-sufficient existence'.[1]

Note on 'compounds' and 'wholes'

The terms 'compound' (*syntheton*) and 'whole' (*holon*) are both technical terms of Aristotle's philosophy. The 'compound' is the genus: the 'whole' is a species of that genus. 'Compounds', as defined by Grote in a passage quoted in Newman's note, 'are of two sorts—aggregates like a heap (mechanical), and aggregates like a syllable (organic)'. 'Wholes' are aggregates of the second or organic kind: they have a Form which gives them an organic unity, and an End or Final Cause which gives them a single purpose. The polis is such a 'whole'.

There is a further point to be noted in regard to the idea of 'compound' (including that of 'whole'). The idea involves a distinction between the ruling element or elements and those which are subject to rule: in other words, it involves a hierarchy of rule and

[1] On the meaning of self-sufficiency see Book I, c. 11, § 8, and the note on that passage. On the general implications of Aristotle's definition of citizenship see the Prefatory Note, § 2, and what is there said in regard to the conception of *to kyrion* (and also § 3, and what is there said about the term *dikastērion*). Sir John Myres speaks of Aristotle's definition, which assigns to the citizen even *archē* itself, as giving room for the expression of 'the voice of human reason, facing facts, opinions, and traditions . . . open-minded'. (*Political Ideas of the Greeks*, pp. 229–30.)

subordination (see Book I, c. v, § 3 and note). Aristotle accordingly notes in the *Ethics*, Book IX, c. viii, § 6, that 'a polis, or any other systematic whole, may be identified particularly with the most sovereign element in it'.

Chapter II

A popular and pragmatic view of citizenship makes it depend on birth, i.e. descent from a citizen parent or two citizen parents. This does not carry us far, and in any case it only relates to old established citizens. A more serious question is raised when we consider new *citizens, who have been given constitutional rights in the course of a revolution. Are they actually citizens? On the criterion of sharing in judicial and deliberate office (which is a functional criterion) they* are *actually citizens when once they possess that function.*

§ 1. For practical purposes, it is usual to define a citizen as 'one born of citizen parents on both sides', and not on the father's or mother's side only; but sometimes this requirement is carried still farther back, to the length of two, three, or more stages of ancestry. This popular and facile definition has induced some thinkers to raise the question, 'How did the citizen of the third or fourth stage of ancestry himself come to be a citizen?' § 2. Gorgias of Leontini—perhaps partly from a sense of this difficulty and partly in irony—said, 'As mortars are things which are made by the craftsmen who are mortar-makers, so Larissaeans are persons who are made by the "craftsmen" who are Larissaean-makers'.[1] § 3. But [there is no reason to raise any difficulty about the title of the earlier citizens:] the matter is really simple. If, in their day, they enjoyed constitutional rights in the sense of our own definition [i.e. the right of sharing in judicial or deliberative

[1] Gorgias was punning on the Greek word *demiourgoi*, which has the general significance of craftsmen, but was also used, in some states, as the regular designation of the magistrates. But he was also defining citizenship seriously, by making its *origin* depend not on birth, but on the act of the state. Aristotle, however, is not interested in the question of origin: here, as elsewhere, he is concerned with *function*. 'All things derive their essential character from their function' (Book I, c. ii, § 13). It follows that on his view we must look to function, and not to origin, if we wish to define the essential character of the citizen.

office], they were certainly citizens. It is obviously impossible to apply the requirement of descent from a citizen father or a citizen mother to those who were the first inhabitants or original founders of a state.

A more serious difficulty is perhaps raised by the case of those who have acquired constitutional rights as the result of a revolutionary change in the constitution. We may take as an example the action of Cleisthenes at Athens, when after the expulsion of the tyrants he enrolled in the tribes a number of foreigners and a number of resident aliens belonging to the slave class. § 4. The question raised by such an addition to the civic body is not the question of fact, 'Who is actually a citizen?' It is the question of justice, 'Are men [who are actually citizens] rightly or wrongly such?' It must be admitted, however, that the further question may well be raised, **1276 a** 'Can a man who is not justly a citizen be really a citizen, and is not the unjust the same thing as the unreal?' § 5. [This further question may be easily answered.] Obviously there are holders of office who have no just title to their office; but we none the less call them office-holders, though we do not say they are justly such. [The same is true of citizens also:] they, too, are defined by the fact of holding a sort of office (for the definition we have given of the citizen involves his sharing in office of the deliberative and judicial kind); and it follows, therefore, that those who have received this sort of office after a change in the constitution must, in practice, be called citizens.

Chapter III

This still leaves us faced by the question, 'Are they justly citizens?' It may be argued that it was not the state, but only a revolutionary government, which gave them the position of citizens, and that they have accordingly no just title. This argument raises the general question of the identity of the state. Is the state identical with the government for the time being? Generally, what are the factors which constitute its identity? The identity of a state does not depend on its being surrounded

by one set of walls, or on its consisting of one stock of inhabitants. The state is a compound; and its identity, like that of all compounds, is determined by the scheme of its composition––i.e. by its constitution.

§ 1. The question whether, in justice, they are citizens or not is a different matter, which is closely connected with a larger question already mentioned [at the beginning of the first chapter].[1] The problem raised by this larger question is that of deciding when a given act can, and when it cannot, be considered to be the act of the state. We may take as an example the case of an oligarchy or tyranny which changes into a democracy. § 2. In such a case there are some who are reluctant to fulfil public contracts—arguing that such contracts were made by the governing tyrant, and not by the state—and unwilling to meet other obligations of a similar nature.[2] They hold the view that some constitutions exist [only] by virtue of force, and not for the sake of the common good: [on which it follows that acts done under such constitutions cannot be acts of the state, which must always, by its nature, act for the common good]. This argument, however, [cuts both ways; for it] leads us to the conclusion that when we find a democracy which exists by virtue of force we have to admit that acts done under the government of such a democracy are no more acts of the state concerned

[1] The essence of this larger question is concerned with the nature and identity of the state. Is the nature of the state such that we may identify it with the constitution in force, and therefore with the government in power, at any given time? Or is the nature of the state such that we must distinguish it from the particular constitution which may be in force, and the particular government which may be in power, at any given time? On the first alternative any action of a government in power (e.g. the action of making new citizens, or the action of making public contracts) will (1) be the action of the state, (2) as such, be valid, and (3) continue to be binding even when the form of government is changed. On the second alternative the action of a government in power—at any rate in the case of a government which has attained power after a revolutionary change in the constitution—will (1) not necessarily be the action of the state, (2) not necessarily be valid, and (3) not necessarily continue to be binding when the form of government is changed.

[2] This was the general issue raised when the Communist government succeeded the government of the Tsars in 1917.

than were acts done under the oligarchy or tyranny [which previously existed]. § 3. But the question here raised would seem to be closely allied to a question which takes us still further—'On what principles ought we to say that a state has retained its identity, or, conversely, that it has lost its identity and become a different state?'

The most obvious mode of dealing with this question is to consider simply territory and population [i.e. to treat the issue of identity merely in *physical* terms]. On this basis we may note that the territory and population of a state may be divided into two (or more) sections, with some of the population residing in one block of territory, and some of it in another. [Does such a division destroy the identity of a polis?] § 4. This difficulty need not be regarded as serious: the issue which it raises can easily be met if we remember that the word 'polis' or state is used in different senses.[1] If we now proceed to take the case in which the whole population of a state resides in a single territory, the question still remains, 'When, or on what conditions, should this state be considered as possessing a real [in addition to its physical] identity?' § 5. The identity of a polis is not constituted by its walls. It would be possible to surround the whole of the Peloponnese by a single wall: [but would that make it a single polis?]. Babylon (which, it is said, had been captured for three whole days before some of its inhabitants knew of the fact) may perhaps be counted a polis of this dubious nature: so, too, might any polis which had the dimensions of a people [*ethnos*] rather than those of a city. § 6. But it will be better to reserve the consideration of this question [i.e. how large a polis can be and yet remain a single polis] for some other occasion. To determine the size of a polis—to settle how large it can properly be, and whether it ought to consist of the members of one people or of several—is a duty incumbent on the statesman. [It is, therefore, a matter to be considered

[1] The settlement of the problem of identity will go one way, and the verdict will be that the polis has not a single identity, if we are using 'polis' in the sense of a city or place. The settlement will go another way, and the verdict will be in favour of identity, if we are using 'polis' in the sense of a political community.

in connexion with the art of statesmanship, rather than in connexion with the theory of the identity of the polis.][1]

[We may now turn from considerations of size to considerations of stock.] Still assuming a single population inhabiting a single territory, shall we say that the state retains its identity as long as the stock of its inhabitants continues to be the same (although the old members are always dying and new members are always being born), and shall we thus apply to the state the analogy of rivers and fountains, to which we ascribe a constant identity in spite of the fact that part of their water is always flowing in and part always flowing out? Or must we take a different view, and say that while the population remains the same, for the reason already mentioned [i.e. that the stock of the inhabitants continues to be the same], the *state* may none the less change?

1276 b § 7. [The latter view carries the day.] If a polis is a form of association, and if this form of association is an association of citizens in a polity or constitution, it would seem to follow inevitably that when the constitution suffers a change in kind, and becomes a different constitution, the polis also will cease to be the same polis, and will also change its identity. We may cite an analogy from the drama. We say that a chorus which appears at one time as a comic and at another as a tragic chorus is not continuously the same, but alters its identity—and this in spite of the fact that the members often remain the same. § 8. What is true of a chorus is also true of every other form of association, and of all other compounds generally. If the scheme of composition is different, the compound becomes a different compound. A harmony composed of the same notes will be a different harmony according as the 'mode' [or scheme of its composition] is Dorian or Phrygian. § 9. If this is the case, it is

[1] Aristotle accordingly considers the size of the polis as a *practical* question for statesmanship when he comes to construct an ideal state (Book VII, c. IV). He thus leaves unsolved, in this passage, the problem of the connexion of the size of the polis with the *theoretical* question of the identity of the state—though he seems to incline to the view that a very large polis cannot possess a real identity.

obvious that the criterion to which we must chiefly look in determining the identity of the state is the criterion of the constitution. [The criterion of stock is irrelevant]: whether the same group of persons inhabits a polis, or a totally different group, we are free to call it the same polis, or a different polis [in the light of the other and final criterion]. . . . It is a different question, and another matter, whether it is right or wrong for a state to repudiate public obligations when it changes its constitution into another form.

Note on public contracts after a revolution

Aristotle thus leaves unsolved the problem raised at the beginning of the chapter, whether public contracts should still be kept when the constitution is changed and (for instance) a tyranny or oligarchy is turned into a democracy. Two different conclusions may be drawn from the arguments which he uses in the course of the chapter. (1) The first is that, if the identity of the state depends on the constitution, a state with a new constitution is a new state, not necessarily bound by the acts of the old state. (2) The second is that if contracts made for the common good are always binding (which is the argument implied in § 2), then any such contract will be binding in spite of a change of constitution; and thus a contract made for the public good under an oligarchy will still be binding under a democracy. It is perhaps this latter consideration which leads Aristotle to say that the question of the validity of public contracts is a different question from that of the identity of the state.

It is interesting to notice how the question of the validity of public contracts, after a change of constitution, was actually solved at Athens in 404 B.C. and afterwards. The restored Athenian democracy honoured even the contracts made with Sparta by their predecessors, the Thirty Tyrants: 'in spite of financial difficulties . . . the debts contracted at Sparta by the Thirty were honoured by their successors and gradually repaid.' (*Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. vi, p. 35.)

Chapter IV

The idea of the constitution thus provides an answer to the question, 'What is the identity of the state?' It also provides an answer to the question, 'What is the relation of the excellence of the good citizen to the excellence of the good man?' If we look at constitutions generally, we must note that different constitutions

require different types of good citizen, while the good man is always the same. If we look at the ideal constitution, we may argue that even here there must be different types of good citizen, because there are different sorts of civic function; and thus here too the good citizen cannot be identified with the good man. On the whole, therefore, the good citizen and the good man cannot be identified. But there is one case in which they can be. This is the case of the good citizen under an ideal constitution who possesses the quality of moral wisdom required for being a good ruler as well as the other qualities required for being a good subject. The quality of moral wisdom which he possesses is the essential quality of the good man; and in his case the excellence of the good citizen is identical with that of the good man.

§ 1. A question connected with those which have just been discussed is the question whether the excellence of a good man and that of a good citizen are identical or different.[1] If this question is to be properly investigated, we must first describe the excellence of the citizen in some sort of outline. Just as a sailor is a member of an association [i.e. the ship's company, with its various members and their different duties], so too is a citizen. § 2. Sailors differ from one another in virtue of the different capacities in which they act: one is a rower, another a pilot, another a look-out man; and others again will have other names in the same sort of way [i.e. according to their capacities]. This being the case [i.e. the ship's company being composed of men acting in different capacities], it is clear that the most accurate definition of the excellence of each sailor will be special to the man concerned;

[1] The general considerations which lie behind the question here raised are well summarized in Newman's note. 'Socrates had taught the unity of virtue, claiming that virtue is one and the same in all who possess it. Aristotle holds, on the contrary, that virtue varies with the work a person has to do, and that, as a citizen's work is relative to the constitution, his virtue varies with the constitution. To identify the virtue of a good citizen with that of a good man is therefore to ignore the difference between one constitution and another.'

The connexion between the new question now raised and the question previously discussed is thus that both are determined by the fact of the constitution. It is that fact which determines the identity of the state. It is also that fact which determines the relation of the good man's excellence to that of the good citizen.

but it is also clear that a common definition of excellence will apply to all, inasmuch as safety in navigation is the common end which all must serve and the object at which each must aim. § 3. What is true of sailors is also true of citizens. Though they differ [in the capacities in which they act, they all have a common object]; the end which they all serve is safety in the working of their association; and this association consists in the constitution. The conclusion to which we are thus led is that the excellence of the citizen must be an excellence relative to the constitution. It follows on this that if there are several different kinds of constitution [the excellence of the citizen must also be of several different kinds, and] there cannot be a single absolute excellence of the good citizen. But the good man is a man so called in virtue of a single absolute excellence.

§ 4. It is thus clear that it is possible to be a good citizen without possessing the excellence which is the quality of the good man. But we may reach the same conclusion in another way, by discussing the question [not, as we have hitherto done, in relation to constitutions generally, but] with particular reference to the best or ideal constitution.[1] § 5. If it is impossible for a polis to be composed entirely and only of good men; if, none the less, each citizen of a polis must discharge *well* the function belonging to him; if his good discharge of his function involves, as it must, his excellence—then, as it is impossible for all the citizens to be alike [differing, as they must, in their functions and their capacities], the excellence of a good citizen cannot be identical with that of a good man. **1277 a** [In other words, there cannot be a single excellence common to both]: the excellence of being a good citizen must belong to all citizens indifferently, because that is the condition necessary for the state being the best state;

[1] The argument of the preceding section has proved that in constitutions generally, with all their variety, there cannot be a single excellence of the citizen which can match, and be identified with, the single excellence of the good man. The argument of this and the following section proves that, even if we isolate the ideal constitution, the excellence of *its* citizen cannot invariably match, or be identified with, the excellence of the good man.

but the excellence of being a good man cannot possibly belong to all—unless, indeed, we hold that every citizen of a good state [by virtue of belonging to it] must also be a good man. . . . § 6. There is a further point to be made.[1] The polis is composed of unlike elements. Just as a living being is composed of [the different elements of] soul and body, or the soul of the different elements of reason and appetite, or the household of man and wife, or property of master and slave, so the polis too is composed of different and unlike elements—among them not only the various elements already mentioned [e.g. man and wife, and master and slave], but also others in addition [e.g. ruler and ruled, or soldier and civilian]. It follows upon this difference between the elements of which the polis is composed that there cannot be a single excellence common to all the citizens, any more than there can be a single excellence common to the leader of a dramatic chorus and his assistants.

§ 7. It is clear from these considerations that the excellence of the good citizen and that of the good man are not in *all* cases identical. But the question may still be raised whether there are not *some* cases in which there is identity. [The cases we have to consider are those of the ruler and statesman.[2]] We call a good ruler a 'good' and 'prudent' man, and we say of the statesman that he ought to be 'prudent'.[3] § 8. [This is to differentiate the ruler, and to make *his* excellence identical with that of the good man.] Indeed there are some who hold

[1] It has been shown in §§ 4–5 that, though all the citizens of the best state have the excellence of the good citizen, that excellence is none the less different from that of the good man. The additional point made in this section is that while all the citizens of such a state have the excellence of the citizen, they have that excellence *in different ways*—with the result that there are different kinds of the excellence of the citizen, which is not the case with the excellence of the good man.

[2] The ruler is the *genus*: the statesman is the *species*, i.e. that particular sort of ruler who holds office in a free polis composed of free associates.

[3] 'Prudent' is a word which fails to give the exact sense of the Greek *phronimos*. The man who is *phronimos* is the man who possesses that quality of 'moral wisdom', or *phronēsis*, which is the ultimate goal of moral development—succeeding and crowning the prior stage of 'habituation', by social environment and education, through which we all pass in our earlier years. He is 'the good man'.

that the very training of the ruler should be, from the first, of a different kind; and it is a matter of observation that the sons of kings are specially trained in riding and the art of war. Thus Euripides makes a king say [of the education of his sons]

No subtleties for me,
But what the state most needs,

which implies a special training for the ruler. § 9. We may thus assume that, in the case of the ruler, the excellence of the good citizen is identical with that of the good man. But we have to remember that subjects too are citizens, [and *their* case is different]. It therefore follows that the excellence of the good citizen cannot be identical with that of the good man in all cases, though it may be so in a particular case [i.e. where the citizen is acting as a ruler]. The excellence of the ordinary citizen [which requires the virtues of obedience as well as those of command] is different from that of the ruler; and this may well be the reason why Jason, the tyrant of Pherae, said that 'he was a hungry man except when he was tyrant', meaning that he did not know how to live in a private station.

§ 10. [So far, the argument favours the ruler who is purely a ruler, because it makes his excellence identical with that of the good man.] On the other hand, men hold in esteem the double capacity which consists in knowing both how to rule and how to obey, and they regard the excellence of a worthy citizen as consisting in a good exercise of this double capacity. Now if the excellence of the good man is in the one order of ruling,[1] while that of the good citizen is in both orders [i.e. both ruling and obeying], these two excellences cannot be held in the same esteem. § 11. The position thus being that we find men holding (1) that ruler and ruled should have different sorts of knowledge, and not one identical sort, and (2) that the citizen should have both sorts of knowledge, and share in both, we can now see the next step which our

[1] The good man, possessing the quality of 'moral wisdom', is able to rule his appetites; and, generally, he meets moral difficulties with the quality of deliberate choice which should characterize the ruler.

argument has to take.[1] [There is a conflict of views, which needs and admits of reconciliation; and in order to attain that reconciliation we must proceed to distinguish the different sorts of ruling and being ruled, and to show that there are *some* sorts of being ruled which the citizen need not learn.]

There is rule of the sort which is exercised by a master [over slaves]; and by this we mean the sort of rule connected with menial duties. Here it is not necessary for the ruler to know how to do [what he requires the ruled to do], but only to know how to use [the capacities of the ruled]: indeed the former kind of knowledge (by which we mean an ability to do menial services personally) has a servile character. § 12. [We may go on to note that menial services are not confined to those who are actually slaves, but have a wider scope.] There are a number of forms of servile position, because there are a number of forms of menial service which have to be rendered. One of these forms of service is that which is rendered by manual labourers. These, as their very name signifies, are men who live by the work of their hands; and the menial craftsman, or mechanic, belongs to this class. This is the reason why in some **1277 b** states the working classes were once upon a time excluded from office, in the days before the institution of the extreme form of democracy. § 13. The occupations pursued by men who are subject to rule of the sort just mentioned [i.e. the rule of a master or an employer over persons in a servile position] need never be studied by the good man, or by the statesman, or by the good citizen—except occasionally and in order to satisfy some per-

[1] Newman's note admirably illustrates the argument. 'One view is that the ruler and the ruled should learn different things; the other is that the citizen, who is in part a ruler, should learn both how to rule and how to be ruled, or in other words should learn the same things as the ruled. Both of these views are partly true. Those who hold that the ruler and the ruled should learn different things are so far correct that the citizen-ruler over citizens, and therefore the citizen, should not learn the work of unfreely ruled persons. Those who hold that the ruler and the ruled should learn the same things are so far correct that the citizen-ruler over citizens should learn to be ruled as a freeman is ruled. Thus the truth lies midway . . . between the two opinions.'

sonal need, in which case there ceases to be any question of the relation of master and servant.

But [besides rule of the sort exercised by their ruler over persons in a servile position] there is also rule of the sort which is exercised over persons who are similar in birth to the ruler, and are similarly free. § 14. Rule of this sort is what we call political[1] rule; and this is the sort of rule which [unlike rule of the first sort] the ruler must begin to learn by being ruled and by obeying—just as one learns to be a commander of cavalry by serving under another commander, or to be a general of infantry by serving under another general and by acting first as colonel and, even before that, as captain. This is why it is a good saying that 'you cannot be a ruler unless you have first been ruled'. § 15. Ruler and ruled [under this system of political rule] have indeed different excellences; but the fact remains that the good citizen must possess the knowledge and the capacity requisite for ruling as well as for being ruled, and the excellence of a citizen may be defined as consisting in 'a knowledge of rule over free men from both points of view' [i.e. that of the ruler as well as that of the ruled].

§ 16. [In the light of these considerations about political rule, and about the nature of the excellence of a good citizen under a system of such rule, we may now return to the question whether the excellence of a good citizen is identical with that of a good man.] A good man, like a good citizen, will need knowledge from both points of view. Accordingly, on the assumption that the temperance and justice[2] required for ruling have a special quality, and equally that the temperance and justice required for being a subject in a free state have *their* special quality, the excellence of the good man (e.g. his justice) will not be one sort of excellence. It will include different sorts—one sort which fits him to act as a

[1] 'Political', in the sense that it is exercised in a free polis, over the free *politēs* or citizen, by the *politikos* or statesman.

[2] The excellence of the good man and citizen (*aretē*, or general goodness) embraced, in the current view of the Greeks, four particular forms of goodness—temperance, justice, courage, and wisdom. Aristotle here selects some of these particular forms in order to elucidate his argument.

ruler, and one which fits him to act as a subject.[1] . . . We may note that the temperance and the courage of a man differ from those of a woman in much the same sort of way [as the temperance and courage of a person acting as ruler differ from those of a person acting as subject]. § 17. A man would be thought to be cowardly if his courage were only the same as that of a courageous woman; and conversely a woman would be thought to be forward if her modesty were no greater than that which becomes a good man. The function of the man in the household is different from that of the woman [as the function of ruling persons in the state is different from that of subjects]: it is the function of the one to acquire, and of the other to keep and store. . . .

'Prudence' is the only form of goodness which is peculiar to the ruler. The other forms [temperance, justice, and courage] must, it would seem, belong equally to rulers and subjects [though their *quality* in the ruler differs from their *quality* in the subject]. § 18. The form of goodness peculiar to subjects cannot be 'prudence', and may be defined as 'right opinion' [or a proper state of *feeling*]. The ruled may be compared to flute-makers: rulers are like flute-players who use what the flute-makers make.[2]

These considerations will suffice to show whether the excellence of the good man and that of the good citizen are identical or different—or [rather] in what sense they are identical and in what sense they are different.

Note on the course of the argument of c. iv

The argument of this chapter, which pursues the 'aporetic' method of raising and discussing various difficulties, is difficult. It may be said to fall into two parts. (1) The first part, in §§ 1–4, deals

[1] Previously, in § 3 of this chapter, Aristotle had assumed that the good man was such in virtue of a single excellence. He now discovers that the excellence of the good man is, after all, a double excellence, because, in order to be excellent, he must be able, according to the position in which he is placed, either to command or to obey as a good man should.

[2] It is easy to see the analogy between the flute-player and the ruler. It is less easy to see in what sense the ruled are like flute-makers (they would seem to be more like flutes)—unless it be that they have to supply the material in the use of which the ruler may show his moral wisdom or 'prudence'.

with the problem of the identity or difference of the excellence of the good man and that of the good citizen *in reference to all types of state*. Here the conclusion is that there is not identity, but difference —for the simple reason that there are many types of state, some good and some bad, and that the bad type demands a kind of excellence from its good citizen which is very different from that of the good man. (2) The second part, in §§ 5–18, deals with the problem *in reference to the ideal state*. This second part falls itself into two subdivisions. (*a*) The conclusion of the first subdivision, in §§ 5–7, is that the excellence of the good citizen of the ideal state is not *in all cases* identical with that of the good man. (*b*) The conclusion of the second subdivision, in §§ 8–18, is that the excellence of the good citizen of the ideal state is *in one case* identical with that of the good man. The case in which identity exists is that of the excellence of the good citizen of an ideal state who possesses the quality of wisdom required for ruling in addition to possessing the qualities required for being ruled.

It may be added that in the course of the argument Aristotle shifts his ground (as has already been observed in a previous note on § 16) about the unity of the excellence of the good man, considered in itself. Having said, in § 3, that the excellence of the good man is a 'single absolute excellence', he argues, in § 16, that his excellence (e.g. his justice) 'has different qualities'—one which fits him to act as ruler and one which fits him to act as subject. But though there is a shifting of ground, there is no contradiction.

Chapter V

There is a further question relating to citizenship, 'Can mechanics and labourers be citizens, and if they cannot be citizens, how are they to be described?' They should not be citizens, because they cannot achieve the excellence of the good citizen; they may be described as necessary conditions of the state. But the answer varies from one kind of constitution to another: in an aristocratic constitution mechanics and labourers cannot be citizens; in an oligarchy, a rich mechanic may.

§ 1. There is still a question which remains to be considered in regard to citizenship. Is citizenship in the true sense to be limited to those who have the right of sharing in office, or must mechanics be also included in the ranks of citizens? If we hold that mechanics, who have no share in

the offices of the state,[1] are also to be included, we shall have some citizens who can never achieve the excellence of the good citizen [which requires an experience of ruling as well as of being ruled]. If, on the other hand, mechanics should not be called citizens, in what class are they to be placed? They are not resident aliens, neither are they foreigners: what is their class? § 2. It is difficult to say; but may we not hold **1278 a** that the difficulty does not involve us in any absurdity? [If mechanics cannot be placed in any of the classes mentioned,] neither can slaves, nor freedmen. The truth is that we cannot include as citizens all who are 'necessary conditions' [without being 'integral parts'] of the state's existence.[2] Similarly, too, children [though they come nearer to being citizens] are not citizens in the same sense as adults. Adults are citizens absolutely; children are citizens only in a qualified sense and with a reservation—the reservation that they are undeveloped.[3] § 3. There were some states, in ancient times, where the class of mechanics was actually composed of slaves or foreigners only, and this explains why a great number of mechanics are slaves or foreigners even to-day. The best form of state [will not go so far, but at the same time it] will not make the mechanic a citizen. In states where mechanics *are* admitted to citizenship we shall have to say that the citizen excellence of which we have spoken [that of the good citizen who has experience of ruling as well as of being ruled] cannot be attained by every citizen, or by all

[1] Aristotle here seems to vary his view. Previously he has made only a share in judicial and deliberative office a requisite for citizenship: and this is a requisite which a mechanic might satisfy. Now he makes a share in the 'offices of the state', which would seem to mean the executive offices, a requisite; and this is a requisite which a mechanic, for want of time as well as capacity, cannot satisfy. Perhaps the cause of this change of view is the argument of the previous chapter, with its emphasis on knowledge of ruling as a part of good citizenship.

[2] Aristotle here draws, by implication, a distinction between (1) those members of a polis who are 'integral parts' and actively share in its life, thus enjoying the status of *politēs* or citizen, and (2) those members of the polis who are 'necessary conditions' or *sine quibus non*, and whose share in its life is not that of active participation in its political activity, but only that of providing the material basis (of housing, food, commodities, and services) which is a condition of that activity. See below, Book VII, c. VIII.

[3] The argument here repeats that of c. 1, § 5, of this book.

who are simply free men, but can only be achieved by those who are free from menial duties. . . . § 4. Those who do menial duties may be divided into two classes—slaves, who do them for individuals, and mechanics and labourers, who do them for the community. . . .

If we start from this basis, and carry our inquiry a little further, the position of these mechanics and labourers will soon become evident; in fact, enough has already been said to make it clear, once the bearing of the argument is grasped.[1] § 5. Constitutions are various: there must thus be various kinds of citizens; more especially, there must be various kinds of citizens who are subjects. In one variety of constitution it will be necessary that mechanics and labourers should be citizens: in other varieties it will be impossible. It will be impossible, for example, where there is a constitution of the type termed 'aristocratic', with offices distributed on the basis of worth and excellence; for a man who lives the life of a mechanic or labourer cannot pursue the things which belong to excellence. § 6. The case is different in oligarchies. Even there, it is true, a labourer cannot be a citizen (participation in office depending on a high property qualification); but a mechanic may, for the simple reason that craftsmen often become rich men. § 7. Yet in Thebes [even when it was an oligarchy] there was a law that no man could share in office who had not abstained from selling in the market for a period of ten years. On the other hand there are many constitutions where the law goes to the length of admitting aliens to citizenship. There are, for example, some democracies where a man who has only a citizen-mother is admitted; and there are many states where the same privilege is given to persons of illegitimate birth. § 8. But the policy of extending citizenship so widely is [generally a temporary policy] due to a dearth of genuine citizens; and it is only a decrease of numbers

[1] 'Enough has already been said' is a reference to c. 1, § 9 of this book, where it was noticed that constitutions differed and were of different qualities. It follows naturally from these differences that citizenship differs from constitution to constitution, and that under some constitutions the position of mechanics and hired labourers may be that of citizens, though it will not be such under other constitutions.

which produces such legislation. When the population increases again [a different policy is gradually followed]: first sons of a slave-father or slave-mother are disqualified; then those who are born of a citizen-mother but an alien father; and finally citizenship is confined to those who are of citizen parentage on both sides.

§ 9. These considerations prove two things—that there are several different kinds of citizens, and that the name of citizen is particularly applicable to those who share in the offices and honours of the state. Homer accordingly speaks in the *Iliad* of a man being treated

like an alien man, *without honour*;

and it is true that those who do not share in the offices and honours of the state are just like resident aliens.[1] To deny men a share [may sometimes be justified, but] when it is done by subterfuge its only object is merely that of hoodwinking others.[2] § 10. Two conclusions also emerge from our discussion of the question, 'Is the excellence 1278 b of the good man identical with that of the good citizen, or different from it?' The first is that there are some states in which the good man and the good citizen are identical, and some in which they are different. The second is that, in states of the former type, it is not all good citizens who are also good men, but only those among them who hold the position of statesmen—in other words, those who direct or are capable of directing, either alone or in conjunction with others, the conduct of public affairs.

[1] The Greek word *timē* which is here used means, like the Latin *honos*, both 'office' and 'honour'. The passage in the *Iliad* refers to honour in the latter sense: Aristotle himself is using it in the former; but it is natural to slide from the one into the other.

[2] This section of summary, § 9, is intended to recapitulate the fifth chapter. The section which follows, § 10, seems intended to recapitulate the fourth; but it does not do that very exactly. It may be an interpolation.

B

CONSTITUTIONS AND THEIR CLASSIFICATION (cc. VI–VIII)

Chapter VI

The definition of a constitution. The classification of constitutions depends on (1) *the ends pursued by states, and* (2) *the kind of authority exercised by their governments. The true end of a state is a good life, and this is the common interest: the right kind of authority is authority exercised in the common interest. We may thus distinguish 'right' constitutions, which are directed to the common interest, and 'wrong' or 'perverted' constitutions directed to the selfish interest of the ruling authority.*

§ 1. Citizenship has now been defined and determined. We have next to consider the subject of constitutions. Is there a single type, or are there a number of types? If there are a number of types, what are these types; how many of them are there; and how do they differ?[1] A constitution (or polity) may be defined as 'the organization of a polis, in respect of its offices generally, but especially in respect of that particular office which is sovereign in all issues'.[2] The civic body [the *politeuma*,[3] or body of persons established in power by the polity] is everywhere the sovereign of the state;

[1] In the first two sections of c. 1 of this book Aristotle had begun by raising the question 'What is a polis?' In order to answer that question, he found it first necessary to ask (following his analytic method of resolving a compound into its elements), 'What is the member of a polis, or, in other words, the citizen?' The first five chapters have fully discussed that question. We might now expect him to return to the previous question, 'What is a polis?' But that question has already been answered in the course of the discussion of the other question (cf. the definition of the polis in c. 1, § 12); and Aristotle now turns to a different question, 'What is a *politeia*, or constitution?' This is a question which logically follows on the discussion of citizenship. Since citizenship is participation in office, and since participation in office is regulated by the constitution, a discussion of the *politēs* necessarily leads to a discussion of the *politeia*.

[2] Another and similar, but fuller, definition is given in Book IV, c. 1, § 10.

[3] The civic body, or *politeuma*, acts as the deliberative, and as such is the supreme authority or sovereign. Aristotle, as Newman remarks in his note, 'proves that the constitution is especially an ordering of the supreme authority by showing that the supreme authority is decisive of the character of the constitution, from which it follows that the main business of the constitution is to fix the supreme authority'.

in fact the civic body is the polity (or constitution) itself. § 2. In democratic states, for example, the people [or *dēmos*] is sovereign: in oligarchies, on the other hand, the few [or *oligoi*] have that position; and this difference of the sovereign bodies is the reason why we say that the two types of constitution differ—as we may equally apply the same reasoning to other types besides these.

[It is thus evident that there are a number of types of constitution, but before we discuss their nature] we must first ascertain two things—the nature of the end for which the state exists, and the various kinds of authority to which men and their associations are subject. § 3. So far as the first of these things is concerned, it has already been stated, in our first book (where we were concerned with the management of the household and the control of slaves), that 'man is an animal impelled by his nature to live in a polis'. A *natural impulse* is thus one reason why men desire to live a social life even when they stand in no need of mutual succour; but they are also drawn together by a *common interest*, in proportion as each attains a share in good life [through the union of all in a form of political association].[1] § 4. The good life is the chief end, both for the community as a whole and for each of us individually. But men also come together, and form and maintain political associations, merely for the sake of life;[2] for perhaps there is some element of the good even

[1] Aristotle here suggests two ends for which the state, as an association, exists—(1) the end of providing satisfaction for a natural impulse, which exists and acts even apart from interest, and (2) the end of providing satisfaction for a common interest. This common interest, it should be noted, is not only or mainly economic: it is an interest in the attainment of a *good* (rather than a comfortable) life: and it requires for its satisfaction those institutions, such as a system of justice, which are necessary to such a life. It is this common interest in the attainment of a good life which is the chief end served by the state.

[2] In the previous section Aristotle has distinguished 'social life' and 'good life'. Here he introduces a third factor—the factor of 'life' itself, independently of its being 'social' or 'good'. The state or polis is connected with all three factors: it satisfies men's impulse towards a social life (which may exist apart from any need of mutual succour); it gives men a share in the good life which is their common interest; but it also helps men simply to live—and life itself is a thing of value. Compare Book I, c. II, § 8.

in the simple act of living, so long as the evils of existence do not preponderate too heavily. § 5. It is an evident fact that most men cling hard enough to life to be willing to endure a good deal of suffering, which implies that life has in it a sort of healthy happiness and a natural quality of pleasure.

[So far of the end for which the state exists. As regards the second question], it is easy enough to distinguish the various kinds of rule or authority of which men commonly speak; and indeed we have often had occasion to define them ourselves in works intended for the general public.[1] § 6. The rule of a master is one kind; and here, though there is really a common interest which unites the natural master and the natural slave, the fact remains that the rule is primarily exercised with a view to the master's interest, and only incidentally with a view to that of the slave, who must be preserved in existence if the rule itself is to remain. § 7. Rule over wife and children, and over the household generally, is a second kind of rule, which we have called by the name of household management. Here the rule is either exercised in the interest of the ruled or for the attainment of some advantage common to both ruler and ruled. Essentially it is exercised in the interest of the ruled, as is also plainly the case with other arts besides that of ruling, such as medicine **1279 a** and gymnastics—though an art may incidentally be exercised for the benefit of its practitioner, and there is nothing to prevent (say) a trainer from becoming occasionally a member of the class he instructs, in the same sort of way as a steersman is always one of the crew. § 8. Thus a trainer or steersman primarily considers the good of those who are subject to his authority; but when he becomes one of them personally, he incidentally shares in the benefit of that good—the steersman thus being also a member of the crew, and the trainer (though still a trainer) becoming also a member of the class which he instructs.

§ 9. This principle also applies to a third kind of rule—that

[1] Literally 'in exoteric discourses', as contrasted with the 'esoteric discourses' (such as the discourses or *logoi* on politics here translated) which were intended for the students of the Lyceum.

exercised by the holders of political office. When the constitution of a state is constructed on the principle that its members are equals and peers, the citizens think it proper that they should hold office by turns [which implies that the office of ruler is primarily intended for the benefit of the ruled and is therefore a duty to be undertaken by each in turn, though incidentally the ruler shares in the general benefit by virtue of being himself a member of the citizen body]. At any rate this is the natural system, and the system which used to be followed in the days when men believed that they ought to serve by turns, and each assumed that others would take over the duty of considering his benefit, just as he had himself, during his term of office, considered the interest of others. § 10. To-day the case is altered. Moved by the profits to be derived from office and the handling of public property, men want to hold office continuously. It is as if the holders of office were sick men, who got the benefit of permanent health [by being permanently in office]: at any rate their ardour for office is just what it would be if that were the case. § 11. The conclusion which follows is clear. Those constitutions which consider the common interest are *right* constitutions, judged by the standard of absolute justice. Those constitutions which consider only the personal interest of the rulers are all *wrong* constitutions, or *perversions* of the right forms. Such perverted forms are despotic [i.e. calculated on the model of the rule of a master, or 'despotēs', over slaves]; whereas the polis is an association of freemen.

Note on the basis of Aristotle's classification of constitutions

This preliminary classification of constitutions into the two *genera* of right and wrong, or normal and perverted, is based on the principle that political rule, by virtue of its specific nature, is essentially for the benefit of the ruled. That is the principle of absolute justice in regard to the proper use of political power; and it is a principle which squares with what has been said above, in § 4, about the main end of the polis—that it is a *common* interest, which, as such, is for the benefit not of a section, but of each and all. Aristotle has thus concluded in this chapter (partly from what has been said in §§ 2–5 about the end of the polis, and partly from what has been said in §§ 5–10 about the specific nature of political rule, or rule over a

political association of freemen, as contrasted with other forms of rule) that the fundamental principle to be followed in a polis, and therefore in its *politeia* or constitution, is the principle of the holding of office for the common interest of all the members, and particularly for the interest of the ruled, who are nearly the whole of the members. That principle separates the right constitutions which follow it from the wrong which contravene it.

Chapter VII

These two types of constitution each fall into three subdivisions on the basis of number, i.e. according as the One, or the Few, or the Many, are the ruling authority in each type. We have thus, as the three subdivisions of the 'right' type, Kingship, Aristocracy, and 'Polity': as the three subdivisions of the 'wrong' type, Tyranny, Oligarchy, and Democracy.

§ 1. Now that these matters have been determined, the next subject for consideration is the number and nature of the different constitutions. We may first examine the class of right constitutions [and consider its different species]; the different perversions will at once be apparent when the right constitutions have been determined. § 2. The term 'constitution' [*politeia*] signifies the same thing as the term 'civic body' [*politeuma*]. The civic body in every polis is the sovereign (*to kȳrion*); and the sovereign must necessarily be either One, or Few, or Many. On this basis we may say that when the One, or the Few, or the Many, rule with a view to the common interest, the constitutions under which they do so must necessarily be right constitutions. On the other hand the constitutions directed to the personal interest of the One, or the Few, or the Masses, must necessarily be perversions. [They deviate from the true standard by not regarding the interest of all, and are thus involved in a dilemma]: either the name of citizen cannot be given to persons who share in the constitution [but whose interests are not regarded], or, if the name is to be given, they must have their share of the benefits.[1]

[1] It follows from what has been said, as Aristotle proceeds to argue, (1) that the criterion of the end of the polis and the true nature of political rule gives us the two genera of right and wrong constitutions; and (2) that the criterion of number gives us three species of each genus —the three

§ 3. Among forms of government by a single person Kingship, in the general use of language, denotes the species which looks to the common interest. Among forms of government by a few persons (but more than one) Aristocracy denotes the species [which similarly looks to that interest]—that name being given to this species either because the best [*aristoi*] are the rulers, or because its object is what is best [*ariston*] for the state and its members. Finally, when the masses govern the state with a view to the common interest, the name used for this species is the generic name common to all constitutions (or polities)—the name of 'Polity'. § 4. There is a good reason for the usage [which gives to this form the generic name, and not a special name which connotes, as the name 'Aristocracy' does, a special excellence]. It is possible for one man, or a few, to be of outstanding excellence; but when it comes to a large number, we can hardly expect a fine edge of all the varieties of excellence. What we can expect particularly is the military kind **1279 b** of excellence, which is the kind that shows itself in a mass. This is the reason why the defence forces are the most sovereign body under this constitution, and those who possess arms are the persons who enjoy constitutional rights. .

§ 5. [These are the three subdivisions of the class of right constitutions.] Three perversions correspond to them. Tyranny is the perversion of Kingship; Oligarchy of Aristocracy; and Democracy of Polity. Tyranny is a government by a single person directed to the interest of that person; Oligarchy is directed to the interest of the well-to-do;[1] Democracy is directed to the interest of the poorer classes.

species of monarchy, aristocracy, and 'polity' (in a peculiar sense of that word) in the genus of right constitutions; and the three species of tyranny, oligarchy, and 'democracy' (again, as we shall see, in a somewhat peculiar sense of the word) in the genus of wrong constitutions. But the criterion of number, as the argument proceeds, turns into a criterion of class, as it does in the course of the next chapter.

[1] It will be noticed that Aristotle is here introducing, in lieu of the criterion of number, that of class; and he proceeds in the next chapter further along that line. What makes an oligarchy is not so much the fact that a few men rule for their own advantage: it is rather the fact that a wealthy class rules; and oligarchy is thus really plutocracy.

None of the three is directed to the advantage of the whole body of citizens.

Chapter VIII

The basis of number is not, however, adequate. The real basis, at any rate so far as oligarchy and democracy are concerned, is social class: what makes an oligarchy is the rule of the rich (rather than the few), and what makes a democracy is the rule of the poor (rather than the many). Number is an accidental, and not an essential attribute; but the accidental generally accompanies the essential.

§ 1. We must treat at somewhat greater length of the nature of each of these last constitutions. There are certain difficulties involved; and when one is pursuing a philosophical method of inquiry in any branch of study, and not merely looking to practical considerations, the proper course is to set out the truth about every particular with no neglect or omission. § 2. Tyranny, as has just been said, is single-person government of the political association on the lines of despotism [i.e. treating the citizens as a master treats slaves]: oligarchy exists where those who have property are the sovereign authority of the constitution; and conversely democracy exists where the sovereign authority is composed of the poorer classes, and not of the owners of property. § 3. The first difficulty which arises concerns the definition just given [of democracy and oligarchy]. We have defined democracy as the sovereignty of numbers; but we can conceive a case in which the majority who hold the sovereignty in a state are the well-to-do. Similarly, oligarchy is generally stated to be the sovereignty of a small number; but it might conceivably happen that the poorer classes were fewer in number than the well-to-do, and yet—in virtue of superior vigour—were the sovereign authority of the constitution. In neither case could the definition previously given of these constitutions be regarded as true. § 4. We might attempt to overcome the difficulty by combining both of the factors—wealth with paucity of numbers, and poverty with mass. On this basis

oligarchy might be defined as the constitution under which the rich, being also few in number, hold the offices of the state; and similarly democracy might be defined as the constitution under which the poor, being also many in number, are in control. But this involves us in another difficulty. § 5. If our new definition is exhaustive, and there are no forms of oligarchy and democracy other than those enumerated in that definition, what names are we to give to the constitutions just suggested as conceivable—those where the wealthy form a majority and the poor a minority, and where the wealthy majority in the one case, and the poor minority in the other, are the sovereign authority of the constitution? § 6. The course of the argument thus appears to show that the factor of number—the small number of the sovereign body in oligarchies, or the large number in democracies—is an accidental attribute, due to the simple fact that the wealthy are generally few and the poor are generally numerous. Therefore the causes originally mentioned [i.e. small and large numbers] are not in fact the real causes of the difference between oligarchies and democracies. § 7. The real ground of the difference between oligarchy and democracy is poverty and riches. It is inevitable that any constitution **1280 a** should be an oligarchy if the rulers under it are rulers in virtue of riches, whether they are few or many; and it is equally inevitable that a constitution under which the poor rule should be a democracy.

§ 8. It happens, however, as we have just remarked, [and this is why number becomes an accidental attribute of both of these constitutions], that the rich are few and the poor are numerous. It is only a few who have riches, but all alike share in free status; and these are the real grounds on which the two parties [the oligarchical and the democratic] dispute the control of the constitution.

C

THE PRINCIPLES OF OLIGARCHY AND DEMOCRACY, AND THE NATURE OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE (cc. IX–XIII)

Chapter IX

The principle of a constitution is its conception of justice; and this is the fundamental ground of difference between oligarchy and democracy. Democrats hold that if men are equal by birth, they should in justice have equal rights: oligarchs hold that if they are unequal in wealth, they should in justice have unequal rights. True justice means that those who have contributed to the end of the state should have rights in proportion to their contribution to that end. The end of the state is not mere life, nor an alliance for mutual defence; it is the common promotion of a good quality of life. We must distinguish between the necessary conditions of the state's existence (contiguity, consanguinity, and economic co-operation) and its operative aim. The operative aim is always the promotion of a good quality of life; and those who contribute most to the realization of that aim should in justice have most rights.

§ 1. We must next ascertain [now that we have discovered the social ground on which they rest] what are the distinctive principles attributed by their advocates to oligarchy and democracy, and what are the oligarchical and the democratic conceptions of justice.[1] Both oligarchs and democrats have a hold on a sort of conception of justice; but they both fail to carry it far enough, and neither of them expresses the true conception of justice in the whole of its range. In democracies, for example, justice is considered to mean equality [in the distribution of office]. It does mean equality—but equality for those who are equal, and not for all. § 2. In oligarchies,

[1] The fact that democracy and oligarchy, as perversions of right constitutions, rest on a social class, is essentially connected with the 'distinctive principle' of each, which leads them to *justify* the predominance of that class. This 'distinctive principle' is thus, in effect, a conception of justice—that is to say, of *distributive* justice, or, in other words, of the justice which distributes the offices of the state among its members on a plan or principle.

again, inequality in the distribution of office is considered to be just; and indeed it is—but only for those who are unequal, and not for all. The advocates of oligarchy and democracy both refuse to consider this factor—who are the persons to whom their principles properly apply—and they both make erroneous judgements. The reason is that they are judging *in their own case*; and most men, as a rule, are bad judges where their own interests are involved. § 3. Justice is relative to persons; and a just distribution is one in which the relative values of the things given correspond to those of the persons receiving—a point which has already been made in the *Ethics*. [It follows that a just distribution of offices among a number of different persons will involve a consideration of the personal values, or merits, of each of those persons.] But the advocates of oligarchy and democracy, while they agree about what constitutes equality in the *thing*, disagree about what constitutes it in *persons*.[1] The main reason for this is the reason just stated—they are judging, and judging erroneously, in their own case; but there is also another reason—they are misled by the fact that they are professing a sort of conception of justice, and professing it up to a point, into thinking that they profess one which is absolute and complete. § 4. The oligarchs think that superiority on one point—in their case wealth—means superiority on all: the democrats believe that equality in one respect—for instance, that of free birth—means equality all round.

§ 5. Both sides, however, fail to mention the really cardinal factor [i.e. the nature of the end for which the state exists]. If property were the end for which men came together and formed an association, men's share [in the offices and honours] of the state would be proportionate to their share of property; and in that case the argument of the oligarchical side—that it is not just for a man who has contributed one pound to share equally in a sum of a hundred pounds (or, for that matter, in the interest accruing upon that sum) with the man who has contributed all the rest—would appear to be a strong argument. § 6. But the end of the state is not mere

[1] See the note at the end of the chapter.

life; it is, rather, a good quality of life. [If mere life were the end], there might be a state of slaves, or even a state of animals; but in the world as we know it any such state is impossible, because slaves and animals do not share in true felicity[1] and free choice [i.e. the attributes of a good quality of life]. Similarly, it is not the end of the state to provide an alliance for mutual defence against all injury, or to ease exchange and promote economic intercourse. If that had been the end, the Etruscans and the Carthaginians [who are united by such bonds] would be in the position of belonging to a single state; and the same would be true of all peoples who have commercial treaties with one another. § 7. It is true that such peoples have agreements about imports and exports; treaties to ensure just conduct [in the course of trade]; and written terms of alliance for mutual defence. On the other hand they have no common offices of state to deal with these matters: each, on the contrary, **1280 b** has its own offices, confined to itself. Neither of the parties concerns itself to ensure a proper quality of character among the members of the other;[2] neither of them seeks to ensure that all who are included in the scope of the treatics shall be free from injustice[3] and from any form of vice; and neither of them goes beyond the aim of preventing its own members from committing injustice [in the course of trade] against the members of the other. § 8. But it is the cardinal issue of goodness or badness in the life of the polis which always engages the attention of any state that concerns itself to secure a system of good laws well obeyed [*eunomia*]. The conclusion which clearly follows is that any polis which is truly so called, and is not merely one in name, must devote itself to the end of

[1] The Greek word is *eudaimonia*, which means something higher than the mere happiness of pleasure (*hēdonē*), and involves an 'energy of the spirit' impossible to slaves and animals. In Book VII, c. XIII, § 5, Aristotle defines *eudaimonia* as 'the energy and practice of goodness'. See the Prefatory Note, § 4.

[2] Aristotle here implies (what he proceeds to make explicit) that a true state does concern itself to secure *excellence* of character and conduct among its members; that its end is essentially a *good* quality of life; and that its laws are intended to make the citizens *good* and just men.

[3] i.e. unrighteousness.

encouraging goodness. Otherwise, a political association sinks into a mere alliance, which only differs in space [i.e. in the contiguity of its members] from other forms of alliance where the members live at a distance from one another. Otherwise, too, law becomes a mere covenant—or (in the phrase of the Sophist Lycophron) 'a guarantor of men's rights against one another'—instead of being, as it should be, a rule of life such as will make the members of a polis good and just.[1]

§ 9. That this is the case [i.e. that a polis is truly a polis only when it makes the encouragement of goodness its end] may be readily proved.[2] If two different sites could be united in one, so that the polis of Megara and that of Corinth were embraced by a single wall, that would not make a single polis. If the citizens of two cities intermarried with one another, that would not make a single polis—even though intermarriage is one of the forms of social life which are characteristic of a polis. § 10. Nor would it make a polis if a number of persons—living at a distance from one another, but not at so great a distance but that they could still associate—had a common system of laws to prevent their injuring one another in the course of exchange. We can imagine, for instance, one being a carpenter, another a farmer, a third a shoemaker, and others producing other goods; and we can imagine a total number of as many as 10,000. But if these people were associated in nothing further than matters such as exchange and alliance, they would still have failed to reach the stage of a polis. § 11. Why should this be the case? It cannot be ascribed to any lack of contiguity in such an association. The members of a group so constituted might come together on a single

[1] On the general Greek notion of law (or *nomos*) see the Prefatory Note, § 3, and the references there given.

[2] 'The method of proof which follows is a method of exhaustion of possibilities. Aristotle takes various possibilities—(1) contiguity of place, (2) a common scheme of intermarriage, (3) a common scheme for the prevention of mutual injuries—and proves that none of them is sufficient to constitute a polis. It is only a common scheme for the encouragement of a good quality of life which can be the basis of a polis. . . . The same method of exhaustion of possibilities has been followed in the definition of the citizen (c. 1, §§ 4–5), and in the discussion of the identity of the state (c. III, §§ 1–9).

site; but if that were all—if each still treated his private house as if it were a state, and all of them still confined their mutual assistance to action against aggressors (as if it were only a question of a defensive alliance)—if, in a word, the spirit of their intercourse were still the same after their coming together as it had been when they were living apart—their association, even on its new basis, could not be deemed by any accurate thinker to be a polis. § 12. It is clear, therefore, that a polis is not an association for residence on a common site, or for the sake of preventing mutual injustice and easing exchange. These are indeed conditions which must be present before a polis can exist; but the presence of all these conditions is not enough, in itself, to constitute a polis. What constitutes a polis is an association of households and clans in a good life, for the sake of attaining a perfect and self-sufficing existence.[1] § 13. This consummation, however, will not be reached unless the members inhabit one and the self-same place and practise intermarriage.[2] It was for this reason [i.e. to provide these necessary conditions] that the various institutions of a common social life—marriage-connexions, kin-groups, religious gatherings, and social pastimes generally—arose in cities. But these institutions are the business of friendship [and not the purpose of the polis]. It is friendship [and not a polis] which consists in the pursuit of a common social life. The end and purpose of a polis is the good life, and the institutions of social life are means to that end. § 14. A polis is constituted **1281 a** by the association of families and villages in a perfect and self-sufficing existence; and such an existence, on our definition, consists in a life of true felicity and goodness.

It is therefore for the sake of good actions, and not for the sake of social life, that political associations must be consider to exist. § 15. [This conclusion enables us to attain

[1] See Book I, c. 11, § 8 (and the note at the end of the chapter), for the implications of this definition.

[2] In other words, contiguity and consanguinity are necessary conditions, or *sine quibus non*; but the essence, and the *causa causans*, is co-operation in a common scheme of good life. Social life (*to suzēn*), arising from the ties of contiguity and consanguinity, is a necessary basis; but the essential structure which arises on this basis is a good life (*to eu zēn*).

a proper conception of justice.] Those who contribute most to an association of this character [i.e. who contribute most to good action] have a greater share in the polis [and should therefore, in justice, receive a larger recognition from it] than those who are equal to them (or even greater) in free birth and descent, but unequal in civic excellence, or than those who surpass them in wealth but are surpassed by them in excellence.[1] From what has been said it is plain that both sides to the dispute about constitutions [i.e. both the democratic and the oligarchical side] profess only a partial conception of justice.

Note on the theory of distributive justice

Aristotle is here enunciating a theory of distributive justice which goes on the basis of proportionate equality. As A and B have given to the state, in the way of personal merit and personal contribution to its well-being, so A and B should receive from the state, in the way of office and honour. If the personal merit and personal contribution of both are equal, they will receive equal amounts: if they are unequal, they will receive unequal amounts: but in either case the basis of proportionate equality will be observed, and the proportion between the thing A receives and A's personal merit will be the same as that between the thing B receives and *his* personal merit. The reference to the *Ethics* is to Book V, c. III, §§ 4 and following (1131 a 14 onwards). We may notice especially the phrase in the *Ethics*, 'The same equality will exist between the persons and the things concerned'; . . . 'if they are not equal, they will not have what is equal—but this is the origin of quarrels and complaints'.

CHAPTER X

What person or body of persons should be sovereign in a state—the people, the rich, the better sort of citizens, the one best, or the tyrant? All these alternatives present difficulties; and there

[1] The conception of distributive justice here enunciated is that the criterion of contribution to the specific and essential end of the state—the performance of good actions—is greater than either the democratic criterion of free birth or the oligarchical criterion of wealth. Those who contribute more to the performance of good actions in and by the association, and who thus show a greater 'civic excellence' (i.e. a higher quality of membership of the association), deserve more from the polis—even if on the ground of free birth, they are only equal or even inferior, and even if, on the ground of wealth, they are actually inferior.

is a difficulty even in a further alternative—that no person or body of persons, but law, should be sovereign.

§ 1. A difficulty arises when we turn to consider what body of persons should be sovereign in the polis.[1] [We can imagine five alternatives]: the people at large (*to plēthos*); the wealthy; the better sort of men; the one man who is best of all; the tyrant. But all these alternatives appear to involve unpleasant results: indeed, how can it be otherwise? [Take, for example, the first alternative.] What if the poor, on the ground of their being a majority, proceed to divide among themselves the possessions of the wealthy—will not this be unjust? 'No, by heaven' (a democrat may reply); 'it has been justly decreed so by the sovereign.' § 2. 'But if this is not the extreme of injustice' (we may reply in turn), 'what *is*?' Whenever a majority of any sort, irrespective of wealth or poverty, divides among its members the possessions of a minority, that majority is obviously ruining the state. But goodness can never ruin anything that has goodness, nor can justice, in its nature, be ruinous to a state. It is therefore clear that a law of this kind [i.e. a law of spoliation passed by a majority of any sort] cannot possibly be just. § 3. [To treat such a law as just is really to justify tyranny.] The tyrant's acts too [on the principle alleged by the democrats that any decree of the sovereign is just] must necessarily be just; for he too uses coercion by virtue of superior power in just the same sort of way as the people coerce the wealthy. [We may now take the alternative that the wealthy are sovereign.] Is it just that a minority composed of the wealthy should rule? If they too behave like the others—if they plunder and confiscate the property of the people—can their action be called just? If it can, the action

[1] Hitherto, in c. IX, Aristotle has been considering what persons, on the ground of distributive justice, should have a superior recognition in the award of office and honours. He now turns to consider what persons, or body of persons, should receive supreme recognition, and thus be vested with supreme authority or sovereignty. It is still a question of distributive justice; but that question now advances from a consideration of who should have more, and on what grounds they should have more, to a consideration of who should have most, and on what grounds they should have most.

of the people, in the converse case, must equally be termed just. § 4. It is clear that all these acts of oppression [whether by the people, the tyrant, or the wealthy] are mean and unjust. [But what of the next alternative?] Should the better sort of men have authority and be sovereign in all matters? In that case, the rest of the citizens will necessarily be debarred from honours, since they will not enjoy the honour of holding civic office. We speak of offices as honours; and when a single set of persons hold office permanently, the rest of the community must necessarily be debarred from all honours. § 5. [We come to a last alternative.] Is it better than any of the other alternatives that the one best man should rule? This is still more oligarchical [than the rule of the wealthy few or the few of the better sort], because the number of those debarred from honours is even greater. It may perhaps be urged that there is still another alternative; that it is a poor sort of policy to vest sovereignty in any person [or body of persons], subject as persons are to the passions that beset men's souls; and that it is better to vest it in law. [But this does not solve the difficulty.] The law itself may incline either towards oligarchy or towards democracy; and what difference will the sovereignty of law then make in the problems which have just been raised? The consequences already stated will follow just the same.

Chapter XI

It is possible, however, to defend the alternative that the people should be sovereign. The people, when they are assembled, have a combination of qualities which enables them to deliberate wisely and to judge soundly. This suggests that they have a claim to be the sovereign body; it also suggests the scope of affairs in which they should be sovereign, or the powers which they should exercise. They should exercise deliberative and judicial functions; in particular, they should elect the magistrates and examine their conduct at the end of their tenure. Two objections may be raised. (1) *It may be argued that experts are better judges than the non-expert; but this objection may be met by reference to* (a) *the*

combination of qualities in the assembled people (which makes them collectively better judges than the expert), and (b) *their knowing 'how the shoe pinches' (which enables them to pass judgement on the behaviour of magistrates).* (2) *It may be urged that the people, if they have such powers, have more authority than the better sort of citizens who hold office as magistrates—though they are not of so good a quality; but we may answer to this that the people as a* whole *may well be of a high quality. We have always, however, to remember that rightly constituted laws should be the final sovereign, and that personal authority of any sort should only act in the particular cases which cannot be covered by a general law.*

§ 1. The other alternatives may be reserved for a later inquiry; but the first of the alternatives suggested—that the people at large should be sovereign rather than the few best —would appear to be defensible, and while it presents some difficulty it perhaps also contains some truth. § 2. There is this to be said for the Many. Each of them by himself may not be of a good **1281 b** quality; but when they all come together it is possible that they may surpass—collectively and as a body, although not individually—the quality of the few best. Feasts to which many contribute may excel those provided at one man's expense. In the same way, when there are many [who contribute to the process of deliberation], each can bring his share of goodness and moral prudence; and when all meet together the people may thus become something in the nature of a single person, who—as he has many feet, many hands, and many senses—may also have many qualities of character and intelligence. § 3. This is the reason why the Many are also better judges [than the few] of music and the writings of poets: some appreciate one part, some another, and all together appreciate all.[1] § 4. [We may note that this combination of qualities, which gives the Many their merit, can also be traced in cases of *individual* merit.] The thing which makes a good man differ from a unit in the crowd—as it is also the thing which is generally said to make

[1] See the first note at the end of the chapter.

a beautiful person differ from one who is not beautiful, or an artistic representation differ from ordinary reality—is that elements which are elsewhere scattered and separate are here combined in a unity. [It is this unity which counts]; for if you take the elements separately, you may say of an artistic representation that it is surpassed by the eye of this person or by some other feature of that.[1]

§ 5. It is not clear, however, that this combination of qualities, which we have made the ground of distinction between the many and the few best, is true of all popular bodies and all large masses of men. Perhaps it may be said, 'By heaven, it is clear that there are some bodies of which it cannot possibly be true; for if you included them, you would, by the same token, be bound to include a herd of beasts. That would be absurd; and yet what difference is there between these bodies and a herd of beasts?' All the same, and in spite of this objection, there is nothing to prevent the view we have stated from being true of *some* popular bodies.

§ 6. It would thus seem possible to solve, by the considerations we have advanced, both the problem raised in the previous chapter 'What body of *persons* should be sovereign?' and the further problem which follows upon it, 'What are the *matters* over which freemen, or the general body of citizens—men of the sort who neither have wealth nor can make any claim on the ground of goodness—should properly exercise sovereignty?'[2] § 7. It may be argued, from one point of view,

[1] Aristotle here follows a subtle line of argument, in drawing an analogy between the composite quality of the Many and the composite quality which may also be traced in the individual good man, or in a beautiful individual, or in an individual work of art. But his fundamental contention is simple. In each case there is a general system of unity: in each case this system of unity issues in something which *as a whole* is the best—though in each case any particular constituent of the whole may not be the best.

[2] Aristotle states two questions: but he assumes that the first has already been answered, and that 'the body of persons which should be sovereign' is the general body of free citizens, who have no individual claims based on wealth or goodness, but a common claim based on common freedom. On this basis he addresses himself, in the rest of the chapter, to the second problem, 'What is the scope of the sovereignty of this body, and over what matters should it be exercised?'

that it is dangerous for men of this sort to share in the highest offices, as injustice may lead them into wrongdoing, and thoughtlessness into error. But it may also be argued, from another point of view, that there is serious risk in not letting them have *some* share in the enjoyment of power; for a state with a body of disfranchised citizens who are numerous and poor must necessarily be a state which is full of enemies. § 8. The alternative left is to let them share in the deliberative and judicial functions;[1] and we thus find Solon, and some of the other legislators, giving the people the two general functions of electing the magistrates to office and of calling them to account at the end of their tenure of office, but *not* the right of holding office themselves in their individual capacity. § 9. [There is wisdom in such a policy.] When they all meet together, the people display a good enough gift of perception, and combined with the better class they are of service to the state (just as impure food, when it is mixed with pure, makes the whole concoction more nutritious than a small amount of the pure would be); but each of them is imperfect in the judgements he forms by himself.

§ 10. But this arrangement of the constitution [which gives the people deliberative and judicial functions] presents some difficulties. The first difficulty is that it may well be held that the function of judging when medical attendance has been properly given [a function analogous to that of the people in judging the conduct of magistrates] should belong to those whose profession it is to attend patients and cure the complaints from which they suffer—in a word, to members of the medical profession. The same may be held to be true of all other professions and arts; **1282 a** and just as doctors should have their conduct examined before a body of doctors, so, too, should those who follow other professions have theirs examined before a body of members of their own profession. § 11. [We may note, however, that] the term 'doctor' is used in three different

[1] These are the rights assigned to the citizen, as such, in c. 1, § 11 of this book. In the rest of the sentence, 'electing the magistrates' may be regarded as an exercise of the deliberative power, and 'calling them to account' as an exercise of the judicial.

senses. It is applied to the ordinary practitioner; it is applied to the specialist who directs the course of treatment; and it is also applied to the man who has some general knowledge of the art of medicine. (There are men of this last type to be found in connexion with nearly all the arts; and we credit them with the power of judging as much as we do the experts —i.e. the practitioners and specialists.)[1] § 12. When we turn to consider the matter of election [as distinct from examination], the same principles would appear to apply. To make a proper election, it may be argued, is equally the work of experts. It is the work of those who are versed in geometry to choose a geometrician, or, again, of those who are acquainted with steering to choose a steersman; and even if, in some occupations and arts, there are some non-experts who also share in the ability to choose, they do not share in a higher degree than the experts. § 13. It would thus appear, on this line of argument, that the people should not be made sovereign, either in the matter of the election of magistrates or in that of their examination. § 14. It may be, however, that these arguments are not altogether well founded. In the first place we have to remember our own previous argument of the combination of qualities which is to be found in the people—provided, that is to say, that they are not debased in character. Each individual may, indeed, be a worse judge than the experts; but all, when they meet together,[2] are either better

[1] Aristotle has here suggested a distinction which may prove, after all, to justify the right of the people (as possessed, collectively, of general knowledge) to *examine* the conduct of magistrates. Instead, however, of pursuing this train of thought immediately to its conclusion, he turns aside in § 12 from the right of examining to that of *electing*, and here he begins by pressing the idea of the right of the expert to elect. Eventually, however, in § 14, he returns to the idea of the rights belonging to men of general knowledge—alike in respect of election and in respect of examination.

[2] This qualification, 'when they meet together', is a qualification which recurs (cf. *supra*, §§ 2, 9). The people at large have the merit of a good collective judgement not as a static mass but when they are dynamic—in other words, when they assemble, and when the process of debate begins. It is thus not an unfair gloss to suggest that Aristotle by implication assumes that the dialectic of debate is the final foundation of the principle of popular government, so far as he accepts that principle. In other words, democracy is based upon discussion.

than experts or at any rate no worse. In the second place, there are a number of arts in which the creative artist is not the only, or even the best, judge. These are the arts whose products can be understood and judged even by those who do not possess any skill in the art. A house, for instance, is something which can be understood by others besides the builder; indeed the user of a house—or in other words the householder—will judge it even better than he does. In the same way a pilot will judge a rudder better than a shipwright does; and the diner—not the cook—will be the best judge of a feast.

§ 15. The first difficulty which confronts our argument about the rights of the people would appear to be answered sufficiently by these considerations. But there is a second difficulty still to be faced, which is connected with the first. It would seem to be absurd that persons of a poor quality should be sovereign on issues which are more important than those assigned to the better sort of citizens. The election of magistrates, and their examination at the end of their tenure, are the most important of issues; and yet there are constitutions, as we have seen, under which these issues are assigned to popular bodies, and where a popular body is sovereign in all such matters. § 16. To add to the difficulty, membership of the assembly, which carries deliberative and judicial functions, is vested in persons of little property and of any age; but a high property qualification is demanded from those who serve as treasurers or generals, or hold any of the highest offices. This difficulty too may however be met in the same way as the first; and the practice followed in these constitutions is perhaps, after all, correct. § 17. It is not the individual member of the judicial court, or the council,[1] or the assembly, who is vested with office: it is the court as a whole,

[1] Aristotle here includes the council (*boulê*) along with the assembly (*ecclêsia*) in his discussion of the rights of the people. Strictly speaking the council—at Athens a small body of 500 members which prepared the business for the assembly—was a body of a different type from the popular courts and the assembly. But election to the council was by lot, from all classes of citizens over the age of 30; and Aristotle thus naturally includes membership of the council in his discussion of popular rights.

the council as a whole, the popular assembly as a whole, which is vested; and each individual member—whether of the council, the assembly, or the court—is simply a part of the whole. § 18. It is therefore just and proper that the people, from which the assembly, the council, and the court are constituted, should be sovereign on issues more important than those assigned to the better sort of citizens. It may be added that the collective property of the members of all these bodies is greater than that of the persons who either as individuals or as members of small bodies hold the highest [executive] offices.

§ 19. This may serve as a settlement of the difficulties which have been **1282 b** discussed. But the discussion of the first of these difficulties [whether expert skill or general knowledge should be the sovereign authority] leads to one conclusion above all others. Rightly constituted laws should be the final sovereign; and personal rule, whether it be exercised by a single person or a body of persons, should be sovereign only in those matters on which law is unable, owing to the difficulty of framing general rules for all contingencies, to make an exact pronouncement.[1] § 20. But what rightly constituted laws ought to be is a matter that is not yet clear; and here we are still confronted by the difficulty stated at the end of the previous chapter—that law itself may have a bias in favour of one class or another. Equally with the constitutions to which they belong [and *according to* the constitutions to which they belong] laws must be good or bad, just or unjust. § 21. The one clear fact is that laws must be constituted in accordance with constitutions; and if this is the case it follows that laws which are in accordance with right constitutions must necessarily be just, and laws which are in accordance with wrong or perverted constitutions must be unjust.

Note on the democratic argument in politics and aesthetics

It is to be noticed that Aristotle here applies the same 'democratic' argument (if it may so be called) both to politics and aesthetics. The two go together in his view—just as, in Athenian practice, the people at large were asked not only to pronounce on politics in the assembly,

[1] See the second note at the end of the chapter.

but also to vote on architectural plans and (through judges drawn by lot from a large panel) to award the dramatic prizes in the theatre. Plato also applied the same line of argument to politics and aesthetics —but in an opposite direction. He condemned 'theatrocracy' in matters of art along with democracy in politics. Speaking primarily of music (*Laws* 700 E–701 A) he notes: 'Our once silent audiences have found a voice, in the persuasion that they understand what is good and bad in art: the old "sovereignty of the best" in that sphere has given way to an evil "sovereignty of the audience" ['theatrocratia']: . . . no great harm would have been done, so long as the democracy was confined to art, . . . but as things are with us, music has given occasion to a general conceit of knowledge and contempt for law, and liberty [i.e. political democracy] has followed in their train' (A. E. Taylor's translation).

It may be added that later Athenian practice, as described in Aristotle's treatise on the *Constitution of Athens* (c. XLIX, § 3), assigned to a popular law-court the right of deciding on architectural and other designs, which had once belonged to the council. The council was held to have shown favouritism: the popular law-court was substituted as a more unbiased body.

Finally, and in regard to Aristotle's general argument in favour of the capacity and the efficiency of the general civic body when its members 'meet together' (see § 14 of this chapter, and the note), we may note that it squares (*a*) with his own definition of citizenship in c. 1 (see § 12 of that chapter, and the note), and (*b*) with the common Greek idea that the general civic body is *to kȳrion* in matters of deliberation, and is entitled to express its public opinion through the *dikastēria* in matters of justice (see the Prefatory Note, §§ 2 and 3.

Note on Aristotle's conception of the sovereignty of law

To understand Aristotle's conception of the sovereignty of law and the subordination of magistrates to its rule we must remember the nature of Athenian law and the position of the Athenian magistrates. (1) Athenian law was an ancient body of standing rules which was seldom changed. Legislative changes were not a matter for the assembly, which was a deliberative body, and not a legislature: they were, indeed, initiated and proposed in the assembly, but they were then referred to the judicial side of the constitution and to a judicial commission, and it was there that changes were considered and enacted. It may thus be said that there was little legislation, and no separate and specific legislature, in the Athenian system; and when the people in the assembly sought to act as a legislature, by passing decrees or *psephismata* which had the force of law or overrode law, such action was regarded—at any rate by Aristotle—as a usurpation. (See Book IV, c. IV, § 25 and note.) (2) The Athenian magistrates

were kept in subordination to law by the exercise of the right, vested in every citizen, to arraign a magistrate who had broken the law; and this was viewed as one of the great safeguards against abuses. The *graphē paranomōn*, or indictment for illegality, was a weapon which never rusted from disuse. (See Vinogradoff, *Historical Jurisprudence*, vol. ii, c. VI, § 2 (on the Rule of Law) and c. VII, §§ 1–2.)

CHAPTER XII[1]

Justice is the political good. It involves equality, or the distribution of equal amounts to equal persons. But who are equals, and by what criterion are persons to be reckoned as equals? Many criteria can be applied; but the only proper criterion, in a political society, is that of contribution to the function of that society. Those who are equal in that respect *should receive equal amounts: those who are superior or inferior should receive superior or inferior amounts, in proportion to the degree of their superiority or inferiority. If all are thus treated proportionately to the contribution they make, all are really receiving equal treatment; for the proportion between contribution and reward is the same in every case. The sort of equality which justice involves is thus proportionate equality; and this is the essence of distributive justice.*

§ 1. In all arts and sciences the end in view is some good. In the most sovereign of all the arts and sciences—and this is the art and science of politics—the end in view is the greatest good and the good which is most pursued.[2] The good in the sphere of politics is justice; and justice consists in what tends to promote the common interest. General opinion makes it consist in some sort of equality.[3] Up to a

[1] The last three chapters—IX, X, and XI—have all been concerned, in different ways, with the general problem of distributive justice, or, in other words, with an attempt to determine what persons, in view of their contribution to the state, should be specially recognized by it in its distribution of office and honour. The argument of c. XI has appeared to go in favour of the special recognition of the people at large. The argument of the present chapter goes along a somewhat different line, and in favour of the view that all contributions, by all different persons and bodies of persons, should alike be recognized.

[2] The argument is the same as that of the first section of the first chapter of the first book.

[3] Here the argument repeats that of c. IX, §§ 1–3, of this book, where

point this general opinion agrees with the philosophical inquiries which contain our conclusions on ethics. In other words, it holds that justice involves two factors—things, and the persons to whom things are assigned—and it considers that persons who are equal should have assigned to them equal things. § 2. But here there arises a question which must not be overlooked. Equals and unequals—yes; but equals and unequals *in what*? This is a question which raises difficulties, and involves us in philosophical speculation on politics.[1] It is possible to argue that offices and honours ought to be distributed unequally [i.e. that superior amounts should be assigned to superior persons] on the basis of superiority *in any respect whatsoever*—even though there were similarity, and no shadow of any difference, in every other respect; and it may be urged, in favour of this argument, that where people differ from one another there must be a difference in what is just and proportionate to their merits. § 3. If this argument were accepted, the mere fact of a better complexion, or greater height, or any other such advantage would establish a claim for a greater share of political rights to be given to its possessor. § 4. But is not the argument obviously wrong? To be clear that it is, we have only to study the analogy of the other arts and sciences. If you were dealing with a number of flute-players who were equal in their art, you would not assign them flutes on the principle that the better born should have a greater amount. Nobody will play the better for being better born; and it is to those who are better at the job that the better supply of tools should be given. If our point is not yet plain, it can be made so if we

Aristotle has already raised the issue of equality in reference to justice, and has already referred to the *Ethics*, as he does again here.

[1] In all this passage a contrast is implied between 'general opinion' (*doxa*, or the current views of the ordinary man) and 'philosophic inquiry', which does not despise, but is none the less bound to analyse (and by analysing to correct and to elevate) the implications of 'general opinion'. Aristotle has a fundamental respect for general opinion, and indeed he states, in the *Ethics*, that a general opinion which is universally held is, in ethical matters, the truth—'that which everyone thinks *is* so' (*Ethics*, X, c. 11, § 4). But he also believes that general opinion must be analysed, corrected, and elevated by philosophic analysis.

push it still further. § 5. Let us suppose a man who is superior to others in flute-playing, but far inferior in birth and beauty. Birth and beauty may be greater goods than ability to play the flute, and those who possess them may, upon balance, surpass the flute-player more in these qualities than he surpasses them in his flute-playing; but the fact remains that *he* is the man who ought to get the better supply of flutes. [If it is to be recognized in connexion with a given function], **1283 a** superiority in a quality such as birth—or for that matter wealth—ought to contribute something to the performance of that function; and here these qualities contribute nothing to such performance.

§ 6. There is a further objection. If we accept this argument [that offices and honours should be assigned on the basis of excellence in *any* respect], every quality will have to be commensurable with every other. You will begin by reckoning a given degree of (say) height as superior to a given degree of some other quality, and you will thus be driven to pit height in general against (say) wealth and birth in general. But on this basis—i.e. that, *in a given case*, *A* is counted as excelling in height to a greater degree than *B* does in goodness, and that, *in general*, height is counted as excelling to a greater degree than goodness does—qualities are made commensurable. [We are involved in mere arithmetic]; for if amount *X* of some quality is 'better' than amount *Y* of some other, some amount which is other than *X* must clearly be equal to it [i.e. must be *equally* good].[1] § 7. This is impossible [because things that differ in quality cannot be treated in terms of quantity, or regarded as commensurable]. It is therefore clear that in matters political [just as in matters belonging to other arts and sciences] there is no good reason for basing a claim to the exercise of authority on any and every kind of

[1] The argument is that if you say that $\frac{8}{8}$ of a perfect stature is 'better' than $\frac{1}{2}$ of perfect goodness, you are also bound to say that $\frac{7}{8}$ of a perfect stature is equal to $\frac{1}{2}$ of perfect goodness. But in that case you make stature and goodness commensurable: i.e. you treat either of them as a quantitative mass, without any difference of quality, and on that basis you assume that some fraction of the one is as good as some fraction of the other.

superiority. Some may be swift and others slow; but this is no reason why the one should have more [political rights], and the other less. It is in athletic contests that the superiority of the swift receives its reward. § 8. Claims to political rights must be based on the ground of contribution to the elements which constitute the being of the state.[1] There is thus good ground for the claims to honour and office which are made by persons of good descent, free birth, or wealth. Those who hold office must necessarily be free men and taxpayers: a state could not be composed entirely of men without means, any more than it could be composed entirely of slaves. § 9. But we must add that if wealth and free birth are necessary elements, the temper of justice and a martial habit are also necessary. These, too, are elements which must be present if men are to live together in a state. The one difference is that the first two elements are necessary to the simple existence of a state, and the last two for its good life.

Chapter XIII

This raises the question, What constitutes a contribution to the purpose of a political society? Wealth, birth, goodness, and the aggregate quality of numbers, may all claim to be contributors. How are these rival claims to be reconciled when they all coexist in the same society? A case may be made in favour of the aggregate quality of numbers; but a case may also be made in favour of the single man of exceptional and outstanding goodness. Such a man must either be made a king or sent into exile. The democratic policy of ostracism means a choice of the latter alternative; and the proportion, or balance, needed in a constitution is certainly disturbed if any one element is outstandingly eminent. On the other hand, it cannot be just, in a good constitution, to refuse the recognition which is due to a man of outstanding goodness; and such a man should not be banished, but should

[1] The elements which constitute the life of the polis are defined later, in Book IV, c. XII, § 1 as 'free birth, wealth, culture, and good descent'. Culture may be held to imply, or to be linked with, goodness, as appears in the first section of the next chapter of this book. The Greek word for it is *paideia*, the general 'training' of the human faculties.

rather be made a king. We are thus brought to the subject of kingship.

§ 1. If we are thinking in terms of contribution to the state's existence, all of the elements mentioned, or at any rate several of them, may properly claim to be recognized in the award of honours and office; but if we are thinking in terms of contribution to its good life, then culture and goodness, as we have noted already,[1] may be regarded as having the justest claim. On the other hand—and following our principle that it is not right for men who are equal in one respect, and only in one, to have an equal share of all things [as the democrats claim], or for men who are superior in one respect to have a superior share of everything [as the oligarchs claim]—we are bound to consider all constitutions which recognize such claims as perverted forms. § 2. We have noted already[2] that there is a certain sense in which all the contributors of the different elements are justified in the claims they advance, though none of them is absolutely justified. (*a*) The rich are so far justified that they have a larger share of the land, which is a matter of public interest: they are also, as a rule, more reliable in matters of contract. (*b*) The free and the nobly born [who both contribute the element of birth] may claim recognition together as being closely connected. The better-born are citizens to a greater extent than the low-born; and good birth has always honour in its own country. § 3. In addition [and apart from any honour paid them] the descendants of better men are likely to be intrinsically better; good birth means goodness of the whole stock. (*c*) Similarly we may also allow that goodness of character has a just claim; for in our view the virtue of justice, which is necessarily accompanied by all the other virtues [and which may thus be identified with *general* virtue or goodness] is a virtue which acts in social relations [and is therefore one of the elements essential to the existence of political society].[3] § 4. (*d*) But

[1] *Supra*, c. IX, §§ 14–15.

[2] *Supra*, c. IX, § 1, where Aristotle allows that both oligarchs and democrats 'have a hold on a sort of conception of justice'.

[3] There are two ideas involved in this succinct sentence. The first is

there is a further claim that may also be urged. [Besides the claims of individuals, based on their having the particular attribute of wealth or birth or goodness, there is the claim of the people at large, based on its having, collectively, still more of all these attributes.] The many may urge their claims against the few: taken together and compared with the few they are stronger, richer, and better.

1283 b Let us suppose these rival claimants—for example, the good, the wealthy and well-born, and some sort of general body of citizens—all living together in a single state. Will they fall to disputing which of them is to govern, or will they agree? § 5. This issue is not a matter of dispute in any of the constitutions mentioned in our previous classification.[1] These constitutions differ in virtue of different groups being sovereign: one of them [oligarchy] is distinguished by sovereignty being vested in the wealthy; another [aristocracy] by its being vested in the good; and so with each of the rest. But the question we are discussing is different. It is a question of determining who is to govern when the claims of different groups are simultaneously present. § 6. Suppose, for example, that the good are exceedingly few in number: how are we to settle their claim? Must we only have regard to the fact that they are few for the function they have to discharge; and must we therefore inquire whether they will be able to manage a state, or numerous enough to compose one? Here there arises a difficulty which applies not only to the good, but to all the different claimants for political office and honour.[2] § 7. It may equally be held that there is

that the form of goodness called justice (in the sense of the temper and disposition of the just man) is really total goodness, because it embraces or involves all other forms: as one of the Greek poets expressed it, 'in justice doth all goodness dwell compact'. The second idea is that justice, being essentially operative in social relations, is necessarily a contribution (as much as, or even more than, wealth or birth) to the existence of a political society: indeed we may say, in the language of § 1 of this chapter, that it is a contribution to its good life, and not merely to its existence. For the second of these ideas cf. Book I, c. II, §§ 12 and 16: 'it is association in a common perception of the just and unjust that makes a polis'.

[1] In c. VII of this book.

[2] If you defend the good on the ground of their quality, in spite of the paucity of their numbers, you are faced with the difficulty, 'May not the

no justice in the claim of a few to rule on the ground of their greater wealth, or on that of their better birth; and there is an obvious reason for holding this view. If there is any *one* man who in turn is richer than all the rest, this one man must rule over all on the very same ground of justice [which the few rich plead for *their* right to rule]; and similarly any one man who is pre-eminent in point of good birth must carry the day over those who claim on the ground of birth. § 8. In aristocracies, too, the same logic may be applied in the matter of merit or goodness.[1] If some one man be a better man than all the other good men who belong to the civic body, this one man should be sovereign on the very same ground of justice [which the other men plead in defence of *their* right to govern. . . . Even the claims of the Many may be challenged by this line of argument]. If the reason why they should be sovereign is their being stronger than the Few, we are logically driven to conclude that where one man is stronger than all the rest—or a group of more than one, but fewer than the Many, is stronger—that one man or group must be sovereign instead of the Many.

§ 9. All these considerations would seem to prove that none of the principles [wealth, birth, goodness, and the strength of numbers], in virtue of which men claim to rule and to have all others subject to their rule, is a proper principle. § 10. Take, for example, those who claim to be sovereign over the citizen body on the ground of goodness; or take, again, those who base their claim on the ground of wealth. The claims of both may be justly challenged by the masses; for there is nothing whatever to prevent the Many—

one best be defended on the ground of *his* quality, in spite of the fact that he is only one in number?' The same difficulty may also be raised in regard to the wealthy or the well-born: the one wealthiest, or the one best-born, in spite of being only one, may claim the reward of his eminence. It may even be raised in regard to the Many: the one strongest may claim a preference over the collective strength of the Many.

[1] In our modern usage of the term we connect aristocracy with birth. In Aristotle's use it is not connected with birth (birth, in his view, goes generally with wealth, and the two together form the basis of oligarchy): it is connected with merit or goodness, and it means the government of the best (*aristoi*).

collectively if not individually—from being better, or richer, than the Few. § 11. This last reflection enables us to take another step, and to meet a difficulty which is sometimes raised and discussed. The difficulty is this. Suppose that the Many are actually better, taken as a whole, than the Few: what, in that case, is the proper policy for a lawgiver who wishes to enact right laws to the best of his power? Should he direct his legislation to the benefit of the better sort, or should he direct it to that of the majority? § 12. We may reply [that the benefit of neither ought to be considered exclusively]; that what is 'right' should be understood as what is 'equally right'; and what is 'equally right' is what is for the benefit of the whole state and for the common good of its citizens. . . . Citizens, in the common sense of that term, are *all* who share in the civic life of ruling and being ruled in turn. In the particular **1284 a** sense of the term, they vary from constitution to constitution; and under an ideal constitution they must be those who are able and willing to rule and be ruled with a view to attaining a way of life according to goodness.[1]

§ 13. [We have just been considering the case in which the Many are collectively superior to the Few. We may now take the opposite case.] If there is one person (or several persons, but yet not enough to form the full measure of a state) so pre-eminently superior in goodness that there can be no comparison between the goodness and political capacity which he shows (or several show, when there is more than one) and what is shown by the rest, such a person, or such persons, can no longer be treated as part of a state. Being so greatly superior to others in goodness and political capacity, they will suffer injustice if they are treated as worthy only of an equal share; for a person of this order may very well be like a god among men. § 14. This being the case, it is clear that law generally [as well as any particular rule of equality in the

[1] These last sentences are in the nature of an additional gloss. What is the general conclusion at which Aristotle has arrived, before he adds this gloss, in regard to the proper object of legislation? Briefly—that legislation should not be directed either to the benefit of the better sort or to that of the majority, but to the benefit of both and all.

distribution of office] is necessarily limited to those who are equal in birth and capacity. There can be no law which runs against men who are utterly superior to others. They are a law in themselves. It would be a folly to attempt to legislate for them: they might reply to such an attempt with the words used by the lions, in the fable of Antisthenes, when the hares were making orations and claiming that all the animals had equal rights, ['Where are your claws and teeth?'] §15. Reasons of this nature will serve to explain why democratic states institute the rule of ostracism. Such states are held to aim at equality above anything else; and with that aim in view they used to pass a sentence of ostracism [banishment from the state for some fixed period] on those whom they regarded as having too much influence owing to their wealth or the number of their connexions or any other form of political strength. § 16. We may also cite the evidence of legend: the Argonauts left Heracles behind for this sort of reason; and the *Argo* itself [the ship that talked] refused to have him among the crew because he was so greatly superior to all the others. From this point of view we cannot altogether regard as just the strictures passed by the critics of tyranny on the advice once given by the tyrant Periander to his fellow-tyrant Thrasybulus. § 17. Thrasybulus, according to the tale that is told, sent an envoy to ask for advice. Periander gave no verbal answer; he simply switched off the outstanding ears, in the corn-field where he was standing, until he had levelled the surface. The envoy did not understand the meaning of his action, and merely reported the incident; but Thrasybulus guessed that he had been advised to cut off the outstanding men in the state. § 18. It is not only tyrants who may derive some benefit from this policy; nor is it only tyrants who put it into practice. Oligarchies and democracies are both in the same position; and ostracism has, in its way, the same effect of pulling down and banishing men of outstanding influence. § 19. States which have gained an ascendancy apply the same sort of policy to other states and peoples. Athens, for instance, acted in this way to Samos, Chios, and Lesbos: once she had gained a firm grip of her empire, she humbled them

all, in violation of her former treaties. Similarly the King of
1284 b Persia repeatedly curtailed the power of Media, Baby-
lonia, and other parts of his realm which were made presump-
tuous by memories of having once had an empire themselves.

§ 20. The difficulty which we are discussing is one which is common to all forms of government, the right as well as the wrong; and if wrong or perverted forms adopt this policy of levelling with a view to their own particular interest, some-thing the same is also true of forms which look to the common good. § 21. This rule of proportion may also be observed in the arts and sciences generally. A painter would not permit a foot which exceeded the bounds of symmetry, however beautiful it might be, to appear in a figure on his canvas. A shipwright would not tolerate a stern, or any other part of a ship, which was out of proportion. A choirmaster would not admit to a choir a singer with a greater compass and a finer voice than any of the other members. § 22. In view of this general rule, a policy of levelling need not prevent a monarch who practises it from being in harmony with his state—provided that his government is otherwise beneficial; and thus the argument in favour of ostracism possesses a kind of political justice in relation to any of the recognized forms of pre-eminence. § 23. It is true that it would be better if the legislator could so frame a constitution initially that it would never need any such remedy; but the next best course, should the need arise, is to endeavour to apply this sort of correction. Actually, states have not applied the policy in this spirit; and each, instead of considering what was required by the interest of its own particular constitution, has resorted to acts of ostracism in a spirit of mere faction.

§ 24. So far as perverted forms are concerned, it is clear that the practice of banishing the eminent is expedient and just from their own point of view—though perhaps it is also clear that it is not absolutely just. But a serious difficulty arises about the use of any such practice in the ideal constitu-tion. The difficulty does not arise in regard to pre-eminence in qualities such as political strength, or wealth, or an abun-dance of connexions. The real question is rather, 'What is to

be done when we meet with a man of outstanding eminence in goodness?' § 25. Nobody, we may assume, would say that such a man ought to be banished and sent into exile. But neither would any man say that he ought to be subject to others. That would be much as if human beings should claim to rule over Zeus, on some system of rotation of office between themselves and *him*. The only alternative left—and this would also appear to be the natural course—is for all others to pay a willing obedience to the man of outstanding goodness. Such men will accordingly be the permanent kings in their states.[1]

D
KINGSHIP AND ITS FORMS (cc. XIV–XVIII)

Chapter XIV

There are five forms of kingship: (1) *the Spartan form;* (2) *kingship among uncivilized peoples;* (3) *the dictatorship or* elective *form of tyranny;* (4) *the kingship of the Heroic Age;* (5) *absolute kingship, with the king exercising a plenary power in the nature of* patria potestas.

§ 1. It will perhaps be well, after the previous discussion, to make a transition, and to proceed to consider kingship.[2] Government by a king is, in our view, one of the right constitutions. The question we have to consider is whether this form of government is expedient for states or territories which are to be properly governed; or whether this is not so and some other form is more expedient—or, at any rate, more expedient in *some* cases, even if it is not in others. § 2. We must begin by determining whether there is only one kind of kingship, or whether it has several varieties. **1285 a** It is easy

[1] Newman cites, most appositely, Milton's defence of the position of Cromwell, in his *Second defence of the people of England*: 'we all willingly yield the palm of sovereignty to your unrivalled ability and virtue, except the few among us who . . . do not know that nothing in the world is . . . more agreeable to reason . . . than that the supreme power should be vested in the best and wisest of men.' Milton's *Prose Works*, Bohn's edition, vol. i, p. 288.

[2] See the note at the end of the chapter.

to see that it includes a number of different kinds, and that the system of government followed is not the same in all these kinds.

§ 3. In the first place, there is the kind of kingship to be found in the constitution of Sparta. This is regarded as the strongest form of constitutional kingship. That is hardly the case. The Spartan kings are not vested with any general sovereignty: they have simply the power of commanding in war when they are outside Spartan territory, and the right of dealing with matters of religious observance. § 4. Kings of the Spartan kind are thus of the nature of generals, with an independent command and a permanent tenure. Such kings do not possess the power of life and death, or, if they do, it is only in some particular variety of this type of kingship—for instance that of the Heroic Age, when kings could put men to death on military expeditions, by right of superior force. Homer may be cited in proof: he represents Agamemnon, in the *Iliad*, as patient under abuse in the presence of the assembly, but as exercising the power of life and death on the field of battle. § 5. At any rate he puts this speech in his mouth:

Whomso I find apart from the fight . . .
he shall have no hope of escaping:
Dogs and vultures shall rend him; for mine is the power to command death.

We may thus say that one type of kingship is a military command held for life; and we may add that this type of kingship has two different species, the one hereditary and the other elective.

§ 6. Another type of kingship is the sort which is to be found among some uncivilized [i.e. non-Hellenic] peoples. Kingships of this sort all possess an authority similar to that of tyrannies; but they are, none the less, constitutional, and they descend from father to son. The reason is that these uncivilized peoples are more servile in character than Greeks (as the peoples of Asia, in turn, are more servile than those of Europe); and they will therefore tolerate despotic rule without

any complaint. § 7. Kingships among uncivilized peoples are thus of the nature of tyrannies; but, being constitutional and hereditary, they are at the same time stable. We may also note that the bodyguards used in such states are such as suit kings, and not tyrants. Kings are guarded by the arms of their subjects; tyrants by a foreign force. Ruling constitutionally, and with the consent of their subjects, kings have bodyguards drawn from their subjects: the tyrant, who rules contrary to the will of his subjects, has a [foreign] bodyguard to protect him against them.

§ 8. These are two types of monarchy; but there is also a third, which used to exist among the ancient Greeks, and which goes by the name of dictatorship (*Aisumnēteia*]. This may be roughly described as an elective form of tyranny. It differs from the type of kingship among uncivilized peoples, but only in being non-hereditary, and not in being non-constitutional. § 9. Some of the dictators held their office for life: others for a fixed period, or for the discharge of a definite duty.[1] Pittacus, for instance, was elected at Mitylene to deal with the attacks of the exiles commanded by Antimenides and the lyric poet Alcaeus. § 10. The fact of the election of Pittacus is attested by Alcaeus, in one of his drinking-songs, where he bitterly says:

> Meanly born Pittacus over their gall-less and heaven-doomed city
> 1285 b Was enthroned by them for their tyrant, with clamour of praise, in the throng of the hustings.

§ 11. These dictatorships were, and still are, of a double character: they were tyrannies in their despotic power, but kingships in being elective and in resting on the assent of

[1] Some of the Greek *aisumnētai* were ordinary magistrates; but Aristotle is dealing with the term only in its application to extraordinary magistrates. The extraordinary *aisumnētēs* was generally analogous to the Roman dictator. We may note (1) that the Roman dictator was appointed by one of the consuls on the strength of a regular decree duly passed by the Senate; (2) that his term was six months or less; and (3) that he was always appointed for the discharge of a definite duty—either *rei gerundae causa* (to do some difficult job, generally in the sphere of foreign policy and military defence) or *seditionis sedandae causa* (to allay some internal discontent).

their subjects. But there is a fourth type of kingship, [which is less ambiguous]. This is the type of the kingships of the Heroic Age, which were constitutional, rested on consent, and descended from father to son. § 12. The founders of royal lines had been benefactors of their people in the arts or in war: they had drawn them together in a city, or provided them with territory; and they had thus become kings by general consent, and had established kingships which descended to their successors. Such kings had three sovereign functions: they were commanders in war; they had the religious function of offering such sacrifices as did not require a priest; and they were also judges in legal actions. Sometimes they judged upon oath, and sometimes without oath: the form of the oath, when they took one, was the lifting up of their sceptre. § 13. In ancient times they enjoyed a permanent authority, which included urban, rural, and foreign affairs: at a later date this was altered. Some of their prerogatives were voluntarily relinquished: others were taken away by the masses; in the issue the only prerogative left to the kings, in the majority of cases, was the management of the traditional sacrifices. Even in cases where it could be said that a real kingship still existed, the only effective power of the king was that of military command in foreign expeditions.

§ 14. There are thus four types of kingship—(1) the kingship of the Heroic Age, based on general consent but limited to a number of definite functions, with the king acting as general and judge and the head of religious observances; (2) the type of kingship among uncivilized peoples, with the king exercising, by right of descent, a despotic authority which is none the less constitutional; (3) kingship of the type which is termed dictatorship, and which is an elective form of tyranny; and (4) the Spartan type of kingship, which may be roughly defined as a permanent command of the army exercised by right of descent. § 15. These four types differ from one another in the ways just mentioned; but there is still a fifth type of kingship [which differs from all the four]. This is the absolute type, where a single person is sovereign on every issue, with the same sort of power that a tribe or a

polis exercises over its public concerns. It is a type which corresponds to paternal rule over a household.[1] Just as paternal rule is kingship over a family, so conversely this type of kingship may be regarded as paternal rule over a polis, or a tribe, or a collection of tribes.

Note on the course of the argument in C. XIV

The previous discussion (in cc. IX–XIII) has been concerned with the problem of the proper distribution of political power, or, in other words, with the problem of distributive justice. Various claims have been canvassed—the claims of the various *qualities* (birth, wealth, and goodness) which contribute to the being and the working of the state, and what may be called the *quantitative* claims of the Many, the Few, and the One. Sometimes the argument has swayed in favour of the Many: at the end of c. XIII it has swayed in favour of the One. At that point, and for the rest of Book III, Aristotle turns to consider kingship—at first on the ground of expediency rather than that of justice, but ultimately on both grounds. In a previous part of Book III (cc. VI–VIII), in which he was concerned with the classification of states, he had suggested that the various constitutions had to be considered in turn—and first the right constitutions (c. VII, § 1). It is in pursuance of this suggestion that, having concluded the exhaustive argument of cc. IX–XIII on the general principles of the distribution of political power, he now proceeds to consider kingship as one of the right constitutions.

CHAPTER XV

Only the last of the five forms of kingship mentioned in the last chapter needs special examination. It raises the problem of personal rule versus *the rule of law. There are arguments on either side: personal rule has the quality of initiative; the rule of law has that of impartiality. The rule of law is of major importance, and should be the main factor in all constitutions, including kingship, which should therefore be a constitutional kingship limited by law. There are, however, matters of detail which cannot be*

[1] Being 'sovereign on every issue', a king of this sort may be called the all-king [or, in Greek, *pambasileus*], as he is afterwards called at the beginning of the next chapter. His total power means that his position may be compared (1) to the position of a whole community governing itself by a similar power, or (2) to the position of the patriarch exercising a similar power over all his family. From the second point of view, the *pambasileus* is analogous to the patriarchal sovereign of Bodin's and Filmer's theory.

settled by law. Even so, the question arises whether such matters are best settled by one person, or by a body of persons. The balance is in favour of a body of persons. Where government by a single person exists, in the form of kingship, it raises two special problems: should it be hereditary, and should it be backed by a guard or standing army?

§ 1. For practical purposes there are only two of these five types of kingship which we need consider—the type just mentioned, and the Spartan type. Most of the instances of the other three types are intermediate between these two: their kings are sovereign to a less extent than they are in the absolute type, or *pambasileia*, but to a greater extent than they are in the Spartan type. § 2. [The intermediate forms may be understood from a study of the two extremes; and] our inquiry is practically reduced to two issues. The first is the issue whether the existence of a permanent general (either on a hereditary basis, or on some scheme of rotation) is, or is not, an expedient system of government. The second is the issue whether it is expedient **1286 a** or not that one man should be sovereign in all matters.

The first of these issues belongs more to the scope of legal enactment than to that of constitutional form. A permanent general may exist under any form of constitution; and we may therefore dismiss this issue for the present. § 3. The absolute type of kingship is a different matter. It is a form of constitution; and we are therefore bound to study it philosophically, and to examine briefly the difficulties which it involves.

Our inquiry will naturally start from the general problem, 'Is it more expedient to be ruled by the one best man, or by the best laws?'[1] § 4. Those who hold that kingship is expedient argue that law can only lay down general rules; it cannot issue commands to deal with various different conjunctures; and the rule of the letter of law is therefore a folly in any and every art [whether the art of politics, or that of medicine, or any other art]. In Egypt it is permissible for

[1] See the note at the end of the chapter.

doctors to alter the rules of treatment after the first four days, though a doctor who alters them earlier does so at his own risk. If we follow this line it is clear that a constitution based on the letter and rules of law is not the best constitution, in the same way and for the same reason [as medical treatment by strict rule is not the best treatment]. § 5. [This is an argument in favour of personal initiative.] But we have to remember that general principle must also be present in the ruler's mind. [We have also to remember a further point.] That from which the element of passion is wholly absent is better than that to which such an element clings. Law contains no element of passion; but such an element must always be present in the human mind. The rejoinder may, however, be made that the individual mind, if it loses in this way, gains something in return: it can deliberate better, and decide better, on particular issues. § 6. These considerations lead us to conclude that the one best man must be a law-giver, and there must be a body of laws [even in a state which is governed by such a man], but these laws must not be sovereign where they fail to hit the mark—though they must be so in all other cases.[1] There is, however, a whole class of matters which cannot be decided at all, or cannot be decided properly, by rules of law. [They must thus be decided by personal initiative;[2] but] the question arises whether this authority should be vested in the one best man or in the whole of the people. [We are thus brought back to our previous problem of the rights of the people.]

§ 7. In the actual practice of our own day the people in their gatherings have both a judicial and a deliberative capacity, and in both capacities they make decisions which are all concerned with particular matters [i.e. the matters that cannot be decided, or properly decided, by law]. Any individual member of these assemblies is probably inferior to the one

[1] Law may deviate, or miss the mark, owing to its generality, which may prevent it from meeting the requirement of some particular conjuncture. Here, it is suggested, the one best man may dispense with law, and use his discretion to apply considerations of equity.

[2] It is perhaps worth noting that the Greek word *archê* had the general sense of 'initiative'. See the Prefatory Note, § 2.

best man. But the state is composed of many individuals; and just as a feast to which many contribute is better than one provided by a single person,[1] so, and for the same reason, the masses can come to a better decision, in many matters, than any one individual. § 8. Again, a numerous body is less likely to be corrupted. A large volume of water is not so liable to contamination as a small; and the people is not so liable to corruption as the few. The judgement of a single man is bound to be corrupted when he is overpowered by anger, or by any other similar emotion; but it is not easy for all to get angry and go wrong simultaneously. § 9. We may assume that the people are all freemen, do nothing contrary to law, and only act outside it in matters which law, by its nature, is obliged to omit. It may be objected that these limitations will not be easily observed in a large body. But if we have a body of persons who are both good men and good citizens, which will be the more likely to be free from corruption—the one man, or the body of persons who are all good men? Is not the balance clearly in favour of the latter?

1286 b Another objection may, however, be urged—that a body of men will be subject to faction, from which the one man will be free. § 10. It is perhaps an answer to this objection that the body may be of good character [and therefore free from faction] equally with the one man. [We thus reach the following conclusion.] If we call by the name of aristocracy a government vested in a number of persons who are all good men, and by the name of kingship a government vested in a single person, we may say that aristocracy is better for states than kingship (whether or no the rule of a king is supported by the force of a bodyguard)—provided only that a body of men who are all equally good can be actually found.[2]

§ 11. Perhaps the reason why kingship was formerly com-

[1] This repeats the argument of c. XI, § 2.

[2] The ground of the argument would seem to be shifted at this point. Previously, from the end of § 6 onwards, Aristotle has been discussing the rights of numbers in the sense of *all*, or the whole people—i.e. on a democratic basis. Here, beginning in § 9 and reaching his conclusion in the present section, he discusses the rights of numbers in the sense of *some*, or the class of good citizens—i.e. on an aristocratic basis.

mon was because it was rare to find a number of men of outstanding goodness—all the more as states were then thinly populated. A further reason why kings were appointed was that they were benefactors—which it is the duty of all good men to be [but only one man was then able to be]. Later there arose a number of persons of equal goodness; and they, refusing to tolerate the rule of a single person, desired to have something they could share in common, and so established a constitution. § 12. Later still they deteriorated in character: they enriched themselves from the public property; and it is to some such origin—the honour in which wealth now began to be held—that we may reasonably ascribe the rise of oligarchy. At a still later stage there was a change from oligarchies to tyrannies, and then from tyrannies to democracy. The reason was that the members of the government, greedy for the gains which office conferred, limited it to a narrower and narrower circle; and by this policy they strengthened the masses until they rose in rebellion and established democracies. § 13. Nowadays, when states have become still larger, we may almost say that it is hardly even possible for any other form of constitution to exist.[1]

[Returning to our consideration of the relative merits of monarchy and aristocracy, we may raise two further questions. The first is this.] If kingship be accepted as the best form of government for states, what is to be the position of the issue of a king? Are we to say that the kingship is vested in the family, and that his descendants should also be kings? If they turn out to be ordinary persons, the result will be mischievous. § 14. It may be argued that a king, even if he has the power to

[1] This digression, which arises from the final sentence at the end of § 10, gives an account of the historical succession of constitutions in Greece (based partly on considerations of population, and partly on considerations of social development) which does not square with the subsequent account given in Book IV, c. XIII, §§ 10–11, which is based on considerations of changes in the art of war. Neither account, in turn, squares with the ideas expressed in the criticism of Plato's views on the historical succession of constitutions (Book V, c. XII, §§ 7–18). We can only say, first that Aristotle naturally expresses different views in different contexts, and secondly that the views expressed in the present context are introduced by the saving word 'perhaps'.

do so, will not transmit the crown to his children. But it is hardly to be believed that a king will act in this way: it is a difficult thing to do, and it needs a greater degree of goodness than human nature warrants us in expecting. The other question, which also raises difficulties, is that of the king's bodyguard. Should the man who is to be king have a force about his person which will enable him to coerce those who are unwilling to obey? If not, how can he possibly manage to govern? § 15. Even if he were a sovereign who ruled according to law, and who never acted at his own discretion and went outside the law, he must necessarily have a bodyguard in order to guard the law. § 16. In the case of a king of this sort, who rules according to law, it is perhaps easy to settle the question. He ought to have some amount of force—less, indeed, than what his people commands, but greater than that commanded by any one individual or any group of individuals. This was the nature of the bodyguard assigned in ancient times, when a man was made head of the state under the title of dictator or tyrant.[1] It was also the size of the force which a counsellor at Syracuse advised the people to give to Dionysius when he asked for a bodyguard.

Note on Aristotle's attitude to absolute monarchy

This general question had been raised by Plato, particularly in the *Republic*, but also in the *Politicus* and, to a less extent, in the *Laws*. The general answer of Plato had been in favour of the free philosophic intelligence of the individual ruler (or rulers) properly trained for the work of government: it had been adverse to the rule of a fixed and dead body of law. The answer of Aristotle, as it develops, is more balanced, and, on the whole, more favourable to the rule of law; but he admits, and indeed he urges, that there are cases in which the free intelligence of the one best man should be sovereign. It may be noticed, however, that Plato was less concerned with the problem of the *one* man, or sole monarch, than Aristotle appears to be. His interest is in the rule of free intelligence, whether of one or more than one (cf. the famous passage on the rule of 'philosopher kings'—in the plural—in the *Republic* 473 C–D); while

[1] Strictly speaking, a 'tyrant', in the Greek sense of the word, is not 'made' head of the State: he makes himself head, generally by a *coup d'état*, and proceeds to rule, for an indeterminate period, without respect for law and without any regard to popular assent.

Aristotle's interest is an interest in monarchy as such, or the rule of a single person. Was Aristotle affected by his residence in Macedonia (after 343 B.C.) and his education of the young Alexander, for whom he is recorded to have written a work *On Monarchy*?

CHAPTER XVI

The general considerations of the previous chapter, so far as they favour kingship at all, are in favour of a constitutional and limited kingship. But the question still remains whether a case can be made in favour of an absolute kingship. It may be objected to such a form of kingship that it is contrary to the idea of a free society of equals, and adverse to the rule of law. True, the rule of an absolute king may be defended on the ground of his expert knowledge; and the analogy of science and the arts may be invoked in his favour. But the analogy does not really hold; and in any case expert knowledge is more likely to reside in a number of men than in one. So far, therefore, the conclusion would seem to be adverse to absolute monarchy—at any rate on general grounds.

1287 a § 1. [We have just been speaking of the king who acts according to law and does nothing at his own discretion.] But the argument which now confronts us, and the inquiry we have still to attempt, is concerned with the king who does everything at his own discretion.[1] . . . A kingship which acts according to law, as has already been noted [in § 2 of the previous chapter], is not in itself a form of constitution. A permanent military command [which is what such kingship

[1] Aristotle had started the previous chapter by an examination of the antithesis, *Aut rex aut lex*. But by the end of § 6 of that chapter he had abandoned the antithesis: he had assumed the general principle of the sovereignty of *lex*; and on that assumption he had started an inquiry into a different antithesis—the antithesis between the claims of one man and those of a number of men to the right of deciding particular cases which lie outside the general rules of *lex*. He had settled the inquiry into this new antithesis by a decision in favour of the claims of a number of men. Now, however, at the beginning of c. XVI, he returns to the old antithesis, *Aut rex aut lex*. In spite of the general presumption in favour of the sovereignty of law, there *may* (he feels) be a case, or cases, in which one man is so eminent, and so good, that his free discretion may be a better mode of sovereignty than the rule of law. It is this question that he now examines.

generally means] may exist in any form of constitution—for example, in a democracy or an aristocracy; and in the sphere of civil administration, too, there are a number of states with different forms of constitution which make a single person sovereign [subject to his acting according to law]: there is a magistrate of this order at Epidamnus, for instance, and another, though with somewhat more limited powers, at Opus.[1] . . . § 2. But an absolute kingship, or, as it is called, a *pambasileia*, is a form of constitution in which a king governs at his own discretion and in all affairs. Now there are some who take the view that the sovereignty of one man over all the other members of a state is not even natural [far less expedient] in any case where a state is composed of equals. On this view those who are naturally equal must naturally have the same rights and worth; and therefore the assignment of unequal amounts to equals (or, conversely, the assignment of equal amounts to unequals) is a method of dealing with the distribution of honours and offices which is as bad [for men's minds] as it would be for their bodies if you followed that method in distributing food and clothing. § 3. The conclusion drawn is that justice for equals means their being ruled as well as their ruling [*not* their always ruling, as absolute kings do], and therefore involves rotation of office. But when we come to that, we already come to law; for the arrangement [which regulates rotation of office] *is* law. The rule of law is therefore preferable, according to the view we are stating, to that of a single citizen. § 4. In pursuance of the same view it is argued that, even if it be the better course to have individuals[2] ruling, they should be made 'law-guardians' or ministers of the law. There must, it is admitted, be offices of state; but these, it is urged, cannot be vested in one man, consistently with justice, when all are equals and peers.

[Further considerations may be added in favour of the rule

[1] Both of these states were oligarchies.

[2] The plural words here used show that the argument has slipped away from the one man. It began by pressing the claims of the impersonal rule of law in preference to any personal rule. It now suggests the idea that even if there is personal rule (and *so far as* there is personal rule) it should be plural rather than singular.

of law.][1] If there are a number of cases which law seems unable to determine, it is also true that a person would be equally unable to find an answer to these cases. § 5. Law [does the best it can: it] trains the holders of office expressly in its own spirit, and then sets them to decide and settle those residuary issues which it cannot regulate 'as justly as in them lies'.[2] It also allows them to introduce any improvements which may seem to them, as the result of experience, to be better than the existing laws.[3] He who commands that law should rule may thus be regarded as commanding that God and reason alone should rule; he who commands that a man should rule adds the character of the beast. Appetite has that character; and high spirit, too, perverts the holders of office, even when they are the best of men.[4] Law [as the pure voice of God and reason] may thus be defined as 'Reason free from all passion'.[5]

§ 6. The parallel of the arts [e.g. that of medicine, already mentioned[6]] is false. It may be true that medical treatment according to the rules of a text-book is a poor sort of thing, and that it is very much better to use the services of those who possess professional skill. [But we have to remember that there is a vital distinction between the physician and the politician.] § 7. Physicians never act in defiance of reason from motives of partiality: they cure their patients and earn their fee. Politicians in office have a habit of doing a number of things in order to spite their enemies or favour their

[1] See the first note at the end of the chapter.

[2] Newman notes that this phrase is taken from the oath of the Athenian jurors, who swore 'to vote according to the laws where there are laws, and where there are not, to vote as justly as in us lies'.

[3] See the second note at the end of the chapter.

[4] The terms here used (*epithymia* and *thymos*) are reminiscent of the psychology of Plato's *Republic*. Appetite, or *epithymia*, is the physical appetite for material satisfaction: high spirit, or *thymos*, is something less physical, and less set on material objects, but still self-centred, and still of the nature of the beast. It is the spirit expressed in Shakespeare's lines,

> But if it be a sin to covet honour
> I am the most offending soul alive.

[5] On Aristotle's general conception of *nomos* or law see the Prefatory Note, § 3.

[6] See c. xv, § 4, and also c. xi, §§ 10–11.

friends. If patients suspected physicians of conspiring with their enemies to destroy them for their own profit, they would be more inclined to seek for treatment by the rules of a text-book. § 8. Again, physicians, when they are **1287 b** ill, call in other physicians to attend them; and trainers, when they are in training, use the services of other trainers. [They turn to a neutral authority], feeling that they cannot judge truly themselves because they are judging in their own case under the influence of their own feelings. This shows that to seek for justice is to seek for a neutral authority; and law is a neutral authority. § 9. [We have been speaking hitherto of written rules of law.] But laws resting on unwritten custom are even more sovereign, and concerned with issues of still more sovereign importance, than written laws; and this suggests that, even if the rule of a man be safer than the rule of written law, it need not therefore be safer than the rule of unwritten law.

It is a further objection to the rule of a single man that [apart from the danger of partiality] he cannot even keep his eye readily on a number of things at once. He will thus find it necessary to appoint a number of officers to give him assistance. But is there any real difference between having these officers [at the start] and having them appointed afterwards by the choice of a single man? § 10. We may add, to clinch the argument, a point which has already been made.[1] If the good man has a just title to authority because he is better than others, then two good men are better than one [and have, therefore, a still juster title]. This is what Homer suggests in the line,

> Two men going together, one sees in advance of the other,

or again in the prayer which he puts into Agamemnon's mouth,

> Would that I had ten men for my counsellors like unto Nestor.

In our own day, too, we find a number of officers—such as

[1] In the previous chapter, c. xv, §§ 10–11.

judges, for example—who are vested with a power of decision on certain issues on which the law is not competent to pronounce, but only on such issues; for no one disputes the fact that law will be the best ruler and judge on the issues on which it is competent. § 11. It is because law cannot cover the whole of the ground, and there are subjects which cannot be included in its scope, that difficulties arise and the question comes to be debated, 'Is the rule of the best law preferable to that of the best man?' Matters of detail, which belong to the sphere of deliberation, are obviously matters on which it is not possible to lay down a law. The advocates of the rule of law do not deny that such matters ought to be judged by men; they only claim that they ought to be judged by many men rather than one. § 12. *All* persons in office who have been trained by the law will have a good judgement; and it may well be regarded as an absurdity that a single man should do better in seeing with two eyes, judging with two ears, or acting with two hands and feet, than many could do with many. Indeed, it is actually the practice of monarchs to take to themselves, as it were, many eyes and ears and hands and feet, and to use as colleagues those who are friends of their rule and their person. § 13. The colleagues of a monarch must be his friends: otherwise they will not act in accordance with his policy. But if they are friends of his person and rule, they will also be—as a man's friends always are—his equals and peers;[1] and in believing that his friends should have office he is also committed to the belief that his equals and peers should have office.

These are the main arguments pressed by those who argue against the cause of kingship.

Note on the logic of the argument in C. XVI

It may be noted that there is something in Aristotle that holds him back—even when he has returned once more to the idea of absolute monarchy after the preliminary conclusion of c. xv in favour of the rule of law—from admitting that such a form of monarchy can be

[1] 'The friendships aforesaid are in the sphere of *equality*: *both* get the same things from one another, and wish them for one another' (*Ethics*, VIII, c. vi, § 7).

accepted. The new discussion in this chapter, which we might expect to state the case in its favour, rapidly turns into a second statement of the case in favour of the rule of law. It needs still another chapter (XVII) before a defence of absolute monarchy, *in some cases*, is at last attempted. It may be added that up to this point Aristotle has been speaking in this chapter as if he were stating the views of others, and he has accordingly expressed himself in *oratio obliqua*. From this point onwards, and for the rest of the chapter, he speaks in *oratio recta*, and may therefore be held to be stating his own views—which are, in effect, the same as those hitherto ascribed to others. On the other hand, it may also be noted that when he summarizes the whole argument at the end of the chapter (§ 13), he ascribes the views developed in it to 'those who argue against the cause of kingship'.

Note on the process of amendment of law at Athens

This passage also would seem to be a reference to Athenian practice. Under the reforms of Pericles provision was made for annual consideration and amendment of existing law by a balanced combination of different authorities, which included two special bodies as well as the popular assembly, and was so constructed as to give something of the forms and the guarantees of judicial procedure to the making and changing of law. The effect was (1) that six officials called the *thesmothetai* were charged with the duty of annually reviewing the laws, reporting on imperfections, and drafting any new laws which were necessary; (2) that the popular assembly then considered the state of the laws, on the basis of the report of the *thesmothetai*; and (3) that, if new laws were proposed, a body of *nomothetai* was next appointed, taken from the members of the *dikastēria*, before which the case for new legislation had to be argued. In this way the executive, the deliberative, and the judicial organs were all combined for the process of reviewing and amending the laws—the executive through the *thesmothetai* (the six junior 'archons', who all belonged to the sphere of *archē*); the deliberative through the popular assembly; and the judicial through the *nomothetai* taken from the members of the law-courts.

Chapter XVII

There may, however, be a particular sort of society in which absolute kingship ought to be instituted. This is the sort of society in which one family, or one person, is of merit so outstanding as to surpass all the other members. Here, justice and propriety may be argued to require that there should be absolute kingship, with plenary power and no limit of tenure.

§1. These arguments, however, may only be partly true—true when applied to some societies, but not when applied to others. There is one sort of society which is meant by its nature for rule of the despotic type [i.e. rule of the type exercised by a master over his slaves], another for rule by a king, and another still for rule of a constitutional type; and it is just and expedient that each of these societies should be ruled accordingly. (But there is no society which is meant by its nature for rule of the tyrannical type, or for rule of the other types found in wrong or perverted constitutions: the societies that are under such types of rule have fallen into an unnatural condition.) § 2. What has just been said is sufficient to show that in a group whose **1288 a** members are equal and peers it is neither expedient nor just that one man should be sovereign over all others. This is equally true whether laws are absent, with the one man ruling as a law in himself, or are present; it is true whether the one man is a good man ruling over the good, or a bad man ruling over the bad; it is even true when the one man is superior [to others] in goodness . . . unless his superiority be of a special character. § 3. We have now to see what that character is—though as a matter of fact it has already been in some sense explained in an earlier passage.[1]

[[We must first determine what sorts of group are appropriate to kingship, to aristocracy, and to government of the constitutional type. § 4. The society appropriate to kingship is one of the sort which naturally tends to produce some particular stock, or family, pre-eminent in its capacity for political leadership. The society appropriate to aristocracy is one which naturally tends to produce a body of persons capable of being ruled, in a manner suitable to free men, by

[1] The earlier passage is in c. XIII, § 13, and again §§ 24–5. It may be noticed that the sentences (printed in double brackets in the text) which immediately follow in the present chapter seem to be in the nature of an interruption or interpolation. Their position in the next may be defended; but they interrupt the argument, and the connexion suggested between constitutional government and military organization (though it agrees with the views expressed later in Book IV, c. XIII, §§ 10–11) does not agree with the general view about the succession of forms of government previously expressed in c. XV, § 11. The final words, too, present a difficulty.

those who are men of leading in their capacity for political rule. The society appropriate to government of the constitutional type [i.e. the 'polity'] is one in which there naturally exists a body of persons possessing military capacity, who can rule and be ruled under a system of law which distributes offices among the wealthy in proportion to merit.]][1]

§ 5. [The special character of the superiority which may entitle one man to rule, in spite of the general presumption to the contrary, is this.] When it happens that the whole of a family, or even a single person, is of merit so outstanding as to surpass that of all the rest, it is only just that this family should be vested with kingship and absolute sovereignty, or that this single person should become king [and absolute sovereign]. § 6. But it is not only a question of what is just. Justice is a ground which is usually pleaded in establishing any form of constitution—be it aristocracy or oligarchy, or be it, again, democracy. In all forms alike the claim is made that justice demands the recognition of some sort of superiority, though the sort for which the claim is made varies from one form to another. Here, however, there is a special ground which we have already had reason to mention[2]—the ground of what is proper. § 7. It would be surely improper to execute a man of outstanding superiority, or to banish him permanently, or to ostracize him for a period. It would be no less improper to require him to take his turn at being a subject under a system of rotation. A whole is never intended by nature to be inferior to a part; and a man so greatly superior to others stands to them in the relation of a whole to its parts. § 8. The only course which remains is that he should receive obedience, and should have sovereign power without any limit of tenure—not turn by turn with others.[3]

These may serve as our conclusions in regard to kingship, and as our answers to the three questions—What are its different forms? Is it, or is it not, advantageous to states?

[1] See the note at the end of the chapter.

[2] See above, c. XIII, § 25.

[3] This paragraph contains the utmost that Aristotle can say on behalf of absolute monarchy. It turns out to be rather a logical necessity (which is left in vague and general terms) than a practical proposition.

And, if it be so, to what states, and under what conditions, is it advantageous?

Note on the interpretation of the 'Polity'

These words 'among the wealthy in proportion to merit' are curious and difficult. In the first place, they seem self-contradictory. If offices are distributed among the wealthy, will they be also distributed in proportion to merit? And vice versa, if they are distributed in proportion to merit, will they be distributed only among the wealthy? In the second place, the words are contrary to what we should expect, which is that offices should be distributed among *all* the citizens, but with a preference for the more meritorious. It may be, however, that 'the wealthy' here means only 'those wealthy enough to provide themselves with armour for military service'; and it may be urged in favour of this view that Aristotle has already presupposed that the civic body possesses military capacity. In that case offices will be open to, and will rotate among, *all* members of the civic body possessing that amount of wealth, but a preference will be given to merit. We may then compare c. VII, § 4, of this book, where it is stated that in the 'polity', or government of the mean or mixed type, 'those who possess arms are the persons who enjoy constitutional rights'. We may also compare Book IV, c. XIII, § 10, where the succession of constitutions is connected with changes in the art of war, and the 'polity' is connected with the development of a heavy-armed infantry.

Chapter XVIII

We may now turn to inquire by what means a good constitution —be it an aristocracy or a kingship—should be brought into existence. The same means must be used to make a good constitution as are used to make a good man. We are thus led to inquire into the nature of the good life, which is the aim of both the good man and the good constitution.

§ 1. [We may now turn to inquire how a good constitution can be brought into being.] We have laid it down that there are three types of right constitution, and that the best of these must be the one which is administered by the best. This is the type in which there is a single man, or a whole family, or a number of persons, surpassing all others in goodness [and therefore entitled to rule], but where ruled as well as rulers are fitted to play their part in the attainment of the most

desirable mode of life. We have also shown, at the beginning of our inquiry,[1] that the goodness of the good man, and that of the good citizen of the best state, must be one and the same. It clearly follows that just the same method, and just the same **1288 b** means, by which a man achieves goodness, should also be used to achieve the creation of a state on the pattern of aristocracy or kingship [i.e. on a pattern which makes the goodness of the good citizen coincide with that of the good man]; and thus the training and habits of action which make a good man will be generally the same as the training and habits of action which make a good statesman[2] or a good king.

§ 2. These issues determined, we must next attempt to treat of the best form of constitution, asking ourselves, 'Under what conditions does it tend to arise, and how can it be established?' In order to make a proper inquiry into this subject it is necessary . . . [to begin by determining the nature of the most desirable mode of life].

Note on the problem of the end of Book III

The words at the close of this chapter, which ends in this abrupt manner, are repeated exactly at the beginning of Book VII. (The words added here in square brackets do not occur in the original text at the end of Book III, where the sentence ends in the middle: they are the words used when the sentence is completed at the beginning of Book VII.) It is an old question among scholars whether the order of the books of the *Politics* should be changed, and Book VII should be made to follow immediately on Book III. Here it may be sufficient to say that the end of this chapter, or even possibly the whole, may well be a later addition. It is by no means clear; and the assumption that the best state, or best type of constitution, will be an aristocracy or kingship does not agree with the argument of Books VII and VIII, where nothing is said of kingship, and little if anything of aristocracy. On the other hand, it *does* agree with what is said about the classification of constitutions in c. VII of this book.

[1] See c. IV of this book, especially from § 11 onwards.

[2] The statesman or *politikos* may be generally defined as a person who exercises authority, in his turn, over a society of equals and peers: cf. *supra*, c. IV, § 14, note. Here he is the statesman in an ideal aristocracy, in which all are equals and peers in goodness.

BOOK IV

ACTUAL CONSTITUTIONS AND THEIR VARIETIES

A

INTRODUCTORY (cc. 1–11)

Chapter I

Politics, like other arts and sciences, must consider not only the ideal, but also the various problems of the actual—e.g. which is the best constitution practicable in the given circumstances; what are the best means of preserving actual constitutions; which is the best average constitution for the majority of states; what are the different varieties of the main types of constitution, and especially of democracy and oligarchy. Politics, too, must consider not only constitutions, but also laws, and the proper relation of laws to constitutions.

1288 b 10 § 1. There is a rule which applies to all the practical arts and sciences, when they have come to cover the whole of a subject, and are no longer engaged in investigating it bit by bit. Each of them severally has to consider the different methods appropriate to the different categories of its subject. For instance, the art of physical training has to consider (1) which type of training is appropriate to which type of physique; (2) which is the ideal type of training—i.e. the training best for a physique of the best endowment and the best equipment (for the ideal type of training must be one which is suitable for such a physique); and (3) which is the type of training that can be generally applied to the majority of physiques—for that, too, is one of the problems to be solved by the art of physical training. § 2. Nor is this all. (4) There may be men who want to have physical training, but do not want to attain the standard of skill and condition which is needed for competitions; and here the trainer and the gymnastic master have still another duty—to impart

the degree of capacity which is all that such men want.[1] . . . What is true of the art of physical training is obviously no less true of medicine, or of shipbuilding, tailoring, and all the other arts.

§ 3. It follows that the study of politics [which belongs to the practical arts and sciences] must be equally comprehensive. First, it has to consider which is the best constitution, and what qualities a constitution must have to come closest to the ideal when there are no external factors [e.g. want of means, or unequal distribution of means] to hinder its doing so. Secondly, politics has to consider which sort of constitution suits which sort of civic body. The attainment of the best constitution is likely to be impossible for the general run of states; and the good law-giver and the true statesman must therefore have their eyes open not only to what is the absolute best, but also to what is the best in relation to actual conditions. § 4. Thirdly, politics has also to consider the sort of constitution which depends upon an assumption.[2] In other words, the student of politics must also be able to study a *given* constitution, just as it stands and simply with a view to explaining how it may have arisen and how it may be made to enjoy the longest possible life. The sort of case which we have in mind is one where a state has neither the ideally best constitution (or even the elementary conditions needed for it) nor the best constitution possible under the actual conditions, but has only a constitution of an inferior type. § 5.

[1] If we apply this analogy to the art and science of politics, it will have four functions: (1) to discover which sort of constitution is appropriate to which sort of civic body; (2) to discover the best constitution which is appropriate to the best sort of civic body; (3) to discover the sort of constitution (e.g. the 'polity') which is generally appropriate to most sorts of civic bodies; (4) to discover the constitution, or constitutions, which—without being either ideally best or generally appropriate—will suit a civic body that is content with a lower degree of civic life (and will accordingly put up with an oligarchy, or an inferior type of democracy, or even a tyranny).

[2] i.e. the assumption of a lower standard of civic attainment than the absolute or even the relative best. It is an assumption which, in the sphere of politics, corresponds to that made in the sphere of training by the man who 'does not want to attain the standard . . . needed for competitions'.

Fourthly,[1] and in addition to all these functions, politics has also to provide a knowledge of the type of constitution which is best suited to states in general. Most of the writers who treat of politics—good as they may be in other respects—fail when they come to deal with matters of practical *utility*.[2] § 6. We have not only to study the ideally best constitution. We have also to study the type of constitution which is practicable [i.e. the best for a state under actual conditions]—and with it, and equally, the type which is easiest to work and most suitable to states generally. As things are, writers fall into two different classes. Some confine their investigations to the extreme of perfection, which requires a large equipment [of initial advantages]. The rest, addressing themselves rather to an attainable form, still banish from view the general range of existing constitutions, and simply extol the Spartan or some other *one* constitution. **1289 a** § 7. The sort of constitutional system which ought to be proposed is one which men can be easily induced, and will be readily able, to graft on to the system they already have. It is as difficult a matter to reform an old constitution as it is to construct a new one; as hard to unlearn a lesson as it was to learn it initially. The true statesman, therefore, must not confine himself to the matters we have just mentioned [the study of the ideally best constitution, or that of some one particular form such as the Spartan]: he must also be able, as we said previously, to help *any* existing constitution [along the path of reform].[3] § 8. He cannot do so unless he knows how many different kinds of constitutions there are. As things are, we

[1] It will be noticed that the order in which Aristotle arranges the functions of the science of politics differs from that in which he arranges the functions of the science of physical training. The first function enumerated for the science of physical training corresponds to the second enumerated for the science of politics: the second to the first; the third to the fourth; and the fourth to the third.

[2] This phrase (*ta chrēsima*) strikes the general keynote of Books IV, V, and VI, which are all occupied with matters of practical utility—in the first instance, with what is useful for the preservation of actual constitutions as they stand, and, in the second, with what is useful in the way of a practical reform of actual constitutions such as can be generally adopted.

[3] In other words, which are the words of an old Greek proverb, he must say to himself, '*This* has fallen to thy lot: make the best of it'.

find people believing that there is only one sort of democracy or oligarchy. This is an error. To avoid that error we must keep in mind the different varieties of each constitution; we must be aware of their number, and of the number of different ways in which they are constituted.[1]

§ 9. Making the same effort of discrimination the student of politics should also learn to distinguish the laws which are absolutely best from those which are appropriate to each constitution. We use the phrase, 'appropriate to each constitution', because laws ought to be made to suit constitutions (as indeed in practice they always are), and not constitutions made to suit laws. § 10. The reason is this. A constitution may be defined as 'an organization of offices in a state, by which the method of their distribution is fixed, the sovereign authority is determined, and the nature of the end to be pursued by the association and all its members is prescribed'.[2] Laws, as distinct from the frame of the constitution, are the rules by which the magistrates should exercise their powers, and should watch and check transgressors. § 11. It follows on this conception of the relation between laws and constitutions that we must always bear in mind the varieties of each constitution, and the number of those varieties, [not only in order to be able to reform each by the appropriate constitutional amendments, but] also in order to be able to enact the laws appropriate to each. If we assume [as we must] that there is not a single form of democracy, or a single form of oligarchy, but a number of varieties of either, the same laws cannot possibly be equally beneficial to *all* oligarchies or to *all* democracies.

[1] The different varieties of democracy, for example, are constituted in a number of ways—one variety by having a greater amount of the features of democracy, another by having a smaller amount, and a third by having them all (VI. c. 1, § 9).

[2] Compare with this definition of 'constitution' the definition already given in Book III, c. VI, § 1: 'the organization of a polis, in respect of its offices generally, but especially in respect of that particular office which is sovereign in all issues'.

Chapter II

On this basis, after the general considerations of the previous book and the account of kingship and aristocracy there given, it remains to discuss the 'right' form of constitution called 'polity', and the three 'perverted' forms called democracy, oligarchy, and tyranny. These three perversions may be graded in an ascending order—tyranny the worst; oligarchy the next worst; and democracy the least bad. The general programme of future inquiry may be stated under five heads:

1. *The varieties of the main types of constitutions (especially democracy and oligarchy);*
2. *The type of constitution which is most generally practicable;*
3. *Which sort of constitution is desirable for which sort of civic body;*
4. *The methods of establishing constitutions;*
5. *The causes of the destruction, and the methods of the preservation, of different constitutions.*

§ 1. In our first discussion of constitutions[1] we distinguished three varieties of right constitution (kingship, aristocracy, and the 'polity'), and three corresponding perversions of those varieties (tyranny being the perversion of kingship, oligarchy of aristocracy, and democracy of the 'polity'). Aristocracy and kingship have already been treated. To consider the ideal constitution is, in effect, to consider the two constitutions so named;[2] for they both aim, like the ideal constitution, at a society whose basis is goodness duly equipped with the necessary means for its exercise. We have also defined, in a previous passage, the nature of the difference

[1] On the argument which follows see the first note at the end of the chapter.

[2] This is a puzzling statement, especially when we remember that monarchy and aristocracy are actual constitutions, and that the ideal constitution is something which, by its nature, transcends the actual—as Books VII and VIII subsequently show. But Aristotle would seem to be referring here to the end of Book III (c. xviii, § 1), where the ideal constitution is stated—not, it is true, very clearly—to be aristocratic or monarchical. We have to recognize, however, that Aristotle, in different contexts, says different things, which cannot be easily reconciled with one another.

between aristocracy and kingship, and we have explained when and where a kingship should be established.[1] It only remains, therefore, to discuss (1) [under the head of right constitutions] the 'polity', which is called by the generic name common to all constitutions or polities, and (2) [under the head of perversions] oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny.

§ 2. [We may pause to note that, just as the order of merit of the right constitutions is obvious, so] it is also obvious which of these perversions is the worst, and which of them is the next worst. The perversion of the first and the most nearly divine of the right constitutions must necessarily be the worst. Kingship [is the first and most nearly divine of the right constitutions; for it] **1289 b** must either be merely a name, without any substance, or be based on the fact of a king's great personal superiority. Tyranny, therefore, is the worst, and at the farthest remove of all the perversions from a true constitution: oligarchy, being as it is far removed from aristocracy, is the next worst: democracy is the most moderate [and so the least bad]. § 3. One of our predecessors [Plato, in his dialogue the *Politicus*] has already advanced the same view; but he used a different principle. On his principle all constitutions could have a good as well as a bad form: oligarchy, for example, could be good as well as bad; and going on this principle he ranked the good form of democracy as the worst of all the good forms of constitution, and the bad form of it as the best of all the bad. In our opinion these two constitutions, in any of their forms, are wholly on the side of error. It cannot properly be said that one form of oligarchy is better than another; it can only be said that one is not so bad as another.[2]

§ 4. But we may dismiss for the present this issue of the grading of constitutions in an order of merit [and return to

[1] The difference between aristocracy and kingship is defined in Book III, c. VII, § 3, c. XV, § 10, and c. XVII, § 4: the proper time and place for establishing a kingship is explained in Book III, c. XVII, §§ 5–8.

[2] The difference between Plato and Aristotle is only a difference of nomenclature. And even in the matter of nomenclature, as Newman notes, Plato had not spoken of 'a good form of oligarchy': he had used the term 'aristocracy'.

our programme of matters which still remain for discussion]. We have, first, to distinguish and enumerate the varieties of each type of constitution, on the assumption that democracy and oligarchy [not to speak of other types] have each several different forms. Secondly, we have to examine what type of constitution—short of the ideal—is the most generally acceptable, and the most to be preferred; and here we must also examine whether, besides this general type, there is any other constitution to be found, of a more aristocratic and well-constructed character, but suitable, none the less, for adoption in most states. § 5. Thirdly, and in regard to constitutions generally, we have to inquire which constitution is desirable for which sort of civic body. It is possible, for instance, that democracy rather than oligarchy may be necessary for one sort of civic body, and oligarchy rather than democracy for another. Fourthly, we have to consider how those who wish to do so should set to work to establish these various constitutions—i.e. the different varieties both of democracy and oligarchy. § 6. Fifthly, when we have given a concise account of all these subjects, to the best of our power, we must attempt to handle a final theme. How are constitutions generally, and each constitution severally, liable to be destroyed; how can they be preserved; and what are the causes which particularly tend to produce these results?

Note on the course of the argument in c. 11

We might have expected, after the statement of the four functions of the science of politics in §§ 3–5 of the previous chapter, that Aristotle would inquire into each of the functions in order. Actually he goes back—perhaps under the influence of what has been said at the end of c. 1 about the importance of distinguishing the varieties of each constitution, and of discovering the number of those varieties—to the classification of constitutions already sketched in Book III, c. VII; and on the basis of that classification he proceeds to state a new programme of inquiry.

When he uses the phrase, 'the first discussion of constitutions', Aristotle is apparently referring to Books II and III, and especially III. From this point of view Book IV may be said to begin 'the second discussion of constitutions', which is continued in Books V and VI. It is never made clear how Books VII and VIII (on the ideal constitution) fit into the scheme of the *Politics*—and, in par-

ticular, how they are related either to Book II (with its sketch of previous ideal constitutions, theoretical and actual) or to Book III (which ends with a promise of the immediate treatment of the ideal constitution).

Note on Aristotle's programme of inquiry in cc. I *and* II

The five headings at the end of c. II are, in effect, a recapitulation of the four functions assigned to politics in §§ 3–5 of the previous chapter; but there are some differences. First, the order is different; secondly, the first function assigned to politics—that of investigating the ideal constitution—disappears in the recapitulation, on the ground that the ideal constitution has already been discussed, and need not enter into the programme of future inquiry; thirdly, some questions which were only incidentally mentioned in the previous statement (e.g. the number of the varieties of actual constitutions, the methods of establishing each variety, and the ways in which each variety may be destroyed and can be preserved) now become separate and main headings of inquiry. Roughly we may say (1) that the first function of politics is here eliminated; (2) that the second function corresponds to the third heading of the new programme; (3) that the third function corresponds to the fourth and fifth headings of the new programme; (4) that the fourth function corresponds to the second heading of the new programme, while a matter only incidentally mentioned in connexion with it before (c. I, § 8) now becomes the first heading. It remains to be added that the headings of the new programme are not altogether followed, as we shall see later, in the subsequent course of the argument. Aristotle sketches plans in advance; but he lets the argument develop afterwards in its own way.

B

THE VARIETIES OF THE MAIN TYPES OF CONSTITUTION ESPECIALLY DEMOCRACY, OLIGARCHY, AND 'POLITY'. (cc. III–X)

Chapter III

The reason for the variety of constitutions is the varieties to be found in the 'parts' or social elements of the state—especially among the populace and the notables. A constitution is an arrangement of offices; and there will be as many constitutions as there are methods of distributing offices among the different parts of the state. There is a general opinion that there are only two sorts of constitutions, just as there are only two sorts of

winds and two sorts of musical modes; but this is a simplification which cannot be accepted.

§ 1. The reason why there are a number of different constitutions is to be found in the fact that every state has a number of different parts.[1] In the first place, every state is obviously composed of families. Secondly, this aggregate of families is bound to be divided into classes—the rich, the poor, and the middle class, with the rich possessing and the poor being without the equipment of the heavy-armed soldier. § 2. Thirdly, the common people (or *dēmos*) are engaged in different occupations—partly agriculture, partly trade, and partly the mechanical arts. Fourthly, there are also differences among the notables—differences based on their wealth and the amount of their property; and these differences appear, for example, in the matter of keeping horses, which can only be done by the very wealthy. § 3. (Incidentally, this is the reason why states whose strength lay in cavalry were in former times the homes of oligarchies. These oligarchies used their cavalry in wars with adjoining states: we may cite the examples of Eretria and Chalcis in the island of Euboea, and of Magnesia on the Maeander and many other cities in Asia Minor.) § 4. There are also other differences, besides that of wealth, among the notables. There is difference of birth: there is difference of merit; **1290 a** and there are other differences based on other factors of the same order—factors already described as being parts of a state in our discussion of aristocracy, where we distinguished and enumerated the factors which are necessary to the life of all states.[2]

[1] On the argument of this (and the following) chapter see the note at the end of the chapter.

[2] It will be noticed that the word 'part', as it is here used, sometimes denotes a quantity or body of persons, and sometimes a quality or attribute possessed by a body of persons. The variation of meaning is natural; for generally the body of persons is united and constituted by the fact of possessing a common attribute or quality, and, conversely, the attribute or quality marks off some body of persons who possess it as a separate body. We may thus speak either of the wealthy or of wealth as a 'part' of the state. The previous 'discussion of aristocracy' is probably the discussion which comes in Book III, c. XII, §§ 8–9. The 'other similar factors' there described as parts which are necessary to the life of the state are 'a temper of justice and a martial habit'.

These are the parts of which states are composed. Sometimes all these parts share in the control of the constitution; sometimes only a few of them share; sometimes a number of them share. § 5. It thus follows clearly that there must be a number of constitutions, which differ from one another in kind. The parts that share in their control differ from one another in kind; and *they* must differ accordingly. A constitution is an arrangement in regard to the offices of the state. By this arrangement the citizen body distributes office, either on the basis of the *power* of those who receive it, or on the basis of some sort of *equality* existing among all who receive it (i.e. the power of the rich *or* the poor, or—if equality be the basis—an equality existing among both rich *and* poor). § 6. There must therefore be as many constitutions as there are modes of arranging the distribution of office according to the superiorities and the differences of the parts of the state.[1]

There is indeed a prevalent opinion that there are only two constitutions. Just as winds, in ordinary speech, are simply described as north or south, and all other winds are treated as varieties of these two, so constitutions are also described as democratic or oligarchical. § 7. On this basis aristocracy is classified, as being a sort of oligarchy, under the heading of oligarchical, and similarly the constitution called 'polity' is classified under the heading of democratic—much as westerly winds are classified under the head of northerly, and easterly winds under that of southerly.[2] The same division into two main kinds is also true, some thinkers believe, of modes in music, which are accordingly described as being Dorian or Phrygian—other arrangements then being called by one or other of these two names. § 8. But though this is the prevalent

[1] The meaning of this, as Newman notes, is that constitutions vary (1) according to the 'superiorities' (in wealth, or birth, or merit) possessed by parts such as the notables, (2) according to the 'differences' (in occupation —agricultural, commercial, or artisan) exhibited by a part such as the common people or *dēmos*.

[2] In England we should naturally reverse this order, and associate west winds with the south and east winds with the north. But the Greek east wind (*euros*) was really an east-*south*-east wind; and similarly the Greek west wind was *north*-west, and accordingly associated by Homer (as a rainy and stormy wind) with the north.

view about constitutions in current opinion, we shall do better, and we shall come nearer the truth, if we classify them on a different basis, as has already been suggested.[1]

On that basis we shall have one or two constitutions which are 'right' or properly formed constitutions; all the others will be perversions of the best (just as in music we may have perversions of the properly tempered modes); and these perversions will be oligarchical when [like perversions of the Dorian mode] they are more than ordinarily severe and dominant, and democratic when [like perversions of the Phrygian mode] they are soft and relaxed.

Note on the course of the argument in cc. III and IV

We should expect this chapter, if it followed the headings of the programme stated at the end of the previous chapter, to begin with a discussion of the question, 'How many are the varieties of each constitution, and especially of democracy and oligarchy?' Instead of this, the chapter (like the chapter by which it is followed) is rather concerned with the question, 'Why are there a number of constitutions, and not one constitution only?' This is obviously a different question; and the change of front presents us with something of a difficulty. Again, in discussing this new question, Aristotle is led to inquire into the parts of the state, because he regards the plurality of constitutions as due to the variety of those parts—each different part issuing, when it is dominant, in a different constitution. Here our difficulty is increased by the fact that c. III gives one account of the parts of the state and c. IV proceeds to give another and discrepant account. There is thus a double difficulty: (1) that of the relevance of the whole argument of both chapters to the programme previously sketched, and (2) that of the discrepancy between the two chapters. The first difficulty may be dismissed: Aristotle, as we have already noted, does not bind himself down to follow exactly the plans he sketches. The second difficulty is more serious. We may try to solve it by the suggestion that Aristotle left two different drafts, which are both reproduced in our text (possibly with some connecting links which were added by a later editor); or we

[1] The previous suggestion came in c. II of this book, §§ 2–3. But neither that passage nor the present passage quite squares with the classification of constitutions given in Book III, c. VII, where there are three 'right' constitutions (not 'one or two', as is here suggested); and the parallel drawn between constitutions and musical modes has the curious reuslt of making restricted oligarchies 'hypo-Dorian' and advanced democracies 'hypo-Phrygian'

may cut the knot by bracketing as an interpolation the whole of c. III and the first 20 sections of c. IV.

CHAPTER IV

Democracy does not mean only the rule of number: it also means the rule of a social class. Both criteria must be used to define democracy, as both number and social class must also be used to define oligarchy. On this basis we may now study the different varieties of democracy and oligarchy, which (as stated in the previous chapter) will depend on the varieties to be found in the 'parts' of different states—i.e. on the different natures of their social composition. We shall accordingly classify the varieties of constitutions as we should classify the various species of animals —by the varieties of their parts and of the composition of those parts. We therefore proceed to enumerate the ten or so parts which go to the composition of a state, contrasting our enumeration with the different enumeration of Plato. We must also take note of the different forms assumed by the dēmos, *or populace—and also by the upper class—according as one or another part predominates in its make-up. This enables us to distinguish five varieties of democracy, in a descending scale which ends in 'extreme democracy'—a variety of democracy, analogous to tyranny, where law has ceased to be sovereign and the notion of a constitution has practically disappeared.*

§ 1. It ought not to be assumed, as some thinkers are nowadays in the habit of doing, that democracy can be defined off-hand, without any qualification, as a form of constitution in which the greater number are sovereign. Even in oligarchies—and indeed in all constitutions—the majority [i.e. the majority of those who enjoy constitutional rights] is sovereign. Similarly, oligarchy cannot be simply defined as a form in which a few persons are the constitutional sovereign. § 2. Assume a total population of 1,300: assume that 1,000 of the 1,300 are wealthy; assume that these 1,000 assign no share in office to the remaining 300 poor, although they are men of free birth and their peers in other respects. Nobody, will say that here there is a democracy. § 3. Or assume, again,

that there are only a few poor men, but that they are stronger than the rich men who form the majority [and are therefore sovereign]. Nobody would term such a constitution an oligarchy, when no share in honours and office is given to the majority who possess riches. It is better, therefore, to say that democracy exists wherever the **1290 b** free-born are sovereign, and oligarchy wherever the rich are in control. § 4. As things go, the former are many, and the latter few: there are many who are free-born, but few who are rich. [The essence, however, in either case is not the factor of number, but the factor of social position.][1] Otherwise [i.e. if number alone were the essence] we should have an oligarchy if offices were distributed on the basis of stature (as they are said to be in Ethiopia), or on the basis of looks; for the number of tall or good-looking men must always be small. § 5. Yet it is not sufficient to distinguish democracy and oligarchy merely by the criterion of poverty and wealth, any more than it is to do so merely by that of number. We have to remember that the democratic and the oligarchical state both contain a *number* of parts; and we must therefore use additional criteria to distinguish them properly. We cannot, for example, apply the term democracy to a constitution under which a few free-born persons rule a majority who are not free-born [as if birth were the one and only criterion]. (A system of this sort once existed at Apollonia, on the Ionian Gulf, and at Thera. In both of these states honours and offices were reserved for those who were of the best birth—in the sense of being the descendants of the original settlers—though they were only a handful of the whole population.) Nor can we apply the term oligarchy to a constitution under which the rich are sovereign simply because they are more numerous than the poor [as if number were the one criterion]. (An example of such a constitution formerly existed at Colophon, where before the war with Lydia a majority of the citizens were the

[1] The argument at this point largely repeats the argument already advanced in Book III, c. VIII, §§ 3–7; but, as Newman notes, the previous argument differs—and differs for the better—in taking fuller account of the difficulties of the question, and in arriving, in consequence, at a fuller definition of democracy and oligarchy.

owners of large properties.) § 6. The proper application of the term 'democracy' is to a constitution in which the free-born and poor control the government—being at the same time a majority; and similarly the term 'oligarchy' is properly applied to a constitution in which the rich and better-born control the government—being at the same time a minority.

§ 7. The general fact that there are a number of constitutions, and the cause of that fact, have been established. It remains to explain why there are more constitutions than the two just mentioned [i.e. democracy and oligarchy]; to indicate what they are; and to suggest the reasons for their existence. In doing so we may start from the principle which was previously stated, and which can now be assumed, that every state consists, not of one, but of many parts.[1] § 8. [Here we may use a biological analogy.] If we aimed at a classification of the different kinds of animals, we should begin by enumerating the parts, or organs, which are necessary to every animal. These will include, for example, some of the sensory organs: they will also include the organs for getting and digesting food, such as the mouth and the stomach; they will further include the organs of locomotion which are used by the different animals. We shall then assume that our enumeration of the necessary organs is exhaustive; and we shall proceed to the further assumption that there are varieties of these organs—or, in other words, different species of mouths, stomachs, sensory organs, and organs of locomotion. We shall thus reach the conclusion that the number of possible combinations of these varieties will inevitably produce several different kinds of animals (for the same kind of animal cannot exhibit several varieties of mouth, or of ears); and thus the whole of the possible combinations of varieties will account for the different kinds of animals, or [to put the same point

[1] These sentences may be an editorial addition, intended to introduce a new account of the parts of the state, which (as has already been noted) is discrepant from the previous account. This new account, which extends from § 7 to § 19, is followed at the beginning of § 20 by a repetition of the first sentence of § 7. We can only regard this new account as a second and alternative treatment of the same theme, added in a somewhat baffling manner, with an introductory explanation which does not succeed in explaining the addition.

in another way] the number of kinds of animals will be equal to the number of the possible combinations of the necessary organs.

§ 9. It is just the same with the constitutions which have been mentioned.[1] [There are as many kinds of *them* as there are possible combinations of the necessary parts of the state.] States too, as we have repeatedly noticed, are composed not of one but of many parts. One of these parts is the group of persons concerned with the production of food, or, as it is called, the farming class. A second, which is called the mechanical class, is the group of persons **1291 a** occupied in the various arts and crafts without which a city cannot be inhabited—some of them being necessities, and others contributing to luxury or to the living of a good life. § 10. A third part is what may be termed the marketing class; it includes all those who are occupied in buying and selling, either as merchants or as retailers. A fourth part is the serf class composed of agricultural labourers; and a fifth element is the defence force, which is no less necessary than the other four, if a state is not to become the slave of invaders. § 11. How is it possible, with any propriety, to call by the name of state a society which is naturally servile? It is the essence of a state to be independent and self-sufficing; and it is the absence of independence which is the mark of the slave.

We may pause to note that this is the reason why Plato's account of the parts of the state, in his *Republic*, is inadequate, though ingenious. § 12. He begins by stating that the four most necessary elements for the constitution of a state are weavers, farmers, shoemakers, and builders. He then proceeds, on the ground that these four are not self-sufficient, to add other parts—smiths; herdsmen to tend the necessary cattle; merchants and retail dealers. These are the parts which form the whole complement of the 'first state' which he sketches—as though a state merely existed for the supply

[1] The reference here would seem to be, not to democracy and oligarchy (as in § 7 above), but to all the six kinds of constitution mentioned in Book III, c. VII—and not only to these six kinds, but also to the species into which some of the kinds (and especially oligarchy and democracy) can be subdivided.

of necessities, and not rather to achieve the Good, and as though it needed the shoemaker as much as it needs the farmer. § 13. The part which serves as a defence force is not introduced till a later stage, when the growth of the city's territory, and its contact with the territory of its neighbours, result in its being plunged into war. [Nor is this all that Plato has omitted in his 'first city'.] The four original parts—or whatever may be the number of the elements forming the association—will require some authority to dispense justice, and to determine what is just. § 14. If the mind is to be reckoned as more essentially a part of a living being than the body, parts of a similar order to the mind must equally be reckoned as more essentially parts of the state than those which serve its bodily needs; and by parts of a similar order to the mind we mean the military part, the part concerned in the legal organization of justice, and (we may also add) the part engaged in deliberation, which is a function that needs the gift of political understanding. § 15. Whether these three functions—war, justice, and deliberation—belong to separate groups, or to a single group, is a matter which makes no difference to the argument. It often falls to the same persons both to serve in the army and to till the fields; [and the same may be true of these three functions]. The general conclusion which we thus reach is that if those who discharge these functions are equally parts of the state with those who supply its bodily needs, they, or at least the armed forces, are *necessary* parts. . . .

The seventh part[1] is the group composed of the rich, who serve the state with their property. § 16. The eighth part is the magistrates, who serve the state in its offices. No state can exist without a government; and there must therefore be persons capable of discharging the duties of office and rendering the state that service, permanently or in rotation.

[1] It will be noticed that no sixth part has been enumerated by Aristotle. We may perhaps assume, from his mention of a judicial part in the criticism of the *Republic*, that the judicial part is intended to be the sixth in his own enumeration. The difficulty of this assumption is, however, that Aristotle afterwards proceeds to mention the judicial part explicitly (§ 17); and perhaps it is best to assume a lacuna.

§ 17. There only remain the two parts which have just been mentioned in passing—the deliberative part, and the part which decides on the rights of litigants. These are parts which ought to exist in all states, and to exist on a good and just basis; and this demands persons **1291 b** of a good quality in matters political. § 18. [Here we begin to confront a difficulty.] The different capacities belonging to the other parts may, it is generally held, be shown by one and the same group of persons. The same persons, for example, may serve as soldiers, farmers, and craftsmen; the same persons, again, may act both as a deliberative council and a judicial court. Political ability, too, is a quality to which all men pretend; and everybody thinks himself capable of filling most offices. There is one thing which is impossible: the same persons cannot be both rich and poor. § 19. This will explain why these two classes—the rich and the poor—are regarded as parts of the state in a special and peculiar sense. Nor is this all. One of these classes being small, and the other large, they also appear to be *opposite* parts. This is why they both form constitutions to suit their own interest [that of wealth in the one case, and that of numbers in the other]. It is also the reason why men think that there are only two constitutions—democracy and oligarchy.

§ 20. The fact that there are a number of constitutions, and the causes of that fact, have already been established. We may now go on to say that there are also a number of varieties of two of these constitutions—democracy and oligarchy.[1] This is already clear from what has been previously said [at the beginning of the previous chapter]. § 21. These constitutions vary because the people (*dēmos*) and the class called the notables vary. So far as the people are concerned, one sort is engaged in farming; a second is engaged

[1] Aristotle here touches, at last, the question which was stated, at the end of c. II, to be the first heading of his programme of inquiry. The fact that this question is here first faced explains why some commentators have bracketed, as an interpolation, the whole of c. III and the first 20 sections of this chapter. But as Aristotle now proceeds to use the argument developed in c. III the remedy seems too drastic. It is simpler to believe that he has made a digression (as he often does, and as most lecturers do), and that he now returns to his theme.

in the arts and crafts; a third is the marketing sort, which is engaged in buying and selling; a fourth is the maritime sort, which in turn is partly naval, partly mercantile, partly employed on ferries, and partly engaged in fisheries. (We may note that there are many places where one of these subdivisions forms a considerable body; as the fishermen do at Tarentum and Byzantium, the naval crews at Athens, the merchant seamen in Aegina and Chios, and the ferrymen at Tenedos.) A fifth sort is composed of unskilled labourers and persons whose means are too small to enable them to enjoy any leisure; a sixth consists of those who are not of free birth by two citizen parents; and there may also be other sorts of a similar character. § 22. The notables fall into different sorts according to wealth, birth, merit, culture, and other qualities of the same order.

The first variety of democracy is the variety which is said to follow the principle of equality closest. In this variety the law declares equality to mean that the poor are to count no more than the rich: neither is to be sovereign, and both are to be on a level. § 23. [We may approve this law]; for if we hold, as some thinkers do, that liberty and equality are chiefly to be found in democracy, it will be along these lines—with all sharing alike, as far as possible, in constitutional rights—that they will most likely be found. A constitution of this order is bound to be a democracy; for [while all share alike] the people are the majority, and the will of the majority is sovereign. § 24. A second variety of democracy is that in which offices are assigned on the basis of a property qualification, but the qualification is low: those who attain it have to be admitted to a share in office, and those who lose it are excluded. A third **1292 a** variety is one in which every citizen of unimpeachable descent can share in office, but the law is the final sovereign. § 25. A fourth variety is one in which every person [irrespective of descent, and] provided only that he is a citizen, can share in office, but the law is still the final sovereign. A fifth variety of democracy is like the fourth in admitting to office every person who has the status of citizen; but here the people, and not the law, is the final sovereign.

This is what happens when popular decrees are sovereign instead of the law;[1] and that is a result which is brought about by leaders of the demagogue type.[2] § 26. In democracies which obey the law there are no demagogues; it is the better class of citizens who preside over affairs. Demagogues arise in states where the laws are not sovereign. The people then becomes an autocrat—a single composite autocrat made up of many members, with the many playing the sovereign, not as individuals, but collectively.[3] § 27. It is not clear what Homer means when he says that 'it is not good to have the rule of many masters': whether he has in mind the collective rule of the many, or the rule of a number of magistrates acting as individuals. However that may be, a democracy of this order, being in the nature of an autocrat and not being governed by law, begins to attempt an autocracy. It grows despotic; flatterers come to be held in honour; it becomes analogous to the tyrannical form of single-person government. § 28. Both show a similar temper; both behave like despots to the better class of citizens; the decrees of the one are like the edicts of the other; the popular leader in the one is the same as, or at any rate like, the flatterer in the other; and in either case the influence of favourites predominates—that of the flatterer in tyrannies, and that of the popular leader in democracies of this variety. § 29. It is popular leaders who, by referring all issues to the decision of the people, are responsible for substituting the sovereignty of decrees for that of the laws. Once the people are sovereign in all matters, *they* are sovereign themselves over its decisions; the multitude follows their guidance; and this is the source of

[1] Aristotle is here drawing a distinction (based on Athenian constitutional history) between (1) a régime in which laws (*nomoi*) are distinguished from decrees (*psephismata*), are superior to decrees, and cannot be overridden by decrees, and (2) a régime in which the distinction has practically disappeared, decrees are as good as laws, and decrees may override laws. See the second note at the end of Book III, c. xi.

[2] See the note at the end of the chapter.

[3] We may repeat the saying (quoted before, p. 54 n. 1) about the modern democrat, 'who looks with pride at his face . . . remembering that he is the forty-millionth part of a tyrant, and forgetting that he is the whole of a slave'.

their great position. § 30. But the critics of the magistrates are also responsible. Their argument is, 'The *people* ought to decide': the people accept that invitation readily; and thus the authority of all the magistrates is undermined. There would appear to be solid substance in the view that a democracy of this type is not a true constitution. Where the laws are not sovereign, there is no constitution. § 31. Law should be sovereign on every issue, and the magistrates and the citizen body should only decide about details. The conclusion which emerges is clear. Democracy may be a form of constitution; but this particular system, under which everything is managed merely by decrees, is not even a democracy, in any real sense of the word. Decrees can never be general rules [and any real constitution must be based on general rules]. . . . So far, then, as concerns the different forms of democracy, and the definition of those forms.

Note on the demagogue at Athens

The rise of the demagogue at Athens (it is Athens which Aristotle has in mind) may be dated from the death of Pericles in 429 B.C. It was connected with a social revolution—the growth of industry and commerce, and the consequent growth of the importance of the urban population in Athens itself, in comparison with that of the 'demes' of the country-side. Cleon, the first notable demagogue, and the successors of Cleon, were townbred men, unlike the previous statesmen of Athens (such as Aristides and Pericles) who had belonged to good families in the country-side.

But the rise of the demagogue was also connected with a political or constitutional change, as well as with a social revolution. The previous 'leaders of the people' had generally held some official position—for instance, that of general—along with their *de facto* position of leadership. The 'demagogue' proper had no official position: he simply exercised, in a peculiar degree and with a permanent influence, the right of the private member of the assembly to take the initiative and propose a policy. The assembly thus became the paradise of the influential private member, playing the part of an unofficial leader; and such a leader—having no official executive position—could exercise initiative and determine policy without incurring political responsibility, since it was not his duty to execute the policy which he had induced the assembly to accept. (See Dr. E. M. Walker, in the *Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. V, pp. 106–10.)

It may be added that it was this political irresponsibility of the

demagogue, rather than his flattery of the people or his inducing the people to act by decree in the teeth of law, which was the fatal defect of his position.

Chapter V

We may similarly classify four varieties of oligarchy. But constitutions which are formally and legally democratic, or formally and legally oligarchical, may in their actual working be of a different character. Legal form and actual working are two different things, and this is particularly liable to be the case after a revolution.

§ 1. Among oligarchies one of the varieties is that in which the holding of office depends on a property-qualification, high enough to exclude the poor—although they form the majority—from a share in constitutional rights, but still giving a share to all who can satisfy its requirements. A second variety is that in which the property-qualification 1292 b is high, and elections to vacant offices are made only *by* those who possess this high qualification. (Where they are also made *from* the whole body of qualified persons, the constitution may be held to incline in the direction of aristocracy: where they are made only from a privileged section, it may be held to be oligarchical.) § 2. A third variety is the hereditary, in which sons succeed to their fathers. The fourth variety is like the third in being hereditary; but here, instead of the rule of law, there is a system of personal rule. This variety is the parallel, among oligarchies, to what tyranny is among monarchies or the variety of democracy last mentioned among democracies. An oligarchy of this sort is called a junto or 'dynasty'.[1]

§ 3. These are the several varieties of oligarchy and democracy. It should be noted, however, that in actual life it is often the case that constitutions which are not legally democratic are made to work democratically by the habits and

[1] A 'dynasty' in our English use is a single family possessing an hereditary power which may be (though it is not necessarily) an absolute power. Aristotle means by a 'dynasty' a group of families possessing an hereditary power which is always an absolute power.

training of the people. Conversely, there are other cases where the legal constitution inclines towards democracy, but is made by training and habits to work in a way which inclines more towards oligarchy. § 4. This happens particularly after a revolution. The citizens do not change their temper immediately; and in the first stages the triumphant party is content to leave things largely alone, without seeking to take any great advantage of its opponents. The result is that the old laws remain in force, even though the party of revolution is actually in power.

Chapter VI

[A second or alternative account of the varieties of democracy and oligarchy, based less on their political structure—which has been, after all, the basis mainly adopted in the account just given in cc. IV–V—and more on their social composition.]

Classifying once more the varieties of democracy, we may distinguish an agricultural or 'peasant' form from three other forms —the main criterion being the degree of leisure which its social conditions enable a people to devote to politics. In the same way, and on the same general social-economic basis, we may also distinguish four varieties of oligarchy, according to the distribution of property and the relative degree of importance attached to its ownership.

§ 1. What we have already said [about the various groups to be found in the people and among the notables][1] is sufficient of itself to prove that there must be all these varieties of democracy and oligarchy. One of two things must happen: either *all* the various groups of the people previously mentioned must share in constitutional rights, or some must share and others not. § 2. When the farming class and the class possessed of moderate means are the sovereign power in the constitution, they conduct the government under the rule of law. Able to live by their work, but unable to enjoy any leisure, they make the law supreme, and confine the meetings of the assembly to a minimum; while the rest of the

[1] The reference is to c. IV, §§ 9–11, 21–2.

population is allowed to share in constitutional rights as soon as its members attain the property-qualification determined by the law. § 3. We may lay it down generally that a system which does not allow every citizen to share is oligarchical, and that one which does so is democratic. Here, accordingly, every citizen who possesses the necessary qualification is allowed to share; but the want of sufficient means prevents the enjoyment of leisure [which is needed for political activity]. This is one form of democracy; and these are the causes which produce its character. A second form is based on the criterion which comes logically next—the criterion of birth. Here all who possess irreproachable descent are legally allowed to share, but only share in practice when they are able to find the necessary leisure. § 4. In a democracy of this order the laws are accordingly sovereign, simply because there are not the revenues [to provide the leisure needed for personal political activity]. A third form is that in which all are allowed to share in constitutional rights, on the one condition of free birth, but the rights are not actually exercised for the reason already given [i.e. want of means]; and here, once more, the rule of law is the necessary consequence. § 5. A fourth form **1293 a** of democracy is the one which comes chronologically last in the actual development of states. Here, under the influence of two causes—the large increase in the population of states, compared with their original size, and the accruing of a considerable revenue—all alike share in constitutional rights, owing to the numerical superiority of the masses, and all alike join in political activity, owing to the facilities for leisure which are provided even for the poor by the system of state-payment [for attendance in the assembly and the courts]. § 6. A populace provided with such facilities may indeed be said to have more leisure than any other section. They are not hindered in any way by the duty of attending to private affairs; the well-to-do are, with the result that they often absent themselves from the assembly and the courts. Under these conditions the mass of the poor become the sovereign power in the constitution, instead of the laws.

§ 7. Such, and so many, are the forms of democracy; and

such are their causes. Turning to the forms of oligarchy, we may rank first the form in which a majority of the citizens have property, but the amount they possess is moderate and not excessively large, while all who acquire this moderate amount are allowed to share in constitutional rights. § 8. Since the generality are thus included in the enjoyment of constitutional rights, it follows that sovereignty, under this form, will be vested in the law, and not in persons. A moderate oligarchy of this type is totally different from the personal rule of a monarch; and as its members have neither so much property that they are able to enjoy a leisure free from all business cares, nor so little that they depend on the state for support, they will be bound to ask that the law should rule for them, and they will not claim to rule themselves. § 9. The second form of oligarchy arises when the owners of property are fewer, and the property they own is larger. Under these conditions they have greater power; and they demand a greater share in constitutional rights. They thus assume the right of selecting themselves the members of the other classes who are to be admitted to the civic body; and—not being powerful enough, as yet, to rule without law—they enact a law to this effect. § 10. A further advance is made, and a third form of oligarchy arises, when matters are strained still further and still fewer persons become the owners of still larger properties. The members of the governing oligarchy now keep the offices entirely in their own hands; but they still act in terms of law—if only of a law which provides that sons shall succeed to their fathers. § 11. The fourth and last form of oligarchy arises when matters are strained to the last degree, alike in the size of properties and the influence of connexions. A junto or 'dynasty' of the type which now emerges is closely akin to the personal rule of a monarch; and it is persons, and not the law, who are now the sovereign. This fourth form of oligarchy is analogous to the last [or 'extreme'] form of democracy.

Chapter VII[1]

Having classified the varieties of democracy and oligarchy, we may now classify the varieties of the other forms. Aristocracy—apart from the true aristocracy which is really the government of the Best—has three varieties, which are all, more or less, of the nature of mixed constitutions, and thus approximate to the 'polity'.

§ 1. There are still two forms of constitution left, besides democracy and oligarchy. One of these [kingship] is usually reckoned, and has indeed already been mentioned, as one of the four main forms of constitution, which are counted as being kingship, oligarchy, democracy, and the form called aristocracy. . . . There is, however, a fifth form, in addition to these four. It is called by the generic name common to all the forms—the name of 'constitution' or 'polity'—but being of rare occurrence it has not been noticed by the writers who attempt to classify the different forms of constitution; and they usually limit themselves, as Plato does in the *Republic*, to an enumeration of only four forms. . . . **1293 b** § 2. The name 'aristocracy' should properly be applied to the form of constitution which has already been treated in our first part.[2] The only constitution which can with strict justice be called an aristocracy is one where the members are not merely 'good' in relation to some standard or other, but are absolutely 'the best' (*aristoi*) in point of moral quality.[3] Only in such a con-

[1] Aristotle might be expected, after having treated fully of the first item of the programme sketched at the end of c. II (the various forms of oligarchy and democracy), to proceed to the second item ('which is the most generally acceptable constitution?'); but he postpones that item until c. XI, in order to deal first with forms of constitution other than oligarchy and democracy. It may be noted that Aristotle proceeds to speak of four constitutions, while in Book III, c. VII, he had enumerated six (the three 'right' constitutions, or kingship, aristocracy, and 'polity', and the three perversions of these, or tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy). But it may also be noted that Aristotle immediately adds the 'polity' to the four constitutions here mentioned, and the sixth form, tyranny, is readily understood.

[2] The reference would appear to be to various passages in Book III, which is thus regarded as 'the first part' of a course 'on constitutions' of which Books IV–VI form 'the second part'.

[3] Two considerations are here involved: (1) that in an aristocracy the

stitution can the good man and the good citizen be absolutely identified; in all others goodness is only goodness relatively to the particular constitution and its particular standard. § 3. But we have to admit that there are some further forms of constitution, which differ enough both from oligarchies and from the so-called 'polity' to be also called aristocracies [even though they do not attain the true standard of aristocracy]. This is the case when elections to office are based not only on wealth but also on moral desert. Constitutions of this type differ from both of the forms just mentioned [i.e. oligarchy and 'polity']; and they thus come to be called aristocracies. § 4. This usage is just, because even in states which do not make the encouragement of goodness a matter of public policy, there may still be found individuals who are of good repute and esteemed to be of high quality. Accordingly a constitution which pays regard to all the three factors—wealth, goodness, and numbers—as the Carthaginian does, may be called an aristocratic constitution; and the same may also be said of constitutions, such as the Spartan, which pay regard only to the two factors of goodness and numbers, and where there is thus a mixture of the democratic and the aristocratic principle. § 5. We may therefore hold that there are these two forms of aristocracy in addition to the first or best form of that constitution; and we may also include, besides them, the form presented by those varieties of the so-called 'polity' which incline particularly to oligarchy.[1]

members must be not merely 'good', but the 'best', and (2) that in it the *standard* by which they are so reckoned must not be a variable standard ('some standard or other'), but the one absolute standard of moral quality.

[1] It emerges from this somewhat crabbed passage that there are four different forms of aristocracy—(1) the first and best form, where regard is paid only to goodness; (2) the Carthinaginian form, where regard is paid to wealth and numbers as well; (3) the Spartan form, where regard is paid to numbers as well as to goodness; and (4) the form presented by those mixed constitutions or 'polities' which pay less regard to numbers than the Spartan constitution does, and thus incline more towards oligarchy.

CHAPTER VIII

We now come to the 'polity' and its varieties. Generally, a 'polity' is a mixture of democracy and oligarchy; but in common usage the term 'polity' is reserved for mixtures which incline more towards democracy, and the mixtures which incline more towards oligarchy are called aristocracies. This leads us into a digression on the uses of the term 'aristocracy' and the reasons why that term—through being associated in men's minds partly with the rule of gentlefolk, and partly with the rule of law—is somewhat vaguely and widely applied. The proper use of terms depends on a recognition of the fact that there are three *elements to be considered in a state—the free-born poor, the wealthy, and the men of merit—and not only the* two *elements of the poor and the wealthy. On this basis we shall confine the term 'aristocracy' to constitutions which recognize merit in some way or other; and we shall use the term 'polity'—and only that term—for constitutions which recognize only the two elements of free birth and wealth.*

§ 1. It remains to treat of the form of constitution called 'polity' and of tyranny. Here we are associating 'polity' with a perverted constitution, although it is not in itself a perversion, any more than are the forms of aristocracy which we have just mentioned. But we may plead in excuse that all these constitutions ['polity' and the connected forms of aristocracy] really fall short of the best form of right constitution, and are therefore to be reckoned among perversions; and we may add that, as has already been mentioned in our first part, the perversions among which they are reckoned are those to which they themselves give rise.[1] § 2. It is natural and proper to mention tyranny last, because we are engaged in an inquiry into constitutions; and tyranny, of all others, has least the character of a constitution.

[1] The reference appears to be to Book III, c. VII, § 5. But the reference is not accurate, because in that passage oligarchy—the perversion here mainly in question—is stated to be a corruption of the true or pure aristocracy, whereas here it is stated, by implication, to be a corruption of the less pure (or mixed) aristocracy and of 'polity'.

We have thus explained the reason for the order we propose to follow; and we must now proceed to treat of the 'polity'. Its character will emerge the more clearly now that we have already defined the nature of oligarchy and democracy. § 3. The 'polity' may be described, in general terms, as a mixture of these two constitutions; but in common usage the name is confined to those mixtures which incline to democracy, and those which incline more to oligarchy are called aristocracies, and not 'polities'—the reason being that culture and breeding [the attributes of aristocracy] are more associated with the wealthier classes [who form the basis of oligarchy]. § 4. We may also note [as explaining this common usage of the term 'aristocracy'] that the wealthy are generally supposed to possess already the advantages for want of which wrongdoers fall into crime; and this is the reason why they are called 'gentlemen' or 'notables'. Now as aristocracy aims at giving pre-eminence to the best, men are led in this way to extend the term and to describe oligarchies too as states governed by gentlemen [i.e., in effect, as aristocracies].

§ 5. [Another reason for the extension of the term 'aristocracy' is a general tendency to suppose that any law-abiding state must be an aristocracy.] **1294 a** Men regard it as impossible that the rule of law should exist in a state which is governed by the poorer sort, and not by the best of its citizens; and, conversely, they regard it as equally impossible that aristocracy should exist in a state which is not under the rule of law. But you do not secure the rule of law by having a good set of laws which are not actually obeyed. § 6. We have to distinguish two senses of the rule of law—one which means obedience to such laws as have been enacted, and another which means that the laws obeyed have also been well enacted. (Obedience can also be paid to laws which have been enacted badly.) The latter sense admits, in its turn, of two subdivisions: men may render obedience to laws which are the best that are possible for *them*, or they may render obedience to laws which are absolutely the best. [It follows that aristocracy, if it is to be associated with the rule of law, should only be associated with the better form of such rule.]

§ 7. It is a general opinion that the essential criterion of aristocracy is the distribution of office according to merit: merit is its criterion, as wealth is the criterion of oligarchy, and free birth of democracy. The principle of the rule of majority-decision is [not peculiar to aristocracy, but is] present in all constitutions. Alike in oligarchies, in aristocracies, and in democracies, the decision of the majority of those who share in constitutional rights is final and sovereign.[1] § 8. The form of constitution called 'polity' is embellished, in most states, by a higher title. The mixture attempted in it seeks only to blend the rich and the poor, or wealth and free birth; but the rich are regarded by common opinion as holding the position of gentlemen [and a 'polity' in which they are included thus comes to be embellished by the higher title of aristocracy]. § 9. In reality there are *three* elements which may claim an equal share in the mixed form of constitution—free birth, wealth, and merit. (Nobility of birth, which is sometimes reckoned a fourth, is only a corollary of the two latter, and simply consists in an inherited mixture of wealth and merit.) Obviously, therefore, we ought always to use the term 'polity' for a mixture of only two elements, where these elements are the rich and the poor; and we ought to confine the name 'aristocracy' to a mixture of three, which is really more of an aristocracy than any other form so called—except the first and true form.[2] § 10. We have now shown that there are other forms of constitution besides monarchy, democracy, and oligarchy; what the nature of these other forms is; how aristocracies differ from one another, and 'polities' differ from aristocracy; and, finally, that aristocracies and 'polities' are not far removed from one another.

[1] Aristotle seems, in §§ 4–7, to have digressed from 'polity' into aristocracy. But what he has really in mind, all along, is the shading off of 'polity' into aristocracy; and he is inquiring into the reasons why mixed constitutions, of the type of the 'polity', are often termed aristocracies. Recognition of gentle birth (§ 4), and the presence of the rule of law (§§ 5–6), are two of these reasons. Neither of these, in his view, is a valid reason. The only valid reason for using the term 'aristocracy', as he proceeds to argue in § 7, is recognition of merit at any rate as *one* among other standards, if not as the only standard.

[2] i.e. the form in which regard is paid *only* to merit or moral quality.

Chapter IX

We may now consider finally the various forms which 'polity' proper may take. There are three possible ways of combining the free-born poor and the rich—or, in other words, of mixing democracy and oligarchy. The first is to mix democracy as a whole with oligarchy as a whole. The second is to take the mean between the two. The third is to take some elements from democracy and some from oligarchy. It is a good criterion of a proper mixture of democracy and oligarchy that you should be able to describe a mixed constitution indifferently as either. Sparta may be cited as an example of such a mixture.

§ 1. We have now to discuss, in continuation of our argument, how the constitution called 'polity' comes into existence by the side of democracy and oligarchy, and in what way it ought to be organized. In the course of that discussion it will also be evident what are the distinguishing marks of democracy and oligarchy; for [to create a 'polity'] we have first to ascertain the difference between these two forms, and then to form a combination between them by taking from both their complements or 'tallies'.[1] § 2. There are three different principles on which men may act in making such a combination or mixture. The first is to take and use simultaneously both democratic and oligarchical rules. We may take as an example the rules for a seat in the law courts.[2] In oligarchies the rich are fined if they do not sit in the courts, and the poor receive no pay for sitting. In democracies, on the other hand, the poor are given pay for sitting, and the rich are not fined if they fail to sit. § 3. To combine both of these rules is to adopt a common or middle term between either; and for that reason such a method is characteristic of a 'polity', **1294 b** which is a mixture of the two constitutions. This is, accordingly, one of the possible ways of combination. A second is to strike an average, or take a mean, between the

[1] The word used in the Greek refers to a coin 'which two contracting parties broke between them' in symbol of their contract.

[2] It has to be remembered that in ancient Greece the law courts or 'dikasteries' were composed of citizens rather than of professional judges.

two different rules. One constitution, for example, requires no property qualification at all, or only a very low qualification, for the right to attend the assembly: the other requires a high qualification. Here both of the rules cannot be used to provide a common term; and we have to take the mean between the two. § 4. The third way of combination is [neither to take the whole of both rules, nor to strike an average between them, but] to combine elements from both, and to mix part of the oligarchical rule with a part of the democratic. In the appointment of magistrates, for example, the use of the lot is regarded as democratic, and the use of the vote as oligarchical. Again, it is considered to be democratic that a property qualification should not be required, and oligarchical that it should be. § 5. Here, accordingly, the mode appropriate to an aristocracy [of the mixed sort] or a 'polity' is to take one element from one form of constitution and another from the other—that is to say, to take from oligarchy the rule that magistrates should be appointed by vote, and from democracy the rule that no property qualification should be required.

§ 6. We have now dealt with the general method of mixture. We may add that it is a good criterion of a proper mixture of democracy and oligarchy that a mixed constitution should be able to be described indifferently as either. When this can be said, it must obviously be due to the excellence of the mixture. It is a thing which can generally be said of the mean between two extremes: both of the extremes can be traced in the mean, [and it can thus be described by the name of either]. § 7. The constitution of Sparta is an example. There are many who would describe it as a democracy, on the ground that its organization has a number of democratic features. In the first place, and so far as concerns the bringing up of the young, the children of the rich have the same fare as the children of the poor, and they are educated on a standard which the children of the poor can also attain. § 8. The same policy is followed for adolescence; and it is equally followed in adult years. No difference is made between the rich and the poor: the food at the common mess is the same

for all, and the dress of the rich is such as any of the poor could also provide for themselves. § 9. A second ground for describing Sparta as a democracy is the right of the people to elect to one of the two great institutions, the Senate, and to be eligible themselves for the other, the Ephorate. On the other hand, there are some who describe the Spartan constitution as an oligarchy, on the ground that it has many oligarchical factors. For example, the magistrates are all appointed by vote, and none by lot; again, the power of inflicting the penalty of death or banishment rests in the hands of a few persons; and there are many other similar features. § 10. A properly mixed 'polity' should look as if it contained both democratic and oligarchical elements—and as if it contained neither. It should owe its stability to its own intrinsic strength, and not to external support; and its intrinsic strength should be derived from the fact, not that a majority are in favour of its continuance (that might well be the case even with a poor constitution), but rather that there is no single section in all the state which would favour a change to a different constitution.

We have now described the way in which a 'polity', and the other forms [of mixed constitution] called aristocracies, ought to be organized.

Chapter X

It now remains to consider, in conclusion, the varieties of tyranny. Two of its varieties, as we have already incidentally noticed (in Book III, c. XIV), *are kingships rather than tyrannies—i.e. the kingships found among uncivilized peoples, and the dictatorships, or 'elective' tyrannies, of the early Greeks. The third variety is tyranny proper—the irresponsible rule of an autocrat acting for his own advantage.*

1295 a § 1. Tyranny remains to be treated.[1] There is not much to be said about it; but as it has been included in our classification of constitutions, it must have a place in our

[1] See c. VIII, § 1, where tyranny is reserved for treatment in connexion with 'polity'.

inquiry. Kingship [of which, as we saw, it is the corruption] has already been discussed in our first part.[1] In the course of discussing it we there dealt with kingship in the most usual sense of the term; we inquired whether it was beneficial or prejudicial to states, what sort of person should be king, from what source he should be drawn, and how he should be established. § 2. In the course of the discussion we also distinguished two forms of tyranny,[2] which we treated in that connexion because—being both of them forms of government conducted in obedience to law—their nature in some sense overlaps with that of kingship. These two forms were (1) the elective monarchs, with absolute power, to be found among some uncivilized peoples, and (2) the monarchs of the same type, termed *aisumnetai* (or dictators), who once existed among the early Greeks. § 3. There are some differences between these two forms; but they may both be called half royal and half tyrannical—royal because government rests on consent, and is conducted on a legal basis; tyrannical because it is conducted in the temper of a master of slaves, and according to the ruler's will. But there is also a third form of tyranny, which is what is most commonly understood by the term. This is the converse of absolute kingship, or *pambasileia*.[3] § 4. This third form of tyranny is bound to exist where a single person governs men, who are all his peers or superiors, without any form of responsibility, and with a view to his own advantage rather than that of his subjects. It is thus a rule of force; and no freeman will voluntarily endure such a system.

These, for the reasons that have just been given, are the forms of tyranny; and this is their number.

[1] Book III, cc. XIV–XVII.
[2] Book III, c. XIV, §§ 6–10.
[3] See Book III, c. XIV, *ad finem* (and note), and also c. XVI, § 2.

C

THE TYPE OF CONSTITUTION WHICH IS MOST GENERALLY PRACTICABLE (c. xi)

Chapter XI

We are here concerned with the best constitution and way of life for the majority *of men and states. Goodness itself consists in a mean; and in any state the middle class is a mean between the rich and the poor. The middle class is free from the ambition of the rich and the pettiness of the poor: it is a natural link which helps to ensure political cohesion. We may thus conclude that a constitution based on this class—i.e. a 'polity'—is most likely to be generally beneficial. It will be free from faction, and will be likely to be stable. But 'polities' have been historically rare—partly for internal reasons, and partly because the policy of the Athenian and the Spartan empires has encouraged extremes in preference to a middle way. Still, the 'polity' may serve as a standard in judging the merits of actual constitutions.*

§ 1. We have now to consider what is the best constitution and the best way of life for the *majority* of states and men.[1] In doing so we shall not employ, [for the purpose of measuring 'the best'], a standard of excellence above the reach of ordinary men, or a standard of education requiring exceptional endowments and equipment, or the standard of a constitution which attains an ideal height. We shall only be concerned with the sort of life which most men are able to share and the sort of constitution which it is possible for most states to enjoy. § 2. The 'aristocracies', so called, of which we have just been treating, [will not serve us for this purpose: they] either lie, at one extreme, beyond the reach of most states, or they approach, at the other, so closely to the constitution called 'polity' that they need not be considered separately

[1] Aristotle here begins to discuss the second question in the programme sketched at the end of c. ii; 'What constitution is the most acceptable, and the most to be preferred, short of the ideal constitution?' It will be noticed that he connects a constitution with 'a way of life'. It is not merely an 'arrangement of offices' (III. vi, § 1); it is also 'a scheme of life, directed to attaining a particular quality of life' (III. ix, §§ 7–14).

and must be treated as identical with it. The issues we have just raised can all be decided in the light of one body of fundamental principles. § 3. If we adopt as true the statements made in the *Ethics*—(1) that a truly happy life is a life of goodness lived in freedom from impediments,[1] and (2) that goodness consists in a mean—it follows that the best way of life [for the *majority* of men] is one which consists in a mean, and a mean of the kind attainable by every individual.[2] Further, the same criteria which determine whether the citizen-body [i.e. all its members, considered as *individuals*] have a good or bad way of life must also apply to the constitution; for a constitution is the way of life of a citizen-body. **1295 b** § 4. In all states there may be distinguished three parts, or classes, of the citizen-body[3]—the very rich; the very poor; and the middle class which forms the mean. Now it is admitted, as a general principle, that moderation and the mean are always best. We may therefore conclude that in the ownership of all gifts of fortune a middle condition will be the best. § 5. Men who are in this condition are the most ready to listen to reason. Those who belong to either extreme —the over-handsome, the over-strong, the over-noble, the

[1] 'Freedom from impediments', if we interpret it positively, means the possession of an adequate 'equipment' of wealth, health, and material resources.

[2] On the theory of Aristotle, goodness in general, and each of the separate virtues, consists in a regulated 'mean' between the extreme of 'excess' and the other extreme of 'defect' to which human affections are prone. In the sphere, for example, of those affections which are stirred by the presence of danger, there is the excess of foolhardiness and the defect of cowardice, and the virtue of courage is a mean between the two.

[3] Here Aristotle follows a line of thought similar to one which he has previously followed in c. VI. There, after a previous discussion of the varieties of oligarchy and democracy (in cc. IV–V), which is mainly based on their political structure, he proceeds to a new discussion which is based on their social composition. Similarly here, after a previous discussion of 'polity' (in cc. VII–IX) which is based on its political structure as a mixture of oligarchy and democracy, he proceeds to a new discussion which is based on its social composition. We now find that 'polity' is the best constitution for the majority of states because it mixes the different classes in, or under, a common and dominant middle class. This is really a new view, or at any rate an extension of the previous view; for a constitution which mixes elements of oligarchy with elements of democracy is not, *per se*, a constitution dominated by the middle class.

over-wealthy; or at the opposite end the over-poor, the over-weak, the utterly ignoble—find it hard to follow the lead of reason. Men in the first class tend more to violence and serious crime: men in the second tend too much to roguery and petty offences; and most wrongdoing arises either from violence or roguery. It is a further merit of the middle class that its members suffer least from ambition, which both in the military and the civil sphere is dangerous to states. § 6. It must also be added that those who enjoy too many advantages—strength, wealth, connexions, and so forth—are both unwilling to obey and ignorant how to obey. This is a defect which appears in them from the first, during childhood and in home-life: nurtured in luxury, they never acquire a habit of discipline, even in the matter of lessons. But there are also defects in those who suffer from the opposite extreme of a lack of advantages: they are far too mean and poor-spirited. § 7. We have thus, on the one hand, people who are ignorant how to rule and only know how to obey, as if they were so many slaves, and, on the other hand, people who are ignorant how to obey any sort of authority and only know how to rule as if they were masters of slaves. The result is a state, not of freemen, but only of slaves and masters: a state of envy on the one side and on the other contempt. Nothing could be farther removed from the spirit of friendship or the temper of a political community. Community depends on friendship; and when there is enmity instead of friendship, men will not even share the same path. § 8. A state aims at being, as far as it can be, a society composed of equals and peers [who, as such, can be friends and associates]; and the middle class, more than any other, has this sort of composition. It follows that a state which is based on the middle class is bound to be the best constituted in respect of the elements [i.e. equals and peers] of which, on our view, a state is naturally composed. The middle classes [besides contributing, in this way, to the security of the state] enjoy a greater security themselves than any other class. § 9. They do not, like the poor, covet the goods of others; nor do others covet their possessions, as the poor covet those of the rich. Neither plotting

against others, nor plotted against themselves, they live in freedom from danger; and we may well approve the prayer of Phocylides

> Many things are best for the middling:
> Fain would I be of the state's middle class.

§ 10. It is clear from our argument, first, that the best form of political society is one where power is vested in the middle class, and, secondly, that good government is attainable in those states where there is a large middle class—large enough, if possible, to be stronger than both of the other classes, but at any rate large enough to be stronger than either of them singly; for in that case its addition to either will suffice to turn the scale, and will prevent either of the opposing extremes from becoming dominant. § 11. It is therefore the greatest of blessings for a state that its members should possess a moderate and adequate property. Where 1296 a some have great possessions, and others have nothing at all, the result is either an extreme democracy or an unmixed oligarchy; or it may even be—indirectly, and as a reaction against both of these extremes—a tyranny. Tyranny is a form of government which may grow out of the headiest type of democracy, or out of oligarchy; but it is much less likely to grow out of constitutions of the middle order, or those which approximate to them [e.g. moderate oligarchies]. § 12. We shall explain the reason later, when we come to treat of revolutions and constitutional change.

Meanwhile, it is clear that the middle type of constitution is best [for the *majority* of states]. It is the one type free from faction; where the middle class is large, there is least likelihood of faction and dissension among the citizens. § 13. Large states are generally more free from faction just because they have a large middle class. In small states, on the other hand, it is easy for the whole population to be divided into only two classes; nothing is left in the middle, and all—or almost all—are either poor or rich. § 14. The reason why democracies are generally more secure and more permanent than oligarchies is the character of their middle class, which

is more numerous, and is allowed a larger share in the government, than it is in oligarchies. Where democracies have no middle class, and the poor are greatly superior in number, trouble ensues, and they are speedily ruined. § 15. It must also be considered a proof of its value that the best legislators have come from the middle class. Solon was one, as his own poems prove: Lycurgus was another (and not, as is sometimes said, a member of the royal family); and the same is true of Charondas and most of the other legislators.

§ 16. What has just been said also serves to explain why ['polities' are rare, and] most constitutions are either democratic or oligarchical. In the first place, the middle class is in most states generally small; and the result is that as soon as one or other of the two main classes—the owners of property and the masses—gains the advantage, it oversteps the mean, and drawing the constitution in its own direction it institutes, as the case may be, either a democracy or an oligarchy. § 17. In the second place, factious disputes and struggles readily arise between the masses and the rich; and no matter which side may win the day, it refuses to establish a constitution based on the common interest and the principle of equality, but, preferring to exact as the prize of victory a greater share of constitutional rights, it institutes, according to its principles, a democracy or an oligarchy. § 18. Thirdly, the policy of the two states which have held the ascendancy in Greece [i.e. Athens and Sparta] has also been to blame. Each has paid an exclusive regard to its own type of constitution; the one has instituted democracies in the states under its control, and the other has set up oligarchies: each has looked to its own advantage, and neither to that of the states it controlled. § 19. These three reasons explain why a middle or mixed type of constitution has never been established—or, at the most, has only been established on a few occasions and in a few states. . . . One man, and one only, of all who have hitherto been in a position of ascendancy, has allowed himself to be persuaded to agree to the setting up of such a type.[1] And now it has also become **1296 b** the habit in each individual

[1] See the note at the end of the chapter.

state [as it was of Athens and Sparta when they stood at the head of a group of states] not even to want a system of equality, but, instead of that, either to try to dominate or, if beaten, just to submit to the victor.

§ 20. It is clear, from the argument, which is the best constitution [for the *majority* of states], and what are the reasons why it is so. Once we have thus settled which is the best, it becomes easy to take all the others (including the different varieties, both of democracy and of oligarchy, which we have already distinguished), and to arrange them in an order of merit—first, second, and so on in turn—according as their quality is a better or a worse quality. § 21. The nearest to the best must always be better than all the rest, and the one which is farthest removed from the mean [and therefore from the best] must always be worse, if we are judging [on general grounds, and] not in relation to particular circumstances. I use the words 'in relation to particular circumstances' for this reason: one sort of constitution may be instrinsically preferable, but there is nothing to prevent another sort from being more suitable in the given case; and indeed this may often happen.

Note on the one man who favoured a mixed constitution

Newman suggests that the one man was Theramenes, a moderate leader at Athens in 411 B.C., and the chief promoter of a moderate constitution which vested power in the 5,000 citizens who could furnish themselves with arms. It is true that Thucydides refers to this constitution as a moderate mixture of oligarchy and democracy (viii, c. 97); but it is also true (1) that Theramenes was never 'in a position of ascendancy' in Greek affairs, and (2) that he can hardly be said to have 'allowed himself to be persuaded to agree to the setting up of a type of constitution'—a phrase which implies co-operation with others in setting up a general system of 'politics' in Greek states generally.

Was it Antipater that Aristotle had in mind—the regent for Alexander, who exercised an 'ascendancy' on his behalf during his absence in the East? The suggestion raises chronological difficulties; for though Antipater did establish a moderate constitution at Athens (under which power was vested in a body of 9,000 citizens), he did not do so till 321, the year after Aristotle's death. Had Aristotle discussed Greek politics with Antipater at an early date, and en-

deavoured to persuade him to favour a system of 'polities' in Greece? (This might explain the phrase 'allowed himself to be persuaded to agree'.) Or is this sentence a later insertion? It must be admitted that it is grammatically difficult—unless the sentence is a later insertion—to include Antipater among those 'who have *hitherto* been in a position of ascendancy'. He held that position just at the time when Aristotle was lecturing at Athens.

D
WHAT SORT OF CONSTITUTION IS DESIRABLE FOR WHAT SORT OF CIVIC BODY? (cc. XII–XIII)

Chapter XII

In constitutions quantity and quality have to be balanced against one another. When the weight of numbers among the poor more than balances the quality of the other elements, a democracy is desirable. When the quality of the other elements more than balances the weight of numbers among the poor, an oligarchy is desirable. When the middle class more than balances both the others—or even one of the others—a 'polity' is desirable. Considerations on the value of 'polities', and on the folly of devices intended to trick men into believing that they have rights when they have none.

§ 1. The next subject to consider, according to our programme, is the question, 'What and what sort of constitution is suited to what and what sort of persons?'[1] In order to answer this question, we must first assume a general axiom which is true of all constitutions—that the part of a state which wishes a constitution to continue must be stronger than the part which does not. Here we have to remember that quality and quantity both go to the making of every state. By 'quality' we mean free birth, wealth, culture, and nobility of descent; by 'quantity' we mean superiority in numbers. § 2. Now quality may belong to one of the parts which compose a state, and quantity to another. For example, those who are low-born may be more numerous than the high-born, or the poor than the rich; but the superiority in

[1] Aristotle here proceeds to the third item of the programme previously laid down in c. II, §§ 4–6.

quantity on the one side may not be sufficient to balance the superiority of quality on the other. Quantity and quality must thus be placed in the balance against one another. § 3. [On that basis we may lay down three propositions.] First, where the number of the poor is more than enough to counter-balance the higher quality of the other side, there will naturally be a democracy; and the particular variety of democracy will depend on the particular form of superiority which is shown, in each case, by the mass of the people. If, for example, the mass of the people are predominantly farmers, we shall have the first—or 'peasant'—form of democracy:[1] if they are mechanics and day-labourers, we shall have the 'extreme' form;[2] and the same will also be true of the intermediate forms between 'peasant' and 'extreme' democracy. Secondly, where the superiority of the rich and the notables in point of quality is greater than their inferiority in point of quantity, there will be an oligarchy; and the particular variety of oligarchy will similarly depend on the particular form of superiority which is shown by the oligarchical body. § 4. (It may be noted, in passing, that a legislator should always make the members of the middle class partners in any constitution which he establishes. If the laws he makes are oligarchical, he should aim at including the middle class in their benefits: if they are democratic, he should seek to attach that class to his democratic laws.) Thirdly, where the number of the members of the middle class outweighs that of both the other classes—and even where it only outweighs that of one of the others—a 'polity' can be permanently established. § 5. There is no risk, in such a case, of the rich uniting with the poor to oppose **1297 a** the middle class: neither will ever be willing to be subject to the other; and if they try to find a constitution which is more in their common interest than the 'polity' is, they will fail to find one. Neither class would tolerate a system under which either ruled in its turn: they have too little confidence in one another. A neutral arbitrator always gives the best ground for confidence; and 'the man in the middle' is such an arbitrator. § 6. The better, and the more

[1] See above, c. VI, § 2.

[2] c. VI, § 5.

equitable, the mixture in a 'polity', the more durable will it be. It is here that an error is often made by those who desire to establish aristocratic constitutions. [Forgetting the claims of equity], they not only give more power to the well-to-do, but they also deceive the people [by fobbing them off with sham rights]. Illusory benefits must always produce real evils in the long run; and the encroachments made by the rich [under cover of such devices] are more destructive to a constitution than those of the people.

Chapter XIII

This mention of devices leads us to consider the various devices used by oligarchies, and to mention the counter-devices used in democracies. The better policy is to pursue a via media, *and to aim at an honest compromise rather than to use devices. This policy may be illustrated from a study of the proper nature of a civic army and the methods by which it can be honestly recruited without recourse to any devices. This leads us to consider the effects of the nature and composition of the army on Greek constitutional development.*

§ 1. The devices adopted in constitutions[1] for fobbing the masses off with sham rights are five in number. They relate to the assembly; the magistracies; the law courts; the possession of arms; and the practice of athletics. As regards the assembly, all alike are allowed to attend; but fines for non-attendance are either imposed on the rich alone, or imposed on the rich at a far higher rate. § 2. As regards the magistracies, those who possess a property qualification are not allowed to decline office on oath,[2] but the poor are allowed to do so. As regards the law courts, the rich are fined for non-attendance, but the poor may absent themselves with impunity; or, alternatively, the rich are heavily fined and the poor are only fined lightly—as is the rule under the laws of

[1] 'Constitutions' here, as Newman suggests, may mean only 'polities', or mixed constitutions; but it may also include 'aristocracies' of the mixed type described in c. VII.

[2] i.e. an oath that their wealth (or health) is inadequate for the performance of the duties of an office.

Charondas. § 3. In some states a different device is adopted in regard to attendance at the assembly and the law courts. All who have registered themselves may attend; those who fail to attend after registration are heavily fined. Here the intention is to stop men from registering, through fear of the fines they may thus incur, and ultimately to stop them from attending the courts and assembly as a result of their failure to register. § 4. Similar measures are also employed in regard to the possession of arms and the practice of athletics. The poor are allowed not to have any arms, and the rich are fined for not having them. The poor are not fined if they absent themselves from physical training: the rich are; and so while the latter are induced to attend by the sanction of a fine, the former are left free to abstain in the absence of any deterrent.

§ 5. The legal devices just mentioned are of an oligarchical character. Democracies have their counter-devices: the poor receive payment for attendance at the assembly and the law courts; the rich are not fined if they fail to attend. § 6. If we want to secure an equitable mixture of the two sides, we must combine elements drawn from both: in other words, we must both pay the poor for attendance and fine the rich for non-attendance. On this plan all would share in a common constitution: on the other, the constitution belongs to one side only. **1297 b** § 7. It is true that the constitution of a 'polity' or mixed state must be based on a citizen-body composed only of those who have arms, [and that this involves a property qualification]. But it is not possible to define this qualification absolutely, or to say that it must consist of a fixed amount in all cases. We must seek to discover in each given case, and to fix for each, the highest amount which it is possible to require without sacrificing the principle that those who enjoy political rights should be in a majority over those who do not. § 8. [This will involve no difficulty with the poor]: even when they do not enjoy political privileges, the poor are ready enough to keep quiet, provided that they are not violently handled or deprived of any of their property. But moderation does not come readily; and those who enjoy political rights are not always humane to inferiors. § 9. There

may, for example, be a difficulty in time of war. The poor are usually reluctant to serve, if they are given no subsistence allowance, and are thus left without any means. But if they are provided with subsistence they are willing enough to fight.

There are some constitutions in which the citizen-body includes not only those who are actually serving, but also those who have previously served.[1] The Malian constitution, for example, in the south of Thessaly, gave the franchise to both; but it restricted eligibility to office to those who were actually on service. § 10. The first form of constitution which succeeded to monarchy in ancient Greece was one in which the soldiery formed the citizen-body. At first it consisted only of cavalry. Military strength and superiority were then the prerogative of that arm; infantry is useless without a system of tactics; and as the experience and the rules required for such a system did not exist in early times, the strength of armies lay in their cavalry. When, however, states began to increase in size, and infantry forces acquired a greater degree of strength, more persons were admitted to the enjoyment of political rights. § 11. For this reason [i.e. because there was then a notable extention of the franchise] the name 'democracy' was given at that time to constitutions which we now call 'polities'. It is not surprising that the old constitutions should have been oligarchical and, earlier still, monarchical. With their populations still small, states had no large middle class; and the body of the people, still few in number, and insignificant in organization, were more ready to tolerate government from above.

§ 12. [We have now considered three of the five subjects mentioned in our programme of study.] (1) We have explained why there is a variety of constitutions, and why there

[1] Aristotle is here led into a digression on the connexion between political forms and military organization. The digression becomes an historical disquisition, in the course of which he shows that the development of political forms is connected with the development of the art of war. It is obvious, especially when we reflect on recent developments in modern Europe, that Aristotle here touches on a theme of cardinal importance.

are other forms than those commonly enumerated. (Democracy has more than one form; and the same is true of other constitutions.) We have also explained the differences between the various forms, and the causes of the character of each. (2) We have explained which is the best constitution in the majority of cases. (3) We have explained, so far as other constitutions are concerned, which sort of constitution suits which sort of civic body.[1]

THE METHODS OF ESTABLISHING CONSTITUTIONS, IN RELATION TO THE THREE POWERS—DELIBERATIVE, EXECUTIVE, AND JUDICIAL (cc. xiv–xvi)

Chapter XIV

There are three elements or powers in the government of a state. The first is the deliberative; and that may be arranged on three different systems. The first system assigns all matters of deliberation to all: it is the system of democracy, and it may be carried into effect in four different ways. The second system assigns all matters to some: it is the system of oligarchy, and it may be carried into effect in three ways. A third system assigns some matters to all the citizens, and others to some of them: this system is characteristic of an aristocracy and of 'polities'. How the deliberative element may best be arranged, as a matter of policy, *in democracies and in oligarchies.*

§ 1. We have now to treat of the next subject [i.e. the proper method of establishing constitutions], and we have to do so both in general terms and separately for each constitu-

[1] The programme of study is that stated at the end of c. II, §§ 4–5. The first subject has been considered in cc. III–X. The second subject has been considered in c. XI; but there is a preliminary consideration of it in cc. VIII–IX, and the consideration is continued incidentally in c. XII, §§ 4–6. The third subject is considered in c. XII, and incidentally in c. XIII, §§ 10–11. There have been some digressions in the course of the argument (e.g. c. XIII is largely a digression on political devices in oligarchies and the counter-devices of democracies); but on the whole the programme stated at the end of c. II has been steadily followed. The two remaining subjects of the programme are now duly treated, at the end of Book IV and in the course of Book V.

tion. We must first find a proper basis for the treatment of the subject. We may lay it down that there are three elements, or 'powers', in each constitution, and that a good legislator [in establishing a constitution] must consider what is expedient for it under each of these three heads. If all of them are constructed properly, the whole constitution too will be constructed properly; and where they are constructed differently, constitutions will also differ. § 2. The first of the three is the deliberative element concerned with common affairs, and its proper constitution: **1298 a** the second is the element of the magistracies (and here it has to be settled what these magistracies are to be, what matters they are to control, and how their occupants are to be appointed): the third is the judicial element, and the proper constitution of that element.[1]

§ 3. The deliberative element is sovereign (1) on the issues of war and peace, and the making and breaking of alliances; (2) in the enacting of laws; (3) in cases where the penalty of death, exile, and confiscation is involved; and (4) in the appointment of magistrates and the calling of them to account on the expiration of their office.[2] Three different arrangements of this element are possible: first, to give the decision on *all* the issues it covers to *all* the citizens; secondly, to give the decision on *all* the issues to *some* of the citizens (either by referring them all to one magistracy or combination of magistracies, or by referring different issues to different magistracies); and thirdly, to give the decision on *some issues to all* the citizens, and on *other issues to some* of them.

§ 4. The first of these arrangements, which assigns all the issues of deliberation to all the citizens, is characteristic of democracies: the equality which it implies is exactly what the people desire. But there are a number of different ways in which it may be effected. First, all the citizens may meet to deliberate in relays, and not in a single body. This was the scheme in the constitution of Telecles of Miletus. (We may

[1] See the first note at the end of the chapter.

[2] Compare Book III, c. XI, §§ 15–16, where 'the election of magistrates, and their examination at the end of their tenure', are stated to be the most important of issues, and to be connected with 'deliberation'.

also cite, as a variation of this scheme, the example of some other constitutions, in which the different boards of magistrates meet together for deliberation in a single body, but the citizens join the boards in relays—drawn from the tribes and the smallest units within the tribes—until they have all been included in the cycle.[1]) It is also a part of this scheme, under which all the citizens meet to deliberate in relays, that they assemble only for the purpose of enacting laws, for dealing with constitutional matters, and for hearing the announcements of the magistrates.[2] § 5. A second way in which this first arrangement may be carried out is that all the citizens should meet to deliberate in a single body, but only for the three purposes of appointing and examining the magistrates, enacting laws, and dealing with issues of war and peace. The other matters [i.e. matters which involve the penalties of death, exile, and confiscation] will then be left for the deliberation of the magistracies assigned to deal with each branch; but appointment to such magistracies will be open—whether it is made by election or by lot—to all the citizens. § 6. A third way is that the citizens should meet for the two purposes of appointing and examining the magistrates, and deliberating on issues of war and foreign policy, but other matters [i.e. the enactment of laws, and the infliction of major penalties] should be left to the control of boards of magistrates which, as far as possible, are kept elective[3]—boards to which men of experience and knowledge ought to be appointed. § 7. A fourth way is that all should meet to deliberate on all issues, and boards of magistrates should have no power of giving a

[1] These constitutions appear at first sight to confine deliberation to *some* of the citizens (since they vest it primarily in a combination of magistracies); but, as they open the magistracies to *all* the citizens (in their turn), they really vest the power of deliberation in *all* the citizens (again in their turn).

[2] Problems arise in regard to this sentence, which limits, and limits greatly, the number of the issues on which all the citizens deliberate. Generally, a scheme which makes the citizens deliberate only in relays, and only on a limited number of issues, can hardly be said to be a way of giving effect to the arrangement which assigns *all* issues of deliberation to *all* the citizens.

[3] See the second note at the end of the chapter.

decision on any issue, but only that of making preliminary investigations. This is the way in which extreme democracy —a form of democracy analogous, as we have suggested, to the dynastic form of oligarchy and the tyrannical form of monarchy—is nowadays conducted.[1]

All these ways of arranging the distribution of deliberative power are democratic. A second system of arrangement, which may also be carried into effect in a number of different ways, is that *some* of the citizens should deliberate on *all* matters. This is characteristic of oligarchy. § 8. One way of carrying this second system into effect is that the members of the deliberative body should be eligible on the basis of a moderate property qualification, and should therefore be fairly numerous; that they should not make changes in matters where the law prohibits change, but should obey its rules; and that all who acquire property to the amount of the qualification required should be allowed to share in the right of deliberation. Here we have something which is an oligarchy, but an oligarchy tending to 'polity' by virtue of its moderation. A second way of giving effect to this system is that membership of the deliberative body should belong only to selected persons—and not to all persons [who acquire property to the amount of the qualification required]—but that these persons **1298 b** should act, as before, in obedience to the rules of law. This is a way characteristic of oligarchy. § 9. Another way of carrying this system into effect is that those who possess the power of deliberation should recruit themselves by co-optation, or should simply succeed by heredity, and should have the power of overruling the laws. This is a way of arrangement which inevitably means oligarchy.

§ 10. A third system of arrangement is that *some* of the citizens should deliberate on *some* matters—but not on all. [The effect will be that on other matters *all* the citizens will

[1] This parallel has already been drawn in c. IV, § 27, and c. VI, § 11. It may be added that these four sections (4–7) all offer a logical difficulty. They start from an intention of describing various ways in which all may deliberate on all issues. Actually, they seem more concerned with ways in which not-all may deliberate on not-all issues.

deliberate.] For instance, all the citizens may exercise the deliberative power in regard to war and peace and the examination of magistrates; but the magistrates only may exercise that power on issues other than these, and these magistrates may be appointed by election.[1] When this is the case, the constitution is an aristocracy. Another alternative is that some issues of deliberation should go to persons appointed by election, and others to persons appointed by lot (with the chance of the lot either open to all or open only to candidates selected in advance), or, again, that all issues should go to a mixed body of elected persons and persons appointed by lot, deliberating together. Such ways of arrangement are partly characteristic of a 'polity' verging on aristocracy, and partly of a pure 'polity'.[2]

§ 11. These are the different forms of the deliberative body which correspond to the different constitutions. Each constitution is organized on the basis of one or other of the systems we have distinguished. [We may now turn from the actual *practice* to the proper *policy* of states.]

§ 12. The policy which is in the interest of a democracy—a democracy, that is to say, of the type which is nowadays held to be peculiarly and specially democratic (and this is the type where the sovereignty of the people dominates even the laws)—is to improve the quality of the deliberative body by applying to it the plan which oligarchies apply to the meetings of the law courts. They compel the attendance of all whose presence is desired in the courts under sanction of a fine—

[1] In the Greek text the words 'or by lot' follow. But the addition of these words would make the form of government described a democracy, and not, as it is said to be, an aristocracy. I therefore follow the editors who have bracketed these words as an interpolation. It may be added that in this section Aristotle appears to be describing (but implicitly rather than explicitly) the third main arrangement described at the end of § 3—that of assigning the power of decision on some issues to all, and on other issues to some. He does not, however, make it clear that this is another main type of arrangement; on the contrary, he seems to add it as an appendix to his description of the second (or oligarchical) type.

[2] The second alternative suggested in the latter part of § 10 seems more characteristic of a pure 'polity': the first alternative (especially when the persons appointed by lot are drawn from candidates selected in advance) seems more characteristic of a 'polity' inclining to aristocracy.

the converse of the democratic plan of persuading men to attend by pay. A democracy will do well to apply this plan of compulsory attendance to the deliberative assembly. The results of deliberation are better when all deliberate together; when the populace is mixed with the notables and they, in their turn, with the populace. § 13. It is also in the interest of a democracy that the parts of the state should be represented in the deliberative body by an equal number of members, either elected for the purpose or appointed by the use of the lot.[1] It is also in its interest, when the members of the populace largely exceed the notables who have political experience, that payment for attendance at the assembly should not be given to all the citizens, but only to so many as will balance the number of the notables or, alternatively, that the lot should be used to eliminate the excess of ordinary citizens over the notables.

§ 14. The policy which is in the interest of oligarchies is to co-opt to the deliberative body some members drawn from the populace; or, alternatively, to erect an institution of the type which exists in some states, under the name of 'preliminary council' or 'council of legal supervision', and then to allow the citizen-body to deal with any issues which have already been considered, in advance, by the members of this institution. (On this latter plan the people at large will share in the right of deliberation, but they will not be able to abrogate any rule of the constitution.) § 15. Another line of policy which is in the interest of oligarchies is that the people should only be free to vote for measures which are identical, or at any rate in agreement, with those submitted by the government; or, alternatively, that the people as a whole should have a consultative voice, but the deliberative organ should be the body of magistrates. If the latter alternative is

[1] It is important to notice that Aristotle here suggests a *representative* organ of deliberation (cf. also Book VI, c. iii, § 1). This shows that the idea of representative institutions was not altogether unknown to the Greeks. It may be added that the new Athenian League, instituted in 377 B.C., made provision for a double parliament—part consisting of the Athenian Council and Assembly, and the other part being 'a synod of representatives from all the other states of the league' (*Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. vi, p. 73).

adopted, it should be applied in a way which is the opposite of the practice followed in 'polities'. The people should be sovereign for the purpose of rejecting proposals, but not for the purpose of passing them; and any proposals which they pass should be referred back to the magistrates. § 16. The practice adopted in 'polities' is the reverse of this. The few [i.e. the magistrates] are sovereign for the purpose of rejecting proposals, but not for the purpose of passing them; and any proposal which they pass is **1299 a** referred back to the many. . . . These are our conclusions in regard to the deliberative or sovereign[1] element in the constitution.

Note on the three elements of government

Prima facie, these three 'elements' seem to be identical with the legislative, executive, and judicial powers of modern theory. Actually, Aristotle's deliberative element was hardly legislative (though it had legislative functions): it was rather concerned with the executive function, and with some of the higher judicial functions. Similarly his magistracies, though they had executive functions (of different specialized kinds), did not constitute an 'executive government' in the modern sense; the deliberative element had overriding power in that respect. Finally, the judicial element, as we have already noticed, was not a body of judges: it was composed of lay or popular courts. The reader has to think himself back into a Greek framework essentially different from the modern, and to abandon any idea of a differentiation of powers on the model of Montesquieu's theory, or of British (or American) practice.

Note on the use of the lot at Athens

Popular feeling in democracies ran in favour of the lot, which was held to give the ordinary man a better chance. Election gave a better chance to those who could plead capacity—or (one may also add) could bring influence to bear.

Appointment to office by means of the lot—the usual procedure at Athens except for the generals and other military officers—may seem strange to-day. But it was safeguarded at Athens in three ways—first, by a formal test of fitness before entry on office (*dokimasia*); secondly, by a vote in the assembly on the conduct of any officer during his tenure (*epicheirotonia*), a vote to which he was at once subjected if the assembly held that there was ground for

[1] The identification of the deliberative with the sovereign element has already been made in Book III, c. xi, § 15, and, more explicitly, in Book II, c. vi, § 2.

examination; and thirdly, by a scrutiny at the end of the tenure of office (*euthūnai*), which included not only a financial audit, but also a general examination before a board of scrutiny, or, in the case of the higher officers, before the Council and the popular courts: see Vinogradoff, *Historical Jurisprudence*, vol. ii, pp. 140–2.

Chapter XV

The second element is the executive, or the system of magistracies. Differences in the system of magistracies turn on four points—number; functions; tenure; and methods of appointment. Definition of the term 'magistracy'; and a general consideration of the number, functions, and tenure of magistracies, with a discussion of the relation of different magistracies (e.g. the Boulē *and the* Probouloi*) to different constitutions. The methods of appointment: the three main factors to be considered, the choice of alternatives presented by each, and the various modes of handling the choice of alternatives. The arrangements for the appointment of magistrates best suited to different constitutions—democracy, 'polity', oligarchy, and aristocracy.*

§ 1. The next subject for examination is the [executive element, or the] magistracies. This element of the constitution, like the deliberative, admits of a number of different arrangements. These differences arise on a variety of points: (1) the number of the magistracies; (2) the subjects with which they deal; and (3) the length of the tenure of each. . . . In some states the tenure is six months; in some it is a less period; in others it is a year; and in others, again, it is a longer period. We have not only to compare these periods; we have also to inquire generally whether magistracies should be held for life, or for a long term of years, or neither for life nor for a long term but only for shorter periods, and whether, in that case, the same person should hold office more than once, or each should be eligible only for a single term. . . . There is also (4) a further point to be considered—the method of appointment; and this raises three questions—who should be eligible; who should have the right of election; and how should the election be conducted? § 2. We have first to

distinguish the various methods which it is possible to apply to each of these questions, and then, on that basis, we have to determine the particular form of magistracies which will suit a particular form of constitution. We are confronted, however, with an initial difficulty of definition. What is to be included under the term 'magistrate'? A political association needs a large number of different officers. We cannot, therefore, reckon as magistrates all the persons appointed—by election or lot—to any office. We can hardly include, for example, the priests of the public cults, whose office must be reckoned as something different from the political magistracies. § 3. The same is true of the officials concerned with the production of plays:[1] it is true of the heralds; it is true of the persons elected to go on embassies. The general range of official duties may be divided into three classes. The first is the political, where the duty is one of directing, in some particular sphere of action, either the whole body of the citizens (as e.g. a general directs the civic army in the field), or some section of the citizens (as e.g. the inspectors of women and children direct their respective charges). The second is the economic; and here the officers elected to measure the corn for distribution (they are to be found in many states) may be cited as an example. The third class is that of subordinate or menial duties—duties of the sort which, in wealthy states, the public slaves are set to discharge. § 4. Among all these offices the title of magistracy should, on the whole, be reserved for those which are charged with the duty, in some given field, of deliberating, deciding, and giving instructions—and more especially with the duty of giving instructions, which is the special mark of the magistrate. But it is all a matter of style, which can hardly be said to have any importance in practice. No decision has been given about it in courts, the issue being merely a matter of terminology; and it only offers an opportunity for speculative inquiry.

§ 5. In dealing with all constitutions, but especially in dealing with those of small states, it is a matter of more impor-

[1] To equip a chorus for a public dramatic festival was an expensive office for which the Athenian tribes provided men in their turn.

tance to distinguish what sort and number of magistracies are necessary to the state's *existence*, and what sort are of value—even if they are not necessary—in ensuring a *good* constitution. § 6. In large states it is both possible and proper that a separate magistracy should be allotted to each separate function. The number of the citizens makes it convenient for a number of persons to enter on office: it permits some of the offices to be held only once in a lifetime, and others (though held more than once) to be held again only after a long interval; and, apart from convenience, each function gets better attention when it is the only one undertaken, and not one among a number of others.

1299 b § 7. In small states, on the other hand, a large number of functions have to be accumulated in the hands of but a few persons. The small number of the citizens makes it difficult for many persons to be in office together; and if there were, who would be their successors? It is true that small states sometimes need the same magistracies, and the same laws about their tenure and duties, as large states. But it is also true that large states need their magistracies almost continuously, and small states only need theirs at long intervals. § 8. There is thus no reason why small states should not impose a number of duties simultaneously on their officers. They will not interfere with one another; and anyhow it is necessary, where the population is small, to turn magistrates into jacks-of-all-trades.[1]

But before this question can be settled finally, there are a number of questions to be considered. One thing which will help us to determine how many magistracies can be combined in the hands of a single magistrate is to know beforehand how many magistracies a state *must* have, and how many others it *ought* to have even though they are not absolutely necessary. § 9. Secondly, we must not omit to consider which matters need the attention of different local magistracies acting in different places, and which ought to be controlled

[1] This is a free translation. Aristotle's word, in the Greek, is one which denotes a spit that can also serve as a lamp-holder—something like 'the Delphic knife' mentioned in Book I, c. 11, § 3.

by one central magistracy acting for the whole area.[1] The maintenance of order is an example. It raises the question whether we should have one person to keep order in the market-place and another in another place, or whether we should have a single person to keep order in every place. Thirdly, we have also to consider whether to allocate duties on the basis of the subject to be handled, or on that of the class of persons concerned: e.g. should we have one officer for the whole subject of the maintenance of order, or a separate officer for the class of children and another for that of women? § 10. Fourthly, we have also to take into account the difference of constitutions. This raises the question whether the scheme of magistracies varies from one constitution to another, or is the same for all constitutions. Are we to say that in all constitutions alike (democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy, and monarchy) the same magistracies form the government—with the one difference that the magistrates personally do not come from the same, or a similar, social class, but are drawn from a different class in each different constitution (in aristocracies, for example, from the cultured class; in oligarchies from the wealthy; and in democracies from the free-born)? Or shall we say that the magistracies too, as well as the magistrates, differ in some respects from one constitution to another; and shall we then add, as a qualification, that in some cases the same magistracies are suitable, but in other cases they are bound to differ? (In some constitutions, for example, it may be appropriate that magistracies should be powerful: in others it may be appropriate that the same magistracies should be weak.)

§ 11. Some magistracies, it is true, are altogether peculiar to one type of constitution. A preliminary council, or body of *probouloi*, is an example. Such a body does not square with democracy, where the ordinary council, or *boulē*, is the appropriate institution. There ought, indeed, to be some sort of

[1] It is often said that the Greek city-state knew no distinction between central and local government. This passage shows the germ of such a distinction, as the previous passage in c. XIV, § 13, shows the germ of the idea of representation.

body charged with the duty of preliminary deliberation on behalf of the people: otherwise the people will not be able to attend to their ordinary business. But if such a body is small, it becomes an oligarchical institution; and a body of *probouloi* will always be small, and therefore will always be oligarchical. § 12. Where a *boulē* and a body of *probouloi* are both to be found, the latter are a check on the former; they are an oligarchical element, and the *boulē* is democratic. Yet even the authority of the *boulē* itself is subverted in democracies of the extreme type, where the people assembles in person to transact the whole business of the state.[1] **1300 a** § 13. This usually happens when there is a high rate of pay for those who attend the assembly. Men need not then mind their business; and therefore they hold frequent meetings and decide all issues themselves. . . . Officers for the maintenance of order among women and children, and other magistrates charged with similar duties of supervision, are suited more to an aristocracy than to a democracy (it would be impossible to control the comings and goings of the wives of the poor); nor are they congenial to an oligarchy, where the wives of the ruling class live a life of luxury. . . .

[There follows, in §§ 14–22, **1300 a 8-b 12** a mathematical account of the permutations and combinations possible in the appointment of magistrates, which are explained as depending upon three factors: (1) the persons appointing, who may be all the citizens or only a section; (2) the persons eligible for appointment, who may be similarly all the citizens or only a section; and (3) the machinery of election, which may be election or lot.]

[1] A Council or *Boulē* with a large membership (at Athens there were 500 members, chosen by lot) is in Aristotle's view consistent with democracy, and forms (we may say) a sort of second chamber by the side of the assembly. A body of *probouloi* with a small membership (probably chosen by election) is, in his view, of a different character. It is not in the nature of a second chamber in a system of democracy, but rather an oligarchical drag or check on the democratic council.

Probouloi (or, as we may call them, 'pre-councillors', or even 'privy councillors') formed a committee for initiating measures. They did not exist at Athens, except on one brief occasion—for about the space of a year, after the end of the Sicilian expedition in 413 B.C. Normally the Council of 500 prepared the business for the assembly.

Chapter XVI

The third element is the judicial, or the system of law courts (dikastēria). *An enumeration of eight different types of law courts, and a consideration of the three main ways in which courts may be constituted. The types of constitution to which these different ways are best suited.*

1300 b 13 § 1. Of the three powers [the deliberative, executive, and judicial], the last alone remains to be considered. The same plan [which we followed in regard to the executive] must also be followed in determining questions connected with courts of law. Here the three points on which differences arise are (1) the membership of the courts; (2) their competence; and (3) the machinery for appointing the members. Membership raises the question whether the courts are to be constituted from all the citizens or from a section; competence raises the question how many kinds of courts there are; the machinery of appointment raises the question whether appointment should be by vote or by lot. . . .

[In the next six sections, §§ 2–7, Aristotle distinguishes eight types of courts, according to the cases with which they deal, and then gives an account of the permutations and combinations possible in the composition of the courts, according as (1) all the citizens, or only a section, are eligible for membership, and (2) the members are appointed by election or by lot.]

1301 a 10 § 8. This gives us a complete list of all the systems on which courts can be constituted. The first sort of system, in which the membership of the courts is drawn from all, and the courts decide on all matters, is democratic. The second sort, in which the membership is drawn from a section, and the courts decide on all matters, is oligarchical. The third sort, [which is a conjunction of the first two, and] in which the membership of some courts is drawn from all, and that of others from a section, is characteristic of aristocracies and 'polities'.

BOOK V

CAUSES OF REVOLUTION AND CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

A

THE GENERAL CAUSES OF REVOLUTION AND CHANGE IN ALL TYPES OF CONSTITUTION (cc. I–IV)

CHAPTER I

Different interpretations of justice and equality lead to the making of different claims by different parties; and the conflict of these claims causes political struggles and changes. The different forms which programmes of political change may take either imply the overthrow of the existing constitution, or involve some sort of modification. Whatever the difference of form may be, the general motive is always a passion for some conception of equality, which is held to be involved in the very idea of justice. There are two main conceptions of equality—the numerical and the proportionate: democracy is based on the one, and oligarchy on the other. Neither conception should be exclusively followed; but, of the two, the democratic is the safer, and the less likely to provoke revolution.

1301 a 19 § 1. We have now practically completed our discussion of the first four subjects stated in our programme; and it only remains to treat, in conclusion, of the last. Under this head we have to consider the general causes which produce changes in constitutions and to examine their number and nature. We have also to consider the particular way in which each constitution is liable to degenerate—i.e. to explain *from* what a constitution is most likely to change *to* what. In addition we have to suggest the *policies* likely to ensure the stability of constitutions, collectively and individually, and to indicate the *means* which may best be employed to secure each particular constitution.[1]

[1] Following the programme laid down at the end of Book IV, c. 11, and having considered already, in Book IV, four of the five subjects of that

§ 2. We must first assume, as a basis of our argument, that the reason why there is a variety of different constitutions is the fact—already mentioned[1]—that while men are all agreed in doing homage to justice, and to the principle of proportionate equality [in which it issues], they fail to achieve it in practice [i.e. disagree in their actual interpretations]. § 3. Democracy arose in the strength of an opinion that those who were equal in any one respect were equal absolutely, and in all respects. (Men are prone to think that the fact of their all being equally free-born means that they are all absolutely equal.) Oligarchy similarly arose from an opinion that those who are unequal in some one respect were altogether unequal. (Those who are superior in point of wealth readily regard themselves as absolutely superior.) § 4. Acting on such opinions, the democrats proceed to claim an equal share in everything, on the ground of their equality; the oligarchs proceed to press for more, on the ground that they are unequal—that is to say, more than equal. § 5. Both democracy and oligarchy are based on a sort of justice; but they both fall short of absolute justice. This is the reason why either side turns to sedition if it does not enjoy the share of constitutional rights which accords with the conception of justice it happens to entertain. § 6. Those who are pre-eminent in merit would be the most justified in attempting sedition (though they are the last to make the attempt); for they—and they only—can reasonably **1301 b** be regarded as enjoying an absolute superiority. § 7. There is also some justification for those who, possessing an advantage of birth, regard themselves as entitled to more than an equal share on the ground of this advantage. Good birth is commonly regarded as the attribute of those whose ancestors had merit as well as wealth.

programme, Aristotle now considers the fifth and last—the causes of the destruction, and the methods of the preservation, of different constitutions. This subject occupies the whole of the next two books. Book V is concerned with 'destruction', or in other words revolutions; Book VI is concerned with 'preservation'—but only so far as democracies and oligarchies are concerned. (There is, however, an excursus on methods of preservation intercalated in the treatment of revolutions in Book V, cc. VIII–IX.)

[1] In Book III. c. IX. § 1, and c. XII. §§ 1–2.

These, in a general sense, are the sources and springs of sedition, and the causes of seditious action.[1] § 8. These considerations will also explain the two different ways in which constitutional changes may happen. (1) Sometimes sedition is directed against the existing constitution, and is intended to change its nature—to turn democracy into oligarchy, or oligarchy into democracy; or, again, to turn democracy and oligarchy into 'polity' and aristocracy, or, conversely, the latter into the former. (2) Sometimes, however, it is not directed against the existing constitution. The seditious party [may follow a more moderate line, in one or other of three directions. First, it] may decide to maintain the system of government—an oligarchy, for example, or a monarchy—as it stands; but it will desire to get the administration into the hands of its members. § 9. Secondly, a seditious party [while leaving a constitution generally intact] may wish to make it more pronounced or more moderate. It may wish, for example, to make an oligarchy more, or less, oligarchical. It may wish to make a democracy more, or less, democratic. It may similarly seek to tighten, or loosen, the strings in any of the other forms of constitution. § 10. Thirdly, a seditious party may direct its efforts towards changing only one part of the constitution. It may wish, for example, to erect, or to abolish, some particular magistracy. Some writers state that Lysander attempted to abolish the kingship at Sparta, and King Pausanias the ephoralty. At Epidaurus, again, there was a partial change of the constitution; and a Council [of a democratic character] was substituted for the meeting of heads of tribes. § 11. But even at the present time [Epidaurus is so far from being a democracy that] the magistrates are the only members of the civic body who are obliged to attend

[1] The word here translated 'sedition' is the Greek *stasis*. *Stasis* is the act of forming (and thence, by an easy transference, the body of persons forming) a combination 'for the attainment of some political end by legal and illegal means' (Newman). From this point of view, and because it may include illegal as well as legal means, *stasis* may involve revolutionary action, and thus issue in revolution; though it may sometimes stop short of that issue, and only produce non-revolutionary changes, within the four walls of the constitution. Aristotle accordingly connects two different forms of constitutional change with *stasis*.

the public assembly, when the appointment to a magistracy is being put to the vote; and the existence of a single Archon [instead of a college of Archons] continues to present another oligarchical feature.

In all these cases [whether sedition is directed against the constitution, or only towards its modification] the cause of sedition is always to be found in inequality—though there is no inequality [and therefore no justification for sedition] when unequals are treated in proportion to the inequality existing between them (and therefore an hereditary monarchy only involves inequality when it exists among equals). It is the passion for equality which is thus at the root of sedition. § 12. But equality is of two sorts. One sort is numerical equality: the other sort is equality proportionate to desert. 'Numerical equality' means being treated equally, or identically, in the number and volume of things which you get; 'equally proportionate to desert' means being treated on the basis of equality of ratios.[1] To give an example—numerically, the excess of 3 over 2 is equal to the excess of 2 over 1; but proportionally, the excess of 4 over 2 is equal to the excess of 2 over 1—2 being the same fraction of 4 as 1 is of 2.[2] § 13. Now men are ready to agree to the principle that absolute justice [in the division of rights] consists [in their being divided] in proportion to desert; but they differ, as we noted at the beginning of this chapter, [as soon as it comes to practice]. Some take the line that if men are equal in one respect, they may consider themselves equal in all: others take the line that if they are superior in one respect, they may claim superiority all round.

§ 14. The result of men's taking these two lines is that two types of constitution—democracy and oligarchy—are particularly prevalent. Good birth and merit are found in few

[1] Aristotle always argues, as he has argued in Book III, that true equality is proportionate equality, or in other words an equality of ratios —i.e. equality of the ratio between A's desert and what he gets with the ratio between B's desert and what *he* gets.

[2] As Newman remarks, this illustration touches only the mathematical point, and does not show that equality in proportion to desert is the true form of political equality.

persons; but the qualities on which democracy and oligarchy are based are found in a much larger number. In no state would you find as many as a hundred **1302 a** men of good birth and merit: there are many in which you would find that number of wealthy persons. But a constitutional system based absolutely, and at all points, on either the oligarchical or the democratic conception of equality is a poor sort of thing. The facts are evidence enough: constitutions of this sort never endure. § 15. The reason is simple. When one begins with an initial error, it is inevitable that one should end badly. The right course is [not to pursue either conception exclusively, but] to use in some cases the principle of numerical equality, and in others that of equality proportionate to desert. Yet it must be admitted that democracy is a form of government which is safer, and less vexed by sedition, than oligarchy. § 16. Oligarchies are prone to two sorts of sedition—the one within the ranks of the oligarchical party itself, and the other between that party and the party of the people. Democracies are only exposed to sedition between the democratic party and the oligarchical; and there are no internal dissensions—at any rate none worth mentioning—which divide democratic parties against themselves. Democracy, too, has the advantage that it comes nearer than oligarchy does to the form of government—the 'polity' based on the middle classes—which is the most stable of all the forms with which we are here concerned [i.e. the imperfect forms which fall short of the ideal].

Chapter II

In dealing with the general origins and causes of revolution we may do so under three heads: (1) *psychological motives;* (2) *the objects in view; and* (3) *the initial occasions, which in turn are of two main kinds.*

§ 1. Since we have to consider the various reasons which lead to the rise of seditions and changes in the general run of constitutions, we had better begin with a general view of their origins and causes. They may be said to be three in number;

and we must begin by giving a brief outline of each of them separately. The three things we have to investigate are (1) the state of mind which leads to sedition; (2) the objects which are at stake; and (3) the occasions which serve to start political disturbance and mutual dissension.

§ 2. The principal and general cause of an attitude of mind which disposes men towards change is the cause of which we have just spoken. There are some who stir up sedition because their minds are filled by a passion for equality, which arises from their thinking that they have the worst of the bargain in spite of being the equals of those who have got the advantage. There are others who do it because their minds are filled with a passion for inequality (i.e. superiority), which arises from their conceiving that they get no advantage over others (but only an equal amount, or even a smaller amount) although they are really more than equal to others. § 3. (Either of these passions may have some justification; and either may be without any.) Thus inferiors become revolutionaries in order to be equals, and equals in order to be superiors.

This is the state of mind which creates sedition. The objects which are at stake are profit and honour. They are also their opposites—loss and disgrace; for the authors of political sedition may be simply seeking to avert some disgrace, or a fine, from themselves or their friends.

§ 4. The occasions and origins of disturbances—occasions which encourage the attitude of mind, and lead to the pursuit of the objects, which have just been mentioned—may be counted, from one point of view, as seven, but from another as more than that number.[1] § 5. Two of these occasions (profit and honour) are identical with two of the objects which have just been mentioned; but when considered as occasions they act in a different way. As objects, profit and honour provoke dissension because (as we have just noted) men want

[1] The seven main occasions are those which intrinsically, and in their own nature, lead to seditious feelings and action. There are also, however, four other occasions which lead to sedition incidentally, or, we may even say, accidentally. These are enumerated at the end of the chapter.

to get them themselves: as **1302 b** occasions, they lead to dissension because men see other persons getting a larger share—some justly and some unjustly—than they themselves get. § 6. Other occasions, besides profit and honour, are insolence; fear; the presence of some form of superiority; contempt; or a disproportionate increase in some part of the state. Four other occasions leading to dissension—but in a different way [i.e. incidentally, and not in themselves]—are election intrigues; wilful negligence; [the neglect of] trifling changes; and dissimilarity of elements [in the composition of a state].

Chapter III

A study of the way in which initial occasions may operate. (1) *There is the kind of occasion which operates intrinsically, or from reasons inherent in its own nature: of this there are seven varieties —insolence; the desire of profit; the point of honour; the presence of some sort of superiority; fear; contempt; and the disproportionate increase of one or other element in the state.* (2) *There is the kind of occasion which operates accidentally, and not from reasons inherent in its own nature: of this there are four varieties—election intrigues; wilful neglect; the overlooking of trifling changes; and the dissimilarity of elements in the composition of the state.*

§ 1. Among these occasions[1] it is fairly clear what influence *insolence* and *profit-making* [among those who are in authority] may exert, and in what ways they may lead to sedition. When those who are in office show insolence, and seek their personal advantage, the citizens turn seditious—not only attacking other persons, but also attacking the constitution which gives

[1] The order in which the various occasions are treated in this chapter is different from the order in which they are stated in the previous chapter. Here Aristotle takes together, as logically connected, the four occasions of insolence, profit, honour, and the existence of some sort of superiority (§§ 1–3): he then takes together the two occasions of fear and contempt (§§ 4–5); and he then treats at some length the seventh occasion—disproportionate increase (§§ 6–8). The four additional occasions of an incidental order are then treated successively, in the order of their previous statement, in §§ 9–16.

such persons power. Personal advantage, we may note in passing, is sometimes sought at the expense of individuals; sometimes at that of the public. § 2. It is also clear how *honour* may serve as an occasion; what influence it may exert; and how it may lead to sedition. Men turn seditious when they suffer dishonour themselves, and when they see others honoured. Both of these things may be unjustifiable, if the honour given, or the dishonour inflicted, is undeserved: both may be justifiable, if the honour or dishonour is deserved. § 3. The *presence of some form of superiority* becomes an occasion for sedition when a person, or body of persons, is in a position of strength which is too great for the state and more than a match for the strength of the general body of citizens. Such a position usually results in a monarchy, or in a 'dynastic' oligarchy. It is for this reason that, in a number of states, a policy of ostracism comes to be used. Argos and Athens are examples. But it is a better policy to begin by ensuring that there shall be no such persons of outstanding eminence, than first to allow them to arise and then to attempt a remedy afterwards.

§ 4. *Fear* is an occasion which leads to sedition among two classes of persons—wrongdoers, who are afraid of punishment; and persons expecting to suffer wrong, who are anxious to anticipate what they expect. An instance of the latter class may be cited from Rhodes, where the notables were moved to conspire against the people by alarm at the number of lawsuits with which they were being threatened.[1] § 5. *Contempt* is another occasion of sedition and insurrection. We can see this in oligarchies, when those who are not in enjoyment of political rights are more numerous and consequently think themselves stronger: we can also see it in democracies, when the wealthy despise the disorder and anarchy which they see prevalent. There are several examples of democracies collapsing from contempt—Thebes, where after the battle of Oenophyta [456 B.C.] democracy was ruined by misgovernment; Megara, where it perished as the result of a defeat which was caused by disorder and anarchy; Syracuse, where

[1] This is explained in c. v, § 2, of this Book.

it began to collapse before Gelon became tyrant; and Rhodes, in the period before the rising of the notables just mentioned.

§ 6. The *disproportionate increase of a part* of the state is also an occasion which leads to constitutional changes. The analogy of the body is instructive. The body is composed of parts, and it must grow proportionately if symmetry is to be maintained. Otherwise it perishes (as it will if the foot be four ells long and the rest of the body two spans); or again it may sometimes change into the form of some other animal, as it will if a disproportionate increase means a change of quality as well as quantity.[1] The same is true of a state. It, **1303 a** too, is composed of parts; and one of the parts may often grow imperceptibly out of proportion. The number of the poor, for example, may become disproportionate in democracies and in 'polities'. § 7. Sometimes this may be the result of accident. At Tarentum, for example, a 'polity' was turned into a democracy in consequence of the defeat and death of a number of the notables at the hands of the neighbouring Iapygian tribe, just after the Persian Wars [480 B.C.]. At Argos the destruction of 'the men of the Seventh',[2] by the Spartan king Cleomenes [*circa* 500 B.C.], made it necessary to admit some of the serfs into the civic body [and thus changed the constitution in the direction of democracy]. At Athens the reverses suffered on land, during the Peloponnesian War, depleted the numbers of the notables, under the system of compulsory service for all registered citizens; [and this fostered the growth of democracy]. § 8. [These are all cases of change, due to disproportionate increase, in oligarchical or moderate constitutions; but] similar changes may also happen for the same reason in democracies—though this is less likely. If the rich become more numerous, or if

[1] Newman notes that some diseases, such as elephantiasis, were held by the Greeks to produce qualitative effects which made the human form approach that of an animal.

[2] It is not clear who the 'men of the Seventh' were. The words may mean 'the men who fell on the seventh day of the month' (and in that case one may compare the habit, during the French Revolution, of speaking of 14me Juillet or 19me Brumaire); or they may mean 'the members of the seventh tribe'.

properties increase, democracies turn into oligarchies and 'dynasties' [or family cliques].

§ 9. [Turning to the 'incidental' occasions of change], we may first note the effects of *election intrigues*, which may lead to constitutional changes without causing actual sedition. At Heraea, for example, the fact that the results of elections were determined by intrigues led to the use of the lot being substituted for the vote [and was thus the occasion of a constitutional change]. *Wilful negligence*, again, may be an occasion; and persons who are not loyal to the constitution may be allowed to find their way into the highest of the magistracies. Oreus, in Euboea, may serve as an example: its oligarchy was overthrown when Heracleodorus was allowed to become a magistrate, and he proceeded to turn it into a democracy—or rather a 'polity'. § 10. Another occasion is *the neglect of trifling changes*. A great change of the whole system of institutions may come about unperceived if small changes are overlooked. In Ambracia, for example, the property qualification for office—small to begin with—was finally allowed to disappear, under the idea that there was little or no difference between having a small qualification and having none at all. § 11. [The last of the incidental occasions of change is *dissimilarity of elements in the composition of a state*.] Heterogeneity of stocks may lead to sedition—at any rate until they have had time to assimilate. A state cannot be constituted from any chance body of persons, or in any chance period of time. Most of the states which have admitted persons of another stock,[1] either at the time of their foundation or later, have been troubled by sedition. There are many instances. The Achaeans joined with settlers from Troezen in founding Sybaris, but expelled them when their own numbers increased; and this involved their city in a curse. § 12. At Thurii the Sybarites quarrelled with the other settlers who had joined them in its colonization; and demanding special privileges, on the ground that they were the owners of the

[1] 'Stock' only means, in Aristotle's use, members of a Greek city. In this sense the Athenians were of a different 'stock' from the Thebans.

territory, they were driven out of the colony.[1] At Byzantium the later settlers were detected in a conspiracy against the original colonists, and were expelled by force; and a similar expulsion befell the exiles from Chios who were admitted to Antissa by the original colonists. At Zancle, on the other hand, the original colonists were themselves expelled by the Samians whom they admitted. § 13. At Apollonia, on the Black Sea, sedition was caused by the introduction of new settlers: at Syracuse the conferring of civic rights on aliens and mercenaries, at the end of **1303 b** the period of the tyrants, led to sedition and civil war; and at Amphipolis the original citizens, after admitting Chalcidian colonists, were nearly all expelled by the colonists they had admitted.

(§ 14. In oligarchies, as has already been noted, the ground which the masses take in justification of sedition is that they are unjustly treated in being denied equal rights although they are actually equal. In democracies the ground taken by the notables is the injustice of their having only equal rights although they are actually superior.)[2]

§ 15. [Besides heterogeneity of stock] heterogeneity of territory is also an occasion of sedition. This happens in states with a territory not naturally adapted to political unity. At Clazomenae the inhabitants of the suburb of Chytrus [on the mainland] were at discord with the inhabitants of the island; and there was a similar discord between Colophon and its sea-port Notium. At Athens, again, there is a similar difference: the inhabitants of the port of Peiraeus are more democratic that those of the city of Athens. § 16. Taking our analogy from war, where the dividing line of a ditch, however small it may be, makes a regiment scatter in crossing, we may say that every difference is apt to create a division. The greatest division is perhaps that between virtue and vice;

[1] These two instances of heterogeneity of stock leading to sedition have been instances of the admission of different stocks at the time of the original foundation of a colony (Aristotle is only concerned with colonies, where mixture of stock was natural). The six instances which follow are all instances of the admission of a different stock at a later date in the history of a colony.

[2] This bracketed section interrupts the argument, and seems to be out of its place. It is a sort of lost or strayed note.

then there is the division between wealth and poverty; and there are also other divisions, some greater and some smaller, arising from other differences. Among these last we may count the division caused by difference of territory.

Chapter IV

The occasions of revolutions may be small, but the issues are great: small and personal matters may lead to large and general consequences. It may be added that revolutionary changes may also be due (1) *to the growth in reputation and power of some office, or some part of the state, and* (2) *to an even balance of parties, resulting in a deadlock. It may also be added that force and fraud both play their part in the conduct of revolutions.*

§ 1. But though sedition springs from small occasions, it does not turn on small issues. The issues involved are large. Even petty seditions [i.e. those springing from small occasions] attain great dimensions when they involve the members of the government. There is an example in the history of Syracuse, where a constitutional revolution arose from a quarrel between two young men, who were both in office, about a love affair. § 2. In the absence of one of the two the other (in spite of being his colleague) seduced the affections of his friend;[1] and the injured man, in his anger, retaliated by seducing his colleague's wife. Both of them, in the issue, drew the whole civic body into their quarrel and divided it into factions. § 3. The moral is that precautions ought to be taken at the very beginning of such feuds, and quarrels which involve men of leading and influence ought to be composed at once. The error is made at the start;[2] and since, as the proverb goes, 'The start is half of the job', a small mistake at the start is equal to all the mistakes made in the rest of the business. § 4. Generally speaking, we may lay it down that discords among the notables involve all the state in their

[1] The reference is to a homosexual connexion.

[2] There is here a pun, or play on words. The same Greek word (*archê*) means both 'beginning' (or 'start') and 'magistracy'; and thus an 'error made at the start' is also an 'error made in (or by) a magistracy'. See Prefatory Note, § 2.

consequences. . . . [Aristotle proceeds to give, in the rest of § 4 and in §§ 5–7, five instances of quarrels, mainly arising from disputes about marriage and especially about the marriage of heiresses, which led to civic discord.][1]

1304 a 17 § 8. Constitutions may also be changed—in the direction of oligarchy, or democracy, or a 'polity'—as a result of the growth in reputation or power of one of the magistracies, or of some other part of the state. The Council of the Areopagus at Athens, for example, gained in reputation during the Persian War; and the result appeared for a time to be a tightening of the constitution [i.e. a movement in the direction of oligarchy]. Then the tide turned: the common people, who served in the navy, were responsible for the victory of Salamis, and secured for Athens an empire which depended on naval power; and the effect of this was to strengthen the cause of democracy.[2] § 9. The notables of Argos gained in reputation by their conduct in the battle against the Spartans at Mantinea [418 B.C.], and they were encouraged by this to attempt the suppression of democracy: at Syracuse, on the other hand, the people were responsible for the victory won in the war against Athens, and they proceeded to turn the existing 'polity' into a democracy. At Chalcis the people united with the notables to remove the tyrant Phoxus, and by the part they played they immediately got a firm hold on the constitution. At Ambracia too, in much the same way, the people joined with the conspirators against him in expelling the tyrant Periander, and they then changed the constitu-

[1] The petty occasions hitherto treated have all been matters involving some sort of 'insolence', leading to some real or fancied insult (cf. c. III, § 1). Aristotle now turns to occasions connected with a disproportionate increase of some part of the state (cf. c. III, §§ 6 ff.).

[2] The connexion between Athenian sea-power and Athenian democracy is noticed in Aristotle's *Constitution of Athens*, xxvii, § 1, and it is mentioned again, by implication, in the *Politics*, Book VII, c. VI, § 7 (see the note). 'Those of the seamen who were citizens were drawn from the class of Thetes, who for the most part were resident in Athens and the Piraeus, and formed the radical element of the community' (Dr. E. M. Walker, in the *Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. V, p. 111). There was thus a logical connexion between (1) the Athenian empire and the Athenian navy; (2) the Athenian navy and the radically minded seamen who, living in Athens and the Piraeus, could attend the assembly and determine its policy.

tion into a popular form. § 10. Generally, experience teaches the lesson, which ought always to be remembered, that any person or body which adds new power to the state—an individual, a board of magistrates, a tribe, or generally any section or group, whatever it may be—will tend to produce sedition; and the sedition will either be started by persons who envy the honours of those who have won success, or be due to the refusal of the latter to remain on a footing of equality when they feel themselves superior.

§ 11. Revolutions also occur when the sections of the state which are usually regarded as antagonists—for example, the rich and the common people—are equally **1304 b** balanced, with little or nothing of a middle class to turn the scale; for where either side has a clear preponderance, the other will be unwilling to risk a struggle with the side which is obviously the stronger. § 12. This is the reason why men of pre-eminent merit do not, as a rule, attempt to stir up sedition: they are only a few against many.

Such, on a general view, are the springs and causes of sedition and change in all constitutions. We may add that political revolutions are sometimes achieved by force, and sometimes by fraud. Force may either be used initially or at a later stage. Fraud, too, may be used at two different stages. § 13. Sometimes it is used in the initial stage. In this way a change may be made at the moment with general assent; but those who have made it then proceed to keep control of affairs in the teeth of all opposition. This was the case with the revolution of the Four Hundred at Athens [in 411 B.C.]: they first defrauded the people by an assurance that the Persian King would provide money for the war against Sparta, and after this act of fraud they attempted to keep the constitution permanently under their control. Sometimes, however, an initial act of persuasion is followed up afterwards by a similar policy, and control is thus kept with general consent. Such, on a summary view, are the causes of change in all constitutions.[1]

[1] This last paragraph, which interrupts the argument, may be an interpolation—the more as it begins with a general summary which is repeated at the end of the paragraph.

B
THE PARTICULAR CAUSES OF REVOLUTION AND CHANGE IN DIFFERENT TYPES OF CONSTITUTION (cc. v–xii)

Chapter V

1. Democracies. *Here revolution tends to be caused by the policy of demagogues in attacking the rich, individually or collectively. In early times demagogues often made themselves tyrants: they no longer do so; and indeed tyrannies of every sort are becoming rare, owing—among other causes—to the increased size of the modern state. Democracy is liable to change from the older and more moderate forms to a new and extreme type. This is largely due to the courting of the people by eager candidates for office.*

§ 1. We must now take the different constitutions separately, and study successively, in the light of these general propositions, what happens in each of the types.

In democracies changes are chiefly due to the wanton licence of demagogues. This takes two forms. Sometimes they attack the rich individually, by bringing false accusations, and thus force them to combine (for a common danger unites even the bitterest enemies): sometimes they attack them as a class, by egging on the people against them. The result of such action may be seen in a number of instances. § 2. At Cos democracy was overthrown by the rise of discreditable demagogues and the combination of the notables against them. The same thing happened at Rhodes, where the demagogues first introduced a system of payment [for attendance at the assembly and courts], and then [in order to secure the necessary funds] withheld the sums due to the trierarchs for their expenses in fitting out triremes; the result was that the trierarchs, vexed by the suits brought against them [by the shipbuilders who had fitted out the triremes for them], were compelled to combine and overthrow the democracy. § 3. At Heraclea [on the Black Sea] democracy was ruined by the behaviour of demagogues soon after the colony was founded. They treated the notables unjustly, and drove them out by

their conduct; but the notables gathered their forces, returned, and overthrew the democracy. § 4. At Megara, too [the city on the Greek mainland which had founded Heraclea], democracy was ruined in a similar way. The demagogues, anxious to have an excuse for confiscating their property, drove a number of the notables into exile, with the result that the exiles became so numerous that they effected their return, defeated the people in battle, and established an oligarchy. **1305 a** The same fate also befell the democracy at Cyme, which was overthrown by Thrasymachus.[1] § 5. A survey of the changes in most of the other Greek states is sufficient to show that they have generally been of this character [i.e. changes from democracy to oligarchy due to the action of demagogues]. Sometimes the demagogues, anxious to win popular favour, drive the notables to combine by the injuries they inflict in imposing public burdens—burdens which either force them to break up their estates or [at any rate] cripple their revenues. Sometimes they bring false accusations in the courts, in order to be in a position to confiscate the property of the wealthier citizens.

§ 6. In early times, when the same man combined in his person the offices of demagogue and general, democracies changed into tyrannies. Most of the early tyrants were men who had first been demagogues. § 7. The reason why this was once the case, and is no longer so, is a matter of social development. In early times, when oratory was still in its infancy, demagogues were always drawn from the ranks of military commanders. To-day, with the growth of the art of rhetoric, men with the gift of speech are the men who make themselves demagogues; but men of this type, unversed in war, make no attempt at becoming tyrants—though here and there a case or two may have occurred. § 8. Another reason why tyrannies were more frequent in early times is that great offices were then entrusted to individuals, [as they now no

[1] As Newman notes, all these instances of the overthrow of democracies owing to the action of demagogues are taken from the history of Dorian colonies in Asia Minor—except for Megara, which seems to be incidentally mentioned as the founder of one of these colonies.

longer are]. The tyranny [of Thrasybulus] at Miletus, for example, was due to his holding the office of prytanis, which carried a number of important prerogatives. A further reason is the smaller size of the cities of early times. The people generally lived in the country, occupied with the daily duties of their farms; and their leaders, when they were men of military capacity, had thus the chance of establishing a tyranny. § 9. They generally did so on the strength of popular confidence; and the basis of this confidence was the hostility they showed to the wealthy. Thus at Athens Peisistratus rose to be tyrant by leading a rising against the [wealthy] party of the Plain.[1] Theagenes became the tyrant of Megara after slaughtering the herds of the rich landlords whom he caught pasturing their cattle outside their own lands by the river-side. § 10. At Syracuse Dionysius attained the position of tyrant denouncing Daphnaeus and the rest of the rich; his enmity to them made the people put their trust in him as a good democrat.

Changes may also take place from the traditional and 'ancestral'[2] form of democracy to the latest and most modern form. Where the offices are filled by vote, without any property qualification, and the whole of the people has the vote, candidates for office begin to play the demagogue, and matters are brought to a pass in which law itself is included in the scope of popular sovereignty. § 11. To prevent this result—or, at any rate, to diminish its full effect—the proper course is to give the vote to the separate tribes,[3] and not to the whole of the people. . . . These, in the main, are the causes of all the changes in democracies.

[1] This party was opposed to the poorer party of the Coast.

[2] 'Ancestral democracy' was a catch-word at Athens in the fourth century, and had been so since the end of the Peloponnesian War in 404 B.C.

[3] This is to act on the motto of *divide et impera*. The tribes, as Newman notes, might vote in turn; or different tribes might elect to different magistracies; or each tribe might elect a member to each board of magistrates. In any case there would be some brake on the power of the people. The system suggested is something like that which is nowadays called 'functional' representation.

Chapter VI

2. Oligarchies. *Here revolutions are due, partly to unjust treatment of the masses, and partly to dissensions within the governing class. Such dissensions may arise* (1) *if a section of that class begins to play the demagogue,* (2) *if some of its members become impoverished and turn revolutionary, and* (3) *if an inner ring is formed inside the governing body. Personal disputes may affect the stability of oligarchies; and accidental causes* (*e.g. a general growth of wealth, increasing the number of persons eligible for office*) *may insensibly alter their character.*

§ 1. There are two particular, and most obvious, methods by which changes are brought about in oligarchies. One is the unjust treatment of the masses by the government. Any leader is then an adequate champion, especially when it so happens that the leader comes from the ranks of the governing class itself. This was the case with Lygdamis of Naxos, who afterwards made himself tyrant of the island. § 2. Sedition which begins in a movement **1305 b** of resistance *outside* the governing class may take several different forms. Sometimes an oligarchy is undermined by persons who themselves are wealthy, but who are excluded from office. This happens when the holders of office are a very limited number; it has happened at Massilia, at Istros, at Heraclea, and in other cities. § 3. In all these oligarchies those who had no share in office continued to cause disturbance till some share was finally given, first to the elder brothers in a family and then to the younger too. (It should be explained that in some states father and son, and in others an elder and a younger brother, are not allowed to hold office together.) The final result was that the oligarchy at Massilia was turned into something more of the nature of a 'polity'; that at Istros ended by becoming a democracy; and the oligarchy at Heraclea, from being in the hands of a narrow ring, was broadened to include as many as 600 members. § 4. At Cnidos, too, there was a change in the oligarchy; [but this was more drastic]. Here sedition began *inside* the ranks of the notables. Few of them were admitted to office; and the

rule was enforced (which we have just had occasion to mention) that if a father were admitted, his son should not be eligible, and if there were several brothers in a family, only the eldest was eligible. In the course of this internal sedition, the people took a hand; and finding a leader among the notables, they attacked and won the day—division (as it always does) leading to the fall of their enemies. § 5. Something of the same sort happened at Erythrae. It was governed oligarchically, in old times, by the clan of the Basilidae, and the government managed affairs with prudence; but the people took offence at its exclusive character and altered the constitution.[1]

[We now come to the second method by which changes are made in oligarchies.] Oligarchies are disturbed from *inside* when their members themselves play the demagogue, for reasons of personal rivalry. § 6. They may do so in two different ways. One way is to practise the art of the demagogue on the governing body itself. A demagogue can arise even in a narrow circle: in the days of the Thirty at Athens [404 B.C.] Charicles and his followers gained power by courting the favour of the Thirty, and in the days of the Four Hundred [411 B.C.] Phrynichus and his followers acted on the same lines. The other way in which the members of oligarchies can play the demagogue is by practising on the masses. This was the case at Larisa, where the police magistrates paid their court to the masses because they were elected by them; and it generally happens in all oligarchies where the magistrates—instead of being elected on a franchise limited to those who are eligible for office themselves—are elected on a broad franchise, including all the army or even the whole of the people, but with eligibility limited to the owners of large properties or the members of political clubs.[2] (This

[1] The first method by which changes are brought about in oligarchies is the method followed when change starts *outside* the governing circle—either as a movement of opposition among the excluded grandees (§§ 2–3), or as a movement which, beginning among them, then spreads to the people at large (§ 4). The second method, to which Aristotle now turns, is the method followed when changes start *inside* the governing circle.

[2] See the note at the end of the chapter.

used to be the rule at Abydus.) § 7. We may add that similar troubles also arise in oligarchies where the law courts are composed of persons not belonging to the sovereign civic body. When this is the case, men begin to practise the tricks of the demagogue in order to secure a verdict; and this leads to dissensions and constitutional change, as it did at Heraclea on the Black Sea. Troubles also arise when some of its members try to make an oligarchy still more exclusive; and those who champion equality of rights are then compelled to enlist the aid of the people.

§ 8. Another way in which oligarchies may be disturbed from inside is when their members waste their substance in riotous living. Men who have done that want to create a revolution; and they either attempt to be tyrants 1306 a themselves or set up some other person. Hipparinus set up Dionysius at Syracuse in this way. At Amphipolis a man of the name of Cleotimus [having lost his fortune] introduced Chalcidian settlers, and incited them after their settlement to make an attack on the rich. § 9. At Aegina, again, it was a similar cause [i.e. dissipation] which moved the man who conducted the transaction with Chares to attempt a change of the constitution.[1] Men of this type will sometimes go straight for some attempt at political change: sometimes they stop short at embezzling the public funds; but even that leads to sedition eventually, whether the sedition be started by the culprits themselves or whether (as happened at Apollonia on the Black Sea) it is begun by those who oppose their misconduct. § 10. An oligarchy at one with itself is not easily overthrown from within. The constitution of Pharsalus may serve as an example: the governing body, restricted as it is, manages to control a large population because its members behave well towards one another.

Still another way in which oligarchies may be undermined from inside is when an inner oligarchy is created within the outer. § 11. Few as are the members of the whole citizen-body, even these few are not all admitted, in such a case, to

[1] Apparently he tried to bargain with the Athenian general Chares for support in an attempt to institute a tyranny.

the highest offices. This is what happened at one time in Elis. The constitution was already in the hands of a small body of senators; but it was only a very small handful of men who were ever appointed to the Senate. Its members, who were ninety in number, all held office for life; and they were elected, much like the Spartan senators, in a way which favoured the interests of a narrow range of families.

§ 12. Changes may happen in oligarchies [owing to internal reasons, and without any attack from outside] alike in war and in peace. They happen in war when the members of an oligarchy are compelled by distrust of the people to employ an army of mercenaries. If a single man is entrusted with the command of these mercenaries, he frequently becomes a tyrant, as Timophanes did at Corinth; and if the command is vested in a number of persons, they make themselves a governing clique [*dynasteia*]. Fear of such consequences sometimes forces an oligarchy to employ a popular force, and thus to give the masses some share in constitutional rights. § 13. Changes happen in peace when the members of an oligarchy, under the impulse of mutual distrust, entrust the maintenance of internal security to mercenaries and a neutral arbiter—who occasionally ends as the master of both the contending factions. This happened at Larisa during the government of Simias, one of the Aleuad clan, [in the capacity of arbiter]: it also happened at Abydus during the struggles of the clubs, one of which was the club of Iphiades.[1]

§ 14. Seditions may also arise inside an oligarchy on matters of marriages and lawsuits, which lead to the discomfiture of one of its sections by another, and thus produce dissension. Some examples of dissension arising from matters of marriage have already been cited (c. IV, §§ 5–7); we may also mention the overthrow of the oligarchy of the knights at Eretria by Diagoras, in resentment at an injustice he had suffered in a matter of marriage. § 15. Decisions given in lawsuits led to dissension at Heraclea [on the Black Sea] and at Thebes. In

[1] It would seem, from the logic of the argument, that in the contention of the different clubs the leader of one of them, Iphiades, was appointed to the office of neutral arbiter, and then made himself supreme.

both cases the offence was that of adultery; and in both cases punishment was exacted (at Heraclea from Eurytion, and at Thebes from Archias) by a method which mixed **1306 b** the spirit of party with the spirit of justice—the enemies of the guilty persons carrying their resentment to the point of having them pilloried in public. . . . § 16. It has also frequently happened that oligarchies have been overthrown, because they were too oppressive, by members of the governing class who resented the methods they used. This was the case, for example, with the oligarchies of Cnidus and Chios. . . .

Finally, constitutional change may sometimes be due to accidents. This is the case with the constitutions called 'polities', and with those forms of oligarchy where a property qualification is necessary for membership of the council and law courts and the holding of other offices. § 17. The qualification may have been originally fixed, on the basis of existing conditions, in a way which limited constitutional rights—in oligarchies to the few, and in 'polities' to the middle class. Then, as frequently happens, there may ensue a period of prosperity, due to long peace or some other good fortune; and the result will be that the same estate [which was once assessed at a moderate amount] must now be assessed at a value many times in excess of the old. When this is the case, the whole body of citizens becomes entitled to every right—a change which may sometimes come about gradually, by small degrees and without being noticed, but sometimes may come about rapidly.

§ 18. Such are the causes of change and sedition in oligarchies. A general observation may be added. Both democracies and oligarchies are occasionally transformed, not into the opposite types of constitution, but into some other variety of their own type. Democracies and oligarchies which are limited by law may turn, for example, into forms which are absolutely sovereign; and the converse may equally happen.

Note on the reasons why electors and eligible should be identical

Aristotle here suggests that in a stable oligarchy the electors to office should be identical with the persons eligible for office. If this

is not the case, and if the electors to office are a larger body than the persons eligible for office, there will (he implies) be trouble—even though the oligarchical principle of restriction, while sacrificed in the matter of election, is retained in the other matter of eligibility. You must restrict in *both* ways, and not in *one* only; at any rate you must not combine restriction of the circle of eligibility with a wide extension of the circle of the electorate.

Newman's note may be cited. 'The cause of constitutional change here indicated by Aristotle—the rivalry of the holders of great offices in courting those who elect them with a view to their own aggrandisement—is indeed widely traceable in history both ancient and modern.'

Chapter VII

3. Aristocracies. *Here revolutions are due to a policy of narrowing the circle of the government. The collapse of aristocracies—as also of 'polities', which are closely allied—is generally due to a defective balance of the different elements combined in the constitution: this may lead either to change in the direction in which the balance is tilted, or to violent reaction towards the opposite extreme. Aristocracies are particularly liable to be the victims of trifling occasions.* All *constitutions may be affected and undermined by the influence of powerful neighbouring states.*

§ 1. In aristocracies sedition may arise, among other reasons, from the limitation of office and honours to a narrow circle. This is a cause which, as we have mentioned (c. VI, § 2), produces commotions in oligarchies; and it naturally affects aristocracies, because they too are in some sense oligarchies. In both types of constitutions—though for different reasons—the ruling class is small; and it is this common feature which will explain why an aristocracy may be regarded as a kind of oligarchy. § 2. Sedition due to this cause must particularly tend to arise when the mass of a people consists of men animated by the conviction that they are as good as their masters in quality. This was the case with those who were called the Partheniae at Sparta. They were the [illegitimate] sons of Spartan peers: they conspired together to vindicate their rights; but their conspiracy was detected, and they

were sent out to colonize Tarentum.[1] Sedition of the same kind may also arise when persons of great ability, and second to none in their merits, are treated dishonourably by those who themselves enjoy higher honours—as Lysander was by the kings of Sparta. § 3. It may happen, again, when a man of high spirit—like Cinadon, the leader of the conspiracy against the Spartan peers in the reign of king Agesilaus—is debarred from honours and office. It may happen, too, when some of the ruling class become excessively poor, and others excessively rich. This is a change which happens particularly in times of war. It happened, for example, at Sparta in the time of the Messenian War. § 4. The poem of Tyrtaeus, 1307 a entitled 'The Rule of Law', is sufficient evidence: it tells us of men, impoverished by the war, who demanded a redistribution of landed property. [Pure ambition may also cause sedition in aristocracies]: a man who has a great position, and the capacity for a still greater, will promote sedition in order to make himself the one ruler. Pausanias, the generalissimo during the Persian War, is an example at Sparta; Hanno at Carthage is another.

§ 5. The actual downfall of aristocracies, and also of 'polities', is chiefly due to some deviation from justice in the constitution itself. In either case the origin of the downfall is a failure to combine different elements properly. In 'polities' the elements are democracy and oligarchy: in aristocracies they are both of these and the further element of merit; but even in the latter the real difficulty is that of combining the first two elements, which are the only elements that most of the so-called aristocracies (as well as 'polities') actually attempt to combine. § 6. The only difference between aristocracies and the constitutions called 'polities' consists in their different ways of mixing the same two elements; and this is also the reason why the former are less secure than the latter. Constitutions where the elements are so mixed that the tendency is more towards oligarchy are called aristo-

[1] The Partheniae, who colonized Tarentum at the end of the eighth century B.C., were apparently the descendants of Spartan 'peers' (or full citizens) by some sort of irregular union.

cracies: those where the mixture is such that the tendency is more in favour of the masses are called 'polities'. This will explain why the latter are more secure than the former. The greater number forms a stronger support: and the masses are ready to acquiesce in a government when they have an equal share of power. § 7. It is different with men of considerable means. When the constitution gives them a position of superiority, they are apt to fall into arrogance and to covet even more. Generally, however, it may be said that if a constitution is not equally balanced, but is inclined in one or another direction, it will tend to change in that direction. The favoured element will proceed to increase its advantage: a 'polity', for instance, will change to democracy; and aristocracy will change into oligarchy.

§ 8. It is possible, however, that change may also go in the opposite direction. Aristocracy may change, for example, into democracy, because the poorer classes, feeling themselves unjustly treated, may divert its natural tendency into the opposite direction; and 'polities' may similarly change into oligarchies, from the growth of a conviction that stability—the aim of every 'polity'—is only to be found under a system of proportionate equality, on the basis of desert, by which each man receives his corresponding due.[1] § 9. It was a change of this nature [i.e. a change in the opposite direction] which happened to the aristocracy at Thurii. The first stage, due to reaction against the high property qualification required from holders of office, was a change to a lower qualification, coupled with an increase in the number of offices. The next stage, due to the fact that the notables had bought up illegally the whole of the land (the oligarchical bias of the constitution enabling them to indulge their greed), was the outbreak of civil war. Here the masses, becoming hardened in the course of hostilities, proved stronger than

[1] See above, Book III. c. IX, where a distinction is drawn between (1) the democratic idea of absolute equality and (2) the aristocratic-oligarchic idea of proportionate equality based on desert, under which each man gets his due in proportion to his desert, and all are treated equally in the sense that the ratio between recognition and desert in one case is equal to the ratio between them in every other.

the civic guard; those who had more land than the law allowed were forced to relinquish their hold; [and the old aristocracy thus became a democracy]. § 10. We may add that the oligarchical bias present in all aristocratic constitutions has a general tendency to make the notables too grasping. In Sparta, for example, we see estates passing steadily into the hands of a narrow circle. Generally, too, the notables have too much power to do what they will, and to marry as they will. This explains the collapse of Locri [in southern Italy], which was due to a marriage between the daughter of one of its citizens and Dionysius of Syracuse [a marriage which eventually led to a Syracusan tyranny in Locri]. This would never have happened in a democracy, or in a properly balanced aristocracy.

§ 11. A general observation which has already been made[1] in regard to all types of constitutions **1307 b**—that even trifles may be the cause of revolutions—is particularly true of aristocracies. They are especially apt to change imperceptibly, through being undermined little by little. Once they have abandoned one of the elements of the constitution, they find it easier afterwards to alter some other feature of a little greater importance; and they end eventually by altering the whole system of the state. § 12. This was what actually befell the constitution of Thurii.[2] There was a law that the office of general should only be held a second time after an interval of five years. Some of the younger men showed soldierly qualities, and won a reputation with the rank and file of the guard. Despising the men who were in charge of affairs, and calculating on an easy triumph, these younger men set out to abrogate the law, wishing to make it possible for generals to serve continuously, and knowing that, in that case, the people would readily elect them for one term after another. § 13. The magistrates charged with the duty of considering such proposals—they were called the Board of Councillors—began

[1] See c. III, § 10: 'a great change . . . may come about unperceived if small changes are overlooked.'

[2] Thurii recurs as an example in the course of this book; cf. c. III, § 12, and § 9 of this chapter. It was an Athenian colony, founded under the supervision of Pericles.

by making an effort to resist the repeal of the law; but they were eventually led to agree, in the idea that when this change had been made the rest of the constitution would not be touched. [They found themselves deceived]; other changes were afterwards mooted; when they sought to oppose them, they failed to make any headway; and the whole scheme of the constitution was changed into an aristocratic junto composed of the revolutionaries.

§ 14. Constitutions generally may be undermined from without, as well as from within. This happens when they are confronted by a constitution of an opposite type, which is either their close neighbour or powerful even if distant. It happened in the days of the Athenian and Spartan empires. The Athenians everywhere put down oligarchies; the Spartans, in turn, suppressed democracies.

Chapter VIII

4. The methods of ensuring constitutional stability in the three previous types of constitution. *Precautions should be taken against lawlessness, and especially against its petty forms. No reliance should be placed on devices intended to hoodwink the masses. A spirit of fairness should be cultivated; and something of the temper, and even some of the institutions, of democracy may therefore be advisable in oligarchies and aristocracies. To maintain a feeling of emergency may help to maintain the government. Promotions, and the award or withdrawal of honours, should be carefully handled. Watch should be kept both on private extravagance and the sudden rise of a whole social class to a new degree of prosperity. In particular, steps should be taken to prevent office from being made a source of profit. Finally, democracies will do well to spare the rich, and oligarchies to encourage and help the poor.*

§ 1. The causes of revolution and sedition in different constitutions have now been generally described. It remains to treat of the methods for preserving constitutions generally, and each type severally.[1] We may begin with a general

[1] See the first note at the end of the chapter.

proposition. To know the causes which destroy constitutions is also to know the causes which ensure their preservation. Opposite effects are brought about by opposite causes; and destruction and preservation are opposite effects. § 2. On this basis we may draw a number of conclusions. The first is that in constitutions where the elements are well mixed there is one thing as vitally important as any—to keep a look-out against all lawlessness, and, more particularly, to be on guard against any of its petty forms.[1] Lawlessness, when it takes such forms, may creep in unperceived—just as petty expenditures, constantly repeated, will gradually destroy the whole of a fortune. § 3. Because it is not all incurred at once, such expenditure goes unperceived; and our minds are misled by it in the same way as they are misled by the logical fallacy, 'When each is small, all are small too.'[2] This is true in one sense, but it is not true in another. The Whole or All is not little, although it is made up of Littles.

§ 4. This is one precaution which ought to be taken—to prevent the beginning of trouble in petty acts of lawlessness. Secondly, we may lay down the rule that 1308 a confidence should never be placed in devices intended to hoodwink the masses. They are always exploded in actual experience. (We have already explained the nature of the constitutional devices to which we are here referring.)[3]

§ 5. Thirdly, we have to observe (and the observation is true of oligarchies as well as of aristocracies) that some states owe their stability not so much to the solidity of their constitutional systems, as to the good relations in which their officers stand alike with the unenfranchised and the members of the civic body. In such states the unenfranchised are never treated unjustly; on the contrary, their leading members are promoted to share in constitutional rights; and while the ambitious among them are not wronged on points of honour, the rank and file are not maltreated in matters of money and

[1] This is a warning already implied in c. III, § 10, and c. VII, §§ 11–13.
[2] The answer to the fallacy is that, though 'all' separately may be small, 'all' collectively may form a large sum.
[3] Book IV, c. XIII, §§ 1–5.

profit. Similarly, in these states, the officers and the other members of the governing class behave towards one another in a democratic spirit of equality. § 6. Democrats seek to widen the principle of equality until it is made to include all the masses. What is certainly just—and expedient as well as just—is that the principle should extend to all who are really 'peers'. In any state, therefore, where the members of the governing class are numerous, a number of democratic institutions will be expedient. It will be expedient, for instance, to restrict the tenure of office to a period of six months, and thus to enable all who belong to the class of 'peers' to enjoy their turn. A numerous class of 'peers' is already, by its nature, a sort of democracy; and that is why, as has already been noticed (c. VI, § 6), we often find demagogues emerging in such a class. § 7. When such a policy is adopted, oligarchies and aristocracies are less prone to fall into the hands of family cliques. Officers with a short tenure can hardly do as much harm as those who have a long tenure; and it is long possession of office which leads to the rise of tyrannies in oligarchies and democracies. The persons who make a bid for tyranny, in both types of constitution, are either the principal men (who in democracies are the demagogues, and in oligarchies the heads of great families), or else the holders of the main offices who have held them for a long period.

§ 8. The preservation of a constitution may not only be due to the fact that a state is far removed from the menace of any danger:[1] it may also, on occasion, be due to the very opposite. When danger is imminent, men are alarmed, and they therefore keep a firmer grip on their constitution. All who are concerned for the constitution should therefore (4) foster alarms, which will put men on their guard, and will make them keep an unwearied watch like sentinels on night-duty. They must, in a word, make the remote come near.

§ 9. An endeavour should also be made, by legislation as well as by personal action, (5) to guard against quarrels and seditions among the notables;[2] and watch should also be kept

[1] Aristotle here refers back to the last section of the previous chapter.
[2] Here the reference back is to c. IV, §§ 1–7.

in advance on those who are not yet involved, before they too have caught the spirit of rivalry. Ordinary men cannot see the beginning of troubles ahead; it requires the genuine statesman.

§ 10. Change may arise, in oligarchies and 'polities', through the working of the system of assessment connected with the requirement of a property qualification.[1] It will tend to arise, for example, when the monetary amount of the property qualification is left unchanged but the amount of money in circulation shows a large increase. To meet this danger (6) a comparison should regularly be made between the present sum-total of all the assessments and their sum-total in a previous year. Where the assessment is annual, the comparison should be made **1308 b** annually; where—as in the larger states—the assessment is made at intervals of three or four years, the comparison should be made at those intervals. If the sum-total is then found to be many times greater (or many times less) than it was on the previous occasion when the assessments obligatory under the constitution were fixed, a law should be passed to provide for the raising (or lowering) of the qualification required to a corresponding extent. § 11. In oligarchies and 'polities' where this policy is not adopted change will be inevitable. In one event [i.e. when the amount of money in circulation decreases, but the qualification is left unchanged] the change will be from 'polity' to oligarchy, and from oligarchy to a family clique; in the other [i.e. when the amount of money in circulation increases, but the qualification remains unaltered] change will move in the reverse direction—from a 'polity' to a democracy, and from an oligarchy either to a 'polity' or a democracy.

§ 12. A rule (7) which applies both to democracies and oligarchies—indeed it applies to all constitutions—is that no

[1] See c. VI, §§ 16–17. The assessments mentioned are not connected with the methods of taxation, but with the system of requiring a property qualification from candidates for office. If the standard of the property qualification required were left unchanged, when the assessments connected with it began to show that a much larger number of persons were attaining the standard, a constitution would be automatically changed. Far more persons would now be eligible for office: and thus a 'polity' or an oligarchy might be unintentionally turned into a democracy. Hence Aristotle's counsel, 'Watch the movement of the assessments.'

person should be advanced by the state out of all proportion to others.[1] It is a better policy to award small honours over a period of time than to give great honours rapidly. (Men are easily spoiled; and it is not all who can stand prosperity.) If this rule is not followed, and if honours are bestowed on a man promiscuously, the least that can be done is not to revoke them promiscuously, but to do so by degrees. It is also good policy to aim at providing, by means of appropriate legislation, against the risk of any man gaining a position of superiority by the strength of his wealth or connexions. Failing that, men who gain such a position should be removed from it by being sent out of the country.

§ 13. Men tend to become revolutionaries from circumstances connected with their private lives [as well as from causes connected with public life]. This suggests (8) that a magistracy should be instituted to supervise those who live in a way out of harmony with the established constitution—who in a democracy do not live democratically; in an oligarchy do not live oligarchically; and so in each other type.[2] For similar reasons [i.e. for reasons connected with circumstances of private life] watch should be kept over the social section which is particularly flourishing at any moment.

§ 14. The remedy for the difficulties which the flourishing of such a section may cause is either (a) always to give the conduct of affairs and the enjoyment of office to the opposite section (it should be explained that the two sections here in question are the quality and the masses, or the wealthy and the poor), and thus to attempt a balance or fusion between the poor and the wealthy section, or (b) to seek to increase the strength of the middle or intervening element.[3] Such a policy will prevent the dissensions which arise from inequality.

§ 15. The most important rule of all, in all types of

[1] Here the reference is to c. III, § 3.

[2] Here the reference is to c. VI, §§ 8–9, and also to c. III, §§ 6–8.

[3] The two forms of policy here suggested are (1) a balance or mixture of two opposite sections, which can be achieved if the social prosperity enjoyed by one is offset by the political power given to the other, or (2) the creation of a *tertium quid*, or strong middle section, which will correct both the arrogance of the socially prosperous and the discontent of the opposite section.

constitution, is (9) that provision should be made—not only by law, but also by the general system of economy—to prevent the magistrates from being able to use their office for their own gain.[1] In oligarchical constitutions, above all others, this is a matter which demands attention. § 16. The masses are not so greatly offended at being excluded from office (they may even be glad to be given the leisure for attending to their own business); what really annoys them is to think that those who have the enjoyment of office are embezzling public funds. That makes them feel a double annoyance at a double loss—the loss of profit as well as office. § 17. If an arrangement could be made to stop men from using office as a means of private gain, it would provide a way—the only possible way—for combining democracy with aristocracy. Both the notables and **1309 a** the masses could then get what they desire. The right to hold office would be open to all, as befits a democracy: the notables would actually be in office, as befits an aristocracy. § 18. Both results could be achieved simultaneously if the use of office as a means of profit were made impossible. The poor would no longer desire to hold office (because they would derive no advantage from doing so), and they would prefer to attend to their own affairs. The rich would be able to afford to take office, as they would need no subvention from public funds to meet its expenses. The poor would thus have the advantage of becoming wealthy by diligent attention to work; the notables would enjoy the consolation of not being governed by any chance comer. § 19. [To make assurance sure, and] to prevent the embezzling of public funds, the outgoing officers should hand over such funds in the presence of the whole civic body; and inventories of them should be deposited with each clan, ward, and tribe.[2] To ensure that no profit should be made by any magistrate in other ways,[3] the law should provide for the award of honours to those who earn a good reputation.

[1] See the second note at the end of the chapter.

[2] Wards are local subdivisions. Clans and tribes are the smaller and larger kin-groups.

[3] e.g. by taking bribes, or by making extortions, from individuals.

§ 20. [Lastly (10), two different, but yet corresponding, rules may be suggested—one for democracies, and the other for oligarchies.] In democracies the rich should be spared. Not only should their estates be safe from the threat of redistribution: the produce of the estates should be equally secure; and the practice of sharing it out, which was insensibly developed under some constitutions, should not be allowed. It is good policy, too, to prevent the rich, even if they are willing, from undertaking expensive, and yet useless, public services, such as the equipping of choruses for dramatic festivals, or the provision of the expenses of torch-races, or other services of that order.[1] In oligarchies, on the other hand, a good deal of attention should be paid to the poor. They should be assigned the offices to which any perquisites are attached; and if a rich man does them violence, the penalties should be heavier than if he had been guilty of violence against members of his own class. Nor should inheritances pass by title of bequest; they should go by right of descent,[2] and not more than one inheritance should ever go to one person. On this system estates would be more evenly distributed, and more of the poor might rise to a position of affluence. § 21. [These suggestions relate to property.] In matters other than property [e.g. honours and ceremonies] a position of equality, or even of precedence, may well be given to those who have fewer constitutional rights—in a democracy to the rich; in an oligarchy to the poor. An exception must, however, be made for the sovereign offices of the constitution.[3] These should be entrusted only, or at any rate entrusted mainly, to those who have full constitutional rights.

[1] Compare c. v, §§ 1–5.

[2] If there were a right of bequest, property might be accumulated in the hands of a few legatees. If the transmission of property is based on the title of descent, Aristotle implies (assuming, it would seem, the absence of primogeniture) that there will be a diffusion of property.

[3] According to the argument of Book III, the deliberative organ is the sovereign organ of the constitution. It may thus be argued that the 'offices' to which Aristotle is here referring are the offices of member of the Council and member of the Assembly. But he probably refers to the highest *executive* offices.

Note on the course of the argument in cc. VIII–IX

It has already been observed, in the note at the beginning of c. I of this book, that these two chapters on preservation (a theme which generally belongs to Book VI) are here intercalated in the middle of a treatment of revolutions. The reason for the intercalation appears to be that the methods of preservation here suggested are (as Newman points out in volume iv of his edition, pp. 569–70) 'as a rule deduced from the investigations, in the preceding part of the Book, as to the causes of the overthrow of constitutions'. Each remedy thus corresponds to a disease which has just been noticed; and it is natural, therefore, that Aristotle should add a list of remedies immediately after his list of diseases. But he recurs again, after these two chapters, to the theme of revolutions—first dealing, in c. X, with the causes of revolution in monarchical states (though here again he proceeds to add, in c. XI, an account of the methods of preservation which correspond to these causes), and then dealing finally, in c. XII, with the inadequacy of Plato's account of revolutions. It will thus be seen that Aristotle gives two accounts of methods of preservation—(1) an *ad hoc* account in cc. VIII–IX, and in c. XI, of Book V, where the methods are adapted to the causes of revolution which have just been mentioned: and (2) a general account, in the course of Book VI, which is not immediately related to the previous account of the causes of revolution.

Note on the connexion of political power and economic advantage

The reference back here is to c. III, § 1. The danger to which Aristotle draws attention—that political power may be used to secure economic advantage—is one which is also noticed by Thucydides and Plato. Thucydides, speaking of the fierce dissensions which arose at Corcyra, writes (iii. 82, § 8), 'The cause of all these things was the pursuit of office for reasons of greed, and through ambition to rise'. Plato, contrasting his ideal state with the actual states of Greece, writes (*Republic* 521 A), 'All goes wrong when, starved for lack of anything good in their own lives, men turn to public affairs hoping to snatch from them the happiness they hunger for. They set about fighting for power, and this internecine conflict ruins them and their country' (Cornford's translation). Aristotle repeatedly draws attention to the same danger; and we may compare with the present passage that in Book III, c. VI, § 10, 'Moved by the profits to be derived from office and the handling of public property, men want to hold office continuously.'

It is thus a steady theme of Greek political theory that political power tends to be used, and should not be used, to secure economic advantage. That theme was not the invention of Marx—though he varied and amplified it.

Chapter IX

Further consideration of the methods of ensuring constitutional stability in the first three types of constitution. In the interest of constitutional stability three qualities are required in the holders of high office; their relative importance. It is always wise to ensure that a majority of the citizen body is in favour of the constitution. The value of the mean, and of refusing to push political issues to an extreme: not all *democratic or oligarchic measures are calculated to ensure the permanence of democracy or oligarchy. The cardinal importance of educating citizens to live and act in the spirit of the constitution: this is too often neglected, especially in extreme democracies, which encourage the idea of 'living as one likes'.*

§ 1. Three qualifications are necessary in those who have to fill the sovereign offices.[1] The first is loyalty to the established constitution. The second is a high degree of capacity for the duties of the office. The third is the quality of goodness and justice, in the particular form which suits the nature of each constitution. (If the *principle* of justice varies from constitution to constitution,[2] the *quality* of justice must also have its corresponding varieties.) § 2. Where these three qualifications are not united in a single person, a problem obviously arises: how is the choice to be made? *A* may possess, **1309 b** for instance, the second qualification, and have military capacity; but he may lack the other two, and be neither good in character nor loyal to the constitution.

[1] Aristotle, taking his cue from the theme of the 'sovereign offices', which has just been mentioned at the end of the previous chapter, proceeds to supplement the ten specific rules for the preservation of states, which he has stated in that chapter, by a number of more general rules. These general rules are still to some extent based on deduction from the previous study of the causes of revolution. But they raise broader and more fundamental issues of policy; the reference to the previous study of the causes of revolution is slight; and the main reference which they involve is a reference to the general argument of the previous books.

[2] This 'relativity' of the principle of justice, with its corollary of the 'relativity' of the quality of justice, has been previously discussed in Book III: see cc. IV and IX of that book, and the notes at the beginning of those chapters.

B may be just in character and loyal to the constitution, [but deficient in capacity]. How are we to choose? It would seem that we ought to consider two points—which, on the whole, is the commoner qualification, and which of them is the rarer; [and on that basis we ought to choose the man with the rarer qualification.] § 3. Thus, for a military office, we must have regard to military experience rather than character: military capacity is rare, and goodness is more common. For the post of custodian of property, or that of treasurer, we must follow the opposite rule: such posts require a standard of character above the average, but the knowledge which they demand is such as we all possess. § 4. A further problem may also be raised in regard to these three qualifications. If a man possesses the two qualifications of capacity and loyalty to the constitution, is there any need for him to have the third qualification of goodness, and will not the first two, by themselves, secure the public interest? We may answer this question by asking another. May not men who possess these first two qualifications be unable to command their passions? and is it not true that men who have no command of their passions will fail to serve their own interest—even though they possess self-knowledge and self-loyalty—and will equally fail to serve the public interest [even though they possess a knowledge of public affairs and public loyalty]?

§ 5. Generally, we may add, a constitution will tend to be preserved by the observance of all the legal rules already suggested, in the course of our argument, as making for constitutional stability. Here we may note, as of paramount importance, the elementary principle which has been again and again suggested—the principle of ensuring that the number of those who wish a constitution to continue shall be greater than the number of those who do not.[1]

§ 6. In addition to all these things, there is another which

[1] Aristotle, in the preceding section, has discussed the three qualifications which *magistrates* must possess if the constitution is to be stable. One of these is loyalty to the constitution. He now adds, taking a more general view, that the majority of the citizens *generally* must possess the quality of loyalty to the constitution, in the sense of cherishing a will for its survival. Here he is referring back to the argument of Book IV, c. XII, § 1.

ought to be remembered, but which, in fact, is forgotten in perverted forms of government. This is the value of the mean.[1] Many of the measures which are reckoned democratic really undermine democracies: many which are reckoned oligarchical actually undermine oligarchies. § 7. The partisans of either of these forms of government, each thinking their own the only right form, push matters to an extreme. They fail to see that proportion is as necessary to a constitution as it is (let us say) to a nose. A nose may deviate in some degree from the ideal of straightness, and incline towards the hooked or the snub, without ceasing to be well shaped and agreeable to the eye. But push the deviation still further towards either of these extremes, and the nose will begin to be out of proportion with the rest of the face: carry it further still, and it will cease to look like a nose at all, because it will go too far towards one, and too far away from the other, of these two opposite extremes. § 8. What is true of the nose, and of other parts of the body, is true also of constitutions. Both oligarchy and democracy may be tolerable forms of government, even though they deviate from the ideal. But if you push either of them further still in the direction to which it tends, you will begin by making it a worse constitution, and you may end by turning it into something which is not a constitution at all.

§ 9. It is thus the duty of legislators and statesmen to know which democratic measures preserve, and which destroy, a democracy; similarly, it is their duty to know which oligarchical measures will save, and which will ruin, an oligarchy. Neither of these constitutions can exist, or continue in existence, unless it includes both the rich and the poor. If, therefore, a system of equal ownership be introduced into either, the effect will inevitably be a new and different form of constitution; and the radical legislation which abolishes riches and poverty will thus **1310 a** abolish along with them

[1] There is a natural transition from the doctrine that a majority should be in favour of the constitution to the doctrine of moderation. A moderate constitution, which steers between the extremities of the right and the left, will tend to command a general allegiance. The reference here again (as in the previous paragraph) is to Book IV, c. XII, especially §§ 4–6.

the old constitutions based on their presence.[1] § 10. [For want of the knowledge they ought to possess][2] errors are made by statesmen alike in democracies and oligarchies. They are made, for instance, by demagogues, in those forms of democracy where the will of the people is superior to the law. Demagogues are always dividing the state into two, and waging war against the rich. Their proper policy is the very reverse: they should always profess to be speaking in defence of the rich. A similar policy should be followed in oligarchies: the oligarchs should profess to speak on behalf of the poor; and the oaths they take should be the opposite of those which they now take. § 11. There are states in which their oath runs, 'I will bear ill will to the people, and I will plan against them all the evil I can.' The opinion which they ought to hold and exhibit is the very opposite; and their oaths should contain the declaration, 'I will not do wrong to the people.'

The greatest, however, of all the means we have mentioned for ensuring the stability of constitutions—but one which is nowadays generally neglected—is the education of citizens in the spirit of their constitution.[3] § 12. There is no profit in the best of laws, even when they are sanctioned by general civic consent, if the citizens themselves have not been attuned, by the force of habit and the influence of teaching, to the right constitutional temper—which will be the temper of democracy where the laws are democratic, and where they are oligarchical will be that of oligarchy. Licentiousness may exist in a state as well as in individual persons, [and training is thus needed for states as well as for individuals]. § 13. The education of a citizen in the spirit of his constitution does not

[1] The modern reader will perhaps doubt whether a democracy ceases to be a democracy if property is equalized. The doubt is natural enough if the word 'democracy' be understood in a modern sense, as the government of the whole people by the whole people for the whole people. In Aristotle's sense of the word, however, democracy is government by one of the social sections, as oligarchy is that by another. If all social sections disappear, both of these forms of government will also disappear.

[2] i.e. knowledge of the difference between the measures which will really preserve a constitution and those which (though they are supposed to preserve it) really tend towards its destruction.

[3] This theme has been previously touched upon in Book IV, c. xi, § 6. It recurs, and is developed, later—especially in Book VIII, c. 1, §§ 1–2.

consist in his doing the actions in which the partisans of oligarchy, or the adherents of democracy, delight. It consists in his doing the actions by which an oligarchy, or a democracy, will be enabled to survive. Actual practice, to-day, is on very different lines. In oligarchies the sons of the magistrates live lives of luxury, and this at a time when the sons of the poor are being hardened by exercise, and by their daily work, and are thus acquiring the will and the power to make a clean sweep. § 14. In democracies of the extreme type—the type which is regarded as being peculiarly democratic[1]—the policy followed is the very reverse of their real interest. The reason for this aberration is a false conception of liberty. There are two conceptions which are generally held to be characteristic of democracy. One of them is the conception of the sovereignty of the majority; the other is that of the liberty of individuals.[2] § 15. The democrat starts by assuming that justice consists in equality: he proceeds to identify equality with the sovereignty of the will of the masses; he ends with the view that 'liberty and equality' consist in 'doing what one likes'. The result of such a view is that, in these extreme democracies, each man lives as he likes—or, as Euripides says,

For any end he chances to desire.

§ 16. This is a mean conception of liberty. To live by the rule of the constitution ought not to be regarded as slavery, but rather as salvation.[3]

Such, in general, are the causes which lead to the change and destruction of constitutions, and such are the means of ensuring their preservation and stability.

[1] See Book IV, c. xiv, § 12, where it appears that these democracies are of the type in which the 'will of the people' is superior to 'the rule of law'.

[2] As Newman justly notes, the two conceptions are not necessarily consistent with one another. The sovereignty of the majority may drastically curtail the liberty of the individual.

[3] How would Aristotle himself have defined liberty? As Newman says (in his note) the passage before us makes it probable that he would have defined it as obedience to rightly constituted law—or as consisting not, as Hobbes wrote, in the things 'which the sovereign hath *pretermitted*', but, as Montesquieu said, in what the laws *permit*.

Chapter X

5. Monarchies—including both kingships and tyrannies. *The distinction, especially in origins, between kingship and tyranny. Kingship is allied to aristocracy, and its general function is that of impartial guardianship of society; tyranny is directed to personal interest, and it combines the more selfish side of oligarchy with the more selfish side of democracy. In monarchies generally revolutions are caused by resentment of insults; by fear; by contempt; or by a desire for fame. Tyrannies are liable to be overthrown by the influence of neighbouring states of an opposite character: they may also be destroyed by internal causes; and the causes which particularly lead to their overthrow are hatred and contempt. Kingships are more durable; but with the general growth of equality they are becoming antiquated, and the form of monarchical government now prevalent is tyranny based on force.*

§ 1. We have still, however, to treat of the causes of destruction, and the means of preservation, when the government is a monarchy.[1] **1310 b** Generally, what has already been said of constitutions proper is almost equally true of kingships and tyrannies.[2] § 2. Kingship is in the nature of an aristocracy. Tyranny is a compound of the extreme forms of oligarchy and democracy, and that is why it is more injurious to its subjects than any other form of government; it is composed of two bad forms, and it combines the perversions and errors of both. § 3. The two forms of monarchical government differ from one another—and differ diametrically—in their very origin. Kingships have grown for the purpose of helping the better classes against the populace; it is from these classes that kings have been drawn; and the basis of their position has been their own pre-eminence, or the pre-eminence of their family, in character and conduct. Tyrants, on the contrary, are drawn from the populace and the masses, to serve

[1] A 'monarchy' (or one-man government) may be, in Aristotle's usage, either a 'kingship' or a 'tyranny'. 'Monarchy', therefore, is not synonymous with 'kingship'. It is a wider term.

[2] See the note at the end of the chapter.

as their protectors against the notables, and in order to prevent them from suffering any injustice from that class. § 4. The record of history attests the fact; and it may safely be said that most tyrants have begun their careers as demagogues, who won the popular confidence by calumniating the notables. § 5. But though it is true that a large number of tyrannies arose in this way, in the days when states were becoming much more populous, there were others, of an earlier date, which arose in different ways. Some of them had their origin in the ambition of kings, who transgressed traditional limitations, and aimed at a more despotic authority. Others were founded by persons who had originally been elected to the highest magistracies—all the more easily because there was a habit, in ancient times, of giving long tenures to public 'craftsmen' and 'overseers'.[1] Others, again, arose from a practice, followed in oligarchies, of appointing a single person to supervise the chief magistracies. § 6. In all these ways an ambitious person was given the chance, if he so desired, of effecting his purpose with ease; he had already power in his hands for a start—here as king, and there as the holder of some other high office. Pheidon of Argos and a number of others started as kings and ended as tyrants. The tyrants of Ionia and Phalaris of Agrigentum used other offices as stepping-stones. Panaetius at Leontini, Cypselus at Corinth, Pisistratus at Athens, Dionysius at Syracuse, and a number of others elsewhere, began as demagogues.

§ 7. Kingship, as we have already observed, may be classified as being in the nature of aristocracy. Like aristocracy it is based on merit. The merit on which it is based may consist in personal (or family) qualities; it may consist in benefits rendered; it may consist in a combination of both of these with capacity. § 8. The men who have gained the position of king have all been men who had actually benefited, or were capable of benefiting, their city or their country. Some of them, like Codrus of Athens, had saved their state from

[1] Aristotle here uses, in the Greek, two peculiar terms for magistrates which were employed in states of the Peloponnese. For the first of these terms see Book III, c. 11, § 2, and note.

defeat in war: others, like Cyrus of Persia, had been its liberators; others, again, had settled or acquired the territory of their state, like the kings of Sparta and Macedonia, or the Molossian kings in Epirus. § 9. It is the aim of a king to be in the position of a guardian of society, **1311 a** protecting the owners of property from any unjust treatment, and saving the bulk of the people from arrogance and oppression.[1] Tyranny, as we have often noted, is just the opposite. It has no regard to any public interest which does not also serve the tyrant's own advantage. The aim of a tyrant is his own pleasure: the aim of a king is the Good. § 10. We can see the results which follow. A tyrant covets riches; a king covets what makes for renown. The guard of a king is a civic guard: the guard of a tyrant is a foreign guard of mercenary troops.

§ 11. Tyranny [being a compound of both][2] has obviously the vices both of oligarchy and democracy. From oligarchy it derives its aim and end of amassing wealth; for it is by his wealth, and by it alone, that a tyrant has to maintain his guard and his luxury. It is also from oligarchy that tyranny derives its habit of distrusting the masses, and the policy, consequent upon it, of depriving them of arms. Tyranny, too, joins hands with oligarchy in oppressing the common people, expelling it from the city, and dispersing it in the country. § 12. From democracy it derives its attitude of hostility to the notables; its policy of ruining them, secretly or openly; its habit of driving them into banishment, as the rivals and hindrances to its power. In fact the notables are more than a hindrance to tyrants: they are also the active cause of conspiracies against them—some because they want to be rulers

[1] This conception of the monarch as a neutral guardian or arbitrator, set above the play of society and preventing any social element from oppressing others, has analogies with the Hegelian conception of monarchy.

It may be noted that in the edition of the *Politics* by the Positivist Richard Congreve (second edition, 1874) there is appended an essay on monarchy, in which it is argued that, to meet the difficulties and problems of modern society, 'there will be needed a dictatorial power ("monocratic", but not "monarchical" in the sense of hereditary) sufficiently representing the interests of the classes that are growing, and at the same time strong enough to protect the weaker and decaying—a power able to act as a mediator' (p. 507). There is here a curious conjunction of Aristotle, Hegel, and Comte.

[2] See § 2 of this chapter.

themselves; others because they do not want to be slaves. § 13. This explains the advice which was offered by Periander to his fellow-tyrant Thrasybulus, when he switched off with his stick the outstanding ears in the corn field. It was a hint that he ought, from time to time, to remove outstanding citizens.

It has already been suggested[1] that the *origins* of revolution in states with a monarchical system must be considered the same as they are in states with regular constitutions. Unjust oppression, fear, and contempt, are often the reasons why subjects rebel against their monarchs. The form of unjust oppression which most frequently leads to rebellion is insult; but the confiscation of property has sometimes the same effect. § 14. The *aims* pursued by revolutionaries, like the origins of revolution, are the same in tyrannies and kingships as they are under regular constitutions. Sovereign rulers enjoy a pre-eminence of wealth and honour; and wealth and honour are objects of general desire. The actual attacks of revolutionaries are sometimes delivered against the person of the sovereign, and sometimes against his office. Attacks provoked by insults are directed against his person.

§ 15. Insults are of many kinds; but anger is the common effect produced by all the kinds.[2] Those who attack a sovereign in anger generally do so for the sake of revenge, and not for reasons of ambition. The attack on the sons of Peisistratus at Athens, by Harmodius and Aristogiton, was caused by the dishonour offered to the sister of Harmodius and the injury thus done to her brother. Harmodius attacked for his sister's sake; and his friend Aristogiton joined the attack **1311 a 39** for *his* sake. [In the next three sections, §§ 16–18, Aristotle cites other instances of attacks made on

[1] Aristotle is here referring back to § 1 of this chapter, and, by implication, to the catalogue of causes of sedition which he has already given in c. 11 of this Book.

[2] The logic of the arrangement followed in the succeeding sections is based on the causes enumerated in § 13. Unjust oppression, especially in the form of *insult*, is treated in §§ 15–20; *fear* is treated in § 21; and *contempt* in §§ 22–5. But in § 26 Aristotle begins to go outside the causes enumerated in § 13; and after first making a natural transition from contempt of the sovereign to personal ambition (§§ 26–8), he goes on—not without some repetition—to a number of other causes.

ruling sovereigns for sexual or homosexual reasons. The instances cover a wide geographical range: several of them are drawn from the history of Macedonia, one from the history of Cyprus, one from that of Thrace, and one from that of Ambracia. None of them belong to the area or the history of the Greek city-state.] **1311 b 23** § 19. Insult may also take the form of physical assault. Men have often been moved to anger by such indignities; and feeling themselves insulted they have either killed, or attempted to kill, even royal officers, and persons connected with the royal circle [let alone actual sovereigns]. [In the rest of this section, and in § 20, Aristotle cites instances at Mytilene and in Macedonia.]

1311 b 36 § 21. Fear is also a motive which, as we have previously noted, operates similarly in monarchies and in constitutional states as a cause of rebellion. It was fear that led the Persian captain Artapanes to murder his master Xerxes. He was afraid of being accused of having had Darius hanged—without any orders from Xerxes—in the expectation that, unable to remember what he might have said in his cups, Xerxes would condone the act.

§ 22. Monarchs are sometimes attacked from the motive of contempt. Sardanapalus of Assyria **1312 a** was killed by a man who saw him carding wool among women (at any rate that is the traveller's tale, which may not be true; but if it is not true of him, it may well be true of some other man). § 23. Dionysius the Younger of Syracuse was similarly attacked by Dion in a spirit of contempt: he saw that he was despised even by his own subjects, and was always drunk. The very friends of a single ruler will sometimes attack him because they despise him: the confidence he gives them breeds their contempt, and they are led to believe that he will notice nothing. § 24. Contempt, of a sort, is also the motive of rebels who think that they can seize power: they are ready to strike because they feel themselves strong, and able, in virtue of their strength, to despise any risks. This is the reason why generals attack their sovereigns. Cyrus, for instance, attacked Astyages because he despised both his habit of life, which had sunk into luxury, and his capacity, which had become

effete. The Thracian Seuthes, when he was general, attacked King Amadocus for similar reasons. § 25. Attacks are sometimes due not to a single cause, but to a plurality of causes. Contempt, for instance, may be mingled with avarice, as it was in the attack which Mithridates made on his father, the Persian satrap Ariobarzanes. But rebellions due to a plurality of causes generally proceed from men who combine a hardy temper with a position of military honour in the service of their sovereign. Courage armed with power turns into hardihood; and it is this combination of courage and power which leads men to rebel, in the confidence of easy victory.

When rebellion is due to desire for fame, we have a cause of a different character from any of those hitherto mentioned. § 26. A man who resolves to risk rebellion out of a desire for fame behaves in a different way from men who attempt the lives of tyrants with an eye to great gain or high honours. Men of that sort are merely moved by greed or ambition; the man who desires true fame will attack a ruler in the same high spirit as if he were offered the chance of some other great adventure likely to win a man name and fame among his fellows—he will want to get glory, and not a kingdom. § 27. It is true that those who are moved by such reasons are only a handful. Their action supposes an utter disregard for their own safety in the event of failure. § 28. They must have in their hearts the resolve of Dion—a resolve to which only a few can rise—when he sailed on his expedition against Dionysius the Younger with his little band of followers: 'I am of this mind—whatever the point I am able to reach, it is enough for me to have got so far in this undertaking; yes, if I die at once, just after getting ashore, it will be well for me to die like that.'

§ 29. One of the ways in which a tyranny may be destroyed —and the same is true, as we have already noted,[1] of all other forms of government—is by external causes. **1312 b** Another state, with an opposite form of constitution, may be stronger than a tyranny. The conflict of opposite principles[2] will

[1] The reference is to c. VII, § 14.

[2] In modern terminology, there will be 'a conflict of ideologies' between a dictatorial state and a state (or states) based on opposite principles.

obviously lead such a state to will the destruction of the tyranny; and where there is a will, and power behind it, there is always a way. § 30. This opposition of constitutions may take different forms. Democracy, in its extreme form of the tyranny of the masses,[1] quarrels with tyranny in the same sort of way as, says Hesiod, 'potter quarrels with potter'. Kingship and aristocracy quarrel with tyranny for the opposite reason, and because their constitutions are the opposite of its spirit. This was the reason why Sparta, ruled as she was by kings, suppressed most tyrannies, and why Syracuse pursued the same policy during the period in which she enjoyed a good constitution.[2]

§ 31. Another way in which tyrannies may be destroyed is by internal causes. The partners in a tyranny may quarrel with one another.[3] This happened at Syracuse in the family of Gelo, and it has happened again in our own days in the family of Dionysius the Younger. The tyranny established by Gelo was destroyed by Thrasybulus. He was the brother of Gelo and of Gelo's successor, Hiero. On Hiero's death he flattered the next heir, Gelo's son, and ambitious to secure power for himself he seduced him into a life of pleasure. The relatives of the heir thereupon formed a party, originally with the idea of overthrowing Thrasybulus and saving the tyranny; but in the event this party, feeling that the opportunity was ripe, expelled the whole of the family. § 32. The overthrow of Dionysius was due to his relative, Dion, who led an expedition against him, succeeded in winning popular support, and expelled him—only to perish himself in the issue.[4]

[We may now proceed to study the causes which are particularly apt to ruin tyrannies.][5] Hate and contempt are the

[1] See Book IV, c. IV, § 27.

[2] Aristotle refers to the period of about fifty years (*circa* 465 to *circa* 413) in which the constitution of Syracuse was an aristocracy or aristocratic 'polity'.

[3] Aristotle, as his instances show, is thinking of family quarrels in the tyrant's own family.

[4] He established himself as tyrant, and was assassinated in consequence.

[5] Aristotle has already dealt with the causes particularly apt to destroy other constitutions (for democracies, see c. V, § 1; for oligarchies, c. VI, § 1;

two most frequent causes of attack. Hate is a passion all tyrants are bound to arouse; but contempt is often the cause by which tyrannies are actually overthrown. § 33. It is a proof of this truth that the tyrants who have won the position by their own efforts have generally managed to retain it, while their successors proceed to lose it almost immediately. Living luxurious lives, they make themselves contemptible, and offer their assailants plenty of opportunities. Hate must be reckoned as including anger, which produces much the same sort of effects. § 34. Anger, indeed, is often a more effective stimulus; an angry man will attack with more fury, because his passion prevents him from stopping to calculate. There is nothing which frays men's tempers more than being insulted: this was what caused the collapse of the tyranny of Peisistratus' family, and of many other tyrannies. § 35. Hate can stop to calculate: you can hate your enemy without feeling pain. Anger is inseparable from pain; and pain makes calculation difficult.

In brief, all the causes previously mentioned as tending to overthrow the unmixed and ultimate form of oligarchy, and the extreme form of democracy, must be counted as equally fatal to tyranny: indeed those forms are themselves no more than collective tyrannies. § 36. Kingship is the constitution least liable to be destroyed by external causes. It therefore tends to be durable; and when it is destroyed, the causes are generally internal. Such causes may take two forms. One is **1313 a** dissension among the members of the royal family: the other consists in attempting to govern like a tyrant rather than a king, and claiming a larger prerogative without any legal restrictions. § 37. Kingship has now gone out of fashion; and any government of that type which emerges to-day is a personal government or tyranny. Kingship is a government by consent, with sovereign authority in matters of major importance; [and such a government is now an anachronism]. Equality is generally diffused; and there is nobody outstanding enough for the grandeur and the dignity of the office of

for aristocracies and 'polities', c. VII, § 5). He now follows the same procedure in regard to tyrannies.

king. There is thus no basis of consent for such a form of government; and when it is imposed, by fraud or by force, it is instantly regarded as a form of tyranny. § 38. Kingships limited to a single family are liable to be overthrown by a further cause which has still to be mentioned. Kings of this type often incur the contempt of their subjects; or—forgetting that they enjoy the dignity of a king, and not the power of a tyrant—they are guilty of insult and injury. Their overthrow is then an easy matter. Kings cease to be kings when their subjects cease to be willing subjects, though tyrants can continue to be tyrants whether their subjects are willing or no.[1]

The destruction of monarchical forms of government is due to these and similar causes: [we may now pass on to the methods of their preservation].

Note on Aristotle's interest in tyrannies

Here Aristotle seems to draw a distinction between 'monarchies' (including kingships and tyrannies) and 'constitutions proper'. He thus appears to imply that a monarchy is not a 'constitution', but merely a personal system—if indeed it can even be called a system. (This contradicts, we may note in passing, the general view of Book III, where kingship and tyranny are both classed among constitutions, and kingship is specifically stated, in c. XIV, § 1, to be one of the 'right' or normal constitutions.) Why, then, it may be asked, does Aristotle devote two long and detailed chapters to a study of 'monarchy' generally, and more especially of tyranny—particularly when he has already said, in Book IV, c. X, § 1, that 'there is not much to be said about it'? Newman suggests, in his note, that he wished to amend the worst of Greek institutions, and that he may also have desired to keep Macedonian kingship on the right track. Perhaps, however, it is simply the encyclopaedic and analytic nature of Aristotle's mind which leads him to examine any and every

[1] The concluding sections of this long chapter (as has already been noticed in the note to § 15) are somewhat desultory. First the idea of 'internal or external causes' occurs to the writer, and this occupies him from § 29 to the beginning of § 32. Next the idea of 'the causes particularly apt to destroy tyrannies' occurs, and this engages his attention to the beginning of § 35. Then the idea occurs that extreme oligarchy and extreme democracy are both really tyrannies, and that the causes which destroy them will also destroy tyrannies; but having stated the idea, the writer lets himself glide away from it into treating of kingships, and of their differences from tyrannies and the causes of their collapse. All this may be Aristotle; but it would seem to be an Aristotle who throws the reins on the neck of the argument.

material and to generalize from it all as far as he possibly can. The doctor in him (we have always to remember his medical ancestry and interest) was attracted to the diagnosis of symptoms and the suggestion of cures; and the problems of one-man government, especially in its tyrannical form, afforded him curious and abnormal material.

Chapter XI

The methods of ensuring the stablity of monarchies. Kingships are best preserved by a policy of moderation. There are two ways of preserving tyrannies. One way is the traditional tyrant's policy of repression, which has its analogy with the policy of extreme democracy: its three main objects are to break the spirit of subjects, to sow distrust among them, and to make them incapable of action. The other way is a policy of assimilating tyranny to kingship, by a good administration and the exercise of personal restraint; a wise tyrant will adorn his city, pay heed to public worship, honour the good, keep his own passions in check, and enlist in his favour as large a measure of social support as he possibly can. In this way he may prolong his days, and attain a state of 'half-goodness'.

§ 1. Taking a general view of monarchical forms of government, we may say that they are all preserved by methods the converse of those which are apt to cause their destruction. Looking at them in detail, and taking kingship first, we may say that a king will preserve his throne by a policy of moderation. The less the area of his prerogative, the longer will the authority of a king last unimpaired: he will himself be less of a master and behave more like an equal, and his subjects, on their side, will envy him less. § 2. This is the reason for the long survival of kingship among the Molossians; and the survival of the Spartan kingship may also be attributed partly to the original division of power between the two kings, and partly to the general policy of moderation afterwards followed by Theopompus,[1] above all in his institution of the office of Ephor. He may be said to have strengthened Spartan kingship, in the long run, by

[1] One of the Spartan kings, in the middle of the eighth century B.C.

depriving it of some of its original power; and there is a sense in which he increased rather than diminished its importance. § 3. This is the point of the answer which he is said to have given to his wife, when she asked him if he were not ashamed to be leaving his sons less power than he had inherited from his father. 'Certainly not', he replied; 'I am leaving them a power that will last much longer.'

§ 4. Tyrannies can be preserved in two ways, which are utterly opposed to one another. One of them is the traditional way; and it is also the method of government still followed by the majority of tyrants. Many of its characteristics are supposed to have been originally instituted by Periander of Corinth; but many of its features may also be derived from the Persian system of government. § 5. This method includes some measures previously mentioned, in the course of our argument, as tending to the preservation of tyranny (so far as it can be preserved): it includes, for instance, the 'lopping off' of outstanding men, and the removal of men and spirit.[1] But it also includes a number of other and additional measures. One of them is the forbidding of common meals, clubs, **1313 b** education, and anything of a like character—or, in other words, a defensive attitude against everything likely to produce the two qualities of mutual confidence and a high spirit.[2] A second measure is to prohibit societies for cultural purposes, and any gathering of a similar character: in a word, the adoption of every means for making every subject as much of a stranger as is possible to every other. (Mutual acquaintance always tends to create mutual confidence.) § 6. A third line of policy is to require every resident in the city to be constantly appearing in public, and always hanging about the palace gates. (This is meant to give the ruler a peep-hole into the actions of his subjects, and to inure them to humility by a habit of daily slavery.) This line of policy also includes other measures of

[1] This measure (ascribed to Periander) has been previously mentioned in Book III, c. XIII, §§ 16–17, and again in the previous chapter of this Book, § 13.

[2] Common meals and clubs might encourage the first of these qualities: education the second.

a similar character, common in Persia and among the barbarians, which have all the same general effect of fostering tyranny.[1] § 7. A fourth line of policy is that of endeavouring to get regular information about every man's sayings and doings. This entails a secret police, like the female spies employed at Syracuse, or the eavesdroppers sent by the tyrant Hiero to all social gatherings and public meetings. (Men are not so likely to speak their minds if they go in fear of a secret police; and if they do speak out, they are less likely to go undetected.) § 8. Still another line of policy is to sow mutual distrust and to foster discord between friend and friend; between people and notables; between one section of the rich and another. Finally, a policy pursued by tyrants is that of impoverishing their subject—partly to prevent them from having the means for maintaining a civic guard; partly to keep them so busy in earning a daily pittance that they have no time for plotting. § 9. One example of this policy is the building of the Egyptian pyramids: another is the lavish offerings to temples made by the family of Cypselus; a third is the erection of the temple to Olympian Zeus by the family of Peisistratus; a fourth is the additions made by Polycrates to the Samian monuments. (All these actions have the same object: to increase the poverty of the tyrant's subjects and to curtail their leisure.) § 10. The imposition of taxes produces a similar result. We may cite the example of Syracuse, where in a period of five years, during the tyranny of Dionysius the Elder, people were made to pay the whole of their property to the state.[2] The same vein of policy also makes tyrants war-mongers, with the object of keeping their subjects constantly occupied and continually in need of a leader.

[It is the sowing of distrust which is the special characteristic of tyrants.] Kings are maintained and secured by their friends; tyrants, going on the principle 'All men want

[1] Among such other measures, as Newman suggests, Aristotle may have in mind 'proskynēsis', or the adoration of the ruler in the form of prostration at his feet—the form of the Chinese 'kotow'.

[2] This would involve a property-tax of 20 per cent. per annum.

my overthrow, but my friends have most power to effect it', distrust them above all others. § 11. The methods applied in extreme democracies are thus all to be found in tyrannies. They both encourage feminine influence in the family, in the hope that wives will tell tales of their husbands; and for a similar reason they are both indulgent to slaves. Slaves and women are not likely to plot against tyrants: indeed, as they prosper under them, they are bound to favour their rule—as they will also favour democracies, where the people likes to play the sovereign as much as any tyrant. § 12. This is the reason why courtiers attain a position of honour under both these forms of government. Democracies are fond of demagogues, who may be called 'the courtiers of democracy', and tyrants like obsequious associates—**1314 a** which it is the business of courtiers to be. Tyranny is thus a system which chooses bad men for its friends. Tyrants love to be flattered, and nobody with the soul of a freeman can ever stoop to *that*; a good man may be a friend, but at any rate he will not be a flatterer. § 13. [Bad men are not only ready to flatter]: they are also good tools for bad objects; 'nail knocks out nail', as the proverb says. It is a habit of tyrants never to like a man with a spirit of dignity and independence. The tyrant claims a monopoly of such qualities for himself; he feels that anybody who asserts a rival dignity, or acts with independence, is trenching on *his* prerogative and the majesty of his sovereign power; and he hates him accordingly as a subverter of his own authority. § 14. It is also a habit of tyrants to prefer the company of aliens to that of citizens at table and in society; citizens, they feel, are enemies, but aliens will offer no opposition.

Such are the arts of the tyrant, and such are the means he uses in order to maintain his authority; but [however astute they may be] they plumb the depth of wrongdoing. We may regard them as all summed up under three main headings, which correspond to the three main ends pursued by tyrants. § 15. Their first end and aim is to break the spirit of their subjects. They know that a poor-spirited man will never plot against anybody. Their second aim is to breed mutual

distrust. Tyranny is never overthrown until men can begin to trust one another; and this is the reason why tyrants are always at outs with the good. They feel that good men are doubly dangerous to their authority—dangerous, first, in thinking it shame to be governed as if they were slaves; dangerous, again, in their spirit of mutual and general loyalty, and in their refusal to betray one another or anybody else. § 16. The third and last aim of tyrants is to make their subjects incapable of action. Nobody attempts the impossible. Nobody, therefore, will attempt the overthrow of a tyranny when all are incapable of action.

We have here three principles to which the ordinary policies of tyrants may be reduced—three ideas to which their measures may be referred: (1) to breed mutual distrust among their subjects, (2) to make them incapable of action, and (3) to break their spirit. § 17. Here, too, we have one of the two main methods for the preservation of tyrannies. But there is also a second method, where the line of action followed is almost the very reverse.[1] § 18. We shall be able to understand the nature of this method if we go back, for a moment, to the causes which destroy kingships. We saw that one way of their destruction was the turning of kingship into the nature of a tyranny. This suggests that a way of preserving tyrannies may be the turning of tyranny into the nature of a kingship—subject to the one safeguard that the reformed tyrant still retains power, and is still in a position to govern his subjects with or without their consent. To surrender even power is to surrender tyranny itself. § 19. Power must thus be retained, as an essential condition of tyranny; but otherwise the tyrant should act, or at any rate appear to act, in the role of a good player of the part of King. He must show himself,[2] in the first place, concerned for the

[1] Newman's note (vol. iv, p. 448) illustrates the difference of the two methods: 'In the first it is taken for granted that the subjects of a tyrant are necessarily hostile to him, and the aim is to make them *unable* to conspire . . . in the second the aim is to make the subjects of the tyrant *indisposed* to conspire.'

[2] In the following sections Aristotle anticipates the character of Machiavelli, and gives 'politic' advice to a 'new prince' in a realistic way. But his advice is fundamentally different from that of Machiavelli. He

public funds. 1314 b Not only must he refrain from expenditure in lavishing gifts which cause public discontent (and that will always arise when money is painfully wrung from a toiling and moiling people, and then lavishly squandered on harlots, aliens, and luxury trades); he must also render accounts of his income and expenditure—a policy which a number of tyrants have actually practised. This is a method of government which will make him appear to be more of a steward than a tyrant. § 20. There is no need to fear that it will involve him in a deficit, so long as he keeps control of affairs; and if he is compelled to be absent from home he may even find that it is more to his advantage to have a deficit than it would be to leave a hoard behind him. The regents whom he appoints will be less likely, in that case, to make a bid for power; and a tyrant campaigning abroad has more reason to fear his regents than he has to fear the citizen body itself. The regents remain behind: the citizens go abroad with their ruler. § 21. Next, and in the second place, he should levy taxes, and require other contributions, in such a way that they can be seen to be intended for the proper management of public services, or to be meant for use, in case of need, on military emergencies; and generally, he should act in the role of a guardian, or steward, who is handling public revenues rather than private income.

[In his personal behaviour] a tyrant should appear grave, without being harsh; and his carriage should be such that men who come into his presence will do so with awe, and not in fear. § 22. This is an aim which cannot easily be achieved if he fails to inspire respect. He should therefore cultivate military qualities, even if he fails to cultivate others, and should give the impression of military efficiency. He should also avoid all sexual offences: he should be personally free from any suspicion of violating the chastity of any of his subjects, boy or girl, and all his associates should be equally free from suspicion. § 23. The women of his family should observe the same rule in dealing with other women: the

bids the new prince abjure 'reason of State', and play the king—and the man.

insolence of women has often been the ruin of tyrannies. In the matter of personal indulgence [in the pleasures of the table] the tyrant should be the opposite of some of the tyrants of our days, who—not content with starting at dawn and going on for days on end—actually want to parade their excesses, in the idea that men will admire their bliss and felicity. § 24. Ideally, a tyrant should be moderate in his pleasures: if he cannot attain that ideal, he should at any rate appear in the eyes of the world as a man who eschews pleasure. It is the drunkards, and not the sober—the drowsy, and not the vigilant—who are easily attacked and readily despised.

Indeed, a tyrant should be the opposite of nearly everything which we have previously described as characteristic of tyrants. He should plan and adorn his city as if he were not a tyrant, but a trustee for its benefit. § 25. He should always show a particular zeal in the cult of the gods. Men are less afraid of being treated unjustly by a ruler, when they think that he is god-fearing **1315 a** and pays some regard to the gods; and they are less ready to conspire against him, if they feel that the gods themselves are his friends. At the same time, the tyrant should show his zeal without falling into folly.[1] § 26. He should also honour good men, in any walk of life; and he should do so in such a way as to make them think that they could not possibly have been honoured more by their own fellow-citizens, if their fellow-citizens had been free to distribute honours themselves. He should distribute such honours personally; but he should leave all punishments to be inflicted by the magistrates or the law courts. § 27. It is a precaution common to all forms of monarchical government [and not peculiar to tyranny] that no single man should be promoted to any great position, and if such promotion has to be made, it should be shared by a

[1] It may seem to the modern reader that Aristotle is here treating religion in a Machiavellian way. But he is not dealing with religion, in our sense of the word: he is dealing with the ritual worship of civic deities —with formal sacrifices, and auguries, and the general apparatus of formal civic worship. Aristotle's religious views must be sought in the *Metaphysics*, and they are profound enough. The civic tradition of formal worship was something different from religion.

number of persons, who will then keep a watch upon one another. But if, after all, a single man must needs be promoted to some great position, he should never be a man of bold spirit: tempers of that sort are the quickest to strike in all fields of action. If, on the other hand, a decision is taken to remove a man from a position of power, the removal should be gradual, and he should not be deprived of all his authority at a single blow. § 28. A tyrant should abstain from every form of outrage, and from two forms above all others—the infliction of physical indignities, and violation of the chastity of the young. He should show a particular caution of behaviour when he is dealing with men of sensitive honour. Arrogance in matters of money is resented by men who care about money; but it is arrogance in matters affecting honour which is resented by men of honour and virtue. § 29. A tyrant should therefore abstain from such acts; or, at the very least, he should make it clear that when he inflicts any punishment, he is doing so not from arrogance but in a spirit of paternal discipline, and when he indulges himself with the young, he is doing so not in the licence of power but because he is genuinely in love. In all such cases, too, he should atone for the dishonours which he appears to inflict by the gift of still greater honours.

§ 30. Attempts at assassination are most dangerous, and need most watching, when they are made by men who are not concerned about escaping with their lives after the deed is done. § 31. For this reason special precautions ought to be taken against any persons who feel that either they themselves, or others for whom they care, are being subjected to outrage. Men who are acting in hot blood take little heed to themselves: witness the saying of Heraclitus, 'It is hard to fight against heat of the spirit, for it is willing to pay the price of life.'

§ 32. [In matters of social policy] a tyrant should always remember that a state is composed of two sections—the poor and the rich. If it is possible, both of these sections should be induced to think that it is the tyrant's power which secures them in their position, and prevents either from

suffering injury at the hands of the other. If, however, one of the sections is stronger than the other, the tyrant should attach that section particularly to his side. There will be no need, if he has its support, to resort to such measures as the emancipation of slaves or the disarming of citizens. The addition of either section to the power which he already possesses will make him strong enough to defeat any attempt against his position.

§ 33. It is unnecessary to treat such matters as these in detail. The general aim is sufficiently evident. A tyrant should appear to his subjects not as a despot, **1315 b** but as a steward and king of his people. He should show himself a trustee for the public interest, not a man intent on his own; he should make moderation, and not excess, the aim and end of his life; he should seek the society of the notables, and yet court the favour of the masses. § 34. The benefit which he is bound to gain by such methods will be twofold. In the first place, his rule will be a nobler and a more enviable rule: his subjects will be men of a better stamp, free from humiliation, and he himself will cease to be an object of hatred and fear. In the second place, his rule will also be more lasting; and he will himself attain a habit of character, if not wholly disposed to goodness, at any rate half-good—half-good and yet half-bad, but at any rate not *wholly* bad.

Chapter XII

The first part of this chapter explains that tyrannies, in the past, have been generally short-lived. The rest contains a criticism of Plato's account, in the Republic, *of the causes of revolution and constitutional change. The criticism is partly concerned with Plato's attempt to give a mathematical explanation of change and corruption in the ideal state, and partly with his failure* (1) *to explain at all the cause of change in tyrannies and* (2) *to explain satisfactorily the causes of change and revolution in oligarchies.*

[The first six sections of this chapter are bracketed by Newman, and other editors, as an interpolation; and they certainly interrupt the argument. Their gist is that, as a

matter of fact and in spite of any suggestion of methods for making them lasting, tyrannies are short-lived, and there are really only four instances of any length of duration. These instances (which stop short about 450 B.C., and from which the durable tyrannies of Aristotle's own century are somewhat curiously omitted) are then recited in detail—with some errors of fact and chronology.]

1315 b 40 § 7. We have now treated of all (or almost all) the causes which lead to the destruction and the preservation of constitutions and monarchies.[1] We may note, **1316 a** in conclusion, that the subject of constitutional change is treated by Plato in the *Republic*; but the treatment is defective.[2] In the first place, he fails to mention specifically the cause of the change peculiar to his own first and ideal constitution. § 8. He says that the cause is that nothing abides, and that everything changes in a given period; and he goes on to say that the source [of such general change] is to be found in a system of numbers, 'where the root ratio of 4 to 3, wedded to 5, furnishes two harmonical progressions' (he adds words to the effect that this happens when the arithmetical value of the diagram is cubed).[3] The implication here is that [through a

[1] Aristotle here, as in other passages of this book, distinguishes between 'constitutions' (where there is an arrangement regulating the holding of offices, which is, in his view, the essence of a constitution) and 'monarchies' or single-man governments (where there is no such arrangement); see the note at the end of c. x.

[2] It should be noticed that Plato's general treatment of constitutional change was meant to give an account of its inner logic rather than of its historical chronology. Aristotle's historical criticism is therefore hardly relevant: see the translator's *Greek Political Theory* (*Plato and His Predecessors*), pp. 244–6.

[3] Aristotle here first quotes some words of Plato, and then adds his own version of the effect of some other words. The words in Plato are a famous puzzle (the puzzle of 'the nuptial number', as it is called by scholars); and Aristotle does not contribute to the solution of the puzzle. It is sufficient to say that there is a reference to the Pythagorean right-angled triangle (hence Aristotle's use of the word 'diagram'), with its sides in the proportions 3, 4, and 5, and with the square of the hypotenuse equal to the sum of the squares of the two other sides ($5^2 = 3^2+4^2$). As Professor Cornford says, in his translation of the *Republic* (p. 263, n. 3), 'the serious idea behind . . . is the affinity and correspondence of macrocosm and microcosm, and the embodiment of mathematical principles in both'.

failure to conform to the mathematical principles regulating man, as they also regulate the whole of the universe] the reproduction of the species sometimes issues in men of poor quality, who are beyond the reach of education.[1] This implication, in itself, is perhaps not incorrect: there may be persons who cannot possibly be educated or made into good men. § 9. But why should this be a cause of change peculiar to the ideal state depicted in the *Republic*, rather than one common to all states, and indeed to all things in existence? There is a further point. Can the efflux of time, which, he says, causes all things to change,[2] explain how things which did not begin simultaneously should simultaneously undergo change? Does a thing which came into existence on the day before the turn of the tide change simultaneously [with things of an earlier origin]?

§ 10. Again, we may ask why the ideal state should turn [as Plato makes it turn] into a state of the Spartan type. Constitutions change, as a rule, more readily into an opposite than into a cognate form. The same argument also applies to the other changes mentioned by Plato, when he depicts the Spartan type as changing into oligarchy, oligarchy into democracy, and democracy into tyranny. § 11. The very reverse may equally happen: democracy, for example, can change into oligarchy, and indeed it can do so more easily than it can change into monarchy.

When it comes to tyrannies Plato stops: he never explains whether they do, or do not, change, nor, if they do, why they do so, or into what constitution they change. The

[1] In explanation of this passage it should be noted that Plato (inspired by a sort of mathematical mysticism) had argued that the rulers of his ideal state should so arrange marriage, and so control the reproduction of the species, that their times were 'propitious', in the sense of being in accordance with the mathematical principles (common to the macrocosm of the universe and the microcosm of man) to which they ought to conform.

[2] Plato had not argued that time, of itself, changes everything. He had argued that things must change, in the course of time, if the mathematical principles governing man and the universe were not observed. But Aristotle fastens on a sentence in the *Republic* (which should be read in its context), 'all that comes into being must decay' (*Republic* 546 A), and interprets it generally and unconditionally.

reason of this omission is that any explanation would have been difficult. The matter cannot be settled along the lines of his argument; for on those lines a tyranny would have to change back into the first and ideal constitution, in order to maintain continuity in the revolving cycle of change. § 12. Actually, however, a tyranny may change into another form of tyranny, as the tyranny at Sicyon changed from the form under Myro to that under Cleisthenes; it may equally change into oligarchy, like the tyranny of Antileon at Chalcis; it may also turn into democracy, like the tyranny of Gelo at Syracuse; or it may change into aristocracy, as happened to the tyranny of Charilaus at Sparta, and as also happened at Carthage. § 13. Tyranny, again, may succeed to oligarchy [and not, as Plato suggests, to democracy].[1] This was the fate that befell most of the ancient oligarchies in Sicily: for instance, the tyranny of Panaetius succeeded to an oligarchy at Leontini, the tyranny of Cleander to one at Gela, and the tyranny of Anaxilaus to one at Rhegium. The same order of change has also been followed in a number of other states.

§ 14. It is curious that Plato should imagine that the change [of the Spartan type of constitution] into oligarchy is merely due to the fact that the magistrates turn money-lovers and profit-makers, and not to the conviction, **1316 b** natural in men of greatly superior wealth, that it is an offence against justice for men without property to be put on a level in the state with the owners of property. Actually, in a number of oligarchies, profit-making is forbidden, and there are specific laws to the contrary. On the other hand at Carthage, although it is democratically governed [and not an oligarchy], profit-making is common—and yet the constitution has never been altered in character. § 15. It is also absurd that Plato should say that an oligarchical state is two states—a state of the rich and a state of the poor.[2] Does it show this character

[1] Aristotle here passes, by an easy transition, from discussing the question, 'what succeeds to tyranny?' to discussing the question, 'to what does tyranny succeed?'

[2] Aristotle is here criticizing Plato's contention that oligarchies change into democracies because the poor get poorer and poorer, until they are forced to claim and assume political power.

more than the Spartan type of state, or more than any other type where all are not equal in property or on the same level of merit? § 16. Without a single man having become any poorer than he was previously, an oligarchy may none the less turn into a democracy, for the simple reason that the poor have become the majority. Conversely, a democracy may also change into an oligarchy, for the simple reason that the wealthier classes show themselves stronger than the masses, and are active while these are passive.

§ 17. There are thus a number of causes which may produce a change from oligarchy to democracy; but Plato confines himself to one—extravagance, leading to debt, and ending in poverty—a view which assumes that all men, or most, are rich to begin with. This is not the truth of the matter. What *is* true is that when any of the leading men lose their property, they become revolutionaries. But the rest may lose their property without any untoward consequence; and any change that may ensue is no more likely to be a change to democracy than it is to be a change to some other form of constitution. § 18. There is also a further point. To have no share in honours and office, or to suffer injustice or insult, is sufficient to cause dissensions and constitutional changes, even if there has been no squandering of property through that licence to 'do as you like' which is caused, in Plato's view, by an exaggerated sense of liberty.

Though there are many varieties of oligarchy and democracy, Socrates [i.e. Plato] discusses their changes as if there were only one form of either. . . .[1]

[1] This chapter is in the nature of a digression, and it is a curious mixture of criticism of Plato with chronological and other details about tyranny. 'It seems', as Newman says, 'too characteristic of Aristotle not to be his'; but it also seems to contain a number of jottings rather than a sustained argument. On some points of historical fact (e.g. in regard to the change at Syracuse on Gelo's death, and the general constitutional development of Syracuse) it does not square with statements in other parts of the *Politics*. In any case the abrupt termination of the chapter, almost in the middle of a sentence, suggests that it is unfinished.

BOOK VI

METHODS OF CONSTRUCTING DEMOCRACIES AND OLIGARCHIES WITH A SPECIAL VIEW TO THEIR GREATER STABILITY

A

THE CONSTRUCTION OF DEMOCRACIES (cc. I–V)

Chapter I

The varieties of democracy: they are due to two causes—the different characters of the populace, and the different combinations of democratic institutions, in different democracies.

1316 b 31 § 1. A number of topics have now been treated. We have discussed the number and nature of the varieties to be found (*a*) in the deliberative organ, which is the sovereign organ of the constitution, (*b*) in the structure of the executive offices, and (*c*) in judicial bodies; and we have discussed, in that connexion, the character of the variety appropriate to each form of constitution.[1] We have also dealt with the occasions and the causes of the destruction and preservation of the different constitutions.[2] § 2. [We may now turn to consider the theme of the construction of constitutions.][3] Democracy and the other types of constitution have each a number of varieties; we must therefore consider what still remains to be said about each variety,[4] and—more especially—what is the mode of organization appropriate and advantageous to each. § 3. We must also investigate the possible combinations of the various modes of organizing each of the three powers [i.e. the deliberative, the executive, and the judicial] **1317 a** for the effect of such combinations is to make constitutions overlap with, or shade off into, each

[1] These topics have been treated in Book IV, cc. XIV–XVI.
[2] These topics have been treated in Book V.
[3] See the note at the end of the chapter.
[4] Over and above what has already been said in Book IV, cc. IV–VI.

other—to make aristocracy, for instance, overlap with oligarchy, or the 'polity' with a democracy. § 4. The possible combinations—which ought to be considered, but have not hitherto been—may be illustrated by examples. The deliberative organ and the method of electing the executive officers may be arranged on an oligarchical basis, while the judicial bodies are constituted on an aristocratic basis. The judicial bodies and the deliberative organ may be constituted on an oligarchical basis, while the method of electing the executive officers is arranged on an aristocratic basis. Other ways may also be followed for getting at the same result—that the parts or elements of a constitution should not one and all have the same complexion.[1]

§ 5. We have already explained[2] what variety of democracy is appropriate to what type of civic body; what variety of oligarchy agrees with what type of society; and which of the other constitutions suits which sort of population. [But our present purpose demands something more.] § 6. It is not enough to ascertain which variety of constitution is best for each state. We have also to ascertain the proper way of *constructing* these—and other—varieties. We must treat the problem succinctly; but if we begin with democracy, we shall also, in dealing with it, be learning to understand its opposite, which is commonly termed oligarchy. § 7. For the purposes of this inquiry [into the proper way of constructing *all* the varieties of democracy] we have to take into account *all* the attributes of democracy, and every feature generally held to be characteristic of it. The sum of these attributes will explain the origin of different types of democracy. It will explain why there is more than one type, and why the types vary.

§ 8. There are two reasons why there are several types of democracy. One has already been mentioned.[3] This is the difference of character between the people of different states.

[1] Aristotle's doctrine of 'combination' of powers may be compared with some forms of the eighteenth-century English doctrine of the 'balance' of powers (Aristotle's 'combination' is also of the nature of a 'balance'). Both doctrines connect themselves with the idea of the mixed constitution.

[2] The reference is to Book IV, c. XII.

[3] Book IV, c. IV, §§ 20–1; c. VI, §§ 2–6; c. XII, § 3. See also below, c. IV.

Here you may have a populace of farmers; there you may have one of mechanics and day-labourers. The democracies which they constitute differ; but if you add farmers to mechanics, and then add day-labourers to both, you create a new difference which is not so much one between better and worse sorts of the same thing, as one between totally different things.[1] This first reason, however, does not concern us here, and we have to deal with a second and different reason. § 9. The second reason for the existence of different types of democracy is the different possible combinations of the features which characterize democracy and are supposed to be its attributes. One variety of democracy will have fewer of these attributes; a second will have more; a third will have them all. Now there is a double advantage in studying all the separate attributes of democracy. Such study not only helps in constructing some new variety which one may happen to want: it also helps the reform of existing varieties.[2] § 10. Men who are engaged in building a constitution will often seek to lump together all the attributes connected with the idea on which the constitution is based. But this is an error, as we have already[3] noted in dealing with the subject of the destruction and preservation of constitutions.

Let us now consider the postulates, the moral temper, and the aims, of democratic constitutions.[4]

[1] Aristotle appears to imply that a democracy which mixes farmers, mechanics, and day-labourers differs in kind (and not merely in degree) from one of farmers only, or one of mechanics and labourers only. Does he mean that it is too socially divided to possess any stability? This seems to be suggested by the subsequent argument of c. IV, §§ 15–20.

[2] Aristotle here, in using the word 'reform', is recurring for the moment to the theme of 'preservation'. But it is construction, and not preservation, which is his real theme.

[3] Book V, c. IX. It may be added, in explanation of the connexion between § 9 and § 10, that in § 9 Aristotle has argued in favour of *studying* all the attributes of democracy, while in § 10 he argues against *using* all the attributes indiscriminately. The point is that, if you study each attribute, you will see that some of the attributes connected with democracy do not advance its cause, and you will realize that 'all is not gold that glitters'. Want of this knowledge makes founders of democracies commit the error of pouring into them every attribute that can be held to be characteristic of democracy, and thus really defeating its cause.

[4] These three things—postulates, moral temper, and aims—may be

Note on the new programme of Book VI

From problems of the destruction and preservation of constitutions *as they stand*, Aristotle here turns to the problem of the construction of constitutions *in a way that will enable them to stand more securely*. He had already discussed, at the end of Book IV, the proper structure of each of the three powers (deliberative, executive, and judicial); and he now promises to discuss the proper structure of the whole constitution, with reference to each type of constitution and the varieties of each type. Actually he deals only with two types (democracy and oligarchy) and the varieties of those two types—varieties which have already been described in Book IV, cc. IV–VI. We may add that the general programme stated at the end of Book IV, c. II, which has been followed through the whole of Books IV and V, is now left, and a new programme is started. Book VI may thus be regarded as a separate section or 'method'; and in its course, accordingly, Aristotle more than once refers back to Books IV and V as 'the previous section'.

Chapter II

The underlying idea of democracies is liberty. Liberty as conceived in democracies is twofold; it is partly political liberty, which means that all have a term of office and the will of all prevails; it is partly civil, and consists in 'living as you like'. The institutions involved by this idea, in the spheres of the executive, the judicature, and the deliberative; the payment of the people for political services, and the democratic objection to any long tenure of office. On the other hand, it is to be noted that a specially typical form of democracy (the agricultural or 'peasant' form?) may be based on an idea of justice which involves a general and all-round system of equality—i.e. a system which does not favour the poorer class.

§ 1. The underlying idea of the democratic type of constitution is liberty. (This, it is commonly said, can only be enjoyed in democracy; and this, it is also **1317 b** said, is the

said to constitute the 'idea' (or hypothesis) of democracy. The 'attributes' (or features, or characteristics), which have been previously mentioned, are the institutions through which democracies seek to realize this 'idea' in practice. In the next chapter Aristotle proceeds to study, in §§ 1–4, the idea or hypothesis of democracy—or, as we might say, 'the democratic cause'—and he then returns to the theme of the attributes or actual practices of democracy.

aim of every democracy.) Liberty has more than one form. One of its forms [is the political, which] consists in the interchange of ruling and being ruled. § 2. The democratic conception of justice[1] is the enjoyment of arithmetical equality, and not the enjoyment of proportionate equality on the basis of desert. On this arithmetical conception of justice the masses must necessarily be sovereign; the will of the majority must be ultimate and must be the expression of justice. The argument is that each citizen should be on an equality with the rest; and the result which follows in democracies is that the poor—they being in a majority, and the will of the majority being sovereign—are more sovereign than the rich. § 3. Such is the first form of liberty, which all democrats agree in making the aim of their sort of constitution. The other form [is the civil, which] consists in 'living as you like'. Such a life, the democrats argue, is the function of the free man, just as the function of slaves is *not* to live as they like. § 4. This is the second aim of democracy. Its issue is, ideally, freedom from any interference of government, and, failing that, such freedom as comes from the interchange of ruling and being ruled. It contributes, in this way, to a general system of liberty based on equality.

§ 5. Such being the idea of democracy, and the root from which it develops, we can now proceed to study its attributes or institutions. [Under the head of the executive], there is the election of officers *by* all, and *from* all; there is the system of all ruling over each, and each, in his turn, over all; there is the method of appointing by lot to all offices—or, at any rate, to all which do not require some practical experience and professional skill; there is the rule that there should be no property qualification for office—or, at any rate, the lowest possible; there is the rule that, apart from the military offices, no office should ever be held twice by the same person—or, at any rate, only on few occasions, and those relating only to a few offices; there is, finally, the rule that the tenure

[1] Aristotle assumes that the idea of liberty, on its political side, is ultimately based on the conception of justice (i.e. distributive justice)—see Book III, c. IX, and the note to § 3 of that chapter.

of every office—or, at any rate, of as many as possible—should be brief. [Under the head of the judicature], there is the system of popular courts, composed of all the citizens or of persons selected from all, and competent to decide all cases—or, at any rate, most of them, and those the greatest and most important, such as the audit of official accounts, constitutional issues, and matters of contract. [Under the head of the deliberative] there is the rule that the popular assembly should be sovereign in all matters—or, at any rate, in the most important; and conversely that the executive magistracies should be sovereign in none—or, at any rate, in as few as possible.

§ 6. Among the executive magistracies the one most popular in democracies is the Council,[1] wherever there are not adequate means for paying all the citizens to attend the popular assembly. If there *are* adequate means, the Council itself is deprived of its power; and the people, once it is furnished with pay, begins to take everything into its hands, as has already been noticed in the previous section of our inquiry.[2] § 7. This system of payment is a further attribute of democracy. The ideal is payment in every sphere—popular assembly, courts, and executive magistracies; but if that cannot be had, there will at any rate be payment for attending the courts, the council, and the stated meetings of the popular assembly, and also for serving on any board of magistrates—or, at the least, any board whose members are required to have a common table.[3] (It may be remarked that while oligarchy is characterized by good birth, wealth, and culture, the attributes of democracy would appear to be the very opposite—low birth, poverty, and vulgarity.)[4] § 8. Another

[1] It should be noticed that the council is included among the executive magistracies. At Athens it was a body of 500 members (chosen by lot, and paid for attendance) which not only prepared business for the popular assembly, but also managed the revenues and discharged other executive functions.

[2] Book IV, c. xv, §§ 12–13.

[3] The system of a common table was intended to keep the members of executive boards in close and constant contact. A 'subsistence allowance' for this purpose would seem to be something different from the payment of a salary.

[4] This sentence is bracketed by Newman and other editors.

attribute of democracy is to dispense with all life offices—or at least to curtail the powers of any such offices, **1318 a** if they have been left surviving from some earlier epoch of change, and to make appointments to any life office depend on the use of the lot and not on election.

§ 9. These are the attributes common to democracies generally. But if we look at the form of democracy and the sort of populace which is generally held to be specially typical, we have to connect it [not so much with these attributes, as] with the conception of justice which is the recognized democratic conception—that of equality of rights for all on an arithmetical basis.[1] Equality here *might* be taken to mean that the poorer class should exercise no greater authority than the rich, or, in other words, that sovereignty should not be exercised only by it, but equally vested in all the citizens on a numerical basis. If that were the interpretation followed, the upholders of democracy could afford to believe that equality—and liberty—was really achieved by their constitution.

Chapter III

How is equality to be secured in democracies? Should the basis be property, and should equal rights be given to equal amounts of property; or should it be personality? It may be suggested that property and personality should both be taken into account, and that sovereignty should rest with the will of a majority of persons who are also the owners of a majority of property.

§ 1. This raises the question, 'How is such equality actually to be secured?'[2] Should the assessed *properties* of the citizens

[1] Aristotle is here referring back to Book IV, c. iv, §§ 22–3, and repeating some of the phrases he had before used in that passage. In that passage it is the 'agricultural' form of democracy, and a populace of peasant farmers, which Aristotle describes. It is not clear whether, in the present section, 'the form of democracy and the sort of populace which is generally held to be specially typical' is the same as the agricultural form of democracy and a populace of peasant farmers. The similarity of the phrasing here to that of Book IV, c. iv, would suggest that they are. So, too, would the fact that Aristotle proceeds, in the next chapter of this book, to discuss the social basis of democracy, and then, in the next chapter after that, to describe and praise the agricultural form of democracy.

[2] See the note at the end of the chapter.

be divided into two equal blocks, but with one block containing 500 large and the other 1,000 small owners, and should the 1,000 and the 500 have equal voting power? Or, alternatively, should equality of this order [i.e. equality based on property, and not on personality] be calculated on some other system—a system, for example, by which properties are divided into two equal blocks, as before, but equal numbers of representatives are then selected from the 500 owners in the one block and the 1,000 in the other, and the representatives so selected are given control of the elections [of magistrates] and the law-courts?[1] § 2. [Either system means, in effect, the basing of the constitution on property.] Now is a constitution so based the one most in accordance with justice, as justice is conceived in democracies? Or is a constitution based on numbers [i.e. on *persons*, rather than property] more truly in accordance with justice? Democrats reply by saying that justice consists in the will of a majority of persons. Oligarchs reply by saying that it consists in the will of a majority of property owners, and that decisions should be taken on the basis of weight of property. § 3. Both of these answers involve inequality and injustice. If justice is made to consist in the will of the few [i.e. the few who own the greatest amount of property], tyranny is the logical result; for if we carry the oligarchical conception of justice to its logical consequence, a single person who owns more than all the other owners of property put together will have a just claim to be the sole ruler. If, on the other hand, justice is made to consist in the will of a majority of persons, that majority will be sure to act unjustly, as we have already noted,[2] and to confiscate the property of the rich minority.

§ 4. In this position we have to ask, in the light of the definitions of justice propounded by both sides, 'What is the sort of equality to which both sides can agree?' Both sides

[1] The difference of this system from the previous system is (1) that it involves the use of representation, and (2) that the representatives form a single body, while in the previous system the group of 1,000 and that of 500 would be two separate bodies. (For the idea of representation see Book IV, c. XIV, § 13, and note.)

[2] Book III, c. X, § 1.

affirm that the will of the major part of the civic body should be sovereign. We may accept that statement; but we cannot accept it without modification. [We may modify it as follows.] There are two classes which compose the state—the wealthy class and the poor. We may attribute sovereignty, accordingly, to the will of both these classes, or that of a majority of both. [This assumes that the wills, or the majority-wills, of the two classes are agreed.] Suppose, however, that the two classes are not agreed, and are resolved on conflicting measures. In that case we may attribute sovereignty to the will of a majority of persons *who are also the owners of a majority of property*.[1] § 5. We may give an illustration. Suppose that there are 10 in the wealthy class, and 20 in the poor; and suppose that 6 of the 10 have arrived at a decision conflicting with that of 15 of the 20. This means that the minority of 4 in the wealthy class agrees with the majority in the poorer class, and, again, that the minority of 5 in the poorer class agrees with the majority in the wealthy class. In that case sovereignty should rest with the will of that side [be it the side of the 6+5, of that of the 15+4] whose members, on both of its elements being added together, have property in excess of that belonging to the members of the other.[2] § 6. The result may, of course, be a deadlock, with both sides absolutely equal; but this presents no greater difficulties than those which ordinarily arise to-day when a popular assembly or a law court is equally divided. The remedy is decision by lot, or some other similar method.

1318 b To find theoretically where truth resides, in these matters of equality and justice, is a very difficult task. Difficult as it may be, it is an easier task than that of persuading

[1] This solution, Newman notes, is different from that of the oligarchs, 'because it takes account of the property of the poor, and adds it together [i.e. adds it in with that of the rich to determine who are the owners of a majority of property], whereas oligarchs would claim that the will of those who own property in large amounts should prevail'.

[2] There are thus, to begin with, two *classes*. From these two classes, when a vote is taken, there emerge two *sides*, each composed of *elements* drawn from both classes. You add up the properties of both the elements on one side, and then those of both the elements on the other, to determine the actual decision and the residence of sovereignty.

men to act justly, if they have power enough to secure their own selfish interests. The weaker are always anxious for equality and justice. The strong pay no heed to either.

Note on the basis of the franchise (property or personality)

The question which Aristotle proceeds to raise is whether equality should be calculated on the basis of property, or on that of personality. (In Book IV, c. IV, § 24, he has already suggested that there can be a variety of democracy which is based on property.) If equality is calculated on the basis of property, he proposes a general method of the classification of citizens, under which equal blocks of property carry equal weights, though the number of persons in each block is different. The proposal may remind us of the Prussian three-class system, as applied till the end of the war of 1914–18, under which there were three blocks of citizens, each equal in terms of property and voting power, but with one block containing only about 5 per cent. of the population, another about 15 per cent., and the third the remaining 80 per cent.

The system of equal blocks of assessed property was practised in fourth-century Athens, though not on the lines here suggested by Aristotle. About 377 B.C. the Athenians made a general assessment of property, real and personal, which amounted to some £1,400,000. All tax-payers were then divided into 100 'symmories' or blocks of equal aggregate wealth (as recorded in the assessment); and each block contributed an equal amount of the taxes required for the year, charging each member of the block with his quota (*Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. vi, p. 74).

CHAPTER IV

(a) *The agricultural form of democracy. It needs, in the interest of stability, a balance between the rights of the whole civic body and the rights of the propertied classes; and that balance may be secured* (1) *by giving to the whole civic body the three rights of electing the magistrates, calling them to account, and constituting the law-courts, and* (2) *by giving to the propertied classes the right to hold the more important magistracies. Methods may also be used for encouraging the growth of an agricultural population.* (b) *The pastoral form of democracy.* (c) *The form based on a populace of mechanics, shopkeepers, and day-labourers. This last form is too often connected with the policy of giving rights indiscriminately to all and sundry: it is a wiser policy to*

stop short at the point at which the strength of the masses just exceeds the combined strength of the upper and middle classes. Other policies which may also be followed in this form of democracy.

§ 1. Of the four varieties of democracy[1] the best, as has already been noted in the previous section of our inquiry, is the one that comes first in the order of classification. It is also the oldest of all the varieties. But the reason why it comes first is not that: it is a reason connected with the grading of the different kinds of populace. The first and best kind of populace is one of farmers;[2] and there is thus no difficulty in constructing a democracy where the bulk of the people live by arable or pastoral farming. § 2. Such people, not having any great amount of property, are busily occupied; and they have thus no time for attending the assembly. Not possessing the necessities of life, they stick to their work, and do not covet what does not belong to them; indeed they find more pleasure in work than they do in politics and government—unless there are large pickings to be got from having a finger in government. § 3. The masses covet profits more than they covet honours; witness the patience with which they bore the old-time tyrannies, and still continue to tolerate oligarchies if only they are allowed to get on with their work and are not robbed of their earnings. Give them the chance and they soon make their way—either up into riches, or, at any rate, out of poverty. § 4. Any craving which the masses may feel for position and power will be satisfied if they are given the right of electing magistrates and calling them to

[1] The discussion of justice, and equality, which runs from c. II, § 8, to the end of c. III, may seem something of a digression. (It has been bracketed as an interpolation by some editors; but hardly with good reason, for it logically follows on c. II and logically prepares the way for c. IV—see the note at the end of c. II.) Aristotle now returns to his specific theme—the proper method of constructing democracy, in the light of the statement of 'attributes' in c. II, §§ 5–8. But he first proceeds to distinguish again the four varieties of democracy (already distinguished and graded in Book IV, c. IV, §§ 22–31); and he does so because different methods of construction are needed for the different varieties.

[2] The agrarian (we may even say the anti-commercial and anti-industrial) trend of Aristotle's thought has already been expressed in the first book of the *Politics*, cc. IX–XI.

account. Indeed there are instances which show that the masses will be contented with a still smaller measure of power. We may cite the example of Mantinea, where the people did not enjoy the right of electing the magistrates (it was vested instead in persons selected from the body of the people on a system of rotation), but exercised, at any rate, the power of deliberation. § 5. Such a system [even if it gives only limited power to the people] must still be considered as a system of democracy, and it was such at Mantinea.[1]

On these general grounds we may argue that policy, as well as general practice, suggests a system of balance in the first [i.e. the agricultural] variety of democracy. On the one hand, all the citizens will enjoy the three rights of electing the magistrates, calling them to account, and sitting in the law-courts; on the other hand the most important offices will be filled by election, and confined to those who can satisfy a property qualification. The greater the importance of an office, the greater might be the property qualification required. Alternatively, no property qualification might be required for any office, but only men of capacity would actually be appointed. § 6. A state which is governed in this way will be sure to be well governed (its offices will always be in the hands of the best of its members, with the people giving its consent and bearing no grudge against persons of quality); and the men of quality and the notables will be sure to be satisfied, under a system which at once preserves them from being governed by other and inferior persons and ensures (by giving others the right to call them to account) that they will themselves govern justly. § 7. To be kept in such dependence, and to be denied the power of doing just as he pleases, is an advantage to any man. The power of acting at will leaves men with no defence **1319 a** against the evil impulses present

[1] This system of government at Mantinea, which Aristotle refers to the past, may perhaps be dated about 421 B.C. or nearly a century before his time. It has sometimes been described as an instance of the idea of representation. That description is incorrect. There was a primary assembly (not a representative body) for purposes of deliberation; and representatives, elected on some plan which Aristotle does not explain, were used only for the purpose of indirect election of the magistrates.

in all of us. Where there is responsibility, the result must always be an advantage of the first order in any constitution: government will be conducted by men of quality, and they will be saved from misconduct, while the masses will have their just rights.

§ 8. It is evident that this form of democracy [the form based on a farming populace] is the best; and the reason is also evident—that the populace on which it is based possesses a definite quality. In the creation of such a populace some of the laws which were generally current in earlier ages may all be of service—laws, for example, forbidding absolutely the acquisition of property in land beyond a certain amount, or, at any rate, forbidding it within a fixed distance from the city centre or the city boundaries. § 9. There used to be also laws, in a considerable number of states, prohibiting an owner from selling the allotment of land originally made to his family; there is also the law [at Elis], attributed to Oxylus, which prohibits, in effect, the raising of a mortgage on a certain proportion of any landowner's estate. [If there are no such laws, and the damage is already done], a law like that of Aphytis [a town near Salonica] should be adopted as a corrective, and as likely to help in securing the object we have in view. § 10. The inhabitants of Aphytis, although they combine a large population with a small territory, are all engaged in farming. The reason is that estates are not assessed as single units. Estates are divided, for purposes of assessment, into a number of sections; and the sections are small enough to ensure that even the poorer landowners will show an assessment exceeding the amount required [as a qualification for political rights].[1]

§ 11. Next to a populace of farmers, the best sort [as a basis for democracy] is a pastoral populace living by its herds and flocks. Many of their characteristics are similar to those of

[1] Aphytis required a property qualification, in terms of the assessed value of land, as a condition of the exercise of political rights. It pitched, and kept, this property qualification low, by means of the system described. The lowness of the qualification encouraged all its inhabitants to cling to the necessary minimum of land, and thus made them all farmers.

farmers; but with their robust physique, and their capacity for camping out in the open, they are specially trained and hardened into a good condition for war. § 12. The other kinds of populace, which form the basis of the other varieties of democracy, are almost without exception of a much poorer stamp. They lead a poor sort of life: and none of the occupations followed by a populace which consists of mechanics, shopkeepers, and day labourers, leaves any room for excellence. § 13. Revolving round the market-place[1] and the city centre, people of this class generally find it easy to attend the sessions of the popular assembly—unlike the farmers who, scattered through the country-side, neither meet so often nor feel so much the need for society of this sort. § 14. When [in addition to a populace of farmers or pastoralists] there is also the further advantage of a country-side which lies at a considerable distance from the city,[2] it is easy to construct a good democracy or a good 'polity'. The mass of the people are then compelled to fix their abode outside the city, on their lands; and even if there is still a mob left which lives round the market-place, a rule will have to be made, where the constitution is democratic, that there shall be no meetings of the popular assembly which cannot be attended by all the inhabitants of the country-side.

§ 15. It has now been shown how the first and best variety of democracy ought to be constructed. It is also clear, from what has been said, how the other varieties should be constituted. They should deviate [from the norm of the first variety] in successive stages, and by the inclusion,[3] at each, of a progressively poorer class.

1319 b The last variety, which includes all classes alike, is one that cannot be borne by all states, and can hardly itself

[1] 'The mechanics and the shopkeepers came to the market-place to sell what they had to sell, and the day-labourers to be hired' (Newman's note, vol. iv, p. 519).

[2] The city might, for instance, be on the coast, while the arable or pastoral land belonging to it lay at some distance inland.

[3] In the Greek Aristotle uses the word 'exclusion'—looking at the class *excluded* from the franchise, and regarding this excluded class as becoming poorer and poorer through the admission of more and more classes to the enjoyment of political rights.

endure, unless it is properly constituted in point of laws and customs. The causes which lead to the destruction of this as of other forms of government have already been, in the main, described [in the previous book]. § 16. In attempting its construction the leaders of popular parties usually follow the policy of seeking to strengthen the populace by simply increasing its numbers to the utmost possible extent. Citizenship is given not only to the lawfully born, but also to the illegitimate; it is given to those who have only one citizen parent, whether that parent be father or mother: in fact there is nothing of this order but will serve, in such a state, as so much grist for 'the people'. § 17. But if this is the policy of construction usually followed by demagogues, the policy which ought to be followed is different. Increase of numbers should stop at the point at which the masses just exceed the combined strength of the notables and the middle class. It should never go beyond this point. Any greater proportion will at once disturb the balance of the constitution; and it will also incite the notables to chafe still more against democracy—a state of feeling which led to the revolution in Cyrene. A small evil may be overlooked; but an evil which grows to large dimensions is always before men's eyes. § 18. Other measures which are also useful in constructing this last and most extreme type of democracy are measures like those introduced by Cleisthenes at Athens, when he sought to advance the cause of democracy, or those which were taken by the founders of popular government at Cyrene. § 19. This means that a number of new tribes and clans should be instituted by the side of the old; that private cults should be reduced in number and conducted at common centres;[1] and that every contrivance should be employed to make all the citizens mix, as much as they possibly can, and to break down their old loyalties. § 20. The measures adopted by tyrants may equally be regarded as all congenial to democracy [in

[1] 'The private cults' are those of tribes, clans, and sacrificial unions, some of which were celebrated in the private houses of the more influential members. Aristotle suggests the reduction of their number, and the holding of their celebrations in common centres.

its extreme form]. We may cite as an instance the licence allowed to slaves (which, up to a point, may be advantageous as well as congenial), and the licence permitted to women and children. We may also cite the policy of connivance at the practice of 'living as you like'. Such a policy ensures a large body of support for the constitution in which it is followed. Most men find more pleasure in living without any discipline than they find in a life of temperance.

CHAPTER V[1]

Besides constructing democracies on a sound basis, it is also necessary to ensure their permanence. The true policy is not one which guarantees the greatest possible amount of democracy, but one which guarantees its longest possible duration. Moderation is therefore advisable. On the one hand, the rich should not be alienated by a policy of confiscating their riches, and the system of payment for political services should be kept within modest bounds; on the other hand, measures should also be taken to improve the lot of the common people by a system of social services, both public and private.

§ 1. Legislators and would-be founders of any constitution of this type [i.e. the type of extreme democracy] will find that the work of construction is not their only or principal business. The maintenance of a constitution is the thing which really matters. A state may last for two or three days under any kind of constitution; [the real test is the test of survival]. § 2. Legislators should therefore direct their attention to the causes which lead to the preservation and the destruction of constitutions—a theme which has already been treated—and on that basis they should devote their effort to the construction

[1] In this chapter Aristotle deserts the general theme of Book VI (which is the theme of construction), and reverts to the theme of preservation already treated in Book V. The reason would appear to be that in Book V, cc. VIII–IX, the theme of preservation had only been handled in general terms, and without specific reference to particular constitutions (except for the treatment of 'monarchies' in c. XI); and thus Aristotle is now led to handle the theme with particular reference to democracy, and especially to extreme democracy—the more, as this form of constitution was now the general and current form.

of stability.[1] They must be on their guard against all the elements of destruction; they must leave their state with a body of laws, 1320 a customary as well as enacted, which will include, above everything else, all the elements of preservation; they must believe that the true policy, for democracy and oligarchy alike, is not one which ensures the greatest possible amount of either, but one which will ensure the longest possible life for both. § 3. The demagogues of our own day, zealous to please the peoples of their states, cause a large amount of property to be confiscated to public use by means of the law-courts.[2] Those who care for the well-being of their constitution should labour to correct such practices. They should have a law passed which prevents the fines imposed in law-courts from becoming public property or being paid into the treasury, and makes them, instead of that, temple-property. Wrongdoers would not, in that case, be any more heedless than they are now (they would still have to pay the same fine), and the people, having nothing to gain, would be less inclined to condemn all defendants. § 4. Public prosecutions should also be made as few as possible; and heavy fines should be used to deter prosecutors from bringing them at random. Such prosecutions are usually brought against notables only, and not against those who belong to the popular party; but the proper policy, wherever it can be pursued, is to keep all citizens alike attached to the constitution and the government under it, or at any rate, failing that, to prevent any citizen from regarding the government as his enemy.

§ 5. Extreme democracies are generally to be found in populous states, where it is difficult to get the citizens to attend the popular assembly without a system of payment. Such a system bears hardly on the notables—unless a state

[1] These words repeat the keyword of Book VI (the word 'construction'); they repeat it, however, not in regard to constitution-making, which in Aristotle's sober thought is the less important matter, but in regard to constitution-keeping.

[2] The Greek word for 'confiscate' (which literally means 'to make public') comes from the same root as the word for 'people'. The popular law-courts could easily be used to transfer property from private hands into the hands of the people.

has already in hand sufficient revenues to pay its cost. The necessary funds have to be procured by a tax on property, by confiscation, and through the agency of bad law-courts; and these are all methods which have led in the past to the overthrow of many democracies. This suggests that, unless there are sufficient revenues already in hand, the meetings of the popular assembly should be infrequent, and the number of sittings of the popular law-courts should be as small as their membership is large. § 6. If the sittings of the court are thus restricted, two advantages will ensue. In the first place, the wealthier classes will cease to fear the expenditure involved —the more if it is only the poor, and not also the well-to-do, who are allowed to receive any pay; and secondly, the cases before the courts will be much better decided, as the rich (who do not care to be absent from their business for days together, but do not mind a short absence) will now be willing to attend. § 7. When, on the other hand, a state has sufficient revenues to defray the cost of a system of payment, [they should be husbanded for that purpose, and] the policy nowadays followed by demagogues should be avoided. It is their habit to distribute any surplus among the people; and the people, in the act of taking, ask for the same again. To help the poor in this way is to fill a leaky jar. . . . Yet it is the duty of a genuine democrat to see to it that the masses are not excessively poor. § 8. Poverty is the cause of the defects of democracy. That is the reason why measures should be taken to ensure a permanent level of prosperity. This is in the interest of all classes, including the prosperous themselves; and therefore the proper policy is to accumulate any surplus revenue in a fund, and then to distribute this fund in block grants to the poor. The ideal method of distribution, if a sufficient fund can be accumulated, is to make such grants sufficient for the purchase of a plot of land: failing that, they should be large enough to start men in commerce **1320 b** or agriculture. § 9. If such grants cannot be made to all the poor simultaneously, they should be distributed successively, by tribes or other divisions: and meanwhile the rich should contribute a sum sufficient to provide the poor

with payment for their attendance at the obligatory meetings of the assembly, and should be excused, in return, from the rendering of useless public services [such as the equipping of choruses at dramatic festivals].[1] It is by a policy of this general nature that the Carthaginian government has secured the goodwill of the people. It sends persons drawn from the ranks of the people regularly to the provincial towns, and thus enables them to become prosperous.[2] § 10. Notables who are men of feeling and good sense may also undertake the duty of helping the poor to find occupations—each taking charge of a group, and each giving a grant to enable the members of his group to make a start.[3] The example of the citizens of Tarentum may also be commended for imitation: the well-to-do share with the poor the use of their property, and thereby conciliate the goodwill of the masses.[4] § 11. The Tarentines have also divided all magistracies into two classes —one with appointments made by election, and the other with appointments made by lot—in the idea that the latter will give the people a share in office, while the former will help to ensure a better administration. The same result may also be achieved by dividing the members of each board of magistrates into two classes—an elected class, and a class appointed by lot.

[1] This scheme of what we should nowadays call 'public social services' is notable. It is a scheme of constructive public assistance, designed less to furnish relief in cases of destitution than to provide a capital sum which will enable men to set themselves up in life. It may be noted that Athens had actually something of a scheme of public assistance, though only for the relief of destitution, as Aristotle notes in his *Constitution of Athens* (c. XLIX, § 4): 'There is a law to the effect that persons with less than 3 minas, who are so crippled in body as to be unable to work, should be examined by the council and then given 2 obols a day from the public funds for their support.'

[2] Apparently they were given some sort of office, and official emoluments, in the provincial towns (see Book II, c. XI, § 15).

[3] Here Aristotle adds a scheme of 'voluntary social service' to his previous scheme of 'public social services' or constructive public assistance.

[4] This passage may remind us of Aristotle's formula for the proper conception of property—'Property several; use of it communal' (Book II, c. V, §§ 5–8).

II

THE CONSTRUCTION OF OLIGARCHIES (cc. VI–VIII)

CHAPTER VI

The best sort of oligarchy will answer to the best, or agricultural, sort of democracy: it will require a moderate property qualification for the holding of any office. The last form of oligarchy, answering to the last, or 'extreme', form of democracy, needs the greatest vigilance. Generally, while democracies rely on quantity or numbers, oligarchies ought to rely on the quality of their organization.

§ 1. We have now explained how democracies should be constructed; and in doing so we have virtually shown how oligarchies ought to be constituted. Each variety of oligarchy should be framed on the principle of opposites—that is to say, the structure of each should be calculated by that of the corresponding variety of democracy. The first and best balanced of oligarchies [will thus answer to the first and best of democracies. Indeed, it] is closely akin to the constitution which goes by the name of 'polity'.[1] § 2. In an oligarchy of this type there should be two separate assessment rolls, a higher and a lower. Entry in the lower roll should qualify men for appointment to the lowest offices that have to be filled; but entry in the higher should be required for appointment to the more important. On the other hand, any person who acquires sufficient property to be put on an assessment roll should be given constitutional rights; and by this means a sufficient number of the people at large will be admitted to make those who enjoy rights in the state a stronger body than those who do not. § 3. The persons newly admitted to

[1] Aristotle begins by arguing, logically, that each variety of oligarchy should correspond to, and be the opposite of, the parallel variety of democracy. But the logical argument would appear to be abandoned, and abandoned instantly, when he deals with the first and best form of oligarchy. Actually this variety is *not* opposed to the first and best variety of democracy. We are told that it is near to polity, which in turn is near to the first and best variety of democracy. There is thus similarity, rather than opposition, between the first variety of democracy and the corresponding variety of oligarchy.

rights should always be drawn from the better sections of the people.

The next succeeding variety of oligarchy should be constructed on lines like the first, but with some little tightening [of the qualifications required for office]. Eventually we shall reach the variety of oligarchy which corresponds to extreme democracy. This is the type of oligarchy which is most in the nature of a ruling clique and most akin to tyranny; and, as it is worst of all, it requires all the greater vigilance. § 4. A man with a healthy physique can afford to run risks: a ship suited for navigation, with a good crew on board, can survive a number of mishaps without being sent to the bottom; but a man of feeble and sickly physique, or a ship badly jointed and poorly manned, cannot face even a slight misadventure. Just the same is true of constitutions: the worst need the greatest 1321 a vigilance. § 5. In democracies the size of the population is generally the saving factor; and with them numbers serve in lieu of the opposite factor—a system of distributive justice on the basis of merit—[which preserves better constitutions]. Oligarchies, on the other hand, must obviously seek security by a method which is the opposite of that of democracies—the quality of their organization.[1]

Chapter VII

Military factors have an important bearing on oligarchies. A cavalry force is favourable to a strict form of oligarchy; on the other hand, light-armed troops and naval forces are favourable to democracy. It is a wise policy for an oligarchy to train its own members to serve as light-armed troops. Oligarchies will also do well to give the masses some share in the government, and to require their more important officials to perform unpaid public services. In a word, they should direct themselves by the idea of public service rather than by that of private profit.

§ 1. Just as there are four chief divisions of the mass of the population—farmers, mechanics, shopkeepers, and day-

[1] In other words, they must organize the distribution of office and honours on a system of distributive justice based on the standard of merit.

labourers—so there are also four kinds of military forces—cavalry, heavy infantry, light-armed troops, and the navy. Where a territory is suitable for the use of cavalry, there is a favourable ground for the construction of a strong form of oligarchy:[1] the inhabitants of such a territory need a cavalry force for security, and it is only men of large means who can afford to breed and keep horses. Where a territory is suitable for the use of heavy infantry, the next [and less exclusive] variety of oligarchy is natural; service in the heavy infantry is a matter for the well-to-do rather than for the poor. § 2. Light-armed troops, and the navy, are [drawn from the mass of the people, and are thus] wholly on the side of democracy; and in our days—with light-armed troops and naval forces as large as they are—the oligarchical side is generally worsted in any civil dispute. This situation should be met, and remedied, by following the practice of some military commanders, who combine an appropriate number of light-armed troops with the cavalry and heavy infantry.[2] § 3. The reason why the masses can defeat the wealthier classes, in any civil dissension, is that a light-armed and mobile force finds it easy to cope with a force of cavalry and heavy infantry. An oligarchy which builds up a light-armed force exclusively from the masses is thus only building up a challenge to itself. [The system of recruitment should be altered.] A distinction of age-groups should be made; and while they are in the lower age-group, the sons of oligarchs should also be

[1] The connexion between military and constitutional development has already been treated in Book IV, c. III, §§ 1–3. (In that passage, as here, Aristotle begins by connecting social with military divisions, and then proceeds to connect military development with constitutional—his idea being that social, military, and constitutional factors are all interconnected.) On the historical connexion between changes of military methods and the constitutional development of the city states of ancient Greece see the *Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. iii, pp. 695–6.

[2] Aristotle does not mean that the practice should be exactly followed. He is using an analogy loosely. What he really means, as he proceeds to explain, is that young men of the upper classes, from which cavalry and heavy infantry are drawn, should be trained as light-armed infantry, in order that they may act with their friends in the event of civil dissension. This will prevent the whole of the light infantry from being composed of the lower classes—though it will not prevent the whole of the cavalry and heavy infantry from being composed of the upper.

instructed [along with the sons of the poor] in light-infantry drill and weapons. They will then be able, when they are moved up into the higher age-groups, to perform themselves, in actual practice, the duties of a light infantry.

§ 4. There are various ways in which an oligarchy may give the masses some place in the civic body.[1] One way, which has already been mentioned (c. VI, § 2), is that the right of holding office should be given to any man who acquires sufficient property to put him on the assessment roll. Another way, of which Thebes affords an example, is that the right should be given to those who have not followed any mechanical occupation for a number of years. A third way, which is that followed at Massalia, is to compile a list of all who are worthy of office, whether or no they have at the time a place in the civic body.

§ 5. [There are some other measures which should also be taken to construct a good oligarchy.] The most important offices, which must necessarily be held by full citizens,[2] should involve the duty of performing unpaid public services. This will have the effect of making the people willing to acquiesce in their own exclusion from such offices, and it will make them ready to tolerate officials who pay so heavy a price for the privilege. § 6. These higher officials may also be properly expected to offer magnificent sacrifices on their entry into their office, and to erect some public building during its course. The people—sharing in these entertainments, and seeing their city decorated with votive ornaments and edifices—will readily tolerate the survival of oligarchy; and the notables will have their reward in visible memorials of their own outlay. § 7. But it is not this policy which is pursued by the oligarchs of our days. Their policy is the very opposite; they covet profit as well as honour: and from this

[1] The arrangement of this chapter is somewhat composite. It begins as though it were to be exclusively concerned with the military system proper to oligarchies. It ends by going back to the constitutional method which should be followed in constructing a good form of oligarchy—a theme already handled at the beginning of the previous chapter.

[2] In the previous chapter, § 2, Aristotle has suggested that the most important offices should be confined to the citizens who have a higher property qualification.

point of view oligarchy may well be described as democracy 'writ small'.

Chapter VIII

A study of the best modes of organizing the executive offices in states generally. A first list of the six indispensable offices which are required for the performance of the minimum functions of a state. A second list of the four more important offices, which are concerned with more important functions and require a higher capacity—military command, the control of finance, the preparation of business for the deliberative body, and the direction of public worship. A final classification of all offices under a number of heads, according to the general character of their functions.

1321 b § 1. This may suffice as an account of the methods which ought to be followed in constructing democracies and oligarchies. It leads us on naturally to consider the right distribution of the executive offices, and to examine their number, their nature, and the functions proper to each—a subject which has already been treated in a previous passage.[1] No state can exist at all in the absence of those offices which are absolutely indispensable; no properly governed state can exist in the absence of those which ensure good organization and order. § 2. [This is one general rule.] It is another that there should be fewer offices in small and a greater number in large states, as indeed we have already noted;[2] and accordingly we must not omit to consider which offices can be conjoined, and which ought to be kept separate.

[There follows a list of the six indispensable offices in a Polis—(1) that of the superintendent of the market-place; (2) that of the city-superintendent; (3) that of the rural inspectors; (4) the office for the receipt and disbursement of public funds; (5) the office for the registration of private contracts and judicial decisions; (6) the office charged with the execution of sentences on offenders.]

§ 13. . . . These six offices must be ranked first, as being the

[1] See the note at the end of the chapter.
[2] In Book IV, c. xv, §§ 6–7.

most indispensable [though not the highest]. Next in order come a number of other offices, which are also indispensable, but of a higher order of importance. They are offices which require a large experience and a high degree of fidelity. § 14. We may count among them, first and foremost, the offices charged with the defence of the city, and any others intended for military purposes. In peace as well as in war, there must be persons to superintend the defence of the city's gates and walls, and to inspect and drill its citizens. Some states have a number of different offices to deal with these various duties, others have only a few, and small states may even be content with a single office to deal with them all. § 15. The holders of these offices are commonly called generals or commandants. 1322 b Where there are separate forces of cavalry, light-armed troops, archers, and marines, each of them is sometimes placed under a separate command; and the officer commanding is then termed admiral, or general of horse, or general of the light forces. Their subordinate officers, in turn, are termed naval captains, captains of horse, and company commanders; and corresponding titles are given to the officers commanding smaller sections. The whole of this organization forms a single department—that of military command.

§ 16. From the organization of military command, as it has just been described, we may next turn to the organization of finance. Several of the offices of a state, if not all, handle large amounts of public money. There must accordingly be a separate office for finance [i.e. a treasury department] which receives and audits the accounts of other offices, and is only concerned with this one function. The holders of this office go by different names in different places—auditors, accountants, examiners, or advocates of the fisc.

§ 17. Besides the various offices already mentioned, there is another which controls, more than any other office, the whole range of public affairs. The office in question is one which, in a large number of states, possesses the double power of introducing matters [to the assembly] and of bringing them to completion. Short of that, and where the people itself is in control, it presides over the assembly; for there must be a

body to act as convener to the controlling authority of the constitution. The holders of this office are in some states called *Probouloi*, or the preliminary council, because they initiate deliberation;[1] but where there is a popular assembly they are called the *Boulē* or Council.

§ 18. Such is the general nature of the main political offices. But there is also another province of affairs, which is concerned with the cult of the civic deities; and this requires officers such as priests and custodians of temples—custodians charged with the maintenance and repair of fabrics and the management of any other property assigned to the service of the gods. § 19. Occasionally (for example, in small states) the whole of this province is assigned to a single office; in other states it may be divided among a number of offices, and apart from priests there may also be the superintendents of sacrifices, the guardians of shrines, and the stewards of religious property. § 20. Closely related to these various offices there may also be a separate office, charged with the management of all public sacrifices which have the distinction of being celebrated on the city's common hearth, and, as such, are not legally assigned to the priests.[2] The holders of this office are in some states called archon, in others king,[3] and in others prytaneis.

§ 21. The offices required in all states may be summarily classified on the basis of their various functions.[4] First, there

[1] On the nature of *Probouloi* see Book IV, c. XIV, §§ 14–16, and c. XV, §§ 11–12 (with the note on § 12). It would appear to be assumed in this passage that where there is only a council, and not a popular assembly, a preluminary council will be needed to initiate matters for the council: where there is both a council and an assembly, the council will initiate matters for the assembly, and no preliminary council will be needed.

[2] The common hearth of a state was in the prytaneum. This was a building consecrated to the goddess of the hearth, in which a perpetual fire was kept burning in her honour; here the magistrates resided and maintained a common table.

[3] The title of king was sometimes kept, even after the disappearance of monarchy, with a religious significance—the early kings having been always priests as well as secular rulers (Book III, c. XIV, § 14).

[4] Aristotle follows in this passage a different order of classification from that followed in the earlier part of the chapter. Previously he had classified offices in an ascending scale of importance. Here he classifies them in four

are the functions connected with public worship, military matters, and revenue and expenditure. Secondly, there are those connected with the market-place, the city-centre, the harbours, and the country-side. Thirdly, there are the functions connected with the law-courts, the registration of contracts, the enforcement of penalties, the custody of prisoners, and the reviewing, scrutiny, and audit of the accounts of magistrates. Finally, there are the functions connected with deliberation on public affairs. § 22. In addition there are offices peculiar to certain states which have a more leisured character and a greater degree of prosperity, and concern themselves with good discipline—offices for the supervision of women; for enforcing obedience to law; for the supervision of 1323 a children; and for the control of physical training. We may also include the office for the superintendence of athletic contests and dramatic competitions and all other similar spectacles. § 23. Some of these offices—those for the supervision of women and children, for example—are clearly out of place in a democracy: the poor man, not having slaves, is compelled to use his wife and children as followers and attendants.[1]

§ 24. There are three sorts of offices concerned with the conduct of the elections made by the electoral body to the highest magistracies. The first is the Guardians of the Law: the second, the Probouloi; and the third, the Boulē. The first is appropriate to aristocracy, the second to oligarchy, the third to democracy.

We have now given a sketch, in outline, of almost every kind of office; but.[2]

main categories determined by the subject-matter with which they deal—the general category of worship, war, and finance; the category of local affairs; the category of legal business; and the category of public deliberation.

[1] Newman notes, very justly, that this passage shows the error of the view 'that a Greek democracy was virtually an aristocracy, inasmuch as most, if not all, of the citizens would be the owners of one or more slaves' (vol. iv, p. 567). Aristotle here notes that the poor had no slaves; and the poor, as he states again and again in the *Politics*, were the majority in a democracy.

[2] The chapter ends in an unfinished state. § 24 seems to be a mere jotting; and the last sentence finishes in the middle.

Note on the relation of Book VI, c. VIII, *to* Book IV, c. XV

The previous passage is Book IV, c. xv. It is somewhat puzzling that there should be two different treatments of the same theme; nor can there be said to be any correlation of the two different treatments. Aristotle's first treatment is somewhat dry and analytical: the treatment in the present passage is more concrete, more practical, and more realistic. Here 'he bases his classification of magistracies on the practice of Greek states: he follows this in separating military from civil functions, for this was the general rule, at any rate in democratic states; he follows it also in instituting magistrates for the audit of the accounts of outgoing officeholders, and in reserving the initiative for the Boulē (Council) and its equivalents' (Newman, vol. IV, p. 54). Generally, it may be said that the account of the magistracies given here is closely related to the actual practice of Greek oligarchies and democracies (especially, perhaps, the latter); and in this sense it may be said to follow naturally, as Aristotle remarks, on the account he has previously given of the proper methods of constructing these constitutions.

BOOK VII

POLITICAL IDEALS AND EDUCATIONAL PRINCIPLES

A

POLITICAL IDEALS: THE NATURE OF THE HIGHEST GOOD AND OF THE BEST AND HAPPIEST LIFE (cc. I–III)

Chapter I

The three 'goods'—external goods; goods of the body; and goods of the soul. The primacy of the goods of the soul is attested by experience and evinced by philosophy: the possession of such goods —courage, wisdom, and the other virtues—'lies not in our stars, but in ourselves'; and it is, for states as well as for individuals, the condition and the cause of the best and happiest life. We thus come to the conclusion that 'the best way of life, both for states and for individuals, is the life of goodness, duly equipped with such a store of requisites—i.e. external goods and goods of the body—as makes it possible to share in the activities of goodness'.

1323 a 14 § 1. Before we can undertake properly the investigation of our next theme—the nature of an ideal constitution—it is necessary for us first to determine the nature of the most desirable way of life.[1] As long as that is obscure, the nature of the ideal constitution must also remain obscure. [The two things are essentially interconnected]; and we may thus expect that—unless something unexpected happens—the best way of life will go together with the best constitution possible in the circumstances of the case.[2] § 2. We must

[1] These words, as has already been noted, are a repetition of the concluding words of Book III. Their argument may be illustrated from Book IV, c. XI, § 3: 'A constitution is a way of life followed by a citizen-body.' If this be the case, an ideal constitution for a citizen-body involves the most desirable way of life for that body.

[2] It is not quite clear, as Newman notes, why Aristotle adds these words of qualification. The ideal constitution, as he has argued before and argues again in this book, is the absolutely best, and not the best which is 'possible in the circumstances of the case'. It presupposes ideal conditions or circumstances (in other words, an ideal social basis), and it is not adjusted to given conditions or circumstances, such as an imperfect and heterogeneous society.

therefore, first of all, find some agreed conception of the way of life which is most desirable for all men and in all cases; and we must then discover whether or no the same way of life is desirable in the case of the community as in that of the individual.

The nature of the best life is a theme which has already been treated by us in works intended for the general public.[1] Much of what has been said there may be considered adequate, and we must use it here. § 3. There is one classification of the constituent elements of the best life which it is certain that no one would challenge. This is the classification of these elements into external goods; goods of the body; and goods of the soul. It will also be generally agreed that *all* of these different 'goods' should belong to the happy man.[2] § 4. No one would call a man happy who had no particle of fortitude, temperance, justice, or wisdom [i.e. none of the goods of the soul]:[3] who feared the flies buzzing about his head; who abstained from none of the extremest forms of extravagance whenever he felt hungry or thirsty; who would ruin his dearest friends for the sake of a farthing; whose mind was as senseless, and as much astray, as that of a child or a madman. § 5. These are all propositions which would be accepted by nearly everybody as soon as they were stated. But differences begin to arise when we ask, 'How much of each good should men have? And what is the relative superiority of one good over another?' Any modicum of goodness [i.e. of the 'goods of the soul'] is regarded as adequate; but wealth and property, power, reputation, and all such things, are coveted to an excess which knows no bounds or limits. § 6. There is an

[1] Literally 'exoteric discourses': see Book III, c. VI, § 5 and note. We may guess that the rest of this chapter is a quotation or summary of these discourses.

[2] The word 'happy' fails to give a just idea of the Greek. The word which Aristotle uses here (*makarios*) is perhaps even stronger than a similar word which he uses more frequently (*eudaimōn*); but both words signify the supreme happiness which is of the nature of what we may call 'felicity'—the happiness springing from a full excellence (*aretē*) of 'mind, body, and estate', without which it cannot exist (c. IX, § 3 of this book).

[3] These are 'the four virtues', in the current Greek classification. The four 'extremes' that follow are the corresponding extremes of cowardice, intemperance, injustice, and folly.

answer which can be given to men who act in this way. 'The facts themselves make it easy for you to assure yourselves on these issues. You can see for yourselves that the goods of the soul are not gained or maintained by external goods. It is the other way round. You can see for yourselves 1323 b that felicity—no matter whether men find it in pleasure, or goodness, or both of the two—belongs more to those who have cultivated their character and mind to the uttermost, and kept acquisition of external goods within moderate limits, than it does to those who have managed to acquire more external goods than they can possibly use, and are lacking in the goods of the soul.' [That is the answer given by actual experience of life.] But the problem can also be easily solved if we consider it theoretically.

§ 7. External goods, like all other instruments, have a necessary limit of size.[1] Indeed all things of utility [including the goods of the body as well as external goods] are of this character; and any excessive amount of such things must either cause its possessor some injury, or, at any rate, bring him no benefit. [It is the opposite with the goods of the soul.] The greater the amount of each of the goods of the soul, the greater is its utility[2]—if indeed it is proper to predicate 'utility' at all here, and we ought not simply to predicate 'value'. § 8. In general terms, we are clearly entitled to lay down this proposition: 'The best state of thing *A* is to the best state of thing *B*, as thing *A* itself is to thing *B*.'[3] If, therefore, the soul is a thing more precious—intrinsically as well as in relation to us—than either our property or our body, the best state of the soul must necessarily bear the same relation to the best state of either our property or our body. § 9. Let us add that it is for the sake of the soul that these other

[1] This is a doctrine which is stated more fully below, c. IV, § 10.

[2] Shakespeare says of love what Aristotle says of the goods of the soul:

> My bounty is as boundless as the sea,
> My love as deep: the more I give to thee,
> The more I have, for both are infinite.

[3] This is a paraphrase rather than a translation. Newman translates (vol. iii, p. 315): 'The best state of every individual thing, if we match one against another, corresponds, in respect of superiority, to the distance between the things of which we say that these very states are states.'

things [property and health of the body] are desirable, and should accordingly be desired by every man of good sense—not the soul for the sake of them.

§ 10. We may therefore join in agreeing that the amount of felicity which falls to the lot of each individual man is equal to the amount of his goodness and his wisdom, and of the good and wise acts that he does. The nature of God Himself bears witness to this conclusion. He is happy and blessed; but He is so in and by Himself, by reason of the nature of His being, and not by virtue of any external good. This will explain why there must always be a difference between being happy and being fortunate. Accident and chance are causes of the goods external to the soul [and therefore of men's being fortunate]; but no man can be just and temperate [and therefore happy] merely by accident or simply through chance.

§ 11. Next in order, and based on the same general train of reasoning, comes the principle that [what is true of the felicity of individuals is also true of that of communities, and that therefore] the state which is morally best is the state which is happy and 'does well'.[1] To 'do well' is impossible unless you also 'do right'; and there can be no doing right for a state, any more than there can be for an individual, in the absence of goodness and wisdom. § 12. The fortitude of a state, and the justice and wisdom of a state, have the same energy, and the same character, as the qualities which cause individuals who have them to be called brave, just, and wise.[2]

§ 13. These observations may serve, at any rate so far as they go, as a philosophical preface to our argument. They deal with matters on which it is impossible not to touch; but

[1] See the note at the end of the chapter.

[2] The argument of this section, as Newman notes, is that 'the happiness of a state, like that of an individual, cannot exist apart from the moral and intellectual virtues, and action in accordance with them: its happiness is inseparable from the very same virtues with which happiness is associated in the individual'. Aristotle naturally advances from the proposition of § 10, that each individual has as much happiness as he has goodness, to the proposition here stated, that each state also has as much happiness as it has goodness. If the two propositions are put together, they imply (as Aristotle proceeds to state explicitly at the beginning of the next chapter) that the happiness of the state is the same as that of the individual.

it is equally impossible to develop here the whole of the argument which is involved. That is a matter for another and different branch of study. Here it may be sufficient to lay down this proposition: 'The best way of life, for individuals severally as well as for states collectively, is the life of goodness duly equipped with such a store of requisites [i.e. of external goods and of the goods of the body] as **1324 a** makes it possible to share in the activities of goodness.'[1] § 14. The proposition may conceivably be challenged; but we must leave the matter there—so far as our present inquiry is concerned—and defer to a later occasion any attempt to answer the arguments of those who refuse to accept our views.

Note on the connexion of felicity and goodness

The phrase in the Greek, translated by the words 'does well', is a phrase used in a double sense—the sense of 'faring well' or 'succeeding', and the sense of 'behaving well' or 'doing right'. The two senses are closely connected; and the connexion implies that 'faring well' is the result of 'behaving well', or that happiness comes from goodness. The connexion between happiness and goodness is the theme of Aristotle's verses on Plato (*Fragmenta*, ed. Rose, no. 673): Plato, he writes, was the only man, or the first, who clearly showed by his own life and the arguments of his writings that man attains goodness and happiness together. The connexion also forms the theme of his verses on Hermias of Atarneus (ibid., no. 675): goodness brings to the mind a harvest undying, better than gold, better than ancestors, better than soft-eyed sleep.

Chapter II

Assuming that the best way of life, alike for the state and for the individual, is the life of goodness, we may go on to raise the question whether the life of goodness consists more in external

[1] It will be noticed that here, as also in § 10, Aristotle lays stress on action. Goodness means good actions as well as a good disposition. . . . It will also be noticed that active goodness requires, in Aristotle's view, a *chorēgia* or equipment—enough of 'external goods' for active liberality, and even for munificence; enough of 'the goods of the body' (health and general fitness) for active fortitude and temperance. Moral and intellectual virtue, as we are told in the *Ethics* (Book X, c. VIII, § 4), both need an external equipment. (And yet, as we are also told in the *Ethics* (Book I, c. X, § 12), even in the absence of such equipment 'nobility shines through, when a man calmly bears a flood of heavy troubles'.)

action, or more in internal development. So far as states are concerned, we are presented with a choice between (a) *the life of politics and action, which issues in the assumption of authority over other states, and* (b) *the life of the self-contained state, engaged in developing its own resources and culture. The former ideal is illustrated by Sparta, and by other military and imperialist states; but it raises doubts in the mind when one reflects on the ethics of conquest and the claims of liberty. The conclusion which suggests itself is that while a state should put itself in a position to maintain its own independence, military activity is only a means to the highest good, which is partnership in a good life and the felicity of that life.*

§ 1. It remains to discuss whether the felicity of the state is the same as that of the individual, or different.[1] The answer is clear [if only we look at the verdict of general opinion]: *all* are agreed that they are the same.[2] § 2. The men who believe that the well-being of the individual consists in his wealth, will also believe that the state as a whole is happy when it is wealthy. The men who rank the life of a tyrant higher than any other will also rank the state which possesses the largest empire as being the happiest state. The man who grades [the felicity of] individuals by their goodness will also regard the felicity of states as proportionate to their goodness.

§ 3. Two questions arise at this point which both need consideration. The first is, 'Which way of life is the more desirable—to join with other citizens and share in the state's activity, or to live in it like an alien, absolved from the ties of

[1] This, as we have noted above (note on c. 1, § 12), has already been implied by the course of Aristotle's argument. Here he makes the point explicitly—arguing that, as a matter of fact, all schools of opinion are agreed in identifying the happiness of the state with that of the individual. Different schools have different conceptions of the nature of happiness. Some, like Aristotle himself, make it consist in goodness: some make it consist in wealth: some make it consist in power. Whatever the difference between their conceptions, all are agreed in believing that what is happiness for the individual (be it goodness, or wealth, or power) is also happiness for the state.

[2] In matters of ethics Aristotle appeals to the *consensus mundi* as the final court: 'what all hold, *is*' (*Ethics*, Book X, c. 11, § 4). This is in the same vein as his appeal to facts and experience in the previous chapter of this Book.

political society?' The second is, 'Which is the best constitution and the best disposition of a state—no matter whether we assume that a share in its activity is desirable for all, or regard it as desirable for the majority only?'[1]

§ 4. This second question—unlike the first, which raises the issue of what is good for the individual—is a matter for political thought and political speculation; and as we are now engaged on a discussion which belongs to that field, we may regard it as falling within the scope of our present inquiry[2]—as the other question can hardly be said to do. § 5. There is one thing clear about the best constitution: it must be a political organization which will enable all sorts of men [e.g. the 'contemplative' as well as the 'practical'] to be at their best and live happily. But if that is clear, there is another point on which opinions diverge. Even those who agree in holding that the good life is most desirable are divided upon the issue, 'Which way of life is the more desirable? The way of politics and action? Or the way of detachment from all external things—the way, let us say, of contemplation, which some regard as the only way that is worthy of a philosopher?' § 6. Here, we may say, are the two ways of life—the political and the philosophic—that are evidently chosen by those who have been most eager to win a reputation for goodness, in our own and in previous ages. It is a matter of no small moment on which of the two sides truth lies: for whether individuals[3] or states are in question, it is always the duty of wisdom to aim at the higher mark. § 7. There are some who dislike the exercise of authority over neighbouring states. They regard it as the height of injustice when the authority is despotic:

[1] See the note at the end of the chapter.

[2] 'Inquiry' (in the Greek *methodos*) denotes the general theme which forms the subject of a book (or books) of the *Politics*. Here the *methodos* is that of Books VII and VIII.

[3] Aristotle here appears to glide back into the question of the more desirable life for the individual—a question which in § 4 he had dismissed as irrelevant. But he only appears to do so. Actually, he is concerned with the more desirable life for the state, and with the form of political constitution which such a life requires; and it is only incidentally that he mentions the individual. The real question throughout this chapter is whether a *state* should devote itself to internal cultivation or to external aggrandizement.

they still regard it as a hindrance to one's own well-being, if not as an injustice to others, when the authority is constitutional. [This is a view which inclines to the idea of a self-contained state, developing its own inner life.] Others again take an opposite view: they hold that the practical and political life is the only life for a man: they believe that a private life gives no more scope for action **1324 b** in any of the fields of goodness [courage, temperance, justice, and wisdom] than the life of public affairs and political interests. § 8. Some of the advocates of the practical and political life are willing to stop at this point: others go farther, and argue that the despotic and tyrannical form of constitution is the only one which gives felicity; and indeed there are states where the exercise of despotic authority over neighbouring states is made the standard to which both constitution and laws must conform.[1]

§ 9. It is true that, in most states, most of the laws are only a promiscuous heap of legislation; but we have to confess that where they are directed, in any degree, to a single object, that object is always conquest. In Sparta, for instance, and in Crete the system of education and most of the laws are framed with a general view to war. § 10. Similarly all the uncivilized peoples which are strong enough to conquer others pay the highest honours to military prowess; as witness the Scythians, the Persians, the Thracians, and the Celts. Some of these nations even have laws for the definite encouragement of military qualities: Carthage, for instance, is said to decorate its soldiers with a new armlet for every fresh campaign. § 11. Macedonia, again, had once a law condemning men who had never killed an enemy to wear a halter instead

[1] Aristotle here distinguishes a moderate and an extreme variety of the general school of opinion which favours the practical and political life. The moderate variety is to the effect that the best form of constitution, which will lead to the happiest life of the community, is one which enlists the citizens in internal political activity. The extreme variety is to the effect that the best form, which will secure most happiness for the community, is one under which the citizens live a life of political activity by ruling despotically over neighbouring states. The first variety involves a belief in an active *internal* political life: the second a belief in an active *external* political life, devoted to conquest and empire.

of a belt. It was a custom among the Scythians that a man who had never killed an enemy was not entitled to drink from the loving-cup passed round at a certain festival. The Iberians, who are a warlike people, have a similar custom: they place a circle of pointed stones round the tombs of the dead, one for each enemy they have killed.

§ 12. There are many institutions of this kind, which vary from people to people—some of them sanctioned by laws, and some of them matters of custom. Yet it cannot, perhaps, but appear very strange, to a mind which is ready to reflect, that a statesman should be expected to be able to lay his plans for ruling and dominating border states without any regard for their feelings. § 13. How can a thing which is not even lawful be proper for a statesman or law-maker? And how can it ever be lawful to rule without regard to the right or wrong of what you are doing? Conquerors may be in the wrong. There is no profession in which we can find a parallel for statesmanship of this type. Doctors and pilots are never expected to use coercion or cajolery in handling their patients or crews. § 14. But when it comes to politics most people appear to believe that mastery is the true statesmanship; and men are not ashamed of behaving to others in ways which they would refuse to acknowledge as just, or even expedient, among themselves.[1] For their own affairs, and among themselves, they want an authority based on justice; but when other men are in question, their interest in justice stops. § 15. The world would be a curious place if it did not include some elements meant to be free, as well as some that are meant to be subject to control; and if that is its nature, any attempt to establish control should be confined to the elements meant for control, and not extended to all. One does not hunt *men* to furnish a banquet or a festival: one hunts what is meant

[1] In other words, a *community* will practise, in dealing with other *communities*, methods which it would repudiate in its own internal life. Aristotle is thinking, throughout this passage, of communities rather than individuals. It may be added that in repudiating (as he does by implication) the idea that 'mastery' is 'statesmanship', he is returning to an idea enunciated at the very beginning of the *Politics*, where he argues that 'it is a mistake to believe that the statesman is the same as . . . the master of a number of slaves' (Book I, c. 11, § 2)

to be hunted for that purpose; and what is meant to be hunted for that purpose is any wild animal meant to be eaten.[1]

1325 a § 16. It is possible to imagine a solitary state which is happy in itself and in isolation. Assume such a state, living somewhere or other all by itself, and living under a good system of law. It will obviously have a good constitution; but the scheme of its constitution will have no regard to war, or to the conquest of enemies, who, upon our hypothesis, will not exist.

§ 17. It is clear, then, from the course of the argument, that if military pursuits are one and all to be counted good,[2] they are good in a qualified sense. They are not the chief end of man, transcending all other ends: they are means to his chief end. The true end which good law-givers should keep in view, for any state or stock or society with which they may be concerned, is the enjoyment of partnership in a good life and the felicity thereby attainable. § 18. [This end will be invariable; but] some of the laws enacted will vary according to circumstances.[3] If a state has a number of neighbours, it will be the duty of its legislator to provide the modes of military training suited to their different characters, and, generally, to take the proper measures for meeting the challenge offered by each. But the problem here raised—which is that of the end at which an ideal constitution should aim—may well be reserved for consideration at a later stage.[4]

Note on the course of the argument in c. II

The transition made at the beginning of this section needs some slight explanation. In the first two sections the happiness of the individual has been identified with that of the state. This might seem, *prima facie*, to immerse the individual in the state. Aristotle therefore proceeds to inquire whether he will actually be happier if he immerses himself in the state's affairs, or if he leads the quiet

[1] All this involves a teleological view of creation, according to which each creature has a *telos* or end which it is 'meant' to serve, and the ends of all other creatures are subordinate to that of man.

[2] Because they elicit the virtue of fortitude in the community at large.

[3] The circumstances are, in a word, frontier problems. Where these are in any way pressing, they will affect internal politics and legislation; and each different problem will produce a different effect.

[4] It is considered in c. XIII and c. XIV.

life of the recluse. But this raises in turn the question, 'What is the sort of state in which the individual has the chance of immersing himself, and what is its constitution and general disposition?' Obviously the answer to this latter question will tend to affect the answer given to the former. A state which has such a constitution, and has so disposed its life, that it can give its members a chance of the highest possible activities, will obviously tend to draw them away from the quiet life into the life of politics.

Chapter III

From discussing the relative claims of external action and internal development in their bearing on states, we may now turn to discuss them in their bearing on the individual. Is it better for him to follow the way of political action, with his life wrapped up in that of the state, or to follow the more solitary way of thought and contemplation? It may be argued that the activity of political management of equals, in a free society, is something higher and finer than the activity of managing slaves; and it may also be argued that true felicity, by its nature, connotes activity. On the other hand, the permanent management of others, whatever its basis may be, is not *a desirable object; and even if felicity means activity, thought is an activity as much as action itself, and it may even be more of an activity than action is. The self-contained individual—like the self-contained state—may be busily active: the activity of God and the universe is that of a self-contained life.*

§ 1. We must now consider the views of those who are agreed in accepting the general principle that a life of goodness is most desirable, but divided in their opinion about the right way of living that life.[1] Two different schools of opinion have thus to be discussed. One is the school which eschews political office, distinguishing the life of the individual freeman from that of the politician, and preferring it to all others.

[1] Aristotle here appears to return to the first of the two questions propounded in c. II, § 3—the question whether the practical and political, or the contemplative and private life, is the more desirable. He had dismissed that question in c. II, § 4, as hardly 'political'. But it does, after all, raise political issues; and it is accordingly raised again in this chapter.

The other is the school which regards the life of the politician as best; they argue that men who do nothing cannot be said to 'do well',[1] and they identify felicity with active 'well-doing'. Both of these schools are right on some points and wrong on others. § 2. The first school is right in holding that the life of a free individual is better than that of the master of any number of slaves. There is nothing very dignified in managing slaves, when they are acting in that capacity; and the giving of orders about menial duties is an act of no high quality. On the other hand, it is wrong to regard every form of authority as so much 'mastery'. Authority over freemen differs as much from authority over slaves as the man who is naturally a freeman does from the natural slave. But enough has already been said on that theme in the first book. § 3. It is another error of this first school that it praises inaction in preference to action. Felicity is a state of activity; and it is the actions of just and temperate men which are the fulfilment of a great part of goodness.

The conclusion to which we have just come [i.e. that felicity is a state of activity] may possibly be interpreted to mean that sovereign power is the highest of all goods, because it is also the power of practising the greatest number of the highest and best activities. § 4. It would follow on this that a man who is able to wield authority should never surrender it to his neighbour: on the contrary, he should wrest it from him. A father should pay no regard to his children, children none to their father, and friends of any kind none to their friends: no man should think of another when it comes to this cardinal point: all should act on the principle, 'The best is the most desirable: and to "*do* well" is the best'. There might be truth in such a view if it were really the case that those who practised plunder and **1325 b** violence *did* attain a supremely desirable object. § 5. But it is perhaps impossible that they should; and to assume that they do is really to make a false assumption. Actions cannot be good and outstanding unless the doer himself has a degree of pre-eminence over others as great as a husband has over his wife, or a parent over his

[1] See the note on c. 1, § 11.

children, or a master over his slaves.[1] It follows that the transgressor [who sinks below others by what he does, instead of rising above them,] can never achieve any subsequent gain which will equal the loss of goodness already involved in his transgression. [We may thus dismiss the idea that the permanent exercise of sovereign power is the highest of all goods.] In a society of peers it is right and just that office should go on the principle of rotation, which is demanded by the ideas of equality and parity. § 6. But that equals should be given unequal shares, and men on a footing of parity treated on a basis of disparity, is a thing which is contrary to nature; and nothing contrary to nature is right. We thus come to the conclusion that the one conjuncture in which it is right to follow, and just to obey, another is when a person emerges who is superior to others in goodness and (we may add) in capacity for actually *doing* the best. § 7. Goodness by itself is not enough: there must also be a capacity for being active in doing good.[2]

If we are right in our view, and felicity should be held to consist in 'well-*doing*', it follows that the life of action is best, alike for every state as a whole and for each individual in his own conduct. § 8. But the life of action need not be, as is sometimes thought, a life which involves relations to others. Nor should our thoughts be held to be active only when they are directed to objects which have to be achieved by action. Thoughts with no object beyond themselves, and speculations and trains of reflection followed purely for their own sake, are far more deserving of the name of active. 'Well-doing' is the end we seek: action of some sort or other is therefore our end and aim; but, even in the sphere of outward acts, action can also be predicated—and that in the fullest measure and the true sense of the word—of those who, by their thoughts, are the prime authors of such acts. § 9. [As thought in itself may be activity, so activity may exist without relation to others.][3]

[1] i.e. a degree of pre-eminence as great as the head of a family has over its three constituent parts.

[2] See above, c. 1, § 13, and note.

[3] Aristotle here reverts to the first of the two propositions stated at the beginning of § 8.

States situated by themselves, and resolved to live in isolation, need not be therefore inactive.[1] They can achieve activity by sections: the different sections of such a state will have many mutual connexions; [and the whole will thus be active, in its own internal life]. § 10. This is also, and equally, true of the individual human being. If it were not so, there would be something wrong with God Himself and the whole of the universe, who have no activities other than those of their own internal life.

It is therefore clear that the same way of life which is best for the individual must also be best for the state as a whole and for all its members.

B

THE POPULATION, THE TERRITORY, THE NATURAL ENDOWMENT OF THE INHABITANTS, THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE, AND THE PHYSICAL PLANNING OF THE CENTRAL CITY, IN AN IDEAL STATE (cc. IV–XII)

Chapter IV

1. *The* population, *in size and quantity, must be neither too large nor too small for the discharge of its civic function. The size of the population is therefore determined and limited by the nature of the civic function; and a great population is not an index of civic greatness. A very populous state will find it difficult to enforce law and order, but a thinly populated state will find it difficult to achieve self-sufficiency. A state, like a ship, must be neither too large nor too small for the business it has to do. In order to do civic business properly, the citizens of a state should know one another personally: and we may thus define the optimum number of the population as 'the greatest* surveyable *number required for achieving a life of self-sufficiency'.*

§ 1. In the light of this general preface, and bearing in mind our previous discussion of other ideal states [in Book II], we may now embark on the rest of our theme. The first

[1] Aristotle has already argued, in c. II, § 16, that such a state may enjoy happiness. He now adds—logically enough on his own conception of happiness—that it may also enjoy activity.

question which arises is, 'What are the necessary bases for the construction of an ideal state?' § 2. An ideal constitution is bound to require an equipment appropriate to its nature.[1] We must therefore assume, as its basis, a number of ideal conditions, which must be capable of fulfilment as well as being ideal. These conditions include, among others, a citizen body and a territory. § 3. All producers—weavers, for instance, 1326 a or shipwrights—must have the materials proper to their particular branch of production; and the better prepared these materials are, the better will be the products of their skill. Like other producers, the statesman and the lawmaker must have their proper materials, and they must have them in a condition which is suited to their needs. § 4. The primary factor necessary, in the equipment of a state, is the human material; and this involves us in considering the quality, as well as the quantity, of the population naturally required. The second factor is territory; and here too we have to consider quality as well as quantity. Most men think that the happiness of a state depends on its being great. They may be right; but even if they are, they do not know what it is that makes a state great or small. § 5. They judge greatness in numerical terms, by the size of the population; but it is capacity, rather than size, which should properly be the criterion. States, like other things, have a function to perform; and the state which shows the highest capacity for performing the function of a state is therefore the one which should be counted greatest. In the same way Hippocrates would naturally be described as 'greater' (not as a man, but as a doctor) than somebody who was superior in point of bodily size. § 6. But even if it were right to judge a state by the size of its population, it would still be wrong to judge in the light of some mere chance total. We have to remember that states will very likely contain a large number of slaves,

[1] Any good way of life (and *a fortiori* the best way of life, which is the way of life under an ideal constitution) requires an equipment or *chorēgia*, or in other words a material basis of social conditions (cf. c. 1, § 13, and note). This being the case, an ideal state living under an ideal constitution requires an ideal social basis. In other words, it must be the best possible *under the best possible conditions* (cf. c. 1, § 1, and note).

resident aliens, and foreigners. If we judge a state by the standard of its population, we ought to limit the population to those who are members of the state and essential elements in its composition. An outstanding number of these may be evidence of a great state; but a state which sends into the field a large force of mere mechanics, and can only raise a handful of heavy-armed infantry, cannot possibly be great. A great state is not the same as a populous state.

§ 7. There is a further consideration. Experience shows that it is difficult, if not indeed impossible, for a very populous state to secure a general habit of obedience to law. Observation tells us that none of the states which have a reputation for being well governed are without some limit of population. But the point can also be established on the strength of philosophical grounds. § 8. Law is a system of order; and a general habit of obedience to law must therefore involve a general system of orderliness. Order, however, is the one thing which is impossible for an excessive number. The creation of order for an infinite number is a task for the divine power which holds together [and reduces to order] the whole of this universe, where beauty [which goes with order] is usually found attending on number and magnitude. § 9. We may therefore conclude that the state with the greatest beauty will be one which combines magnitude with the standard of order suggested above.[1] But we may also note [apart from this general rule] that states, like all other things (animals, plants, and inanimate instruments), have a definite measure of size. § 10. Any object will lose its power of performing its function if it is either excessively small or of an excessive size. Sometimes it will wholly forfeit its nature; sometimes, short of that, it will merely be defective. We may take the example of a ship. A ship which is only 6 inches in length, or is as

[1] In simple terms, it is the argument of Aristotle that divine power can order great numbers and large magnitudes, and that beauty may be found in such numbers and magnitudes when they are so ordered. But man is man; he cannot order such numbers and magnitudes: the best he can do, and the farthest he can go in following the example of the divine power, is to go *as far* in number and magnitude as is compatible with *his* power of ordering.

much as 1,200 feet long, will not be a ship at all;[1] and even a ship of more moderate size 1326 b may still cause difficulties of navigation, either because it is not large enough or because it is unwieldily large. § 11. The same is true of states. A state composed of too few members is a state without self-sufficiency (and the state, by its definition, is a self-sufficient society).[2] A state composed of too many will indeed be self-sufficient in the matter of material necessities (as an uncivilized people may equally be); but it will not be a true state, for the simple reason that it can hardly have a true constitution.[3] Who can be the general of a mass so excessively large? And who can give it orders, unless he has Stentor's voice?

The initial stage of the state may therefore be said to require such an initial amount of population as will be self-sufficient for the purpose of achieving a good way of life in the shape and form of a political association. § 12. A state which exceeds this initial amount may be a still greater state; but such increase of size, as has already been noticed, cannot continue indefinitely. What the limit of increase should be is a question easily answered if we look at the actual facts. The activities of a state are partly the activities of its governors, and partly those of the governed. The function of governors is to issue commands and give decisions: [the function of the governed is to elect the governors]. § 13. Both in order to give decisions in matters of disputed rights, and to distribute the offices of government according to the merit of candidates, the citizens of a state must know one another's characters.[4] Where this

[1] To-day a ship may be nearly 1,000 ft. in length. The same idea which is expressed here recurs in the *Ethics*, Book IX, c. x, § 3: 'A state cannot be made out of ten citizens, and one which is made out of ten times ten thousand is no longer a state.' [2] Book I, c. 11, § 8.

[3] It follows that a state must have two attributes in order to be a state —the attribute of self-sufficiency, and the attribute of a 'way of life' expressed in a constitution.

[4] It throws a light on Greek jurisprudence that Aristotle should suggest that judges must know litigants personally in order to judge properly. Greek law-courts had hardly achieved the stage of impersonal justice. It also throws a light on Greek politics that he should suggest that electors should know the candidates personally. The Greek candidate for office did not stand as the representative of an impersonal programme, but on his own personal merits.

is not the case, the distribution of offices and the giving of decisions will suffer. Both are matters in which it is wrong to act on the spur of the moment; but that is what obviously happens where the population is overlarge. § 14. Another thing also happens under these conditions. Foreigners and resident aliens readily assume a share in the exercise of political rights: it is easy for them to go undetected among the crowd.

These considerations indicate clearly the optimum standard of population. It is, in a word, 'the greatest surveyable number required for achieving a life of self-sufficiency'.[1] Here we may end our discussion of the proper size of the population.

Chapter V

2. *The* territory *should also be of a moderate size—no more, and no less, than will enable the citizens to live a life of leisure which combines temperance and liberality. Like the population, it should be 'surveyable'. This will enable the defence of the state to be properly planned, and will ensure the proper relation of the central city to the surrounding country for economic as well as for military purposes.*

§ 1. Similar considerations apply also to the matter of territory. So far as the *character* of the soil is concerned, everybody would obviously give the preference to a territory which ensured the maximum of self-sufficiency; and as that consists in having everything, and needing nothing, such a territory must be one which produces all kinds of crops. In point of *extent* and size, the territory should be large enough to enable its inhabitants to live a life of leisure which combines liberality with temperance. § 2. Whether this standard is right or wrong is a question we shall have to examine more closely at a later stage of the argument, when we come to consider the general problem of property and the possession of means, and to examine the relation which ought to exist between posses-

[1] The formula contains two factors. First, the population must be large enough to provide for itself, and from its own resources, every material and spiritual requisite of a complete and rounded good life. Secondly, it must not be so large but that it can be readily surveyed, in the sense that all its members can 'know one another's characters'.

sion and use.[1] This is a much-disputed matter; and men tend to conduct their lives in a way that runs to one or other of two extremes—miserliness or extravagance. § 3. As for the general lie of the land, it is easy to make the suggestion (though here a number of questions arise on which the advice of military experts ought to be taken) that the territory of a state should be difficult of access to enemies, and easy of egress for its 1327 a inhabitants. What was said above of the population—that it should be such as to be surveyable—is equally true of the territory. A territory which can be easily surveyed is also a territory which can be easily defended. The ideal position for the central city should be determined by considerations of its being easy of access both by land and by sea. § 4. [Two matters are here involved.] The first, which has already been mentioned, is that the city should be a common military centre for the dispatch of aid to all points in the territory. The second is that it should also be a convenient commercial centre, where the transport of food-supplies, timber for building, and raw materials for any other similar industry which the territory may possess can easily be handled.

Chapter VI

It is a question much debated whether the territory of a state should have a close connexion with the sea. Some argue that maritime connexions mean the introduction of a crowd of undesirable aliens; but on the other hand there are reasons, both of military security and of economic supply, which make such connexions valuable. A state should not be a mart for the world, but it ought to secure its own market; and a certain amount of naval power is also desirable—though the oarsmen required as the basis of such power should not be citizens, but serfs and labourers.

§ 1. It is a hotly debated question whether connexion with the sea is to the advantage, or the detriment, of a well-ordered state. There are some who maintain that the introduction of

[1] This is a promise which is not fulfilled. But the subject has already been treated, first in Book I, and then in Book II, where the formula of 'property several, use of it communal' has been suggested.

strangers, who have been born and bred under other laws, and the consequent increase of population, is prejudicial to good order. They argue that such an increase is inevitable when numbers of merchants use the sea for the export and import of commodities; and they regard it as inimical to good government. § 2. On the other hand, and if only this increase can be avoided, there can be no doubt that it is better, in the interest both of security and of a good supply of material necessities, for the city and territory of a state to be connected with the sea. § 3. In order to enjoy security, and to meet enemy attacks more easily, a state should be capable of being defended by sea as well as by land. It will also be in a better position for taking the offensive, and inflicting losses on its assailants, if it is able to use both elements, and to act on one or the other if not on both simultaneously. § 4. Similarly, in order to procure supplies, it is imperative that a state should be able to import commodities which it does not itself produce, and to export, in return, the surplus of its own products. It should act as a merchant for itself—but not as a merchant for others. States which make themselves marts for the world only do it for the sake of revenue; and if a state ought not to indulge in this sort of profit-making, it follows that it ought not to be an exchange centre of that kind. § 5. We see from the practice of our own times that territories and cities often have ports and harbours which are conveniently placed in relation to the main city—distinct and separate, but not too remote, and thus in a position to be commanded by connecting walls and other and similar fortifications.[1] Any advantage which can be derived from connexion with ports and harbours will obviously be secured by these methods; any disadvantage which may threaten can easily be met by legislation which states and defines the persons who may, or may not, have dealings with one another.

[1] The obvious example is Athens. Here the port—the Peiraeus—lay at a distance of about 5 miles from the main city, but was connected with it by the 'Long Walls' which enabled the city to command the port. Athens could thus enjoy the advantages of connexion with the sea without being greatly affected by the bustling life of the port and its foreign elements: the port was kept at a distance, and yet kept under control.

§ 6. A certain amount of naval power is obviously a great advantage. This is more than a matter of self-defence. There will also be neighbouring **1327 b** powers which a state must be in a position to intimidate, or to assist, by sea as well as by land. § 7. The actual size and amount of such power depends upon, and must be determined by, the way of life which a state prefers to pursue. If that way is to be one of leadership, and of active relations with other states, naval power must be commensurate with the activities which are involved. The increase of the population by a mass of naval oarsmen is a consequence which need not follow: such men should not be an integral part of the citizen body.[1] § 8. The marines [as distinct from the oarsmen] belong to the class of full freemen: they count as part of the infantry, and are in control and command on shipboard. But [the oarsmen are a different matter, and] if there are masses of serfs and farm-labourers ready to hand, it should always be possible to draw an abundant supply from this source. We may observe that this policy is actually followed, at the present day, in a number of states. It is followed, for instance, at Heraclea [on the Black Sea], which fits out a considerable number of triremes with a citizen body smaller in size than those of other states.

This may suffice by way of conclusions about territory, harbours, towns, the sea, and naval power.

Chapter VII

3. *The* natural endowment *proper to the citizens of an ideal state is suggested by a comparison of three peoples—the people of the colder regions of Europe; the people of Asia; and the Greek*

[1] Two observations may be made on this section. First, Aristotle assumes—naturally enough, in the light of previous Greek history—that leadership, or 'hegemony', involves a fleet. Secondly, as Greek fleets were composed of triremes or large galleys propelled by three banks of oars, he assumes that a fleet will involve what he calls 'a mob of oarsmen', who, if they are admitted to citizenship, may swamp the civic body (cf. Book IV, c. IV, § 21 and Book V, c. IV, § 8). He would accordingly disfranchise naval oarsmen, and treat them not as an integral part of the state, but as a mere condition or *sine qua non* of its existence. What he has in mind is the experience of Athens, where 'the mob of oarsmen' had led, in his view, to the growth of extreme democracy.

people. The first has high spirit, but less skill and intelligence: the second has skill and intelligence, but little spirit: the Greeks combine both sets of qualities. The legislator for an ideal state will naturally prefer the mixed endowment; and he will not, as Plato does, attach too great an importance to the factor of high spirit—valuable as that factor is in its sphere.

§ 1. We have already discussed the proper standard for determining the quantity of the population of a state [c. IV, § 6]. We have now to consider its quality, and to inquire what sort of natural endowment its members ought to have. We may get some idea of what this endowment should be if we take a general view, which not only embraces the Greek states of standing and reputation, but also includes the non-Greek peoples in their distribution throughout the whole of the habitable world. § 2. The peoples of cold countries generally, and particularly those of Europe, are full of spirit, but deficient in skill and intelligence; and this is why they continue to remain comparatively free, but attain no political development and show no capacity for governing others.[1] The peoples of Asia are endowed with skill and intelligence, but are deficient in spirit; and this is why they continue to be peoples of subjects and slaves. § 3. The Greek stock, intermediate in geographical position, unites the qualities of both sets of peoples. It possesses both spirit and intelligence: the one quality makes it continue free; the other enables it to attain the highest political development, and to show a capacity for governing every other people—if only it could once achieve political unity.[2] § 4. The same sort of difference as that

[1] Aristotle's idea of the 'spirit' of the peoples of the colder countries of Europe may be illustrated from what he says of the Celts in the *Ethics* (III. VII, § 7), who 'fear nothing whatever, neither earthquakes nor the waves of the sea'.

[2] Newman remarks that political unity may either mean unity under a hegemony, such as Macedonia had recently assumed, or unity in a free federation freely entered into by free states. 'The latter kind of union', he adds, 'would be more truly a union' of the Greek stock, such as Aristotle has in view (vol. iii, p. 366). But the reference here would naturally seem to be a reference to the Macedonian policy, inaugurated by Philip of Macedon at the Congress of Corinth in 338 B.C., of combining the Greek states in a political and military alliance. This was the policy continued by Alexander and by Antipater.

between Greek and non-Greek peoples may also be traced among Greek peoples themselves. Some of them are of a one-sided nature: others show a happy mixture of spirit and intelligence.

The argument shows that the sort of people which a legislator can easily guide into the way of goodness is one with a natural endowment that combines intelligence and spirit. § 5. The attitude which some[1] require in their guardians—to be friendly disposed to all whom they know, and stern to all who are unknown—is the attitude of a high-spirited temper. Spirit is the faculty **1328 a** of our souls which issues in love and friendship; and it is a proof of this that when we think ourselves slighted, our spirit is stirred more deeply against acquaintances and friends than ever it is against strangers. § 6. This explains why Archilochus, when he is complaining of his friends, is naturally led to address his spirit, and to say to it

> Verily thou wert wounded in the house of thine own friends.

This faculty of our souls not only issues in love and friendship: it is also the source for us all of any power of commanding and any feeling for freedom. Spirit is a commanding and an unconquerable thing. § 7. But it is wrong to say [as Plato does] that men ought to be harsh to those who are unknown to them. They ought not to be harsh to anybody; and magnanimous men, as a matter of fact, are not of a stern disposition—except when they have to deal with wrongdoers. Even then they are likely to show still greater sternness, as we have just had reason to notice, if the persons by whom they think themselves wronged are their own acquaintances. § 8. This is only what might be expected. We feel, in such a case, that men whom we regard as under an obligation to repay us for our services are adding insult to injury, and ingratitude to wrong-doing.

> Stern is the strife between brethren,

[1] Aristotle is here alluding to Plato's division of the soul into the three faculties of reason, 'spirit' (*thȳmos*), and desire. The 'spirited' man is the man who is highly sensitive to the claims of honour and keenly alive to the obligations of friendship.

as one of our poets says; and as another also says,

> Those who have loved exceedingly can hate
> As much as they have loved.[1]

§ 9. Such, in general terms (for the degree of precision required in a philosophical argument is not as great as is needed in dealing with the data of sense-perception) are the conclusions which we have reached about the bases necessary for an ideal state—i.e. (1) the right size of the citizen-body, and the proper character of its natural endowment; and (2) the right size of the territory, and the proper character of its soil.

Chapter VIII

4. *In considering the* social structure *required in an ideal state, we must begin by making a distinction between 'integral parts' and 'necessary conditions'. The integral parts of a state are the full citizens who share actively in the full good life of the state: the necessary conditions are the ancillary members who make it possible for the full citizens to share in that life. Including together both 'parts' and 'conditions', we may enumerate six services which must be supplied by the social structure of the state—the service of agriculture; the service of arts and crafts; the service of defence; the service of land-ownership; the service of public worship; and the service of political deliberation and civil jurisdiction.*

§ 1. In the state, as in other natural compounds, [there is a distinction to be drawn between 'conditions' and 'parts':] the conditions which are necessary for the existence of the whole are not organic parts of the whole system which they serve. The conclusion which clearly follows is that we cannot regard the elements which are necessary for the existence of the state, or of any other association forming a single whole, as being 'parts' of the state or of any such association.[2]

[1] The first of these passages is ascribed by Plutarch to Euripides. The author of the other is unknown.

[2] In this passage Aristotle uses a number of technical terms and conceptions. First, he uses the terms 'whole' (*holon*), and 'compound' (*syntheton*), on which see Book III, c. 1, § 2 and note. Secondly, he uses

§ 2. [We have spoken of associations forming a single whole.] This means that there must be some one thing which is common to all the members, and identical for them all. Their shares in the thir g may be equal or unequal. The thing itself may be various—tood, for instance, or a stretch of territory, or anything else of the kind. [But there must be some one thing which is common and identical.] § 3. Now there is nothing joint or common to the means which serve an end and the end which is served by those means—except that the means produce and the end takes over the product. Take, for example, the relation in which building tools, and the workmen who use them, stand to the result produced by their action. There is nothing in common between the builder and the dwelling-house he builds: the builder's skill is simply a means, and the dwelling-house is the end.[1] § 4. On this it follows that, if states need property, [as a dwelling-house needs building tools and workmen to use them], property nevertheless is not a part of the state. It is true that property includes a number of animate beings [i.e. slaves], as well as inanimate objects. But [two other things are also true:] the state is an association of equals, and only of equals; and its object is the best and highest life possible, [in which the slave cannot share]. § 5. The highest good is felicity; and that consists in the energy and perfect practice of goodness. But in actual life this is not for all; some may share in it fully, but others can only share in it partially or cannot even share at all. The consequence is obvious. These different capacities will issue in different kinds and varieties of states, and in a number of different constitutions. **1328 b** Pursuing felicity in various ways and by various means, different peoples create

the distinction between the integral part sharing actively in the life of the whole (the *meros* or *morion*) and the necessary 'condition', or rather conditions (the *hōn ouk aneu*), without which that life is impossible, but which none the less stand outside it and do not themselves participate in it (see c. VI above, § 7 and note).

[1] Aristotle's argument may well be criticized by a generation far later in time. To-day we should hardly lump together the builder and his tools as 'means'. We should be more apt to consider the house as a means and the builder as an end in himself, in virtue of being a man. There is logic in Aristotle's argument; but its moral implications may be challenged.

for themselves different ways of life and different constitutions.[1]

§ 6. It remains for us now to enumerate *all* the elements necessary for the existence of the state. Our list of these elements will include what we have called the 'parts' of the state as well as what we have termed its 'conditions'. To make such a list we must first determine how many services a state performs; and then we shall easily see how many elements it must contain. § 7. The first thing to be provided is food. The next is arts and crafts; for life is a business which needs many tools. The third is arms: the members of a state must bear arms in person, partly in order to maintain authority and repress disobedience, and partly in order to meet any threat of external aggression. The fourth thing which has to be provided is a certain supply of property, alike for domestic use and for military purposes. The fifth (but, in order of merit, the first) is an establishment for the service of the gods, or, as it is called, public worship. The sixth thing, and the most vitally necessary, is a method of deciding what is demanded by the public interest and what is just in men's private dealings [i.e. some system of deliberation and jurisdiction]. § 8. These are the services which every state may be said to need. A state is not a mere casual group. It is a group which, as we have said, must be self-sufficient for the purposes of life; and if any of these services is missing it cannot be totally self-sufficient. § 9. A state should accordingly

[1] This section is puzzling, because the consequence drawn, at the end, from the premiss stated in the beginning is not the conclusion we should expect. The conclusion we should expect, from the premiss that all men cannot share in happiness, is that all men cannot share in, or be 'parts' of, the best and happiest state. (This would explain the exclusion of slaves and others who are merely means.) The conclusion actually drawn is different. Arguing that different men share differently in happiness or felicity, Aristotle concludes that different peoples must develop different ways of life, and must therefore (as a constitution is 'a way of life') have different constitutions.

It would seem to follow from this conclusion that there may, after all, be states in which men who are merely means are none the less 'parts' of the state. But as the whole argument of Book VII is concerned only with the ideal state, this admission—if it is made or implied—would hardly seem to be necessary.

be so constituted as to be competent for all these services. It must therefore contain a body of farmers to produce the necessary food; craftsmen; a military force; a propertied class; priests; and a body for deciding necessary issues and determining what is the public interest.[1]

Chapter IX

The question arises whether each of the necessary services should be discharged by a separate social class, or whether some of them may be combined—and, if so, which. We may answer that (1) *the first two services—agriculture, and the arts and crafts—cannot be rendered by the full citizens, because their life needs leisure, and* (2) *three of the other services—defence, public worship, and the service of deliberation and jurisdiction—should, from one point of view, be combined in the hands of the same body of persons, but, from another, be discharged by different bodies of persons. This last result can be achieved if* (a) *all full citizens are concerned with all these three services at some time or other of their lives, but* (b) *the younger citizens are set to render the service of defence, the middle-aged to render the service of deliberation and jurisdiction, and the aged to render the service of public worship. The effect will be that each citizen will be concerned with each of these three services, but will be concerned with each at a different period of his life. The remaining service —that of land-ownership—should be assigned to the whole body of full citizens (which is the contrary of Plato's view in the* Republic, *where the full citizens are debarred from the ownership of land).*

§ 1. These points determined, a further point is still left for consideration. Should all the members share in the per-

[1] This account of functions, and of corresponding classes, may be compared with the account given before in Book IV, c. iv. The two accounts are different: they come in different contexts—the one in connexion with democracy, the other in connexion with the ideal state; and though they can be compared, they can hardly be co-ordinated. It adds to our difficulties that Aristotle also gives another account of the functions and classes of the state in Book IV, c. iii, and that this account, as already noted (see the note to the first section of that chapter), does not square with the account which immediately follows in c. iv.

formance of all these services? (That is a possibility: the same persons may all be engaged simultaneously in farming, the practice of arts and crafts, and the work of deliberation and jurisdiction.) Or should we assume a separate body of persons for each of the different services? Or, again, should some of the services be assigned to different sets of persons, and others be shared by all? The same system need not be followed in every constitution. § 2. Different systems, as we have noted,[1] are possible: all may share in all functions, or different persons may undertake different functions. The existence of these alternatives explains why constitutions differ: in democracies all men share in all functions, while the opposite practice is followed in oligarchies. § 3. Here we are only concerned with the best or ideal constitution. Now the best constitution is that under which the state can attain the greatest felicity (c. 11, § 5); and that, as we have already stated (c. 1, §§ 11–12), cannot exist without goodness. Upon these principles it clearly follows[2] that a state with an ideal constitution—a state which has for its members men who are absolutely just, and not men who are merely just in relation to some particular standard[3]—cannot have its citizens living the life of mechanics or shopkeepers, which is ignoble and inimical to goodness. § 4. Nor can it have them **1329 a** engaged in farming: leisure is a necessity, both for growth in goodness and for the pursuit of political activities.[4]

[1] Aristotle may be referring here, as Newman suggests, to what he has just said in the previous section of this chapter. But he may be also referring back to Book IV, c. IV, § 18, where the same point is made.

[2] i.e. if goodness is necessary to felicity, and felicity is necessary to the best (or ideal) constitution, then it follows that the persons who can share in such a constitution must be good—and good with that active goodness (of fortitude, temperance, justice, and wisdom) which is denied to mechanics and farmers.

[3] i.e. the particular standard of an oligarchy, or a democracy, which has its own—and lower—conception of justice.

[4] 'The wisdom of the scribe cometh by opportunity of leisure; and he that hath little business shall become wise. How then shall he become wise that holdeth the plough . . . whose discourse is of the stock of bulls?' (Ecclesiasticus, xxxviii. 24–5). The 'scribe' of Ecclesiasticus is the guardian and interpreter of the law of the Jewish community. The book, written about 200 B.C., 'exhibits unmistakably some of the permanent effects of Greek influence' (G. H. Box, *Judaism in the Greek Period*, p. 162).

On the other hand, a military force, and a body to deliberate on matters of public interest and to give decisions in matters of justice, are both essential, and are evidently 'parts' of the state in a particular and special sense. Should they be kept separate? or should both functions be given to one and the same set of persons? § 5. The obvious answer is that in one sense, and from one point of view, they should be given to the same set of persons, but in another sense, and from another point of view, they ought to be kept separate. On the one hand, either function requires a different prime of life: deliberation needs the wisdom of maturity, and war the vigour of youth; and from this point of view they ought to go to different bodies of persons. On the other hand, men who have vigour enough to use force (or to prevent it from being used) cannot possibly be expected to remain in permanent subjection; and from this point of view the two functions should go to the same set of persons [the members of the military force thus joining in deliberation]. We have to reflect that control of military power is also control of the future destiny of a constitution. § 6. The only course thus left to us is to vest these constitutional powers [i.e. the military and the deliberative] in one set of the persons—that is, in *both* age-groups—but to do so successively, and not simultaneously. The order of nature gives vigour to youth and wisdom to years; and it is policy to follow that order in distributing powers among the two age-groups of the state. It is justice as well as policy; for distribution on such a basis is the award of rights in proportion to desert.[1]

§ 7. The persons who exercise these powers must also be the owners of property; [and they will thus form the propertied class].[2] . . . The *citizens* of our state must have a supply

[1] The simple gist is that the same persons who have been soldiers in youth should be councillors and judges in age (say, after the age of 50). This is policy, because it will give the state a more efficient (because younger) army, and a more efficient (because older) government; it is also justice—justice of the true order, which means the proportion of rights to desert—because it gives to each age-group exactly the rights it deserves.

[2] Aristotle has dealt with two of the six factors of the state—farming, and the arts and crafts—at the beginning of the chapter, and has decided that they are *not* the concern of the citizens of the ideal state. He has

of property [in order to have leisure for goodness and political activities]; and it is these persons who are citizens—they, and they only. The class of mechanics has no share in the state; nor has any other class which is not a 'producer' of goodness.[1] . . . This conclusion clearly follows from the principle of the ideal state. That principle requires that felicity, or happiness, should go hand in hand with goodness. Now happiness can only be ascribed to a state if we extend our view to embrace the whole body of its citizens, and do not confine ourselves to a single one of its elements.[2] § 8. A further argument is provided for the view that property ought to belong to citizens, if we consider that the farming population ought by rights to be one of slaves or barbarian serfs.

Of the six elements or classes which we enumerated, only the priesthood is left. § 9. The plan on which it ought to be based is clear. Nobody belonging to the farming or the mechanic class should be made a priest. The cult of the gods should be a matter for citizens. Citizens, on the plan just proposed, are divided into two groups—the military or junior, and the deliberative or senior. It is the older members of the senior group—men who are already weary with years—who ought to conduct the worship of the gods and to find rest in their service; and they are therefore the class to which the

dealt with two others—arms, and government—in §§ 4–6, and has decided that they *are* the concern of the citizens. He now turns to the fifth factor ('a supply of property'), and decides that it too is a concern of the citizens —of *all* of them, but only of them.

[1] To understand this passage, we must remember that Plato in the *Republic* had deprived his guardians of property, and had vested property in the farming class. Aristotle would reverse this: he would vest property in the class which corresponds to Plato's guardians (the class concerned with arms and government); and he would make the farming class consist of landless and propertyless labourers.

[2] The argument here used in regard to happiness is also a reference to, and a criticism of, Plato (*Republic*, 419–21): see Book II, c. v, § 27 of the *Politics*, where Aristotle argues that Plato has deprived the governors (i.e. the citizens proper) of happiness in depriving them of property. Generally Plato, in Aristotle's view, had gone the wrong way to work in the matter of making his state happy. He had confined himself to the one element of the farming class, to which alone he had given property and the happiness it brings (cf. II, c. v, §§ 8–9); and he had not extended his view to embrace the real 'parts' of the state (the military and governing classes), which he had deprived of property and thereby of happiness.

priestly offices should be assigned. § 10. This completes our survey of the 'conditions' necessary to constitute a state, and of its integral 'parts'. Farmers, craftsmen, and the general body of day-labourers, belong to the first of these categories: the second includes the military force and the deliberative and judicial body. Each of these is a separate element—the separation being for life in some cases, and for a period of life in others, with one element succeeding to another at the end of that period.[1]

Chapter X

A system of classes, we may note in passing, appeared at an early date in Egypt and Crete. The system of common tables (suggested later in Chapter XII) may also be found in ancient Crete; and it appeared even earlier in south Italy. This leads us to note that institutions generally have been invented again and again, in the course of time, in a number of different places. Returning to the subject of landownership, we have to consider the problem of the distribution of such ownership. The land should not be entirely owned in common—though some of it may be, in order to provide for a system of common tables and for the needs of public worship. On this basis we may suggest (1) *that some of the land should be publicly owned, for the purpose of such provision, but* (2) *that the rest should be privately owned, and each owner should have two plots—one near the central city, and one on the frontier. The cultivation of all the land should be assigned to slaves or serfs.*

§ 1. It does not appear to be a new or even a recent discovery in the theory of the state that states ought to be divided into classes, **1329 b** and the military class and the farming class should be separate. Even to-day this is still the case in Egypt, as it is also in Crete: the practice began in Egypt, so it is said, with the legislation of Sesostris, and it began in Crete with that of Minos. . . . [There follows, in

[1] The elements in the first category are fixed in their position for life. Each of the elements in the second occupies its position for a period determined by the age of its members, and is then succeeded by the new age-group which has grown up to take its place.

§§ 2–5, an antiquarian passage on the origin of the system of common tables.] § 6. It was thus in southern Italy that the system of common tables originated. The other institution mentioned above—the division of the body politic into classes —originated in Egypt [*not* in Crete]: the reign of Sesostris is long anterior to that of Minos. § 7. [Just as these two institutions were invented independently in different places and at different times] so, we must also believe, were most other institutions. They have been invented in the course of the years on a number of different occasions—indeed an indefinite number. Necessity itself, we may reasonably suppose, will steadily be the mother of indispensable inventions: on that basis, and with *these* once provided, we may fairly expect that inventions which make for the adornment and graces of life will also steadily develop; and this general rule must be held to be true in matters of politics as well as in other spheres. § 8. The history of Egypt attests the antiquity of all political institutions. The Egyptians are generally accounted the oldest people on earth; and they have always had a body of law and a system of politics. [This may teach us a lesson.] We ought to take over and use what has already been adequately expressed before us, and confine ourselves to attempting to discover what has hitherto been omitted.

§ 9. It has already been stated that the land should be owned, in our ideal state, by the class which bears arms and the class which shares in the conduct of government. It has also been explained why the farming class should be separate from these two classes; what the extent of the territory should be; and what kind of soil it should have. We have now to discuss the distribution of the land; to decide how it should be farmed; and to determine the character of the farming class. On our view of the problem of distribution, two things should be combined. On the one hand, property ought not to be owned in common, as some writers have maintained— **1330 a** though it ought to be used in common and as friends treat their belongings.[1] On the other hand, none of the citizens should go in need of subsistence. § 10. The institution

[1] This is a reference back to Book II, c. v, §§ 6–7.

of common tables is generally agreed to be for the advantage of all well-ordered states; and we shall have reason to explain, at a later point, why we share this view.[1] The right of dining at the common tables should be equally open to every citizen; but poor men will always find it difficult to contribute their quota of the cost from their own resources, when they have also to provide simultaneously for the rest of the family expenditure. [This is an argument for meeting the cost of the system of common tables from public funds]; and expenditure on public worship should also be a charge on the state in general.

§ 11. We may accordingly suggest that the territory of our state should be divided into two parts, one of which will be public property, while the other will belong to private owners. Each of these parts should again be divided into two sections. One section of the public property should be allocated to the service of the gods, and the other to the expenses of the system of common tables. The land which belongs to private owners should be so divided that one section lies on the frontiers, and the other is near the city—each individual receiving a plot in either section, and all alike thus having an interest in both. This arrangement[2] has two advantages: it satisfies the claims of equality and justice; and it produces more solidarity in the face of border wars. § 12. In the absence of such an arrangement, some of the citizens [i.e. those with estates remote from the frontiers] will think little of provoking the enmity of a neighbouring state, while others [i.e. those in the opposite position] will think of it only too much, and more than honour can justify. This will explain why some states have laws which

[1] Aristotle turns aside for the moment to this matter of common tables, partly because they are an example of the common use of property, which he has just been commending, and partly because the mention of them prepares the way for the general scheme of distribution which he proceeds to suggest in the next section. The promise to explain why he favours a system of common tables is not fulfilled; but the simple fact that it is of the nature of common use of property is sufficient to explain his approval.

[2] It is an arrangement which Plato had already proposed in the *Laws*. Aristotle borrows his proposal here (though he had criticized it in Book II, c. VI, §§ 15–16); and in the course of Books VII and VIII he borrows many other proposals from the *Laws*. See the translator's *Greek Political Theory*, pp. 380–2.

prohibit citizens on the frontier from joining in deliberations about hostilities with neighbouring states; the reason is that their personal interest would affect their judgement adversely.

§ 13. This is the way in which we suggest that the territory of our state should be distributed, and these are the reasons for our suggestions. The class which farms it should ideally, and if we can choose at will, be slaves—but slaves not drawn from a single stock, or from stocks of a spirited temper. This will at once secure the advantage of a good supply of labour and eliminate any danger of revolutionary designs. Failing slaves, the next best class will be one of serfs who are not of Greek origin and whose character is like what has just been described. § 14. The farm hands employed on private estates should belong to the owners of those estates: those who are employed on public property should belong to the public. How the slaves who till the soil should be treated, and why it is wise to offer all slaves the eventual reward of emancipation, is a matter which we shall discuss later.[1]

CHAPTER XI

5. *The* planning of the central city *should be determined mainly by* (a) *considerations of health* (*which require a good exposure and a good water-supply*), *and* (b) *considerations of defence* (*which affect the internal layout of the city and raise the vexed question of fortifications*). *Other considerations which affect the planning of the city are* (c) *convenience for political activities* (§ 2), *and* (d) *beauty of appearance* (§ 7, end).

§ 1. The city of our state, as we have already noticed, should be, so far as circumstances permit, a common centre, linked to the sea as well as the land, and equally linked to the whole of the territory. Internally, and in its own layout, we ought to plan the ideal of our city with an eye to four considerations.[2] The first, as being the most indispensable, is

[1] This promise, again, is not fulfilled. But it may be noted that Aristotle provided in his own will for the emancipation of his slaves.

[2] 'The four things seem to be health, adaptation to the needs of political life, adaptation to those of war, and beauty (see the end of § 7), though Aristotle in his haste omits to mention the last' (Newman, vol. iii, p. 396).

health. § 2. Cities which slope towards the east, and are exposed to the winds which blow from that quarter, are the healthiest: the next best aspect, which is healthy in the winter season, is one sheltered from the north wind [and therefore facing south]. **1330 b** Two other considerations to be borne in mind are matters of the city's convenience for political and military activities. § 3. For the purpose of military activities it should be easy of egress for its inhabitants, but difficult to approach or blockade for any enemies. It should also have, if possible, a natural supply of waters and streams; but if there was no such supply, a substitute has now been found in the construction of large and bountiful reservoirs of rain-water, which will not fail even when the inhabitants are cut off by the pressure of war from the territory round their city. § 4. Due regard for the health of the inhabitants not only means that their place of abode should be in a healthy locality and should have a healthy exposure: it also means that they should have the use of good water. This is a matter which ought not to be treated lightly. The elements we use most and oftenest for the support of our bodies contribute most to their health; and water and air have both an effect of this nature.[1] § 5. It should therefore be laid down, in all prudently conducted states, that if all the streams are not equally wholesome, and the supply of wholesome streams is inadequate, the drinking-water ought to be separated from the water used for other purposes.[2]

In the planning of strongholds there is no one policy which is equally good for all constitutions. A citadel (or *acropolis*) is suitable to oligarchies and monarchies; a level plain suits the

[1] In his observations on the 'siting' and planning of cities with a view to health Aristotle may be remembering his own medical training. The subject was one which had been handled by writers of the school of Hippocrates, and especially by the author of the remarkable little treatise *On Airs, Waters, and Places*. It will be noticed in the text that the three subjects of its title are all handled by Aristotle.

[2] Aristotle's concern for public health deserves notice. In the Greek cities of the Hellenistic age elaborate provision was made for water-supply; and on the site of one city as many as eleven metal water-pipes have been discovered by excavators, crossing a single street, side by side, under the pavement (Breasted, *Ancient Times*, c. XXI).

character of democracy; neither suits an aristocracy, for which a number of different strong places is preferable. § 6. The arrangement of private houses is generally considered to be more sightly, and more convenient for peace-time activities, when it is regularly planned [i.e. with straight streets] in the modern style introduced by Hippodamus.[1] For reasons of military security, however, the very reverse is preferable; and from this point of view there is much to be said for the haphazard arrangement of ancient times, which made it difficult for a foreign garrison to make its way out and for any assailants to find their way in. § 7. The two methods of arrangement should accordingly be combined; and this may be done by adopting the system which vine-growers follow in planting their 'clumps' of vines.[2] Alternatively, regular planning might be confined to certain sections and districts, and not made to cover the whole of the city. This would conduce at once to security and to beauty.

§ 8. The fortification of cities by walls is a matter of dispute. It is sometimes argued that states which lay claim to military excellence ought to dispense with any such aids. This is a singularly antiquated notion—all the more as it is plain to the eye that states which prided themselves on this point are being refuted by the logic of fact.[3] § 9. When the question at issue is one of coping with an enemy state of a similar character, which is only slightly superior in numbers, there is little honour to be got from an attempt to attain

[1] Hippodamus, the town-planner, who also proposed what may be called 'an engineer's system of political planning', has already been mentioned in Book II, c. VIII.

[2] The vines were grown in the form of a quincunx, i.e. the five spots on dice, × × / × / × ×, so that the lines ran obliquely, and not straight. This was held to look better, and to make the vines more productive.

[3] Sparta (which had always prided itself on being defended by men, not walls) had been humiliated by Epaminondas in 369 B.C. and afterwards, and this is the fact of which Aristotle is thinking. The Greek dispute about 'walls' is much the same as the modern dispute about 'Maginot lines'. Aristotle may have been moved to discuss the theme in consequence of the repair and strengthening of the walls of Athens by the contemporary statesman Lycurgus.

security by the erection of a barrier of walls. But it sometimes happens—and it is always possible—that the superiority of an assailant may be more than a match for mere courage, human or superhuman; and then, if a state is to avoid destruction, and to escape from suffering and humiliation, the securest possible barrier of walls should be deemed the best of military 1331 a methods—especially to-day, when the invention of catapults and other engines for the siege of cities has attained such a high degree of precision. § 10. To demand that a city should be left undefended by walls is much the same as to want to have the territory of a state left open to invasion, and to lay every elevation level with the ground. It is like refusing to have walls for the exterior of a private house, for fear they will make its inhabitants cowards. § 11. We have also to remember that a people with a city defended by walls has a choice of alternatives—to treat its city as walled [and therefore to act on the defensive], or to treat it as if it were unwalled [and therefore to take the offensive]—but a people without any walls is a people without any choice. If this argument be accepted, the conclusion will not only be that a city ought to be surrounded by walls; it will also be that the walls should always be kept in good order, and be made to satisfy both the claims of beauty and the needs of military utility—especially the needs revealed by recent military inventions. § 12. It is always the concern of the offensive to discover new methods by which it may seize an advantage; but it is equally the concern of the defensive, which has already made some inventions, to search and think out others. An assailant will not even attempt to make an attack on men who are well prepared.

Chapter XII

The common tables maintained in the city should be placed in the temples; and the temples should be placed on a commanding site, with the 'Free Square' at its foot for the recreations of the older citizens. There should also be a separate 'Market Square', with the courts of law for business matters adjacent to

it. In the country-side the common tables should be connected with the guard-houses of the militia, and there should be a number of country temples.

§ 1. If we assume that the citizens should be distributed at common tables, and the walls should be dotted with guard-houses and towers at convenient intervals, the idea will naturally occur that some of the common tables should be established in these guard-houses. § 2. This will be one combination. [It will also be well to make another.] The principal common tables of the magistrates may be associated with the buildings devoted to public worship, on some convenient and common site—except for such temples as are required by law, or by a rule of the Delphic oracle, to be kept distinct and separate.[1] § 3. This site should be on an eminence, conspicuous enough for men to look up and see goodness enthroned, and strong enough to command the adjacent quarters of the city. Below this site provision should be made for a public square, of the sort which is called in Thessaly by the name of the Free Square. § 4. This should be clear of all merchandise; and no mechanic, or farmer, or other such person, should be permitted to enter, except on the summons of the magistrates. The place would be all the more pleasant if recreation grounds for the older men were included in its plan. § 5. The arrangements for recreation (like those for the common tables) should be different for different age-groups; and if this plan be followed some of the magistrates should stay with the younger men [near their guard-houses], while the older men should remain [in the public square] with the other magistrates. To be under the eyes of the magistrates will serve, above anything else, to create a true feeling of modesty and the fear of shame which should animate freemen.[2] **1331 b** § 6. The market-square

[1] The effect would be that the younger citizens, under the age of 50, would mainly have their common tables in the guard-houses, while the older citizens who conducted the government, along with the aged priests, would have their common tables in temple buildings.

[2] Aristotle has here in mind, as in other passages of the *Politics*, the tendency to homosexual passion, which might be encouraged by unregulated games and recreations.

for buying and selling should be separate from the public square, and at a distance from it: it should occupy a site which forms a good depot, alike for commodities imported by sea and those which come from the state's own territory.

The directors of the state include priests as well as magistrates. [We have already settled where the magistrates should have their common tables]; and it is fitting that those of the priests should be associated, in the same way as theirs, with the temple buildings. § 7. The proper place in which to establish the magistrates who deal with contracts, indictments in lawsuits, summonses into court, and other business of that order—and, we may also add, those concerned with the superintendence of the market square and the duties of 'city-superintendence'—will be near some square or general centre of public resort. The place which suits this requirement best is the site of the market square. The public square, on its higher ground, is assigned on our plan to leisure: the market square belongs to the business activities of life. § 8. The general system we have described should also be applied to the country-side. There, too, the various magistrates—who are sometimes termed forest-wardens, and sometimes rural inspectors—should have guard-houses and common tables in connexion with their duties; and the country should be studded with temples, some of them dedicated to the gods and others to heroes.

§ 9. But it would be a waste of time to linger here over details and explanations. It is easy enough to theorize about such matters: it is far less easy to realize one's theories. We talk about them in terms of our wants; what actually happens depends upon chance. We may therefore dismiss, for the present, any further study of these issues.

C
THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EDUCATION (cc. XIII–XV)

CHAPTER XIII

1. The End and the Means. *For the attainment of well-being, or felicity, it is necessary to know the right end as well as to*

choose the right means. (a) *So far as the* end *is concerned, felicity has been defined in the* Ethics *as 'the energy and practice of goodness, to a degree of perfection, and in an absolute mode'. The point of the words 'in an absolute mode' is that goodness must not be handicapped (in which case the mode of its energy will only be 'relative'), but must go into action furnished with the proper advantages of health, wealth, and general equipment. In order, therefore, to be in a position to attain the end of felicity, a state must start with the proper advantages—which is a matter of good fortune rather than of man's art; in order actually to attain it, a state (i.e. its members) must achieve 'the energy and practice of goodness'—and this belongs to the realm of human knowledge and purpose, where the art of the legislator can operate. We thus turn to consider means.* (b) *There are three* means *by which the members of a state may achieve goodness—natural endowment; habit; and rational principle. Natural endowment has already been considered in Chapter VII: we have now to discuss habit and rational principle; and here we enter the domain of education and legislative art.*

§ 1. We have now to speak of the constitution itself;[1] and here we have to explain the nature and character of the elements required if a state is to enjoy a happy life and possess a good constitution. § 2. There are two things in which well-being always and everywhere consists. The first is to determine aright the aim and end of your actions. The second is to find out the actions which will best conduct to that end. These two things—ends and means—may be concordant or discordant. Sometimes the aim is determined aright, but there is a failure to attain it in action. Sometimes the means to the end are all successfully attained, but the end originally fixed is only a poor sort of end. Sometimes there is failure in both respects: a doctor, for example, may not only misjudge the proper nature of physical health, but he may also fail to discover the means that produce the object which he actually has in view. The proper course, in all arts and sciences, is to

[1] Hitherto Aristotle has been discussing the territory and the population required for an ideal state. He now comes to the essential thing—the constitution (or 'way of life') which should be built on that basis.

get a grasp of both equally—alike of the end itself, and of the actions which conduce to the end. § 3. The good life, or felicity, is obviously the end at which all men aim. Some men have the power of attaining that end. Others are stopped from attaining it by something in their own endowment, or by some lack of opportunity. (We have to remember that a certain amount of equipment [which depends upon opportunity] is necessary for the good life, and while this amount need not be so great for those whose endowment 1332 a is good, more is required for those whose endowment is poor.) § 4. Others, again, start wrong from the outset; and though they have the power of attaining felicity they seek it along wrong lines. Here, and for the purposes of our inquiry, it is obviously necessary to be clear about the nature of felicity. The object we have in view is to discover the best constitution. The best constitution is that under which the state is best constituted. The best-constituted state is the state which possesses the greatest possibility of achieving felicity.[1]

§ 5. It has been argued in the *Ethics* (if the argument there used is of any value) that felicity is 'the energy and practice of goodness, to a degree of perfection, and in a mode which is absolute and not relative'.[2] § 6. [We must explain the concluding words of this definition.] By 'relative' we mean a mode of action which is necessary and enforced; by 'absolute' we mean a mode of action which possesses intrinsic value. Consider, for example, the case of just actions [i.e. actions in which the particular virtue of justice is practised]. To inflict a just penalty or punishment is indeed an act of goodness; but it is also an act which is forced on the agent, and it has value only as being a necessity. (It would be better if neither individuals nor states ever needed recourse to any such action.) Acts done with a view to bestowing honours and wealth on

[1] There are two equations which must be borne in mind in following Aristotle's thought. First, constitution = way of life; and therefore the best or ideal constitution = the best or ideal way of life. Secondly, goodness = felicity; and therefore the constitution which is the most good or ideal constitution (and, as such, is the most good or ideal way of life) = the happiest way of life.

[2] The phrase does not occur, *totidem verbis*, in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. But the same thing is implied in more than one passage.

others [i.e. acts of distributive, as distinct from criminal justice] are in a different category: they are acts of the highest value.[1] § 7. An act of punishment is a choice of something which, in a sense, is an evil [i.e. the infliction of pain]: acts of the order first mentioned have an opposite character—they are foundations and creations of something good. We may argue, along the same line, that while a good man would handle well the evils of poverty, sickness, and the other mishaps of life, the fact remains that felicity consists in the opposites of these evils.[2] The truly good and happy man, as we have stated elsewhere in our arguments on ethics,[3] is one who by the nature of his goodness [which is *absolute*] has advantages at hand which are *absolute* advantages. § 8. It is plain that his use of such advantages must also show an absolute goodness, and possess an absolute value. But the fact [that the good and happy man has absolute advantages ready to hand] leads men to think that external advantages are the *causes* of felicity. One might as well say that a well-executed piece of fine harp-playing was due to the instrument, and not to the skill of the artist.

It follows from what has been said that some elements of the state should be 'given', or ready to hand, and the rest should be provided by the art of the legislator. § 9. We may therefore pray that our state should be ideally equipped at all points where fortune is sovereign—as we assume her to be in the sphere of the 'given'. The goodness of the state is a different matter: here we leave the realm of fortune, and we enter the realm of human knowledge and purpose [where the art of the legislator can act]. A state is good in virtue of the

[1] When you punish wrongdoing, you may be engaged in 'the energy and practice of goodness to a degree of perfection', but the mode of your action is *forced* upon you by the existence of wrongdoing, and it is relative to wrongdoing. When you do good to others (by bestowing honours or wealth according to their desert), you are acting freely; and from that point of view your mode of action may be called absolute.

[2] In other words, you can only attain absolute goodness, and with it absolute felicity, if you have the requisite wealth, the requisite health, and the general requisite 'equipment' of life.

[3] The reference here would appear to be not so much to the *Nicomachean Ethics*, as to two other ethical treatises also ascribed to Aristotle.

goodness of the citizens who share in its government. In our state all the citizens have a share in the government [and all must therefore be good]. § 10. We have therefore to consider how a man can become a good man. [This is a matter of *each* individual.] True, it is possible for all to be good collectively, without each being good individually. But the better thing is that each individual citizen should be good. The goodness of all is necessarily involved in the goodness of each.

There are three means by which individuals become good and virtuous. § 11. These three means are the natural endowment we have at birth; the habits we form; and the rational principle within us. In the matter of endowment we must start by being men—and not some other species of animal—and men too who have certain qualities both of body and soul. **1332 b** There are, indeed, some qualities which it is no help to have had at the start. Habits cause them to change: implanted by nature in a neutral form, they can be modified by the force of habit either for better or worse. § 12. Animate beings other than men live mostly by natural impulse, though some are also guided to a slight extent by habit. Man lives by rational principle too [as well as natural impulse and habit]; and he is unique in having this gift. It follows that all the three powers of man must be tuned to agree. [The power of rational principle will play a great part in this tuning]: men are often led by that principle not to follow habit and natural impulse, once they have been persuaded that some other course is better. § 13. We have already determined, in an earlier chapter (VII), the character of the natural endowment which is needed for our citizens, if they are to be easily moulded by the art of the legislator. When they have that endowment, the rest is entirely a matter of the education which he provides; and they will partly learn it from a training in habits, partly from a system of instruction [which makes an appeal to their reason].

CHAPTER XIV

2. Education and citizenship: education for leisure, and education of character. *Should there be two different systems of education—one for the governors (as in Plato's* Republic), *and one for the governed? Fundamentally, in the ideal state, all the citizens will belong to a single society of freemen and peers; but, as has been already suggested in Chapter IX, there is a distinction (which is one of age-groups passing on into one another, and not one of classes kept permanently separate) between the young who are still under government and the older citizens who conduct the government. The young must learn to obey a free government of which they will eventually be members; and in doing so they will also be learning to govern when their turn comes. In thus learning generally 'the virtue of the good citizen', they will also be learning 'the virtue of the good man'; for the two virtues, as has been argued before (in Book III, c. iv), are here fundamentally the same.*

In planning the system of education which will produce the good man and citizen, we must make two distinctions. (1) *We must distinguish the different parts of the soul—the part which has rational principle (in its turn divided into a practical and a speculative part), and the part which has simply the capacity for obeying such a principle.* (2) *We must also distinguish the different parts or aspects of life (which are implied in the previous distinction)—action and leisure; war and peace. Education must regard all the different parts of the soul and the different parts or aspects of life. States in the past, e.g. Sparta, have tended to concentrate on only one part of the soul and one aspect of life: they have forgotten the part of the soul which has rational principle, and the aspect of life which is concerned with peace and leisure, and they have devoted themselves to war and empire. States, however, like individuals, should devote themselves in the main to the aspect of life which is concerned with peace and leisure.*

§ 1. As all political associations are composed of governors and governed, we have to consider whether the two should be distinguished for life, or merged together in a single body.

The system of education will necessarily vary according to the answer we give. § 2. We may imagine one set of circumstances in which it would be obviously better that a lasting distinction should once and for all be established between governors and governed. This would be if there were one class in the state surpassing all others as much as gods and heroes are supposed to surpass mankind—a class of men so outstanding, physically as well as mentally, that the superiority of the ruling stock was indisputably clear to their subjects. § 3. But that is a difficult assumption to make; and we have nothing in actual life like the gulf between kings and subjects which the writer Scylax describes as existing in India. We may therefore draw the conclusion, which can be defended on many grounds, that all should share alike in a system of government under which they rule and are ruled by turns. In a society of peers equality means that all should have the same rights: and a constitution can hardly survive if it is founded on injustice [i.e. if it gives *different* rights to men who are of the same quality]. § 4. The subject citizens will then be joined by all [the serfs] of the country-side in a common policy of revolution; and the civic body will be too small to cope successfully with all its enemies. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that there should be a difference between governors and governed. How they can differ, and yet share alike, is a dilemma which legislators have to solve. § 5. We have already touched on a possible solution in a previous chapter.[1]

Nature, we have suggested, has provided us with the distinction we need. She has divided a body of citizens who are all generically the same into two different age-groups, a younger and an older, one of them meant to be governed and the other to act as the government. Youth never resents being governed, or thinks itself better than its governors; and it is all the less likely to do so if it knows that it will take over the government on reaching a proper maturity. § 6. In one sense, therefore, it has to be said that governors and governed are the same sort of persons; in another, that they are different. The same will be true of their education: **1333 a** from one

[1] c. IX, §§ 4–6.

point of view it must be the same; from another it has to be different, and, as the saying goes, 'If you would learn to govern well, you must first learn how to obey.' [We may first treat of learning how to obey.] Government, as has already been said in our first part,[1] may be conducted in two different ways. One way is to govern in the interest of the governors: the other, to govern in the interest of the governed. The former way is what we call 'despotic' [i.e. a government of slaves]; the latter is what we call 'the government of free-men'.[2] § 7. [This is the sort of government which the young must begin by learning to obey; but they must also learn to obey some orders which may seem more appropriate to a government of slaves.] Some of the duties imposed [on the free] differ [from those of slaves] not in the work they involve, but in the object for which they are to be done. This means that a good deal of the work which is generally accounted menial may none the less be the sort of work which young freemen can honourably do. It is not the inherent nature of actions, but the end or object for which they are done, which makes one action differ from another in the way of honour or dishonour.

§ 8. [We may now treat of learning how to govern.] We have laid it down that the excellence of the full citizen who shares in the government is the same as that of the good man.[3] We have also assumed that the man who begins by being a subject must ultimately share in the government [and will therefore require the same sort of excellence as the good man]. It follows on this that the legislator must labour to ensure that his citizens become good men. He must there-fore know what institutions will produce this result, and what is the end or aim to which a good life is directed.

[1] The reference is to Book III, c. IV, §§ 10–13, and c. VI, § 6; but cf. also this book, c. III, §§ 1–2.

[2] Aristotle, in the course of this section, begins to discuss education as something different for the governed from what it is for the governor. The governed, he argues, must be taught to obey, but to obey with the obedience of freemen. But this proviso, he proceeds to add (§ 7), will not preclude the governed from being taught to do menial duties which are usually done by slaves—if only they are taught to do them in the spirit of freemen.

[3] This has been argued in Book III, c. IV.

§ 9. There are two different parts of the soul. One of these parts has a rational principle intrinsically and in its own nature. The other has not; but it has the capacity for obeying such a principle. When we speak of a man as being 'good', we mean that he has the goodnesses of these two parts of the soul. But in which of the parts is the end of man's life *more particularly* to be found? The answer is one which admits of no doubt to those who accept the division just made. § 10. In the world of nature as well as of art the lower always exists for the sake of the higher.[1] The part of the soul which has rational principle is the higher part. [It is therefore the part in which the end of man's life is more particularly to be found.] But this part may in turn be divided, on the scheme which we generally follow, into two parts of its own. Rational principle, according to that scheme, is partly practical, partly speculative. § 11. It is obvious, therefore, that the part of the soul which has this principle must fall into two corresponding parts. We may add that as the parts of the soul have their hierarchy, so, too, have the activities of those parts. It follows on this that those who can attain *all* the activities possible [i.e. rational activity of the speculative order, rational activity of the practical order, and the activity of obedience to rational principle], or *two* of those activities, will be bound to prefer the activity of the part which is in its nature the higher. All of us always prefer the highest we can attain.[2]

§ 12. Life as a whole is also divided into its different parts —action and leisure, war and peace; and in the sphere of action we may further distinguish acts which are merely necessary, or merely and simply useful, from acts which are good in themselves. § 13. The preferences which we give to the parts of life and their different activities will inevitably follow the same general line as those which we give to the parts of the soul and their different activities. War must therefore be regarded as only a means to peace; action as a

[1] Man, in his art, creates the lower in order to achieve the higher: nature, in her process of genesis, produces the lower as a stage in a development tending to the higher.

[2] See the first note at the end of the chapter.

means to leisure; and acts which are merely necessary, or merely and simply useful, as means to acts which are good in themselves. The legislation of the true statesman must be framed with a view to all of these factors. In the first place, it must cover the different parts of the soul and their different activities; and in this field it should be directed more to the higher than the lower, and rather to ends than means. § 14. In the second place it must also cover, and it must place in the same perspective, the different parts or ways of life and the different categories of acts.[1] It is true that the citizens of our state must be able to lead a life of action and war; 1333 b but they must be even more able to lead a life of leisure and peace. It is true, again, that they must be able to do necessary or useful acts; but they must be even more able to do good acts. These are the general aims which ought to be followed in the education of childhood and of the stages of adolescence which still require education.[2]

§ 15. The Greek states of our day which are counted as having the best constitutions [and therefore the best 'ways of life'], and the legislators who framed their constitutional systems, have fallen short of this ideal. It is plain that their constitutions have not been made with a view to the higher ends of life, or their laws and systems of education directed to all the virtues. On the contrary, there has been a vulgar decline into the cultivation of qualities supposed to be useful and of a more profitable character. § 16. A similar spirit appears in some of our recent writers who have adopted this point of view. They laud the constitution of Sparta, and they admire the aim of the Spartan legislator in directing the whole of his legislation to the goal of conquest and war. This is a view which can be easily refuted by argument, and it has now been also refuted by the evidence of fact.[3] § 17. Most men are believers in the cause of empire, on the ground that

[1] See the second note at the end of the chapter.

[2] To what age would Aristotle continue the education of the young? Apparently beyond the first stage of adolescence (and possibly to the age of 21): otherwise he would not speak of different stages—in the plural.

[3] Aristotle is here alluding to the collapse of Sparta before Epaminondas. See above, c. xi, § 8.

empire leads to a large accession of material prosperity.[1] It is evidently in this spirit that Thibron, like all the other writers on the constitution of Sparta, lauds its legislator for having trained men to meet danger and so created an empire. § 18. To-day the Spartans have lost their empire; and we can all see for ourselves that they were not a happy community and their legislator was not right. It is indeed a strange result of his labours: here is a people which has stuck to his laws and never been hindered in carrying them out, and yet it has lost all that makes life worth living. § 19. In any case the partisans of Sparta are in error about the type of government for which the legislator should show a preference. [It is not, as they think, the 'despotic' type]: the government of freemen is a finer government, and a government more connected with goodness, than any form of despotism. . . . We may add a further reflection. There is another reason why a state should not be considered happy, or its legislator praised, when its citizens are trained for victory in war and the subjugation of neighbouring states. Such a policy involves a great risk of injury [to the internal life of the state]. § 20. It obviously implies than any citizen who can do so should make it his object to capture the government of his own state.[2] This is exactly what the Spartans accuse their King Pausanias of having attempted to do—and this although he already held an office of such great dignity.

We may justly conclude that none of these arguments [in

[1] It is possible that Aristotle, in this general discussion of the merits of a peace policy and a war policy, had in mind the politics of Athens, though it is to Sparta that he actually refers. Down to 336 B.C. there had been a peace party at Athens, which had been in favour of using the 'theoric fund' liberally to give the citizens the benefits of leisure—a policy which precluded expenditure on preparation for war; and there had been what may be called a war-party, represented by Demosthenes, which was in favour of maintaining the old traditions of Athenian policy and championing the cause of liberty against the growth of tyranny. The antinomy is modern as well as ancient. It is an antinomy between the cause of internal development and social progress, and the cause of foreign affairs and the assumption of political responsibilities.

[2] This suggestion—that *imperium* is not only prejudicial to the *libertas* of dependencies, but also to that of the imperial state itself—is, as Newman remarks, both original and shrewd. It was the argument urged by the Whigs of 1770 against the American policy of George III.

favour of a training directed to the acquisition of empire] and none of the policies advocated is statesmanlike, or useful, or right. § 21. The Good is one and the same for individuals and communities; and it is the Good which the legislator ought to instil into the minds of his citizens.[1] Training for war should not be pursued with a view to enslaving men who do not deserve such a fate. Its objects should be these—first, to prevent men from ever becoming enslaved themselves; secondly, to put men in a position to exercise leadership—but 1334 a leadership directed to the interest of the led, and not to the establishment of a general system of slavery; and thirdly, to enable men to make themselves masters of those who naturally deserve to be slaves.[2] § 22. In support of the view that the legislator should make leisure and peace the cardinal aims of all legislation bearing on war—or indeed, for that matter, on anything else—we may cite the evidence of actual fact. Most of the states which make war their aim are safe only while they are fighting. They collapse as soon as they have established an empire, and lose the edge of their temper, like an unused sword, in time of peace. The legislator is to blame for having provided no training for the proper use of leisure.

Note on the soul and its parts

Aristotle begins by dividing the soul into two parts—the part which has a rational principle intrinsically, and the part which has the capacity for obeying such a principle. He then subdivides the first part into two divisions—a practical and a speculative. We may therefore say that there are, in all, *three* divisions or parts of the soul. These three divisions have three corresponding activities; and both the divisions and their activities can be graded in an order

[1] Aristotle thus suggests that the morality of the Athenian state—i.e. of the 40,000 citizens who formed the political association called Athens—is identical with the morality of each individual Athenian. It was less easy to hold a doctrine of *raison d'état* when the state was thus a body of citizens, and not a sovereign prince. But the Melian dialogue recorded by Thucydides shows that even the body of Athenian citizens could speak the language and hold the doctrine of Machiavelli.

[2] A Greek state, Aristotle implies, should exercise only a leadership (*hēgemonia*) over other Greek states, and it should exercise it in their interest; but it may also exercise the despotic control of a master over uncivilized peoples naturally intended for slavery.

of value. Beginning at the bottom, and proceeding upwards, we may say (1) that the part of the soul with a capacity for obeying rational principle issues in the activity of temperance; (2) that the practical division of the purely rational part of the soul issues in the activity of moral prudence (or *phronēsis*); and (3) that the speculative division of the purely rational part issues in the activity of wisdom. A man who can attain all the three activities will prefer the third to the other two: a man who can attain the first two only will prefer the second to the first: the man who can only attain the first will have to be content with the first.

On the general analysis of the nature of the soul here suggested see also the *Ethics*, Book I, c. XIII. 'The genuine statesman (*politikos*)', it is there stated, 'is regarded as one who has spent his labours on goodness above everything else, for his object is to make his fellow-citizens good and obedient to the laws (§ 2). . . . The statesman must therefore study the soul [goodness being a state and activity of the soul]; but he must study it [only] with this object in view, and just so far as this object requires' (§ 8). The rest of the chapter deals mainly with the 'desiderative' part of the soul which has the capacity for obeying rational principle. Later in the *Ethics*, in the course of Book VI, Aristotle proceeds to deal with the part of the soul which has a rational principle inherently and in its own nature; and, as in the *Politics*, he divides this part into two divisions —the speculative or contemplative, and the calculative or practical (c. I, §§ 5–6).

Note on the different parts or ways of life

The different 'parts or ways of life' are the life of action as contrasted with the life of leisure, and the life of war as contrasted with the life of peace. The different 'categories of acts' are acts which are merely necessary or useful, as contrasted with acts which are good in themselves.

The antithesis of the two 'ways of life'—action and war, leisure and peace—appears also in the last book of the *Ethics* (Book X, c. VII, §§ 6–7). Here Aristotle, speaking in praise of the contemplative life, puts politics generally, as well as the politics of war, on a lower plane. 'We occupy ourselves with action in order that we may have leisure, and we make war in order to enjoy peace. The activity of the practical virtues is shown in political or military affairs, but our action in such affairs must be held to be unleisured action. Military action is entirely so . . . but the action of the statesman too is unleisured action.'

Chapter XV

If leisure is thus of major importance, we may go on to notice that its enjoyment demands certain conditions, or, in other words, requires certain virtues—especially the virtues of wisdom and temperance. This will explain why a training such as the Spartan, which encourages only the virtue of courage, is defective and breaks down in practice. . . . Reverting now to the means of education—training in habits and the training of rational principle—we must inquire, 'Which of them should first be employed'? The answer is that the training of rational principle should, from the very first, be kept in view as the ultimate aim; but the training which ought to be given first is that of the part of the soul which has the capacity for obeying rational principle, and we must therefore begin by providing for the training of this part in habits. But even prior to the training of this part of the soul, there is a physical problem to be considered—the problem of ensuring a good physique which will be a good servant of the soul.

§ 1. The final end of men is the same whether they are acting individually or acting collectively; and the standard followed by the best individual is thus the same as the standard followed by the best political constitution. It is therefore evident that the qualities required for the use of leisure must belong to the state as well as the individual; for [these are the qualities which particularly matter, and], as we have repeatedly argued, peace is the final end of war, and leisure the final end of occupation. § 2. The qualities required for the use of leisure and the cultivation of the mind are twofold. Some of them are operative in and during leisure itself: some are operative in and during the activity of occupation.[1] [To understand why qualities of the latter sort are required, we must note that] a number of necessary conditions must be present, before the use of leisure is possible. This is why a state must possess the quality of temperance, and why, again, it must possess the quality of courage and endurance. 'There 's no leisure for slaves', as the proverb

[1] See the note at the end of the chapter.

goes, and men who cannot face danger courageously become the slaves of the first to assail them. § 3. The quality of courage and endurance is required for the activities of occupation: wisdom is required for those of leisure: temperance and justice are qualities required at both times and under both heads—though they are particularly required in times of peace and leisure.[1] A time of war automatically enforces temperance and justice: a time of the enjoyment of prosperity, and leisure accompanied by peace, is more apt to make men overbearing. § 4. A special degree of justice and temperance is therefore required in those who appear to be faring exceptionally well and enjoying all that the world accounts to be happiness, like the denizens of 'the happy isles' of which poets sing; and the greater the leisure which these men are able to use, when they are set among an abundance of blessings, the greater too will be their need of wisdom, as well as of temperance and justice. § 5. We can now understand why a state which seeks to achieve felicity, and to be good, must partake of all these three virtues. If some shame must always attach to *any* failure to use aright the goods of life, a special measure of shame must attach to a failure to use them aright in times of leisure; and people who show themselves good in times of occupation and war, but sink to the level of slaves in times of peace and leisure, will be found to incur particular censure. § 6. Excellence must not be sought by a training such as the Spartan. The Spartans are like the rest of the world in their view of the **1334 b** nature of life's highest goods [which they identify, like everybody else, with the external goods of fortune]: they only differ from others in thinking that the right way of getting them is to cultivate a single excellence [i.e. military courage]. Regarding external goods as higher than any others, and the enjoyment they give as

[1] It is interesting to note the distribution of the four virtues—fortitude, temperance, justice, and wisdom—in the thought of this passage. Fortitude is regarded as operative only in and during occupation, though it also provides a necessary condition for leisure; the virtues of temperance and justice are assigned the higher position of being operative in and during both occupation and leisure; and the virtue of wisdom is given the still higher position of being purely operative in and during leisure.

greater than that derived from the general cultivation of excellence, [they cultivate only the single excellence which they consider useful as a means to securing those goods. But it is the *whole* of excellence which ought to be cultivated],[1] and cultivated *for its own sake*, as our argument has already shown. That still leaves us, however, with the problem, 'How, and by what means, is a general excellence to be achieved?'

§ 7. Using the distinction already made in a previous chapter,[2] we may say that the means required for achieving general excellence are natural endowment, habit, and rational principle. So far as the first of these is concerned, we have already determined [in c. VII] the character of the endowment with which our citizens should start. It remains to consider the other two means, and to determine whether training in habit or training in rational principle ought to come first. The two modes of training must be adjusted to one another as harmoniously as possible [which not only means starting first with the mode that ought to come first, but also directing both modes alike to the same sort of high purpose]; otherwise rational principle may fail to attain the highest ideal, and the training given through habit may show a similar defect. § 8. With a view to this result, we may assume two things as evident.[3] First, in the sphere of man's life (as in all life generally), birth has a first beginning [i.e. the union of parents], but the end attained from such a beginning is only a step to some further end. The exercise of rational principle and thought is the ultimate end of man's nature. It is therefore with a view to the exercise of these faculties that we should regulate, from the first, the birth and the training in habits of our citizens.[4] § 9. Secondly, as soul and body are

[1] The passage in brackets represents Newman's conjecture of a passage which has dropped out in the Greek text as it has come down to us.

[2] c. XIII, § 11.

[3] Newman's note (vol. iii, p. 454) will elucidate the argument: 'Aristotle is about to decide that training through habit must precede training through reason, but that training through habit must be adjusted to and pursued for the sake of reason, which is the end; and he proves the second proposition first (in § 8), and then the first (in §§ 9–10).'

[4] The argument is that there is a *scala naturae*. On the first rung of the

two, so there are also two parts of the soul, the irrational and the rational; and there are also two corresponding states of these parts—the state of appetite, and the state of pure thought. In order of time and in date of birth, the body is prior to the soul, and the irrational part of the soul is prior to the rational. § 10. This is proved by the fact that all the signs of appetite—such as anger, self-will, and desire—are visible in children from their very birth; while reasoning and thought are faculties which only appear, as a rule, when they grow older. The conclusion which follows is obvious. Children's bodies should be given attention before their souls; and their appetites should be the next part of them to be regulated. But the regulation of their appetites should be intended for the benefit of their minds—just as the attention given to their bodies should be intended for the benefit of their souls.

Note on Aristotle's conception of leisure

Some words should be said about the general conception of leisure (*scholē*). In the first place we must note that leisure is not contrasted with activity. It is itself activity, and the highest form of activity—the activity of the part of the soul which possesses rational principle, and especially of the speculative division of that part. It is therefore contrasted not with activity, but with 'occupation' (*ascholia*)—in other words, with the sort of activity which is pursued not for its own sake (as the activity of leisure is), but for the sake of something else. Secondly, we must note that leisure is not only contrasted with, or distinguished from, 'occupation': it is also contrasted with, or distinguished from, 'recreation' (*anapausis*) and 'amusement' (*paidia*—'the sort of thing children do'). Amusement and recreation mean rest after occupation, and preparation for new occupation: they are thus both essentially connected with the idea of occupation. Leisure stands by itself, in its own independent right. Aristotle thus operates with three different notions—the notion of leisure; the notion of occupation; and the notion (in one sense intermediate between the two, but in another sense closer to the latter) of amusement and recreation.

ladder parents unite to secure the end of the birth of a child. But that end is not final: it leads to the next rung of the ladder (the training of the child in habits); and that in turn leads to a further rung (the training of the child in the use of rational principle and thought). It is the final rung of the ladder which controls the previous and lower rungs: cf. *supra*, c. XIV, § 11.

If it be asked, 'What is the activity of leisure?', we may answer in one word, '*diagōgē*', or the cultivation of the mind. *Scholē* is spent in *diagōgē* (Book VIII, c. III, § 6), and conversely *diagōgē* is pursued in and during *scholē* (Book VIII, c. III, § 8). Newman's words may also be quoted (vol. iii, p. 442): *scholē* 'is employment in work desirable for its own sake—the hearing of noble music and no doubt of noble poetry; intercourse with friends chosen for their worth; and above all the exercise, in company or otherwise, of the speculative faculty.'

D
THE EARLY STAGES OF EDUCATION (cc. XVI–XVII)

CHAPTER XVI

1. *The regulation of* marriage *is the first necessity, if we are to ensure a good physique for our future citizens. The age at which husband and wife marry affects the physique of their offspring; and on physical grounds it may be suggested that the husband should be older than the wife, and the man of 37 should marry the woman of 18. The husband's physique should not be spoiled by over-exercise or the reverse; the wife should take regular exercise during pregnancy. If the size of the family has to be limited, it will be necessary to consider means such as the exposure of infants and the procuring of miscarriages. The age at which procreation should cease, and the treatment of adultery.*

§ 1. If we assume that the legislator ought, for a start, to see to the provision of a stock of the healthiest possible bodies in the nurseries of our state, it follows that his first attention must be devoted to marriage; and here he will have to consider what the ages of the partners should be, and what qualities they ought to possess. § 2. The first thing to be taken into account, in legislating about matrimony, is the length of time that husband and wife are likely to live together. The right thing is that they should arrive simultaneously at the same epoch of sexual life. There should be no divergence of physical power, with the husband still able to beget but the wife unable to conceive, or the wife still able to conceive and the husband unable to beget. Such a position is apt to cause discord and difference between married persons. The second

thing to be taken into account is the difference of age between children and their parents. § 3. On the one hand, there should not be too much of a gap (elderly fathers cannot give their children the benefit of parental guidance, or receive from them in return the benefit of filial piety); and yet, on the other hand, there should not be too little 1335 a of a gap. § 4. That, too, leads to considerable difficulties: it makes children treat parents with less respect, feeling that they are almost contemporaries, and it readily leads to quarrels about the management of the household. The third thing the legislator has to take into account—and here we return to the point from which we have just digressed—is the provision of a stock of healthy children answerable to his purposes.

Now all these objects may be secured at once by a single policy. § 5. The period of procreation finally ends, as a rule, at the age of 70 for men, and the age of 50 for women; and the beginning of marital intercourse should therefore be fixed for both parties with a corresponding interval. [The husband will thus be 20 years older than his wife at the time of marriage.] § 6. The union of young parents is bad for the procreation of issue. In the whole of the animal world the descendants of young parents have imperfections. They tend to be of the female sex, and they are diminutive in figure. We are bound to expect the same sort of result among human beings. There is evidence to warrant that expectation. In all the states[1] where it is the custom for men and women to marry young, the inhabitants are imperfectly developed and small of stature. § 7. We may add that young mothers have harder labours and die more often in childbirth. This was the reason, according to some accounts, for the response once given by the oracle to the people of Troezen ['Plough not the young fallow']. It had no relation to the cultivation of crops, but referred to the large mortality caused by the marriage of girls at too early an age. § 8. It also conduces to sexual restraint if the daughters of a family are not married early: young women are supposed to be more intem-

[1] Aristotle may have in mind here the Cretans of his time, as well as the people of Troezen.

perate when once they have had experience of sexual intercourse. The physique of men is also supposed to be stunted in its growth, when intercourse is begun before the seed has finished *its* growth.[1] (The seed, too, has its own period of growth—a period which it observes exactly, or with only a slight variation, in the course of its development.) § 9. Women should therefore marry about the age of 18, and men at 37 or thereabouts. If these ages are observed, union will begin while the bodies of both the partners are still in their prime, and it will end for both simultaneously with the simultaneous ending of their power of procreation. The succession of children to parents will also be as it should be. § 10. If reproduction, as we may reasonably expect, begins immediately after marriage, children will be ready to take over in the beginning of their own prime, and just at the time when the period of the father's vigour has come to an end with the attainment of the age of 70.

We have now discussed the proper ages for marriage. In regard to the proper season of the year, it is best to follow the sensible practice, which is observed by the majority of people to-day, of fixing winter as the time for men and women to set up house together. § 11. Married couples should also study for themselves the lessons to be learned from doctors and natural philosophers about the bringing of children into the world. Doctors can tell them all they need to know about
1335 b the times of good physical condition: natural philosophers can tell them about favourable winds (for instance, they hold that the north wind is better than the south).

§ 12. What habit of body in the parents is likely to be of

[1] In considering this physical approach to the subject of marriage, we must remember that Aristotle was the son of a doctor, and that he had received a medical training. In his reference to seed (*sperma*, which is the reading of the better manuscripts, though the word *soma* is found in some) Aristotle seems to suggest that the male seed grows; that its growth is not finished till a given date; and that if sexual intercourse begins before its growth is finished, the whole physique of the person indulging in intercourse will be adversely affected.

It may be added, in regard to the suggestion that men should marry at 37 or thereabouts, that he places the period of physical prime at the age of 30 to 35 in the *Rhetoric* (Book II, c. XIV, § 4).

most benefit to the future physique of their children? That is a theme to which closer attention will have to be paid when we come to treat of the management of children;[1] but some general indication may be given here. The athlete's habit of body neither produces a good condition for the general purposes of civic life, nor does it encourage ordinary health and the procreation of children. The habit of valetudinarians and persons unfit for any exertion is equally unfavourable. The best habit is one which comes midway between the athletic and the valetudinarian. § 13. Some amount of exertion must therefore go to its making. But the exertion must not be violent or specialized, as is the case with the athlete; it should rather be a general exertion, directed to all the activities of a freeman.

Wives, as well as husbands, need the physical qualities of which we have just been speaking. § 14. Pregnant mothers should pay attention to their bodies: they should take regular exercise, and follow a nourishing diet. The legislator can easily lead them to a habit of regular exercise if he requires them to make some daily pilgrimage for the purpose of worshipping at the shrines of the goddesses who preside over childbirth. Their minds, unlike their bodies, should be kept free from exertion; for children evidently draw on the mother who carries them in her womb, just as plants draw on the soil.[2]

§ 15. The question arises whether children should always be reared or may sometimes be exposed to die.[3] There should

[1] It is not clear why the proper physique of parents should be a matter to be treated in connexion with the management of children. In any case, no treatment of that subject follows.

[2] Here, as in § 8 above, Aristotle seems to take a purely physical view of woman (the Greek world was a masculine world). It seems curious, if children draw on the mother who carries them, that they should not draw on the whole of her—mind as well as body. But Aristotle apparently desires the mother to be like the patient unthinking earth in which the seed is germinating.

[3] The exposure of children (sometimes in the hills that rose above the city) was not uncommon among the Greeks; and the heroine of a Greek play or romance (it was especially daughters who were thus 'exposed') is sometimes a foundling of this character. The very word 'foundling' shows the survival of the practice in modern times; but modern charity has provided the foundling hospital in lieu of the bare hill-side.

certainly be a law to prevent the rearing of deformed children. On the other hand, there should also be a law, in all states where the system of social habits is opposed to unrestricted increase, to prevent the exposure of children to death *merely* in order to keep the population down. The proper thing to do is to limit the size of each family, and if children are then conceived in excess of the limit so fixed, to have miscarriage induced before sense and life have begun in the embryo. (Whether it is right or wrong to induce a miscarriage will thus depend on whether sense and life are still to come, or have already begun.)

§ 16. We have now determined the ages at which men and women should begin their married life. It remains to determine the length of time for which they should render service to the state by bringing children into the world. The offspring of elderly men, like that of very young men, tends to be physically and mentally imperfect; and the children of old age are weakly. We may therefore fix the length of time for which procreation lasts by reference to the mental prime.[1] § 17. This comes for most men—as some of the poets, who measure life in seven-year periods, have suggested—about the age of 50. Men may therefore be released from the service of bringing children into the world when they are four or five years above this age; and from that time forward we must regard them as indulging in intercourse for reasons of health, or for some similar cause. § 18. For husband or wife to be detected in the commission of adultery—at whatever time it may happen, and in whatever shape or form, during all the period of their being married and being called husband and wife—must be made a matter of disgrace. But to be detected in adultery 1336 a during the very period of bringing children into the world is a thing to be punished by a stigma of infamy proportionate to such an offence.

[1] 'Aristotle is here speaking of the mental prime of the husband, not the wife' (Newman, vol. iii, p. 476).

Chapter XVII

2. The nursery and the infant school. *The first stage: the diet of the infant; the proper use of its limbs; the enuring of children to cold. The second stage, to the age of 5: games and stories: young children should be protected from bad company, and safeguarded from hearing indecent language or seeing indecent pictures: generally, they should be saved from an early familiarity with anything low, since early impressions go deep. The third stage, from the age of 5 to that of 7: children of this age should watch other children doing the work they will have to do later themselves.*

After the age of 7 education will fall into two periods—the first from the age of 7 to that of puberty: the second from the age of puberty to the age of 21. Should there be a code of regulations, and should education be managed by the state or privately managed?

§ 1. When children are born, their physical powers will be seriously affected, during their growth, by the nature of the nourishment which they are given. On any consideration of the matter, and whether we look to the animal world or to the example of those uncivilized peoples who make it their aim to produce a martial habit of body, it is evident that a diet abounding in milk is best suited to the physical development of children; and the less wine they are given the better, if they are to escape diseases. § 2. It is also good to encourage every sort of physical movement which their little bodies can make; but in order to prevent any distortion of their soft limbs, some uncivilized peoples still use mechanical appliances which keep their bodies straight.[1] It is good to habituate children to the endurance of cold from their earliest infancy; and this is a practice which greatly conduces to their general health, as well as hardening them in advance for military service. § 3. This will explain why some uncivilized peoples[2]

[1] Aristotle does not explain what these 'instruments' were; but we may remember the back-boards in which girls used to be pent.

[2] The various references made here, and in other passages of the *Politics*, to the practices of uncivilized peoples (the *ethnē*, or 'gentiles', outside the Greek pale), are probably drawn from the collection of the customs of such peoples which Aristotle made.

have the habit of plunging their children at birth into a cold river, or (like the Celts) of making them go lightly clad. Wherever it is possible to implant a habit in children, it is best to begin the process of habituation in their earliest years, and then to increase it gradually. The physical constitution of children, owing to their natural warmth, is well adapted for training in the endurance of cold.

§ 4. The earliest years will best be handled in the ways we have just described, and in other similar ways. The next stage of the child's life, which lasts to the age of five, is one which cannot be set any lessons, or put to any compulsory tasks, for fear of hindering its growth. But it is a stage which needs some practice in movement, to prevent the body from becoming limp; and this should be provided by games, as well as in other ways. § 5. The games should be neither laborious nor effeminate, but such as become a freeman. Care should also be taken by the officers in charge (who are generally termed the superintendents of education) to determine the sort of tales and stories which children of this age ought to be told. All these things should prepare the way for the occupations of later years; and even the games of children should be for the most part mimicries of what will later be earnest. § 6. Plato, in his *Laws*, would like to stop children from straining their lungs and sobbing; but thinkers of his sort are wrong in the view they take of the matter. It helps the growth of children: it is, in its way, a sort of physical exercise; and just as holding the breath gives adults strength for exertion, so straining the lungs will equally strengthen children.

§ 7. The superintendents of education must exercise a general control over the way in which children pass their time. In particular, they must be careful that very little of their time is passed in the company of slaves. The stage of life through 1336 b which children pass down to the age of seven is bound to be one of home training; and young as they are they will be likely to contract vulgar habits from anything vulgar they hear or see. § 8. It should therefore be a primary duty of the legislator to exorcize the use of bad language

everywhere in our state. To use bad language of any sort lightly is next door to acting badly. The young, especially, should be kept free from hearing, or using, any such language. § 9. Those who are guilty, in spite of all prohibitions, of talking or acting indecently must be punished accordingly. The younger freemen, who are not yet allowed to recline at the common tables,[1] should be subjected to corporal punishment and other indignities; and men of an older age should pay the penalty for behaving like slaves by undergoing indignities of a degrading character.

If the use of indecent language is thus to be proscribed, it is obvious that we must also prevent the exhibition of indecent pictures and the performance of indecent plays. § 10. It should therefore be the duty of the government to prohibit all statuary and painting which portrays any sort of indecent action.[2] An exception may, however, be made for the festivals of deities where even the use of scurrility is licensed by the law.[3] (But here, we may note, the law also allows men who have reached a proper maturity to acquit their wives and children from attendance by attending in person themselves.) § 11. The seeing of mimes or comedies should be forbidden to young persons by the legislator, until they have reached the age when they are allowed to share with the older men in the right of reclining and taking wine at the common tables. By that time their education will have made them all immune from the evil effects of such performances.

§ 12. We have now given a cursory account of this question. We must give it our attention, and settle it in more detail, at a later stage, when we have gone into the arguments for and against such legal control, and discussed the form which it

[1] Reclining was the usual posture of the Greeks and Romans at the dinner-table: hence the Latin word *triclinium* for a dining-room. The younger freemen, however, sat on chairs, instead of reclining on couches.

[2] Aristotle, beginning with the idea of protecting children from hearing bad language, allows himself to digress into the general problem of censorship, for old as well as for young. He takes censorship in his stride (as Plato had done before him), with little or no regard to our modern ideas of the artist's 'freedom' or to general 'freedom of thought'.

[3] We may remember that mock ceremonies might be conducted even in medieval churches, with 'boy-bishops' and 'abbots of unreason'.

ought to take. Here we have only touched on the issue so far as the occasion immediately requires. § 13. Perhaps there is point in the remark of Theodorus, the tragic actor, that he had never yet allowed any other actor, however poor he might be, to make his entrance before he did, because (as he put it) 'spectators get fond of those they hear first'. This is a fate which is apt to befall us not only in our associations with persons, but also in our contacts with things: we always prefer what we come across first.[1] § 14. The young must therefore be kept from an early familiarity with anything that is low, and especially anything that may suggest depravity or malice. When the first five years are safely over, children should then spend the next two years, down to the age of seven, in watching others at work on the lessons which they will afterwards have to learn themselves.

§ 15. [This brings us to the stage of regular education.] There should be two different periods of education—the first from the age of seven to that of puberty; the second from puberty to the age of twenty-one. Those who divide man's life into seven-year periods are on the whole right. But the divisions which we ought to follow [when we are planning the course of education] **1337 a** are the divisions made by nature herself. The purpose of education, like that of art generally, is simply to copy nature by making her deficiencies good.[2] § 16. Three subjects here suggest themselves for our consideration. The first is whether there ought to be some code of regulations governing the education of children. The second is whether the education of children should be a matter for the state, or should be conducted on a private basis, as it still is, even to-day, in the great majority of cases. The third question which we have to consider is the proper nature of a code of regulations.

[1] Horace said the same thing later:

> Quo semel est imbuta recens servabit odorem
> Testa diu.

[2]

> This is an art
> Which does mend nature, change it rather, but
> The art itself is nature. (*The Winter's Tale*, Act IV, sc. iv, 95–7).

BOOK VIII

THE TRAINING OF YOUTH

A
THE GENERAL SCHEME OF TRAINING (cc. I–III)

Chapter I

Legislation is needed to regulate education, both for political and for moral reasons. There should be a uniform system for all, and it should be a system of state education.

1337 a 11 § 1. All would agree that the legislator should make the education of the young his chief and foremost concern.[1] [There are two reasons for taking this view.] In the first place, the constitution of a state will suffer if education is neglected. § 2. The citizens of a state should always be educated to suit the constitution of their state.[2] The type of character appropriate to a constitution is the power which continues to sustain it, as it is also the force which originally creates it. The democratic type of character creates and sustains democracy; the oligarchical type creates and sustains oligarchy; and as the progression ascends each higher type of character will always tend to produce a higher form of constitution. In the second place, every capacity, and every form of art, requires as a condition of its exercise some measure of previous training and some amount of preliminary habituation. Men must therefore be trained and habituated before they can do acts of goodness, as members of a state should do. [There is thus a moral, as well as a political reason, for making education the chief concern of the legislator.]

§ 3. The whole of a state [i.e. the whole body of its members] has one common End. Evidently, therefore, the system

[1] This is Aristotle's answer to the first question raised at the end of the previous book—'Should there be a code of regulations governing the education of children?' He answers, 'Yes—and that code should be of the foremost importance.'

[2] We have to remember, as always, that the constitution, in Aristotle's view, is not only 'an arrangement of offices', but also 'a way of life'.

of education in a state must also be one and the same for all, and the provision of this system must be a matter of public action.[1] It cannot be left, as it is at present, to private enterprise, with each parent making provision privately for his own children, and having them privately instructed as he himself thinks fit. Training for an end which is common should also itself be common. § 4. [There is another reason for taking this view.] We must not regard a citizen as belonging just to himself: we must rather regard every citizen as belonging to the state.[2] Each is a part of the state; and the provision made for each part will naturally be adjusted to the provision made for the Whole. Here, as in some other respects, the Spartans are to be praised. They pay the greatest attention to the training of the young; and they pay that attention collectively, and not in their private capacity.

Chapter II

The absence of any clear view about the proper subjects of instruction: the conflicting claims of utility, moral discipline, and the advancement of knowledge. Some subjects should be taught because of their utility; but the teaching of such subjects should never go so far as to produce a mechanical bias, and even the more liberal subjects should not be studied too professionally.

Two things are now evident. The first is that there ought to be laws to regulate education. The second is that educa-

[1] This is Aristotle's answer to the second question raised at the end of the previous book—'Should education be managed by the state, or conducted on a private basis?' The answer is that there ought to be a state system of education. Here, as in his answer to the first question, he gives two reasons for the view which he adopts. The first reason is connected with his doctrine of Ends: the second with his doctrine of Wholes and the relation between the Whole and its parts.

[2] This is almost an echo of a passage in Plato's *Laws* (923 A): 'I, as your legislator, do not count either your persons or your property as your own: I count them as belonging to your family, past and future; and still more do I count the whole of your family and your property as belonging to the state.' From the same point of view, in the *Ethics*, Book V, c. XI, §§ 2–3, Aristotle regards the suicide as acting unjustly towards the state; 'and this', he notes, 'is the reason why the state punishes him, and some loss of civic rights is inflicted on the man who destroys himself, as a wrongdoer against the state.'

tion ought to be conducted by the state. § 1. We have now to consider the nature of the education to be given, and the methods by which it ought to be given.[1] At present opinion is divided about the subjects of education. All do not take the same view about what should be learned by the young, either with a view to plain goodness or with a view to the best life possible;[2] nor is opinion clear whether education should be directed mainly to the understanding, or mainly to moral character.[3] § 2. If we look at actual practice, the result is sadly confusing; it throws no light on the problem whether the proper studies to be followed are those which are useful in life, or those which make for goodness, or those which advance the bounds of knowledge. Each sort of study receives some votes in its **1337 b** favour; [none of them has a clear case]. If one looks, for example, at the studies which make for goodness, one finds a total absence of agreement. Goodness itself, to begin with, has not the same meaning for all the different people who honour it; and when that is the case, it is hardly surprising that there should also be difference about the right methods of practising goodness.

§ 3. There can be no doubt that such useful subjects as are really necessary ought to be part of the instruction of children. But this does not mean the inclusion of every useful subject.[4] Occupations are divided into those which are fit for freemen

[1] This is the third of the questions propounded at the end of the previous book—What should be the nature of the code of regulations governing education? The answer to this question—so far as it is actually given—occupies the rest of this Book.

[2] The distinction here implied is somewhat obscure. Perhaps 'plain goodness' is a matter of the virtues belonging to the practical division of the rational part of the soul; while 'the best possible life' goes farther, and includes also (and more particularly) the virtues of the speculative and higher division of that part of the soul (see Book VII, c. xiv, the first note at the end of the chapter).

[3] This sentence may be interpreted to mean, first, that there is no agreement about the subjects which ought to be taught, whichever part of the human spirit be regarded as the more important; secondly, that there is no clear answer to the question, 'Which is the more important part of the human spirit?'

[4] The useful subjects which are necessary may include reading, writing, some arithmetic, and some geometry. Domestic science may be an example of a useful subject which is not necessary. (Newman, vol. iii, p. 506.)

and those which are unfit for them; and it follows from this that the total amount of useful knowledge imparted to children should never be large enough to make them mechanically minded. § 4. The term 'mechanical' (*banausos*) should properly be applied to any occupation, art, or instruction, which is calculated to make the body, or soul, or mind, of a freeman unfit for the pursuit and practice of goodness. § 5. We may accordingly apply the word 'mechanical' to any art or craft which adversely affects men's physical fitness, and to any employment which is pursued for the sake of gain and keeps men's minds too much, and too meanly, occupied. Much the same may also be said of the liberal branches of knowledge. Some of these branches can be studied, up to a point, without any illiberality; but too much concentration upon them, with a view to attaining perfection, is liable to cause the same evil effects that have just been mentioned. § 6. A good deal depends on the purpose for which acts are done or subjects are studied. Anything done to satisfy a personal need, or to help a friend, or to attain goodness, will not be illiberal; but the very same act, when done repeatedly at the instance of other persons, may be counted menial and servile.[1]

Chapter III

There are four subjects of instruction to be considered—reading and writing; drawing; gymnastic; and music. The first two have an element of utility: the third promotes the moral virtue of courage: the purpose of the fourth is not so clear, but it may be argued that it serves to promote the proper use of leisure. This leads us to note the distinction between (1) *occupation*, (2) *play*

[1] In something of an English fashion—at any rate as that fashion went in the eighteenth century—Aristotle feels that the freeman or 'gentleman' ought to preserve an amateur character. Even in the liberal arts—such as music, painting, and literature—he must be a dilettante, with a fine edge of appreciation, but with an edge of execution which is not too precious or virtuose. Something of the same circle of ideas already inspires Castiglione's *Il Cortigiano*, at the beginning of the sixteenth century. The courtier must have a sort of magnanimity, or *sprezzatura*, about all the knowledge which he professes, 'employing in everything a certain disdain which conceals art'. On the idea of 'the mechanical', or 'banausic', see the Prefatory Note, § 4.

or relaxation, and (3) *the use of leisure. The real purpose of music is to be found in the cultivation of leisure; and drawing too, while it has its utility, may also serve to give the young an observant eye for beauty of form and figure.*

§ 1. The studies now generally established as parts of the curriculum may be regarded, as has already been said, from two different points of view.[1] There are some four subjects which are usually made the basis of education. They include reading and writing, physical training, and music; and some would also add drawing. The first and the last of these subjects are generally regarded as useful for the practical purposes of life in a number of different ways. Physical training is commonly thought to foster the virtue of courage. The object of training in music is a matter of doubt and dispute. § 2. At present, indeed, it is mainly studied as if its object were pleasure; but the real reason which originally led to its being made a subject of education is something higher. Our very nature has a tendency (on which we have often remarked) to seek of itself for ways and means which will enable us to use leisure rightly, as well as to find some right occupation; indeed it is the power to use leisure rightly, as we would once more repeat, which is the basis of all our life.[2] § 3. It is true that both occupation and leisure are necessary; but it is also true that leisure is higher than occupation, and is the end to which occupation is directed. Our problem, therefore, is to find modes of activity which will fill our leisure. We can hardly fill our leisure with play. To do so would be to make play the be-all and end-all of life. § 4. That is an impossibility. Play is a thing to be chiefly used in connexion with one side of life—the side of occupation. (A simple argument shows that this is the case. Occupation is the companion of work and exertion: the worker needs relaxation: play is intended to provide relaxation.) We may

[1] 'i.e. they may be used in support of the view that useful subjects should be studied, or in support of the view that subjects tending to promote virtue should be studied' (Newman, vol. iii, p. 510).

[2] The fact has already been insisted upon in Book VII, c. XIV, § 22, and c. XV, §§ 1–2.

therefore conclude that play and games should only be admitted into our state at the proper times and seasons, and should be applied as restoratives. The feelings which play produces in the mind are feelings of relief from **1338 a** exertion; and the pleasure it gives provides relaxation. Leisure is a different matter: we think of it as having in itself intrinsic pleasure, intrinsic happiness, intrinsic felicity.[1] § 5. Happiness of that order does not belong to those who are engaged in occupation: it belongs to those who have leisure. Those who are engaged in occupation are so engaged with a view to some end which they regard as still unattained. But felicity is a present end; and all men think of it as accompanied by pleasure and not by pain. It is true that all are not equally agreed about the nature of the pleasure which accompanies felicity. Different persons estimate its nature differently, according to their own personality and disposition. But the highest pleasure, derived from the noblest sources, will be that of the man of greatest goodness.

§ 6. It is clear, therefore, that there are some branches of learning and education which ought to be studied with a view to the proper use of leisure in the cultivation of the mind. It is clear, too, that these studies should be regarded as ends in themselves, while studies pursued with a view to an occupation should be regarded merely as means and matters of necessity. § 7. This will explain why our forefathers made music a part of education. They did not do so because it was necessary: it is nothing of the sort. Nor did they do so because it is useful, as some other subjects are. Reading and writing, for example, are useful in various ways—for money-making; for housekeeping; for the acquisition of knowledge; and for a number of political activities. Drawing may be held to be useful in helping men to judge more correctly [and therefore to purchase more wisely] the works of different artists. [Music serves none of these

[1] The argument here is that occupation has no intrinsic pleasure, but has to be supplemented by an extrinsic pleasure derived from subsequent play. Leisure, on the contrary, has an intrinsic pleasure, which is felt in the very act and moment of its use.

uses.] Nor is it, like physical training, useful in improving health and military prowess: it has no visible effect upon either. § 8. We are thus left with its value for the cultivation of the mind in leisure. This is evidently the reason of its being introduced into education: it ranks as a part of the cultivation which men think proper to freemen. This is the meaning of the lines in Homer, beginning,

> Such are they who alone should be called to the bountiful banquet,

and continuing (after a mention of various guests) with the words,

> § 9. With them call they a minstrel, to pleasure all men with his music.

Again, in another passage, Odysseus is made to say that music is the best of pastimes when men are all merry, and

> They who feast in the hall lend their ears to the minstrel in silence,
> Sitting in order due.

§ 10. We may take it as evident, from what has been said, that there is a kind of education in which parents should have their sons trained not because it is necessary, or because it is useful, but simply because it is liberal and something good in itself. Whether this kind of education is confined to a single subject, or includes a number of subjects; what the subjects are (if they are several), and how they should be studied—all this must be left for further discussion. § 11. But we have already reached a point at which we are entitled to say that the evidence of tradition supports our general view. This is shown by the old-established subjects of study; and the example of music is sufficient to make it clear. We are also entitled to say that the reason why some of the useful subjects ought to be taught to children—for example, reading and writing—is not only the fact of their being useful: it is also the fact that they make it possible to acquire many other branches of knowledge. § 12. Similarly the object of instruction in drawing is not so much to save people from making mistakes in their private purchases, or from being deceived

in the buying and selling 1338 b of articles; it is rather to give them an observant eye for beauty of form and figure. To aim at utility everywhere is utterly unbecoming to high-minded and liberal spirits.

§ 13. In educating children we must use the instrument of habits before we use that of reason, and we must deal with the body before we deal with the mind. We must therefore begin by putting them into the hands of physical instructors and games-masters. The former will give them a proper habit of body: the latter will teach them all the necessary accomplishments.

B

PHYSICAL TRAINING, OR GYMNASTIC (c. IV)

Chapter IV

There are dangers in over-athleticism, and defects in the Spartan system of education: courage is not the only virtue, and a training meant to produce toughness is one-sided and ineffective, even in the matter of fostering true courage. The right policy in regard to physical training is to avoid an excessive early training, which stunts the proper development of the body. Light exercises till the age of puberty, followed by a period of three years spent in study, which should be followed in turn by a period of hard exercise and strict diet—this is the best system. The young should not be made to work hard with body and mind simultaneously.

§ 1. Among the states which are generally regarded as paying the greatest attention to the training of youth, there are some which seek to create an athletic habit of body, but do so at the cost of serious injury both to the figure and the growth of the body. The Spartans have not been guilty of this particular error; but they turn the young into savages by imposing rigorous exercises, in the idea that this is the best way of fostering the virtue of courage. § 2. It is, however, a mistake, as we have repeatedly said, to direct the training of youth exclusively, or mainly, to this one virtue; and even if courage were the main object, the Spartans are wrong in their way of encouraging it. Both in the animal world, and among

uncivilized peoples, courage is always found, as observation will show us, not in association with the greatest ferocity, but in connexion with a gentler and more lion-like temper. § 3. There are, it is true, many uncivilized peoples which are ready enough to indulge in murder and cannibalism. Among the peoples on the coast of the Black Sea, the Achaeans and Heniochi are of this sort, and some of the inland peoples are equally or even more savage; they are peoples of bandits—but they have no real courage. § 4. Even the Spartans themselves, as we know from experience, were superior to others only so long as they were the only people which assiduously practised the rigours of discipline; and nowadays they are beaten both in athletic contests and in actual war. Their previous superiority was not due to the particular training which they gave to their youth: it was simply and solely due to their having some sort of discipline when their antagonists had none at all. § 5. The noble heart—not the ferocious temper—should bear the palm. It is not wolves, or other savage animals, that will fight a good fight in the presence of a noble danger: it is the man who is of a good courage. § 6. To let youth run wild in savage pursuits, and to leave them untrained in the disciplines they really need, is really to degrade them into vulgarity. It is to make them serve the statesman's purposes in one respect, and one only; and even there, as our argument shows,[1] it is to make them of less service than those who have been differently trained. § 7. We must not judge the Spartans on the grounds of their former achievement, but on the ground of their present position. The Spartan training has now to face rivals. Formerly it had none.

There is now general agreement about the necessity of physical training, and about the way in which it ought to be given. Till the age of puberty the exercises used should be light, and there should be no rigorous dieting or violent exertion, such as may hinder the proper growth of the body. § 8. The bad effects of excessive early training **1339 a** are strik-

[1] The argument has shown, in § 4, that the Spartans are beaten by others even on their own chosen field.

ingly evident. In the lists of Olympic victors there are only two or three cases of the same person having won in the men's events who had previously won in the boys'; and the reason is that early training, and the compulsory exercises which it involved, had resulted in loss of energy. § 9. [There will thus be light exercises in the years before puberty.] After that age is reached, the next three years may be spent in other studies [such as reading and writing, music, and drawing]; and then the next period of development may properly be given to hard exercise and strict diet. It is not right to do work with the mind and the body at the same time. The two different sorts of work tend naturally to produce different, and indeed opposite, effects. Physical work clogs the mind; and mental work hampers the body.

C

THE AIMS AND METHODS OF EDUCATION IN MUSIC

(cc. v–vii)

Chapter V

There are three possible views about the purpose of education in music—(1) *that it serves for amusement and relaxation;* (2) *that it serves as a means of moral training;* (3) *that it serves as a means to the cultivation of the mind. Amusement cannot be the aim: if it were, we should not want to have children taught to play music themselves; we should be content to let them get amusement by listening to the playing of others. But this argument cuts several ways at once. If moral training be regarded as the purpose of music, we may equally ask whether children should be taught to play themselves for* that *purpose; and even if the cultivation of the mind be regarded as its aim, we may still raise the same question. We may therefore dismiss for the present the question whether children should play themselves, and turn back to consider the aim of education in music independently of that question.*

In a sense education in music has more than one aim. Music produces pleasure, and the pleasure which it produces may serve the purpose of amusement as well as that of cultivation of the mind and the right use of leisure. (The fact that music and its

pleasure can serve both purposes explains how easy it is to fall into the idea that amusement is the one end of life: we look at the simpler and more obvious of the two purposes served, and forget the other.) But may not music also serve the purpose of moral training, as well as those of amusement and cultivation of the mind? It would appear that it can. Music can supply 'images' of the virtues, and by inducing us to take pleasure in the 'images' it can induce us to take pleasure in the virtues themselves. All artistic representations (e.g. paintings as well as musical compositions) have this quality; but music has it in a special degree. Both the modes and the times of music have obvious ethical effects, especially upon the young; and indeed harmony, in the view of many thinkers, is the essence—or at any rate an attribute—of the soul.

§ 1. Some questions concerning music have already been raised at an earlier stage of our argument; but it will be well to pick up the thread again here, and to pursue the matter further. We may thus provide something in the nature of a preface to the considerations which would naturally be advanced in any full view of the subject. § 2. It is difficult to define the exact effects of music; and it is equally difficult to define the exact purpose for which it ought to be studied. Some would hold that the purpose of music, like that of sleeping or drinking, is simply amusement and relaxation. Sleep and drink are not in themselves good things; but they are at any rate pleasurable things, and, as Euripides says, they 'bid dull cares avaunt'. § 3. It is on this ground that music is sometimes ranked with them both, and that sleep and drink and music (to which dancing may also be added) are all treated in just the same way. Another possible view is that music should be regarded as something of an influence making for goodness, inasmuch as it has the power of giving a tone to our character (just as physical training can give a tone to our bodies) by habituating us to feel pleasure in the right sort of way.[1] § 4. There is still a third possible view—

[1] A piece of music, e.g. the *Marseillaise*, may affect our character, and give it a tone, by habituating us to take pleasure in the message of courage which it conveys.

that music has some contribution to make to the cultivation of our minds and to the growth of moral wisdom.[1]

It is clear that amusement is *not* the object with a view to which the young should be educated. Learning is not a matter of amusement. It is attended by effort and pain. On the other hand it is also true that cultivation of the mind is not a thing which is proper for children or the young of a tender age. Those who are themselves still short of their own end cannot yet cope with the ultimate end. § 5. [A case may indeed be made out for amusement, and] we may argue that the serious studies of children [including music] are ways and means to the amusement which they will be able to enjoy when they reach their full growth as adults. But if that ground be taken, why (we may ask) should children be taught to play music *themselves*? Why should they not follow the example of the Persian and Median kings, and get their pleasure and instruction through listening to others who make a business of music? § 6. Those who make it an occupation and a profession are bound to attain a better result than those who only practise it long enough just to learn. We may add that if children are to be made to work away at musical performances, they ought equally to be made to work at the business of cooking—which is absurd.

§ 7. The problem whether children should learn to play themselves equally arises if we look at music as a power which can improve character. Here, too, we may ask, 'Why should children learn to perform themselves, and why should not listening to the music of others be enough to give them the **1339 b** power of enjoying and appreciating music in the right sort of way?' The Spartans act on that principle: they do not learn to play; but report says that they are able to appreciate properly the difference between good and bad

[1] These three views may be compared with the threefold classification of the soul in Book VII, c. XIV, §§ 11–12 (see the note *ad locum*). The view that music, like sleep and drink, is a form of amusement and relaxation connects it with the irrational part of the soul. The view that music makes for goodness connects it with the practical division of the rational part of the soul. The third and last view connects it with the speculative division of that part.

tunes. § 8. Much the same may be said if we take the third view about music, and hold that it ought to be used to promote our felicity and to give us a liberal cultivation. Why, for this purpose, should we learn ourselves, instead of drawing on the services of others? Here we shall do well to remember the conception we hold of the gods. The Zeus of our poets does not sing, or play on the harp; [he simply listens]. We are apt to regard as vulgar those who do otherwise, and we think of them as behaving in a way in which a man would not behave unless he were drunk or jesting.

§ 9. This, however, is perhaps a matter for later consideration. We must first inquire whether music should, or should not, be included in education; and that leads us to ask, 'In which of the three ways previously distinguished does it act —the way of education [or the giving of tone to the character], or that of amusement, or that of cultivation of the mind?' There are reasons for connecting it with all three; for it evidently embraces elements common to all. § 10. [Let us take, for example, as one of these elements, the element of pleasure.] Amusement is intended to produce relaxation; and relaxation, which is in its nature a remedy for the pain produced by exertion, must necessarily contain the element of pleasure. Similarly, again, cultivation of the mind is generally agreed to have an element of pleasure, as well as an element of nobility; and the spirit of true felicity is a spirit composed of *both* of these elements. [Pleasure, therefore, is an element common both to amusement and to cultivation.] § 11. Now we all agree that music, whether instrumental or accompanied by the voice, is one of the greatest of pleasures.[1] At any rate we can cite the testimony of the poet Musaeus:

Song is to mortals the sweetest;

and here we may see the reason why men very naturally enlist the aid of music for their social parties and pastimes—it has the power of gladdening their hearts. We may therefore con-

[1] The argument is that music is a great pleasure; that pleasure is an element common both to amusement and to cultivation; and that music, therefore, is intended both for amusement and cultivation—and not for one object only.

clude that the pleasure it gives them is one of the reasons why children ought to be educated in music. § 12. All innocent pleasures have a double use: they not only help us to achieve our end [i.e. felicity], but they also serve us as means of relaxation. It is seldom we enjoy the fruition of our end. But we can often enjoy relaxation, and indulge ourselves in amusements (not so much with a view to something beyond, but just for the pleasure they give us); and it may therefore be well to let the young rest and relax for a while in the pleasures which come from music.

§ 13. Men fall, it is true, into a way of making amusements the end of their life. The reason for their doing so is that the end of life would seem to involve a kind of pleasure. This kind of pleasure is not the ordinary, but in their search for it men are apt to mistake ordinary pleasure for it; and they do so because pleasure generally has some sort of likeness to the ultimate end of human activity. This end is desirable just for itself, and not for the sake of any future result; and the pleasures of amusement are similar—they are not desired for the sake of some result in the future, but rather because of something which has happened in the past, that is to say, the exertion and pain which have already been undergone. § 14. This, it may reasonably be held, is the cause which induces men to seek happiness from pleasures of this order.

Pleasure is not the only reason why men have recourse to music. Another reason is its *utility* in furnishing relaxation.[1] This is how the case for it seems to stand. § 15. But we have to inquire whether it does not possess, over and above these *accidents* [of pleasure and utility], **1340 a** an *essence* which is of higher value than the uses hitherto mentioned. Perhaps there is more in question than our sharing in the common

[1] The distinction here drawn is somewhat subtle. Aristotle has previously said that there are three headings under which music may be discussed—amusement, moral instruction, and the cultivation of the mind. Here he appears to draw a distinction within the first heading—the distinction between amusement which is just pure pleasure and amusement which has utility because it brings recreation and refreshes the mind.

pleasure which all men derive from music—a pleasure, indeed, which is natural and instinctive, and which explains why the use of music appeals to all ages and all types of character—and perhaps we ought to consider whether music has not also some sort of bearing on our characters and our souls. § 16. It will clearly have such a bearing if our characters are actually affected by music. That they are so affected is evident from the influence exercised by a number of different tunes, but especially by those of Olympus. His tunes, by general consent, have an inspiring effect on the soul; and a feeling of inspiration is an affection of the soul's character.[1] § 17. We may add that, in listening to mere imitative sounds, where there is no question of time or tune, all men are moved to feelings of sympathy.

Since music belongs to the category of pleasures, and since goodness consists in *feeling delight* where one should, and loving and hating aright, we may clearly draw some conclusions.[2] First, there is no lesson which we are so much concerned to learn, and no habit which we are so much concerned to acquire, as that of forming right judgements on, and feeling delight in, fine characters and good actions. § 18. Next, musical times and tunes provide us with images of states of character—images of anger, and of calm; images of fortitude and temperance, and of all the forms of their opposites; images of the other states—which come closer to their actual nature than anything else can do. This is a fact which is clear from our own experience; to listen to these images is to undergo a real change of the soul. § 19. Now to acquire a habit of feeling pain or taking delight in an image is some-

[1] Newman notes (vol. iii, p. 536), 'Aristotle has to prove that music affects the character of the soul; therefore he has to prove that the inspiration which it admittedly produces is an affection of the character of the soul. Some may have regarded it as a *bodily* affection, . . . and others as a special condition of the *mind*, . . . but Aristotle regards it as connected with an impulse to action, . . . and this is perhaps the reason why he here traces it to the *character of the soul*.'

[2] The general argument is that, since (1) music can give pleasure, and (2) goodness consists in feeling pleasure aright (i.e. in connexion with the right sort of acts and the right sort of characters), music of the right character can help in producing goodness, because it can help in producing a feeling of pleasure in acts and characters of the right sort.

thing closely allied to feeling pain or taking delight in the actual reality. The man, for example, who finds delight in looking at the sculptured image of some object—purely on the ground of its intrinsic form [and not on the ground of its material, or the beauty and cost of that material]—will also be bound to find pleasure in looking at the actual object itself. § 20. It is true that the objects of some of the senses, such as touch and taste, cannot furnish any resemblance to states of character. Objects of sight may do so, but only to a slight extent. There are indeed shapes and figures which bear a resemblance to states of character, but the resemblance is not great; and we have to remember that all sorts of persons have the sense of sight.[1] Moreover, the shapes and colours presented by visual art are not *representations* of states of character: they are merely *indications*. § 21. And they are indications which can only be given by depicting the body when under the influence of some emotion.[2] But in so far as there *is* any difference between the effects of looking at different works of art, the young should be discouraged from looking at the works of Pauso, and encouraged to study the works of Polygnotus and any other painter or sculptor who depicts moral character.

With musical compositions, however, the case is different. They are, in their very nature, representations of states of character. § 22. This is an evident fact. In the first place, the nature of the modes varies; and listeners will be differently affected according as they listen to different modes. The effect of some will be to produce a sadder and graver temper **1340 b**—this is the case, for example, with the mode called the Mixolydian. The effect of others (such as the soft modes)[3]

[1] The argument would appear to be (1) that objects of sight can only resemble states of character to a small extent, and (2) that—as all sorts of persons have the sense of sight—this small resemblance will tend to pass unregarded among the mass.

[2] Statuary, therefore, cannot *represent* courage: it can only *indicate* it—and that only by depicting a human body when under the influence of the emotions aroused by the presence of danger. Music, on the other hand, can get to the soul of courage.

[3] The softer varieties, Newman suggests, of the Ionian and Lydian modes.

is to relax the tone of the mind. Another mode is specially calculated to produce a moderate and collected temper; this is held to be the peculiar power of the Dorian mode, while the Phrygian mode is held to give inspiration and fire. § 23. We may well approve of the views thus advanced by those who have studied the subject of musical education; for the evidence by which they support their theories is derived from actual facts.

What has just been said about musical modes is equally applicable to the varieties of musical time. Some of these varieties have a more steady character: others have a lively quality; and these last may again be divided, according as they move with a more vulgar rhythm or move in a manner more suited to freemen. § 24. What we have said makes it clear that music possesses the power of producing an effect on the character of the soul.[1] If it can produce this effect, it must clearly be made a subject of study and taught to the young. § 25. We may add that the teaching of music is congenial to the natural endowment of youth. Owing to their tender years, the young will not willingly tolerate any unsweetened fare; and music, by its nature, has a quality of sweetness. Nor is that all. The modes and rhythms of music have an affinity with the soul, as well as a natural sweetness. This explains why many thinkers connect the soul with harmony—some saying that it *is* a harmony, and others that it possesses the attribute of harmony.[2]

[1] Aristotle never gets to the highest of the topics previously suggested —that of the effect of music on the *speculative* division of the rational part of the soul, or, in other words, on 'the cultivation of the mind'. But cf. § 4 of this chapter.

[2]
> From harmony, from heavenly harmony
> This universal frame began:
> From harmony to harmony
> Through all the compass of the notes it ran,
> The diapason closing full in man.
>
> (Dryden, *Song for Saint Cecilia's Day*.)

Jaeger, in his *Aristoteles* (p. 43), remarks that Aristotle's own doctrine of the soul in the *De Anima* 'stands midway between the materialistic conception that the soul is a harmony of the body and the Platonic conception . . . that it is itself a substance'.

Chapter VI

We return to the question, 'Should children be taught to play themselves?' To judge any performance well, you ought to be able to perform yourself; and the answer to the question is therefore 'Yes'—provided that the performance of music is not carried to professional lengths. Three inquiries thus suggest themselves—(1) *what* is *the length to which the performance of music should be carried;* (2) *what sorts of melodies and rhythms should children learn to play; and* (3) *what instruments should they use? In regard to the first of these questions, we may say that difficult compositions should not be attempted, and the point to which children should go in learning to play themselves is the point at which they begin to be able to appreciate good melodies and rhythms. In regard to the last of the three questions, we may deprecate the use of the flute or similar instruments. We may also deprecate any attempt at professional skill and any entering for competitions, which tends to have a vulgarizing effect.*

§ 1. It remains to answer the question, which has already been tentatively raised, whether children ought to learn music by actually singing and playing. It is clear that it makes a great difference to the acquisition of an aptitude whether one has, or has not, joined in an actual performance. It is difficult, if not impossible, for those who have never joined in a performance to become good judges of others. § 2. Children, too, should always have something to keep them occupied; and the rattle of Archytas (which parents give to children in order to divert their attention and stop them from breaking things in the house) must be counted an admirable invention. Young things can never keep quiet: a real rattle suits children in infancy; and a training in music will serve as a rattle for children of an older growth.

§ 3. These considerations make it plain that a training in music should include some share in its actual performance. There is no difficulty in determining what is suitable or unsuitable for the different ages of growth; and we can easily answer the objection that a study of music which includes execution is professional and mechanical. § 4. We must

begin by noting that the purpose for which the young should join in the actual performance of music is only that they should be able to judge [the performances of others]. This means that they ought to practise execution in their earlier years; but it also means that they ought to be released from it at a later age, when the education they have received in their youth should have made them able to judge what is good and to appreciate music properly. § 5. The censure which is sometimes passed on music—that it produces a professional or mechanical turn of mind—may be easily answered if we pause to make a few inquiries. What, in the first place, is the point up to which those who are being trained with a view to civic excellence should continue to join in actual performances? Secondly, what is the quality **1341 a** of the melodies and rhythms in which they ought to be instructed? Thirdly, what is the nature of the instruments (for that, too, is likely to make a difference) in the use of which they ought to be trained? § 6. If we answer these questions we shall also be able to answer the censure. There may well be *some* kinds of music which have a mechanical effect; [but we must begin by distinguishing the different effects of different kinds before we can really judge].

We may take it for granted that the study of music should be pursued in such a way that it will neither impede the activities of later and riper years, nor produce a mechanical habit of body which is ineffective for the purposes of the period of military and civic training—ineffective, initially, in bodily exercise, and afterwards in the pursuit of knowledge. § 7. The study of music might follow these lines if two conditions were observed—first, that pupils were not set to work on the sort of performances which belong to professional competitions; secondly, that they were not made to attempt the extraordinary and extravagant feats of execution which have recently been introduced into competitions, and have thence passed on into education. § 8. Even so [i.e. when such excesses have been excluded], performances should only be carried to the point at which students begin to be able to appreciate good melodies and rhythms, and are not content

merely to enjoy that common element in music [i.e. the element of mere pleasure] which is felt by some of the animals and by nearly all slaves and children.

The nature of the instruments which should be used may also be inferred from what has just been said. § 9. Flutes should not be used in musical education; and we ought to avoid any other instrument which requires professional skill, such as the harp and all other such instruments. The instruments which ought to be used are those that will make students intelligent, whether in the field of music itself or in other fields of study. A further argument against the flute [besides the technique which it requires] is the fact that it does not express a state of character, but rather a mood of religious excitement; and it should therefore be used on those occasions when the effect to be produced on the audience is the release of emotion (*katharsis*), and not instruction. § 10. Another reason against the use of the flute in education is the fact that flute-playing prevents the player from using his voice. Our ancestors were therefore right in debarring the use of the flute to youths and freemen—although they had in earlier days encouraged it. § 11. In those earlier days wealth had given them increased leisure and a higher appetite for general excellence: their achievements, in the period of the Persian wars and afterwards, had elated their pride; and anxious only to explore fresh fields they took all studies indiscriminately for their province. It was in this spirit that they introduced flute-playing into education. § 12. Even in Sparta the leader of a chorus is reported to have played the flute for his dancers personally [instead of leaving it to a hired player]; but at Athens flute-playing attained such vogue that most freemen joined in the fashion—witness the tablet erected by Thrasippus, who had equipped a chorus of dancers, in honour of Ecphantides [the flute-player of the chorus]. At a later date, when men were better able to judge what really conduced to excellence, and what had the opposite effect, a larger experience of flute-playing led to its final rejection. § 13. Many of the older instruments were also included in the rejection—zithers, lutes, and similar instruments calculated

merely to please the audience; and, along with them, heptagons, triangles, sackbuts, and all other instruments merely
1341 b requiring manual dexterity. There is wisdom in the myth of the ancients about the flute. Athene, it tells us, invented the flute—and then threw it away. § 14. There is some point, too, in the rest of the story—that she threw it away in disgust at the ugly look of her face when she was playing upon it. But Athene is the goddess to whom we ascribe the gift of knowledge and skill in the arts; and it seems more likely that she threw it away because the study of flute-playing has nothing to do with the mind.

§ 15. Both in regard to the instruments used, and the degree of proficiency sought, we may accordingly reject any professional system of instruction. By that we mean any system intended to prepare pupils for competitions. On such a system the player, instead of treating music as a means to his own improvement, makes it serve the pleasure—and that a vulgar pleasure—of the audience to which he is playing. That is why we regard his performance as something improper in a freeman, and more befitting a hireling. § 16. The players themselves may also become vulgar in the process. The standard by which they fix their aim [i.e. the pleasure of their audience] is a bad standard: the commonness of the audience tends to debase the quality of music; and the artists themselves, with their eyes on the audience, are affected by it—affected not only in mind, but also even in body, as they move and swing to suit the taste of their hearers.

Chapter VII

In regard to the second question—what sorts of melodies and rhythms should children learn to play?—there is this to be said. Melodies can be divided into (1) *those which are expressive of character,* (2) *those which stimulate to action, and* (3) *those which produce inspiration. The benefits which may be derived from music can also be stated under three heads*—(1) *education,* (2) *release of emotion, and* (3) *cultivation of the mind, with which we may also link relaxation and recreation. The relation*

of the different sorts of melodies to the different benefits: the melodies suitable for producing the benefit of release of emotion. The adaptation of melodies to different sorts of audiences—the educated and the uneducated. The character of the different modes, especially the Dorian and Phrygian, and the different effects which they produce. The different ages of life best suited by different sorts of music.

§ 1. It remains to consider the different modes and times;[1] to determine whether they should all be used, or a choice should be made among them; and to decide whether those who are practising music with a view to education should observe the same rule [as all others who practise it] or a special rule of their own. There is also a further subject to be considered. Music is produced, as we may easily observe, by the two means of melody and time; and we ought therefore to know the influence exercised on education by either of these means, and to ask ourselves whether we ought to prefer music with good melody to music in good time.[2] § 2. But we believe that there is a good deal of truth in the observations made on these matters by some of the musicians of our day, and also by some of our thinkers, on the more philosophic side, who are versed in the general subject of musical education. We therefore propose to refer any student who desires a precise treatment of each subject to these authorities; and we confine ourselves here to sketching general outlines and laying down, much as a law does, the broad rules to be followed.

§ 3. We accept the classification of melodies, which is made by some of our philosophic thinkers, into those which are expressive of character, those which stimulate to action, and those which produce inspiration; and we note that these thinkers would also make the nature of the musical modes correlative to that of these classes, with each different mode

[1] Aristotle has treated two of the subjects mentioned in § 5 of the previous chapter—the first and the third: he now discusses, in conclusion, the remaining subject—the second in the original order of enumeration.

[2] The translation follows an emendation of the text suggested by Newman.

corresponding to each different class of melody. On the other hand, we hold, as has already been stated,[1] that music should not be pursued for any single benefit which it can give, but for the sake of several. There are three benefits which it can give. One is education: a second is release of emotion (the sense of that term will be explained more clearly in our lectures on poetics, but may be left to speak for itself at the moment): a third is the benefit of cultivation, with which may be linked that of recreation and relaxation of strain.[2] It is clear from 1342 a the view we have stated that all the modes should be used, but not in the same sort of way. When education is the object in view, the modes which ought to be used are those which express character best: when it is a question of listening to the performance of others, we may also admit the modes which stimulate men to action or provide them with inspiration. § 4. Any affection which strongly moves the souls of several persons will move the souls of all, and will only differ from person to person with a difference of degree. Pity, fear, and inspiration are such affections. The feeling of being possessed by some sort of inspiration is one to which a number of persons are particularly liable. These persons, as we can observe for ourselves, are affected by religious melodies; and when they come under the influence of melodies which fill the soul with religious excitement they are calmed and restored as if they had undergone a medical treatment and purging.[3] § 5. The same sort of effect

[1] See c. v, §§ 9–10.

[2] See c. III, § 4, of this Book, where Aristotle also mentions together—but mentions as different—the two ideas of (1) leisure and cultivation, and (2) recreation and relaxation. It should be added that the three 'benefits' of music here mentioned are different from the three effects ascribed to music in the beginning of chapter v. There the three effects of music are explained as (*a*) amusement and relaxation, (*b*) moral training, and (*c*) cultivation of the mind. Here Aristotle adds release of emotion as a new effect, but combines (*a*) and (*c*) together—retaining (*b*) as it stands, though with the new style of 'education . . . through the modes which express character best'.

[3] Aristotle uses the same word (*katharsis*) for what has before been translated as 'release of emotion' and for what is here translated as 'purging'. The release of the bowels by purging is analogous, in his view, to the release of the feelings by listening to some forms of music—or by

will also be produced [i.e. by appropriate music] on those who are specially subject to feelings of fear and pity, or to feelings of any kind; indeed it will also be produced on the rest of us, in proportion as each is liable to some degree of feeling; and the result will be that all alike will experience some sort of purging, and some release of emotion accompanied by pleasure. We may add that melodies which are specially designed to purge the emotions are likewise also a source of innocent delight to us all.

§ 6. We may go on to argue that these are the modes and melodies which competitors in musical contests ought to be required to use. But there are two different kinds of audiences. One is an audience composed of the free and educated; the other is the common audience composed of mechanics, hired labourers, and the like. There should therefore be contests and festivals not only for the first kind of audience, but also for the second, to give it the relaxation of which it stands in need. § 7. [The music for this second kind of audience will correspond to its state of mind]; just as the souls of its members are distorted from their natural state, so there are musical modes which are correspondingly perverted, and melodies which are similarly strained and overcoloured. A man derives pleasure from what suits him best; and we must therefore permit musicians who are competing before an audience of the baser sort to use a baser sort of music which corresponds to their audience.

§ 8. For education, as we have already noted, the melodies and modes which ought to be used are those expressive of character. The Dorian, as we have already observed, is one of these modes; but we must also adopt any of the other modes which we find recommended by those who have been concerned in philosophical studies and musical education. § 9. Plato, in the *Republic*, makes the error of selecting the Phrygian mode as the only one to be kept along with the

listening to tragedy (*Poetics*, c. VI). Newman quotes Milton's lines about music in *Paradise Lost*, Book I,

> Not wanting power to *mitigate and suage*
> With solemn touches troubled thoughts.

Dorian; and his error is the more striking, as he has previously rejected the use of the flute. Actually the Phrygian mode **1342 b** is related to the others, in the effect which it produces, as the flute is to other instruments: the effect of both is religious excitement and general emotion. § 10. We can see from poetry that this is so. Dionysiac frenzy, and all such agitations of the mind, are more naturally expressed [when depicted in poetry] by an accompaniment on the flute than by one on any other instrument. Similarly, in the matter of modes, we find that melodies which are in the Phrygian mode are the vehicle suitable for such states of mind. The dithyramb,[1] which is generally agreed to be Phrygian in character, will serve as an example. § 11. Many instances attesting the character of the dithyramb are cited by experts in the art of music. The case of Philoxenus is one. He attempted, but failed, to compose a dithyramb, entitled 'The Mysians', in the Dorian mode; and he was driven by the very nature of his theme to fall back on the Phrygian mode as the more appropriate. § 12. The Dorian mode is generally agreed to be the gravest and the most expressive of a temper of fortitude. It has also another merit. On our general view the mean, which lies midway between extremes, is preferable and ought to be followed. Now the Dorian mode stands to other modes in the position of the mean. It is therefore Dorian melodies which suit the young best as an instrument of education.[2]

§ 13. There are two aims which men pursue—the possible, and the proper; and each man, in his pursuit of these aims, should concern himself particularly with what is possible and proper *in his own case*. This is determined for him by his age. Those who are old and exhausted find it difficult to sing in high-pitched modes; and nature herself prompts the use of the lower and softer modes for that age. § 14. There is

[1] A song, with music and dancing, originally concerned with the birth and fortunes of the god Dionysus, but afterwards taking a wider range; it was in a lofty but often inflated style, and was always in the Phrygian mode and therefore accompanied by the flute.

[2] Here, as in c. v (see the note on § 24 of that chapter), Aristotle omits to consider the melodies and modes which are suited to the cultivation of the mind during leisure.

therefore justice in the censure which some musicians pass upon Plato for rejecting the lower and softer modes as instruments of education, on the ground that they are connected with drinking—an argument which is not founded on the immediate effect of drink (which is mainly one of inspiring a frenzy of intoxication), but on its after-effect in producing exhaustion. We must remember [as Plato failed to do] the years to come and the days of old age; and with a view to their needs the lower and softer modes and melodies must also be used [i.e. in youth, and as a part of the education of youth]. § 15. We must also include any mode which is proper to the age of youth by virtue of combining the attraction of beauty with some instructive power. This is a combination which the Lydian mode would seem particularly to present. There are thus three standards to which education in music should conform—the mean, the possible, and the proper.

Note on the conclusion of the Politics

The mean is a standard which suggests the Dorian mode. The possible is a standard which suggests that age should avoid the high-pitched modes, and content itself with the lower (e.g. the Phrygian)—though (as is suggested in § 14) the lower modes may also be studied in youth, with a view to the needs of age, along with the high-pitched modes which are possible for the young. The proper is a standard which suggests the Lydian mode, as being, by its combination of beauty and instruction, particularly proper for the young.

At this point the sketch of the ideal state ends—apparently in the middle of an unfinished discussion of education, and with the later life and activities of the citizen (after his education is finished) still to be described. There is more to be said about the *subjects* of education ('gymnastic', for example, and intellectual studies): Aristotle has, on the whole, confined himself to 'music'. There is more to be said about the different *stages* of education: Aristotle has dealt, in the main, only with the early years. There are also a number of promises of 'future discussions' which are not fulfilled. All that one can say is simple. Aristotle's notes stopped at this point. That is just what happens to a set of notes or a course of lectures, as many lecturers can testify; and there is no more to be said. We cannot apply the standards of a printed book to the manuscript of a set of notes. . . . Almost every 'method' or section of the *Politics* stops abruptly. It is not surprising that the last of the 'methods' should have a similar ending.

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The index is not exhaustive. It does not, for instance, contain all the names of persons and places mentioned in the text, but only those which seemed to the translator to be of some more particular importance. The main references are indicated in a heavier type.

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GLOSSARY

SOME OF THE MAIN TERMS USED IN THE *POLITICS*, WITH AN EXPLANATION OF THE SENSE IN WHICH THEY ARE THERE USED

Agathos: see ARETĒ.

Agora: originally an assembly (from a verb which means 'gathering'); thence, the place of assembly (in the same sense as the Latin *forum*); thence, again (as the place of assembly also served for ordinary business), the market-place. In Athens, however, the place of assembly was not the market-place, but a height, not far from it, called the Pnyx.

Agros: the country-side or rural area of a city-state; see POLIS.

Archē: a word which originally means 'beginning' or 'initiative', and thence is extended to mean (1) an office or magistracy which takes the initiative, and (2), by a further extension, rule or empire, such as that exercised by Athens over other cities in the fifth century, and by Sparta in the fourth. See p. xvi.

Aretē: 1. The general quality of being 'good at a thing', or possessing excellence in it: thus there may be an *aretē* of the heavy-armed soldier (*hoplitikē aretē*), an *aretē* of the citizen (*politikē aretē*), and other varieties of *aretē* according to the thing in question.

2. The particular quality of being good at conduct, or possessing excellence in one's ways of behaviour (*ēthē* or *mores*); this may be called *ēthikē aretē* (or moral goodness), but it may also be called plain *aretē* (or simple goodness).

The man who has *aretē* in this second sense is 'the good man' (*agathos anēr*), and is distinguished by Aristotle from 'the good citizen' (*agathos politēs*), who has an *aretē* in the first sense. The *aretē* of 'the good man' includes four forms of excellence (or four 'cardinal virtues'):

Andria (fortitude).

Sophrosynē (temperance).

Sophia or *Phronēsis* (wisdom). See pp. xxv, 376.

Dikaiosynē (justice).

Aristoi and Aristokratia: (1) the *aristoi* (the word is the superlative of *agathos*) are strictly 'the best', *not* in birth or descent, but in *aretē* or merit or moral goodness; the word, however, tends to suggest a social *élite*, and the *aristoi* are accordingly identified with the *epieikeis* ('the decent people') or the *gnorimoi* ('the notables'); (2) *aristokratia* is strictly a constitution which is purely and exclusively a government of the best, and is therefore based on the qualification of *aretē*, but it comes to mean, by

extension, a constitution which gives *some* share in government to the best, and thus gives *some* recognition to the qualification of *aretē*. In this latter sense *aristokratia* is a form of the 'polity' or mixed constitution—a better or higher form, because it does at any rate recognize merit, and is not limited (like ordinary 'polities') to the recognition merely of wealth and numbers.

Asty: the central city, as distinct from the *agros* or rural area: see POLIS.

Autarkeia: self-sufficiency, considered as a quality of the *polis*; by which is meant its possession of such material resources, and such moral incentives, as make a full human development possible, without any dependence on help from outside, material or moral.

Axia: worth or merit or desert; a term used by Aristotle in arguing for the principle of 'proportionate equality' in the award of *timē*—i.e. the principle that the ratio between 'worth' and the award of *timē* (office and honour) should be equal for every member of a *polis*—the more worthy thus getting a greater award (in proportion to their greater worth), and the less worthy a less (in proportion to their less worth), but all receiving equally in proportion to their worth.

Banausos: base or mechanical, with a soul subdued to what it works in. (The word is said to be derived from the Greek word for a smithy, and to have denoted originally the blacksmith and his like.)

Barbaros: does not connote barbarism: the 'barbarian' is simply the non-Greek person, outside the circle of the Greek *polis* and Greek *paideia*, and belonging to the *ethnē* or 'gentiles'.

Basileus and **Basileia**: the good kind of monarch and monarchy, ruling in the interest of the governed: see MONARCHIA.

Boulē and **to bouleutikon**: the Athenian *Boulē* was a body of 500, which not only prepared business for the *ekklēsia*, but also discharged executive functions. The deliberative proper (*to bouleutikon*) is the whole civic body, or *politeuma*, and is regarded by Aristotle as sovereign (*to kyrion*).

Chorēgia: the equipment of material things needed by 'the good man' for the attainment of *aretē*, consisting in (1) a supply of 'external goods' for liberality, and (2) enough of 'the goods of the body' (health and general fitness) for the virtues of fortitude and temperance.

Chrēmatistike: the art of acquisition of the things (*chrēmata*) needed for household life; distinguished as (1) good, when it is practised in order to gain the means needed for the good life of the household, and (2) bad, when it is used to gain unlimited means, and thus to turn means into an end. The latter sense is the more usual in the *Politics*; see also KTĒSIS.

Dēmos and its derivatives:

The word *dēmos* originally meant the country-side (*agros*), or the people of the *agros*. By the fifth century B.C. it means in Athens the whole Athenian community when assembled in the *ekklēsia*. It may be identified with *to plēthos* ('the masses', or, more exactly, 'the *plenum*' or full body), and also with *hoi polloi* and *hoi pleiones* ('the many' and 'the majority'). It may also be identified with *ochlos* ('the mob'), but this has a derogatory sense not conveyed by the other words.

A number of connected and associated words are derived from the word *dēmos*. Among them are the adjectives *dēmotikos* (used in the *Politics* of men belonging to the popular or democratic cause) and *dēmosios* (used of public property belonging to the *dēmos*). But the most important are the two nouns *dēmokratia* and *dēmagōgos*.

1. *Dēmokratia* denotes a constitution in which the government rests with the *dēmos* assembled in the *ekklēsia*. In Aristotle's view it is a 'perverted' constitution, directed to the class interest of the poor (*penētes*) who form the majority (*hoi pleiones*); but when he discusses the claims of 'the masses' (*to plēthos*) he holds that, in virtue of their power of judgement, they are entitled to elect the magistrates (*archai*) and to review their conduct.

2. *Dēmagōgos* denotes a popular leader, *with no official position*, who proposes and guides the policy of the *ekklēsia*. The 'demagogue' appeared at Athens after the death of Pericles in 429 B.C., and he is to be distinguished from the previous *prostatēs tou dēmou*, a popular chief who *did* hold an official position (such as that of one of the ten generals or *stratēgoi*) along with a *de facto* position of leadership. In Aristotle's view the 'demagogue' is a flatterer of the *dēmos*, who enthrones its decrees, or *psēphismata*, above the laws.

Despotēs: a master of slaves, or a man ruling others in the way in which a master rules slaves.

Dikē and its derivatives:

Dikē is an objective system of justice, interpreted in courts (or *dikastēria*) by bodies of judges (*dikastai*) drawn from the general community. It is connected with, but distinct from, *dikaiosynē*, which is the subjective quality of justice. *Dikē* is also connected with, but distinct from, *nomos* or law. The essence of *dikē* is that it is an 'indication' of what is right in particular cases; *nomos*, on the other hand, is a general formulation of rules, proceeding from the development of custom or from the action of a legislat*or* (rather than a legislat*ure*).

The *dikastēria* which interpreted *dikē* were in Athenian usage popular courts, mostly containing as many as 500 members. The *dikastai*, or members of the courts, were annually appointed by lot (*klēros*), and distributed among the *dikastēria*.

Doulos and douleia: *Doulos* means a household slave, man or woman, who is the purchased or inherited property of a master (*despotēs*). But there were also slaves used in industries, where they worked as *synergoi* or 'fellow workers' along with freemen. The slave is distinct from the serf (see under HEILOTES and PERIOIKOI) who is attached and tied to land, and not to the household.

Dynasteia: an oligarchical government vested in the hands of a body of powerful men (*dynatoi*) ruling by arbitrary discretion—such a body being often a group of families possessing hereditary power.

Ekklēsia: literally 'an assembly of the summoned', or 'a meeting of those called out for attendance' (*ekklētoi*). At Athens it was a primary meeting of the civic body, which included some 40,000 citizens; but an attendance of as many as 6,000 would be unusually large. The Athenian assembly met almost weekly. A member of the assembly was an *ekklēsiastēs*.

Eleutheros and eleutheria: the *eleutheros* is a man who is not a slave—a freeman, who is one of a society of 'equals and peers' (*isoi kai homoioi*). By a natural extension—since the Greeks regarded themselves as unique in being members of such a society—the adjective *eleutheros* is used to denote specifically Greek institutions and characteristics, as distinct from and opposed to those of the non-Greek peoples or 'barbarians'. *Eleutheria* is the status of the *eleutheros*; and since he, besides being a member of a society of 'equals and peers', also lived under the rule of law (while the 'barbarian' lived under the rule of a *despotēs*), his *eleutheria* is connected in Greek political thought with *nomos*. In democracies Aristotle regards *eleutheria* as meaning (1) the political right of sharing in office in turn, and (2) the civil right of 'living as one likes'. (*Politics*, VI, c. II, §§ 1–4.)

Emporos, emporia, emporion: the *emporos* is the merchant trader, generally conveying his goods by sea. *Emporia* is the commerce which he conducts: it includes (*Politics*, I, c. XI, § 3) the provision of a ship, the carriage of freight, and the operation of selling. An *emporion* is a mart or trading-station set up in a port by merchant traders. The whole of such activity is distinguished by Aristotle from that of the huckster or retail trader (the *kapēlos*).

Epieikeis: 'the decent people' (see ARISTOI).

Ergon and energeia: (1) *Ergon* is the function of a person or thing, which gives each person or thing its character and determines its size; (2) *Energeia* is the state of being actively engaged in the discharge of function, or 'act' as distinguished from 'potency'.

Ethnos: the tribe as distinguished from the *polis*: the *ethnē*, or 'gentiles', are the peoples of the non-Greek or 'barbarian' world.

Ethos, ethismos, and ēthos: *Ethos* is habit, which in Aristotle's

view is the second stage of moral development, succeeding natural impulse (or *physis*), and preceding moral wisdom (or *phronēsīs*). *Ethismos* is the process of 'habituation', through education and social discipline, in this second stage. *Ēthos*—to be distinguished from *ĕthos*—means 'manners and character', like the Latin *mores*; and the adjective *ēthikos* thus means 'moral', or relating to manners and character.

Eudaimonia: the condition of 'being under a good genius': felicity, which is defined by Aristotle as a state of activity consisting in the energy and practice of *aretē*.

Eugeneia: the condition of being well-born: nobility, defined by Aristotle as '*aretē* of the stock' or again as a combination of 'ancestral wealth and *aretē*'.

Gerousia: the assembly of the elders (*gerontes*), cf. the Latin *senatus*: the name of the Spartan *Boulē* or Council.

Gnorimoi: notables (see ARISTOI).

Graphē paranomōn: an indictment of illegality, which might be brought against any man who proposed a measure in the *ekklēsia* that could be held to contravene the established law or *nomos*.

Gymnastikē: the training of the stripped (*gymnos*) body in the gymnasium and the *palaestra*: the science of general all-round physical development, including some measure of dietetics. *Gymnastikē* is to the body what *mousikē* (q.v.) is to the mind.

Harmonia: used by Aristotle for a 'mode' (a *tonos* or key) of music —the Dorian, the Phrygian, or the Lydian.

Hēgemonia: a leadership of Greek cities (much the same as an *archē*, but suggesting a greater degree of independence), such as was assumed by Philip of Macedonia at the Congress of Corinth in 338 B.C.

Heilotes or helots: the serfs of Sparta who tilled the land for the benefit of the Spartan owners (the 'peers' or *homoioi*). Midway between the Spartan peers and their helots were the *perioikoi*, the 'dwellers around' or provincials, who inhabited the towns in Spartan territory other than Sparta itself, and enjoyed civil but not political liberty.

Holon: see SYNTHETON.

Homoioi: 'the Spartan peers': also used generally in the phrase *isoi kai homoioi* to describe the Greek *polis* as an association of 'equals and peers'.

Hōn ouk aneu: *sine quibus non*, or the members of a *polis* who are 'necessary conditions' of its life, but are not integral 'parts' sharing actively in its life. The term is contrasted with *meros* or *morion* (q.v.); and it denotes serfs, farm-labourers, and the like, as distinct from citizens proper.

Hybris: insolence or wanton arrogance, regarded by Aristotle as a cause of faction and revolution. At Athens the indictment for

hybris lay against persons guilty of malicious assaults, of the type described by Aristotle in the *Politics*, V, c. x.

Idios and Idiōtēs: the words have something of the connotation of our 'individual' and 'individualist'. *Idios* is what is one's own, or personal, such as private property. *Idiōtēs* is a private person, or a man living in a private station, and not handling politics: it may also denote the 'layman' as distinct from the professional.

Isos and isotēs: equal and equality. On the conception of 'equal' see HOMOIOI. *Isotēs* is regarded by Aristotle as being, along with *Eleutheria*, a postulate of democracy, which interprets it in the sense of equality of rights for all on a *numerical* basis. He himself argues (see AXIA) that the true equality is proportionate equality, under which the ratio between award (of office and honour) and worth is equal for all alike, but all are not treated as numerically equal.

Kapēlos and kapēleutikē: the retail trader or huckster, and the business of retail trading: contrasted with the merchant trader (*emporos*) and commerce (*emporia*).

Katharsis: purging or purification of the emotions, attained through music (and, as Aristotle argues in the *Poetics*, through tragedy).

Klēros: lot. Most of the magistrates at Athens were appointed by lot (the generals were the chief exception), beans being used for the purpose, and those who drew white beans being appointed. A method which makes pure chance the arbiter in the appointment of men to posts of responsibility may seem strange to us. But the method was used in the cause of the principle of equality: it recurs in medieval Florence, where for each office a purse or *borsa* was formed at intervals of the names of all eligible citizens, and names were drawn from it by lot at the beginning of each period of office; and at Athens there were a number of safeguards: see the second note at the end of Book IV, c. XIV.

Koinōnia: a *koinōnia* is an association of persons sharing together in some common activity directed to some common purpose or 'good'. The household and the *polis* are both examples of *koinōnia*; but the *polis*, or 'political association', is the highest, of which (as it is said in the *Ethics*) all other associations 'are in the nature of parts'. All associations are in their nature composed of different kinds of persons (*Politics*, II, c. II, § 3), who, being different, can exchange services, and who, in virtue of their different and complementary capacities, can share in a common good which they could not enjoy individually.

Ktēmata and ktēsis: *ktēsis* is properly the act or process of acquisition, and *ktēmata* the things acquired. *Ktēsis*, as the *act* of acquisition, is closely related to *chrēmatistikē*, as the *art* of acquisition: on the other hand, *ktēsis*, as a matter of getting, is contrasted with *chrēsis*, as a matter of using what has been got. But though

ktēsis is thus contrasted with *chrēsis*, *ktēmata* and *chrēmata* are much the same, the only difference being that the former means 'acquisitions' or 'possessions', and the latter simply 'things'.

Kyrion: *to kyrion* is the sovereign body, identified by Aristotle with the *politeuma* or body of citizens acting as the deliberative; hence he also speaks of *to bouleutikon* as *kyrion*.

Leitourgia: 'liturgies' or public services rendered by the rich without payment, such as fitting out triremes or equipping choruses for a drama.

Logos: the rational principle of the soul or *psychē*, with its practical and its speculative parts. *Logos* is also used by Aristotle to mean rational speech. (*Politics*, I, c. 11, § 10.)

Meros and morion: used by Aristotle to denote an 'integral part' or active member of the *polis*, as contrasted with the 'necessary conditions' (or *hōn ouk aneu*) who are only passive members.

Mesos and its derivatives:

(1) *Mesos* means 'middle' or 'mean'. (2) In the neuter, *to meson* signifies 'the mean' which is in the middle between excess (*hyperbolē*) and defect (*elleipsis*); and Aristotle regards *aretē* as consisting in such a mean, so that fortitude, for example, is a mean between the excess of rashness and the defect of cowardice. (3) The middle constitution (*mesē politeia*, generally called 'the polity', without any adjective) is regarded as consisting in a mean between democracy, with its excess of numbers, and oligarchy, with its defect; but it may also be called a mixed as well as a middle or mean constitution, because it mixes elements of both. (4) *Hoi mesoi* constitute the middle class which is in the mean between the rich and the poor: they are the backbone of the middle constitution, and they consist of those who have the means to furnish themselves with a military equipment. (5) The terms *metron* and *metrios* ('measure' and 'measured' or 'moderate') are also used in the *Politics*; connected with the notion of *mesos*, they are also connected with that of *peras* or 'limit' (q.v.) which leads Aristotle to argue for the proper limit of wealth and for the proper limit of the size and population of the state.

Metablētikē: a term used in Book I of the *Politics* for the general art of Exchange, and there connected with the use of currency, or *nomisma* (q.v.).

Metabolē: change or revolution, a term used in Book V of the *Politics*, and connected with *stasis* (q.v.).

Methodos: a term used for an 'inquiry' or 'section' of the *Politics*, which, though now arranged in 8 books, falls properly into 6 *methodoi* (Books IV and V, and Books VII and VIII, each forming a single *methodos*).

Metoikos: one who 'lives among' the citizens, as a resident alien, paying taxes, but possessing no civic rights.

Misthos: payment to citizens for services rendered to the *polis*, either by sitting in the *dikasteria*, or by attending the *ekklēsia*, or otherwise: a system criticized by Aristotle (cf. VI, c. II, § 7), but defended by Pericles in the Funeral Speech reported by Thucydides.

Monarchia: the rule of one man only (*monos*): it is of two sorts, (1) *basileia*, or kingship, when it is exercised in the interest of the ruled, and (2) *tyrannis*, when it is exercised in the interest of the ruler.

Mousikē: used in the *Politics* in the sense in which we now use the word 'music', but generally used in Greek to signify 'arts and letters', and thence, by extension, education in arts and letters (or the training of the mind, as distinct from *gymnastikē*, which trains the body).

Nomos and its derivatives: (1) *Nomos* is a general formulation of rules, intended to be permanent, proceeding from the development of custom or from the action of a *nomothetēs* (see also DIKĒ and NOUS). (2) The *nomothetēs* is a legislator (the notion of a legislature is generally foreign to the Greeks) who lays down a body of rules for a new colony, or in an existing *polis* after a period of perturbation. (3) *Nomisma* is currency, or the current means of exchange which are the rule (cf. our word 'numismatic', indirectly derived from the Greek).

Nous: thought, as the state of the rational part of the soul (*Politics*, VII, c. XV, § 9). *Orexis* is the state of the part of the soul which is irrational, and immersed in passions, appetites, or desire. Aristotle defines *nomos* as *nous* free from *orexis*.

Ochlos: the mob (see DĒMOS). Aristotle refers to the mob of the *Agora*, and to the mob of oarsmen (*nautikos ochlos*) in the Athenian fleet.

Oikos and its derivatives: (1) *Oikos* is the household, composed of the three societies of husband and wife, parents and children, and master and slaves. (2) *Oikonomos* is the master or manager of the household. (3) *Oikonomia* is the art or activity of managing the household, especially in training and guiding its members, but Aristotle sometimes uses the term with reference to the management of public or state finances.

Oligoi and oligarchia: (1) *Oligoi* is the few in the sense of the wealthy (*plousioi* or *euporoi*). (2) *Oligarchia* is thus a constitution which is in its essence a government of the wealthy (rather than of the few in number), and may therefore be called a plutocracy. It is classed by Aristotle as a 'perverted constitution' (a corruption of *aristokratia*), and regarded as directed to the class interest of the wealthy.

Orexis: passion or appetite: see NOUS.

Organon: an instrument used in the discharge of some *ergon* or

function. Aristotle regards the slave as a living *organon* used by the *oikonomos* in the discharge of his function.

Orthai politeiai: 'right constitutions', directed to the general interest of the community: they include *basileia*, or kingship, *aristokratia*, and the 'polity' (see POLIS).

Ousia: what is one's own: one's 'estate' or property. The term is parallel to *ktêmata*, but it suggests the existence of an estate rather than the act of its acquisition.

Paideia: (1) Education or training (from *pais*, a child). (2) Culture, resulting from education, or the general 'training' of the human faculties.

Paidia: amusements or play (also from *pais*, a child): the sort of things that children do: connected with the notion of *anapausis* or relaxation (see SCHOLÊ).

Pambasileia: an absolute kingship vested in the one best man.

Parekbasis: perversion; a term applied to the three perverted constitutions which are corruptions of the three *orthai politeiai*—*tyrannis*, *oligarchia*, and *dêmokratia*.

Penêtes: the poor, regarded by Aristotle as the social basis of democracy, while the wealthy (*plousioi*) are the social basis of oligarchy.

Peras: limit; especially the limit of size determined for any thing (e.g. a ship) or institution (such as a *polis*) by the function which it exists to discharge. ('All things are determined by their *ergon*', I, c. II, p. 13.) The function (or *ergon*) being much the same as, and almost synonymous with, the *telos* or final cause, we may say, as Aristotle says in I, c. IX, § 13, that the *telos* is the *peras*.

Perioikoi: (1) At Sparta the 'dwellers around' in the towns of the Spartan territory (see under HEILOTES); (2) in the general usage of the *Politics*, applied to agricultural serfs, who may even be *barbaroi* (VII, c. X, § 13).

Phronêsis and phronimos: *Phronêsis* is the quality of moral wisdom (sometimes translated by the inadequate word 'prudence'), which is the ultimate goal of moral development, succeeding and crowning the prior stage of 'habituation' by social environment and its discipline. The *phronimos* is the man who possesses this quality, and he is 'the good man', who can see and choose his way.

Physis: not so much 'nature' (though that is the Latin word necessarily used in translating it), because 'nature' suggests the primitive, or 'being born' (*nasci*); but rather the whole process that leads from the first inception of 'growing', through all the stages of 'growth', to the completion of the 'grown' thing or being. (The Greek verb *phyô* has a larger and further suggestion than the Latin *nascor*: it includes, indeed, 'being born', but it also includes the process of 'growing', and, even beyond that,

the state of full 'growth' or completion.) Growth, or development, is the essential notion; and when Aristotle says that 'a thing is so and so by *physis*', he means that it is so by the law of its development. The essence of that law is the end or *telos* of the development, which determines or causes (as a *final* cause) the whole process called *physis*; and hence Aristotle states that *physis* is *telos* (I, c. 11, § 8). See Prefatory Note.

Plethos and hoi polloi: see DĒMOS

Plousioi: the wealthy; see OLIGOI.

Poiēsis: making; see PRAXIS.

Polis and its derivatives: The word *polis* means a city-state, or civic republic, generally governed on the lines of democracy, oligarchy, or the mixed constitution. The *polis* (which originally meant the 'high city', or *acropolis*, or 'topmost tower') includes (1) the residential centre, or *asty*, and (2) the appendent country, or *agros*. Athens, as such a city-state, had an area of 1,000 square miles and a total citizen population (including women and children) of 150,000–170,000, of whom about 40,000 were active citizens.

Four connected and associated words are derived from the word *polis*—the words *politēs*, *politeia*, *politeuma*, and *politikos*. In translation these words have to be rendered by separate and dissociated words, all derived from the Latin. *Polis* itself must often become 'state'; *politēs* has to become 'citizen'; *politeia* must be translated as 'constitution'; *politeuma* must be rendered as 'the civic body', or in other words the body of persons established as sovereign by the constitution; *politikos* cannot be rendered by 'politician' (which has its own particular connotation in English), and has to be translated as 'statesman'. In Greek each term, connected with the rest, carries its own associations clearly.

The word *politēs*, or citizen, explains itself. The three other words associated with and derived from the word *polis* each need some further explanation.

1. The *politeia*, or constitution, is not only 'an arrangement of offices' (or political organization): it is also 'a way of life', or 'a scheme of life directed to attaining a particular quality of life' (or, in other words, a moral order). This is the *general* sense of the term. But Aristotle also uses the word *politeia* in a *particular* sense, to denote the middle or mixed constitution, to which he applies the general term for want of any specific term (see MESOS). Where *politeia* is used in this particular sense, it is translated in the text by the word 'polity'.

2. The *politeuma*, or civic body, is the body of citizens acting as the deliberative, and therefore (since Aristotle holds that the deliberative is sovereign) acting as the sovereign authority or *to kyrion*. See KYRION.

3. The *politikos*, or statesman, is a man who handles the civic affairs of a political association composed of equal and like members, and who exercises authority, in his turn, over the members of such an association. He thus differs in kind from the ruler of a kingdom (and *a fortiori* from a tyrant), and again from the *despotēs* or master who exercises authority over slaves. See pp. xv–xviii on *polis* and its derivatives.

Ponos: labour and toil, as contrasted on the one hand with amusement (*paidia*) and relaxation generally (*anapausis*), and on the other hand with leisure (*scholē*, q.v.).

Praxis: doing, or activity, as contrasted (1) with *poiēsis* or making, which aims at an end outside and beyond itself (the made thing), while the end of *praxis* lies in itself and the doing of a thing for its own sake; (2) with *theōria* (speculation or contemplation), which is the activity of the speculative part of the rational faculty, while *praxis* is the activity of its practical part.

Prostatēs tou dēmou: see DĒMOS.

Psēphisma: a decree of the *ekklēsia*, as distinct from the permanent and established laws or *nomoi*. Aristotle regards 'extreme democracy' as substituting the rule of arbitrary and temporary *psēphismata* for the rule of *nomos*.

Psychē: the soul or *anima*: on its divisions or parts see LOGOS and NOUS, and see also the note at the end of VII, c. XIV.

Scholē: leisure, as distinct from *ponos* (q.v.), and also from *anapausis* or relaxation: regarded by Aristotle as a time to be spent in the cultivation of the mind; see the note at the end of VII, c. XV.

Sophia: wisdom, one of the four virtues (see ARETĒ); but the word is only used twice in the *Politics*, and the more usual term is *phronēsis* (q.v.).

Sophrosynē: temperance; see ARETĒ.

Stasis: faction or sedition, often leading to revolution: the word means the act of forming (and thence the body of persons forming) a combination for the attainment of some political end by legal or illegal means. The characteristics of *stasis*, which vexed the Greek *polis*, are described by Thucydides at Corcyra, III, 82–4.

Syntheton and holon: *Syntheton*, or compound, is a unity composed of a number of units. The unity may be either a mechanical unity or aggregate, like a heap, or an organic unity of different and complementary parts, which work together for one end and have one shaping form. A *syntheton* which is a unity of the latter kind is termed by Aristotle a *holon* or whole.

Technē and technitae: (1) *Technē*, in a general sense, is art as distinct from nature: more specifically, it means an art or craft. (2) *Technitae* are artisans, as distinct from agricultural workers.

Telos: end or final cause; see ERGON and PHYSIS.

Thēoria: (1) the activity of speculation or contemplation, as distinct from *praxis*, q.v.; (2) an inquiry or speculation on some theme.

Thētes: hired labourers, belonging to the class of *banausoi*; at Athens the fourth and lowest of the four classes established by Solon.

Thymos: like *epithumia* (which is lust or desire), *thymos* belongs to the sphere of *orexis*: it is the spirit of ambition, and, so far, superior to mere *epithumia*; generally translated as 'spirit'.

Timē is a word which, like the Latin, has the double sense of 'honour' and 'office'. It is sometimes used by Aristotle in one sense, and sometimes in the other.

Timēma signifies a property qualification for office, or, more exactly, the assessment which determines whether or no a man possesses that qualification. A constitution which makes the holding of office depend on the possession of such a qualification is termed by Aristotle (in the *Ethics*) a timocracy; and since the 'polity' requires a property qualification (based on the amount of property needed for the equipment of a heavy-armed soldier), it may therefore be identified (as it is in the *Ethics*) with timocracy.

Tokos: interest on a loan; literally 'offspring' or 'breed'.

Tyrannos and tyrannis: the Greek *tyrannos* is regarded by Aristotle as a corruption of the *basileus*, and *tyrannis* as a corruption of *basileia*. The *tyrannos* establishes himself as autocrat, generally by a *coup d'état* (though he may institute an hereditary dynasty), and rules at his own discretion for his own personal interest.

Zēn: (1) *to zēn*, or life, regarded as the cause of the *growing* of the *polis* (I, c. II, § 8; III, c. VI, § 4); (2) *to eu zēn*, or the good life, regarded as the purpose and final cause of the *existence* of the *polis* (I, c. II, § 8); (3) *to suzēn*, or social life, also regarded as a purpose of the *polis*.

KEY TO GLOSSARY

Acquisition, act of: *ktēsis.*
Acquisition, art of: *chrēmatistikē.*
'Act', as distinct from 'potency': *energeia* (see under *ergon*).
Action, and activity: *praxis.*
Alien, resident: *metoikos.*
Amusement: *paidia* (see also under *ponos*).
Appetite: *orexis.*
Aristocracy: *aristoi* and *aristokratia.*
Arrogance: *hybris.*
Art: *technē.*
Artisan: *technitēs.*
Arts and letters: *mousikē.*
Assembly, act of: *ekklēsia.*
Assembly, place of: *agora.*
Assessment, of property qualification: *timēma.*
Association: *koinōnia.*

Barbarian: *barbaros* (see also *ethnos*).
Base, or mechanical: *banausos.*
'Best', the: *Aristoi.*

Cause, final: *telos.*
Citizen: *politēs* (see under *polis*, and also under *aretē*).
City: *asty* (as distinct from *agros*, or country-side).
City-state: *polis.*
Civic body: *politeuma* (see under *polis*, and see also *boulē*).
Commerce: *emporia.*
Common: see under *koinōnia.*
Compound: *syntheton.*
Conditions, necessary: *hōn ouk aneu.*
Constitution: *politeia* (see under *polis*, and see also *orthai politeiai* and *parekbasis*).
Contemplation: *theōria.*
Council: *boulē* (see also *gerousia*).
Country-side: *agros.*
Courage: *andria* (see under *aretē*).
Courts: see under *dikē.*
Culture: *paideia*, and also *mousikē.*
Currency: *nomisma.*

'Decent' people: *epieikeis.*
Decree: *psēphisma.*
Deliberative, the: *to bouleutikon* (see under *boulē*).
Demagogue: see under *dēmos.*
Democracy: see under *dēmos.*
Desert, or worth: *axia.*
Desire: *orexis* (see also under *nous* and *thymos*).
Development (or evolution): *physis.*

Education: *paideia* (see also *mousikē*).
Election (by lot): see under *klēros.*
Empire: *archē* (see also *hēgemonia*).
End, or final cause: *telos* (see also *ergon*).
Energy: see under *ergon.*
Equality: see under *isos* and *homoioi*, and also under *axia.*
Equipment: *chorēgia.*
Estate, in the sense of property: *ousia.*
Ethics: see under *ethos*, and also *aretē.*
Excellence: *aretē.*
Exchange: *metablētikē.*

Faction: *stasis.*
Felicity: *eudaimonia.*
Few, the: *oligoi.*
Final cause: *telos* (see also *ergon*).
Fortitude: *andria* (see under *aretē*).
Forum: *agora.*
Freedom: *eleutheria.*
Freeman: *eleutheros.*
Function: *ergon.*

'Gentiles', the *ethnē* and *barbaroi.*
Good and goodness: see under *aretē.*
Good life, the: see under *zēn.*
Growth: *physis.*
Gymnastic: *gymnastikē.*

Habit and habituation: *ethos* and *ethismos.*
Happiness: *eudaimonia* (but 'felicity' a better rendering).
Honour: *timē* (see also under *axia*).
Household and household management: *oikos* and *oikonomia.*

Illegality, indictment of: *graphē paranomōn.*
Individual: *idios* and *idiōtēs.*
Initiative: *archē.*
Inquiry: *methodos.*
Insolence: *hybris.*
Instrument: *organon.*
Interest, or usury: *tokos.*

Judge: *dikastēs* (see under *dikē*).
Justice: *dikē* and *dikaiosynē.*

King, and kingship: *basileus* and *basileia.*

Labour: *ponos.*
Labourers, day: *thētes.*
Law: *nomos.*
Law-court: *dikastērion* (see under *dikē*).
Layman, the: *idiōtēs.*
Leader, of people: *prostatēs tou dēmou* (see under *dēmos*).
Leadership: *hēgemonia.*
Legislator: *nomothetēs* (see under *nomos*).
Leisure: *scholē.*
Liberty: *eleutheria.*
Life: *zēn.*
Limit: *peras* (see also *mesos*).
Lot: *klēros.*

Magistracy: *archē.*
Majority: *hoi pleiones* (see under *dēmos*).
Making: *poiēsis.*
Manners: see under *ēthos.*
Market-place: *agora.*
Mart: *emporion.*
Masses: *plēthos* (see under *dēmos*).
Master: *despotēs* (see also under *doulos*).
Mean: *to meson* (see under *mesos*).
Measure: see under *mesos*, and also under *peras.*
Mechanical: *banausos.*
Merchant: *emporos.*
Merit: *axia* (and see also under *aristoi*).
Middle class: *hoi mesoi* (see under *mesos*).
Middle, or mixed constitution, or 'polity': see under *polis*, and also under *mesos* and *aristokratia.*
Mob: *ochlos* (see under *dēmos*).
Moderate: *metrios* (see under *mesos*).
Monarchy: *monarchia.*
Moral: *ēthikos* (see under *ēthos*, *aretē*, and *phronēsis*).

Nature: see under *physis*.
Necessary conditions: *hōn ouk aneu*.
Nobility: *eugeneia*.
Non-Greek: *barbaros* (and see also *ethnos*).
Notables: *gnōrimoi* (see also *aristoi*).

Office: *archē* (see also *timē*).
Oligarchy: see under *oligoi*, and also under *dynasteia*.

Part: *meros* or *morion*.
Passion: *orexis*.
Payment, for political service: *misthos*.
Peers: *homoioi*.
People: *dēmos*.
Perverted constitution: *parekbasis*.
Play: *paidia*.
Plutocracy: see under *oligoi*.
'Polity', the: see under *polis*, and also under *mesos* and *aristokratia*.
Poor: *penētes*.
Popular: see under *dēmos*.
Private (person or property): *idios*.
Property: *ktēsis* and *ktēmata* (see also *ousia*).
Proportionate equality: see under *axia* and *isos*.
Public property: see under *dēmos*.
Public service, free rendering of: *leitourgia*.
Purging, or purification, of emotions: *katharsis*.

Qualification, property: *timēma*.

Reason, or rational principle: *logos*.
Relaxation: see under *paidia* and *scholē*.
Resident alien: *metoikos*.
Retail trade: *kapēleutikē*.
Revolution: *metabolē* (see also *stasis*).
Right constitutions: *orthai politeiai*.

Section (of the *Politics*): *methodos*.
Sedition, or faction: *stasis*.
Self-sufficiency: *autarkeia*.
Serfs: *heilōtes* (see also *perioikoi*).
Senate: *gerousia* (see also *boulē*).
Service, public; freely rendered: *leitourgia*.
Slave: *doulos*.
Soul: *psychē*.
Sovereign: *kyrion*.
Speculation: *theōria*.
Speech, rational: *logos*.
Spirit, high: *thymos*.
State: see under *polis*.
Statesman, the: *politikos* (see under *polis*).
Temperance: *sophrosynē* (see under *aretē*).
Thought: *nous*.
Trade, retail: *kapēleutikē*.
Training: *gymnastikē*.
Tribe: *ethnos*.
Tyrant: *tyrannos*.

Use (of property): *chrēsis*.
Usury: *tokos*.

Wealthy: *plousioi* (see also under *oligoi*).
Whole: *holon* (see under *synthe-ton*).
Wisdom, moral: *phronēsis*, or *sophia*.
Work: *ponos*.
Worth: *axia*.